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
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A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE standpoint from which sovereignty is examined is usually that of philosophy, law, or political science. The philosopher seeks the fundamental and general principle in the nature of man and the universal on which sovereignty is based. This principle always includes the ultimate purpose, the reason, the logical and rational end, to be met by the state. The view is moral, and may be called the moral-philosophical view of sovereignty. Schopenhauer, for example, defines the state as "the work of reason that mounts from the one-sided and personal to the collective point of view, whence it discerns the fundamental unity of man, and recognizes that in the total of humanity the pleasure of inflicting wrong is always defeated and swallowed up by the suffering which is necessarily correlative thereof. . . . The substitution for individualistic egoism of a collective or corporate egoism of all."

The lawyer, on the other hand, has a practical problem before him, namely, to decide between two claimants for control over a definite thing or person. He looks, therefore, for an ultimate human authority which has final power over both the litigants, and then for any expression of will, opinion, or preference, which has been laid down by this authority, applicable to the

particular case in court. He, therefore, goes no farther than the analysis of Austin,¹ who says :

If a *determinate* human superior, *not* in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receives habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society. . . . The position of its other members toward that determinate superior is a *state of subjection, or a state of dependence*.

In political science there are three phases of sovereignty usually examined—the nature of sovereignty, its location in the body politic, and the particular action of sovereign authorities. The nature of sovereignty is strictly a problem of philosophy and sociology, and underlies, rather than constitutes, political science. Whether the state be based on contract, on force, or on the general will, these are the philosophical and sociological foundations of political science. The latter is properly limited to the problem of the location of sovereignty and the action of the authorities. The standpoint here is the same as the legal, but the view is widened by a comparative study of constitutions, and of the practical utility or expediency of state interference in particular fields, such as the family, the church, property, and morals.

A sociological view of sovereignty should take the two standpoints, analysis and development. In the analysis of government its true nature is to be determined, the state is to be distinguished from other institutions, and both sovereignty and the state are to be directly established upon the observed nature of man in society. This is something less than philosophical analysis, which includes also the purpose of the state as conceived by the philosopher. The sociologist, as such, is not concerned with the moral end of the state—with the goal to be attained—but with its actual qualities, and its concrete relations to other institutions. He deals, not with the *idea* of sovereignty, but with the *concept*, the idea being, in the words of Coleridge,² "that conception of a thing which is given by a knowledge of

¹ *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (London, 1873), Vol. I, p. 226.

² *Complete Works*, Vol. VI, p. 30. See also article by C. M. PLATT in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X, p. 292.

its ultimate aim." The psychology of the sociologist is historical, rather than moral. Analysis with him, therefore, is necessarily based on evolution, and adheres to the lines of actual development which history shows to have occurred. This is the second standpoint in a sociological view of sovereignty. Development is differentiation. In primitive society, sovereignty and its institution, the state, were blended homogeneously with all the other psychic motives and social institutions. Sociology traces the gradual separation of institutions out from the mass, holding fast, however, to their persistent unity in the one social organism. Thus analysis and development are inseparable. In this way sociology lays foundations for political science based on sovereignty, as well as for other social sciences based each on its peculiar psychic principles. Society precedes the state just as it precedes the family, the church, the corporation, the political party. It also unites all of these as a tree unites its branches. Sociology must discover both the laws of development and the basis of union, as found in the nature of the institutions themselves and in the psychology of the individual, who is, at one and the same time, a member of each. In the following chapters social institutions and their psychic bases are first analyzed, for the sake of definition, and then analysis and development are carried side by side.

CHAPTER II.

INSTITUTIONS.

In all human societies individual caprice is bounded by definite limits. These are the usages and laws which prescribe accepted modes of dealing with one another. In early society customs, usages, conventions, ceremonies, guide each person rigidly in his dealings with others. In advanced societies statutory law lays down certain general rules of conduct within which a large range of personal choices is opened, and reliance is placed on the right character and the personal beliefs and desires of the individual to hold him to tolerant treatment of his fellows. These definite and accepted modes of mutual dealing, handed down from generation to generation, and shaping each individual,

are institutions. The principal institutions with which we are here concerned are the state, the church, industrial property (tools, slaves, lands), business corporations, and political parties.

Institutions are not mechanical organizations imposed from without, but are definite modes according to which persons deal with one another. This will appear when we examine the threefold aspect of each institution corresponding to a threefold relationship of the individual to society. An institution has, first, a body of accepted beliefs, which color and shape the individual's desires from infancy; second, a group of material products, designed to satisfy these desires; third, an organization which sets the alignment of individuals toward one another.

The beliefs which hover about an institution are the social atmosphere, the "social mind," related thereto. They are the traditional estimates and valuations, expressed and transmitted in some form of language, which a society or a class ascribes to the institutional relationships involved. The word "belief," the German *Glauben*, is derived from the Gothic *liubs*, *galaubjan*, "to hold dear, or valuable, or satisfactory." Its Anglo-Saxon kin is *leof*, "love." "Belief is the active part of our nature. It is related to will. We believe a thing when we accept it and are willing to act upon it."¹ The child is born and begins to grow as a plastic, homogeneous group of desires and activities urging him in all directions. He comes in contact with parents at home, policemen in the street, teachers in school and church, workers in shop and factory, and his homogeneous desires are drawn out and distinguished from each other by each several group of fellow-men. He learns the language of each institution. His innate but incoherent aptitudes and likings are thus given shape and particular expression. His mind fits into these social beliefs, and he learns to believe and act more or less spontaneously and appropriately in each institution. Social beliefs, giving shape to personal desires, are, therefore, the moving forces from which institutions get their life. In everyday language equivalent but

¹ W. B. PARKER, "The Psychology of Belief," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LI, pp. 747-55.

different terms are employed for the various institutions, referring each to the peculiar activity of each. The family is based on domestic "affection," denoting sexual and parental love. The state and political parties are based on political "principles" or "opinions," denoting the common feeling of class or national aims and hopes. The church is based on religious "beliefs" and ethical opinions, denoting conscience, or the feeling of guilt, and the feeling of dependence upon a mysterious but perfect power governing nature and society. Industrial property and corporations are based on "self-interest," the sense of coming wants, the "effective desire of accumulation," the love of work. There are other minor institutions, such as schools, "sociables," charitable associations, etc., which are further differentiations, or crossings, of the major ones, and do not have a sufficiently distinct psychic basis to warrant attention in this brief discussion.

It is not difficult in advanced societies to mark off the several mental qualities of the individual, as above, seeing that each has expressed itself in a clean-cut institution. Indeed, to several of these institutions special social sciences have been erected. But in primitive society these mental qualities were blended and fused. Single passions and desires did not stand out alone in the mind of the hordes-man, because he had no institutions to develop them separately. His mind was homogeneous like his society. Religious, political, sexual, industrial activities were all concerned with the same small number of fellow-men; no definite times in the day or year were set apart for each; the same tools and weapons were used in each; there was the same headship and subordination. The homogeneous blending of institutions was reflected in the homogeneous blank of his mind. But with the civilized man social institutions are both the condition and expression of self-consciousness. The large field of distinct personal choices which they open up deepens the sense of responsibility and personality. This it is that distinguishes belief from desire. Belief is more than desire, yet it is based on desire. Belief is the form, desire the substance, of the psychic life. The pressure of the social group is the education which gives shape to the innate desires and capacities of each individual, bringing

them out into definiteness, making them susceptible to the suggestions of public opinion, and thus fitting each person for membership in each institution to the extent of which he is capable. These become his beliefs. Desire is common to men and animals. Belief is only for self-conscious beings. The sexual passion, without social education, ends only in animal-like pairing; but with the social beliefs of right and wrong, love of home, respect for women, hope for children, it forms the psychic basis of the social institution, the family. Hunger leads animals to seize and destroy their prey; but with the social beliefs of right and wrong, regard for others, love of work, provision for the future, it becomes the basis of the institution of property in material things. Religious and political beliefs have but the weakest germ of desire in animals, but in man they form his most powerful motives. Social beliefs, therefore, are the psychic foundation of each institution. They furnish the basis in the affections of each person which alone makes possible his responsiveness to the appeals of those with whom he must coöperate. The institution in which he finds himself is both the cause and effect of his beliefs. Every enduring socio-psychic motive or belief builds about itself a form of social organization. Sexual and parental love envelops itself with the institution of the family; conscience and belief in moral perfection, with the church; class interest, with political parties; the love of work, with industrial property and business corporations; and so on. It might be thought that the ethical motive—which may be defined as the longing for a more perfect relationship with others—demands an exception to this statement. There is, indeed, no *ethical* institution separate from other institutions, because the ethical motive tends in time to diffuse itself through all institutions and to modify their structure. The exception is only apparent. The ethical motive, in so far as it really leads to action, is identical with a religious belief in a perfect unseen ruler and a perfect society, and with the consciousness of guilt which a violation of that belief provokes.¹ The fact that it tends to modify other institutions is not peculiar to the religious belief. The psychic principles which

¹ See below, chap. ix. Right.

constitute the bases of the state, the family, political parties, do the same. The differentiation of institutions is not their isolation. They all continue to act organically, each upon the other, through the interaction of the beliefs and desires peculiar to each.

While the beliefs of each person are the product of his desires and his social education, and, consequently, are the mark which self-consciousness adds to desire, they are, at the same time, like desires, satisfied only through some form of the material of nature. No matter how ethereal and elevated the belief, it, like all things human, is a part of nature. "Life, in all its manifestations," says Spencer, "inclusive of intelligence in its highest form, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."¹ But this adjustment is different for beliefs from that for desires. Desires are satisfied by the raw material of nature. But nature's products are irregular, inadequate, and, for the higher wants, wholly lacking. Nature's material must be worked over by human thought and labor for the purpose both of creating and of satisfying human desires and beliefs. This the economists call the production of wealth. It is an essential part of that social education, above described, whereby the individual's self-consciousness is evoked and his beliefs are given form. It is also the means for satisfying these desires and beliefs when once evoked. "In consumption," says Hegel, "it is chiefly human products and human efforts that are used up." Now, each social institution has its own peculiar social product which forms its material basis. The activity of individuals associated in each institution is concerned with the production and consumption of this physical material. The industrial and business institutions are preëminently devoted to the production of material things to be consumed in the other institutions. But the others also first add their own peculiar increment of usefulness and value before consumption takes place. Religion has its fetiches, idols, temples, its host and relics, whose worth proceeds from the touch and word of the holy priest, answering to the faith of the believers. The family has its keepsakes and heirlooms, but especially its food, clothing,

¹ *First Principles*, p. 25.

shelter, which bind wife and children to the fate and service of the bread-winner. The state has its naval and military equipment, its prisons and gallows, its tax proceeds, which compel obedience. Political parties depend for their control on a piece of ballot-paper, which in the hands of the managers carries the fate of candidates, of large business interests, of masses of the people. In each of these institutions this material basis is partly the object for the production of which the institution exists and partly the tie that holds its members together. Common to them all is the vital fact that each institution controls and dispenses, in the form of wages, salaries, interest, profits, charity, friendship, love, punishment, or reward, the food and subsistence of those whose work is specialized in each. This is in part the basis of the third aspect of institutions, their organization.

Theories of the organization of society and institutions have been largely shaped by the biological analogy. Leaving this aside, if possible, and looking directly at the facts, we see that the so-called division of labor in society consists in a specialization of individuals for the purposes of each institution. Those whose interests are merged in one institution draw their subsistence and support from individuals who are specialized in the other institutions. Consequently a twofold relationship of its members arises, first as a unity, with reference to other institutions, and, second, as individuals, with reference one to another. The unity of an institution is its capacity for joint action in dealing with other individuals and institutions. It acts as one; its members settle their differences; it has a single will. This gives energy and power. Common beliefs and desires are the vitalizing, active force within the institution. Material products represent its command over nature. Organization gives it unity and command over society.

Within the institution this unity is maintained in one of two ways, by mastery or by partnership. If the will of one man is the absolute will of the institution, the relationship is mastery. The will of others is not consulted. This is, however, seldom the case, and, to the extent that concessions are made to the likes and dislikes of subordinate members, partnership ensues.

Perfect partnership would be that relationship wherein the wishes of each and every member agree in every respect with the executed will of the whole. This also seldom, if ever, occurs. Majority rule is usually the nearest approach. In perfect partnership each individual would have a veto on all the others, and consequently there could be no unity of the institution except with such mutual concessions as would unite them all on a single course of action.¹ In so far as this ideal of perfect partnership is approached, it follows that mutual concessions must be brought about by mutual persuasion. Motives of all kinds are appealed to, and especially the motives dependent upon the common beliefs and desires peculiar to the institution. In the church it is the common faith to which appeal is made; in the family it is parental and sexual love; in industry it is self-interest and love of work; in the state it is patriotism; in the political party it is class-interest. To the extent that mastery supersedes partnership, coercion takes the place of persuasion. The veto is taken away from certain members, who thereby become subordinate, and united action is brought about, not solely through appeals to their beliefs and desires, but also through suppression of the same.

The foregoing shows briefly the threefold relation of the institution to the individual; first, as his teacher, shaping his character through education and persuasion in the form of beliefs; second, as his fellow-worker, fashioning nature into material products to satisfy these beliefs; third, as his arbiter, assigning his place in the social organization. Each institution is thus an organic union of beliefs, material products, and organization. This analysis will reappear in the following chapters, and will be amplified and illustrated.

CHAPTER III.

PRIVATE PROPERTY.

Comparing the use of force by human beings with that by animals, there are the following points of difference: The

¹ This was the arrangement in the Iroquois Confederacy and among American Indians generally; consequently military enterprises had to be undertaken usually under private initiative.

animal either drives others away, or seizes directly upon its prey by its own physical equipment and devours it at once for immediate gratification or self-preservation. Man, on the contrary, besides this animal exercise of force, also preserves, and even multiplies, the objects of his coercion for future gratification or service, and holds physical force in reserve as a means of compelling obedience to his commands. In the one case force is temporary, repellent, or destructive for present appetite, and essentially physical. In the other case force is enduring, appropriative, preservative, providing for future wants, and only conditionally physical. In the animal we have force *per se*, generic force, the competitive struggle for life by beings pressed on by desire. In man we have the same kind of force with the same motives, but it is postponed, reserved, economized, and made a means to lasting advantage. The difference suggests a psychic difference.

Those sociologists who have made distinct quest for the psychic basis of society have either contented themselves with an empiric classification of motives and desires, each of which is asserted to underlie some particular social phenomenon or institution, or they have attempted to designate that peculiar psychic bond which underlies the single fact of association. The former group would seem to lack the true scientific sense, which always seeks unity in a single underlying principle, and the latter group have falsely narrowed the field of their science. If sociology is a science underlying and unifying all the social sciences, then it must furnish the psychic as well as biologic basis for all the social sciences. Political science, jurisprudence, and religion must have a psychic basis as well as economics and the science of the family. Spencer, in so far as he touches the problem, finds the enduring psychic basis in altruism; "Christian" sociologists find it in love; Giddings practically agrees with them when he finds it in consciousness of kind; Ward finds a double basis, desire and intellect; Tarde, desire and belief. Other writers, like Durkheim, Novicow, De Greef, do not seek the psychic basis proper, but the social modes of its operation (imitation, social pressure, conflict, force yielding to contract).

In none of these efforts do we find the psychic basis of coercion; or, rather, in none of them do we find that unifying psychic principle which includes alike love, belief, desire, and coercion. Without entering here into the province of the psychologist, we may simply assert that the distinctive characteristic of man is self-consciousness, and that this includes, in an organic whole, all the contributing psychic facts above mentioned. Man is pre-eminently self-conscious, and since he finds in society both the external factor for developing self-consciousness and the field for its manifold exercise when developed, we can assert that the psychic basis of society is nothing less than the entire psychic unity of man, self-consciousness. While psychologists demonstrate in detail this conclusion, we are to trace its social workings, here particularly in the single aspect of coercion.

Self-consciousness implies not merely feeling, but, especially, knowledge of self. Such knowledge is, however, at the same time knowledge of others and of the world about. It is the knowledge and conviction of an enduring *ego*, having a past, a present, and a future, in the midst of a changing and passing environment. But this environment contains the essential means of the *ego's* life and happiness. Wherever there is a permanent scarcity of particular objects which constitute these means, the self-conscious person recognizes his dependence upon them, and these objects then come to have a conscious value to him. In other words, he believes, on account of their scarcity, that they are worthy of acquisition and retention for the sake of the present and future services they afford him. When man, in his evolution from the animal, reaches this stage, he begins to appropriate and save certain things which he formerly neglected or destroyed. First are probably fetiches; then rude tools, mere sticks; then wild animals, like the dog, which he takes young and domesticates. Here is the first bud of self-consciousness. For centuries he gets no farther than this. But with slow improvement in weapons and tools, and with the resulting increase of population, a new object of appropriation is forced upon him.

There is disagreement among sociologists as to the exact

nature of the primitive human family and the order of its evolution. It seems, however, that with the lowest races monogamy is the rule. But this is the rule with the highest apes,¹ and it cannot, therefore, be based on a strictly human element. Such monogamy is the outcome of mere instinctive natural selection. It is not a permanent union, but a temporary alliance holding through the infancy of the offspring. The monogamic pair lives an isolated life. With the increase of population and the increasing struggle for existence, larger groups are formed, and natural selection preserves the endogamous clan or tribe with its rigid rules of marriage. In such a state the women and children belong to no particular man. The principle of self-consciousness had not yet entered the institution of the family. But when we come to wife-capture, wife-purchase, and polygamy, we have individual appropriation of women. This is the true beginning of the human family as distinguished from the animal pairing or the endogamous hordes, for it is based on self-consciousness. Westermarck mentions several reasons why a man may desire to possess more than one wife, such as freedom from periodical continence, attraction for female youth and beauty, taste for variety, desire for offspring, wealth, and authority. The wife whom he has captured is his own, her children are his, and with them he is freed from the kinship bond of the clan, and stands out in his own right as an individual.

McLennan's theory of the rise of exogamy² brings out more clearly the economic basis of the self-conscious family. He finds the introduction of exogamy to coincide with the increasing practice of female infanticide, resulting, as it does, in a scarcity of women. The term "exogamy" with him is apparently equivalent to wife-capture, and this should be borne in mind by his critics, who find exogamy along with the matriarchate. Wife-capture and wife-purchase doubtless crept in gradually, like the private appropriation of weapons and animals, unnoticed by the clan; but because it increased the power of the stronger and led to slavery and chieftainship, it forced recognition and supplanted

¹ WESTERMARCK, *The History of Human Marriage*, pp. 12-17.

² *Studies in Ancient History*, pp. 74 f.

the pre-human instinctive pairing. Slavery followed as the capture and appropriation of men; thus constituting, with polygamy, the patriarchy; and, finally, with increased population and agriculture, the conquest of territory and the establishment of feudalism completed the extension of self-consciousness through all the institutions of society.

It may be objected that man had become fully self-conscious long before the appearance of feudalism, and even before slavery or polygamy, and that, therefore, we should not look to social institutions as the peculiar expression of that capacity. The objection is not sound, for self-consciousness ranges from the child to the adult, from the idiot to the genius, and it reaches its highest development only with the appearance of a social environment fitted to give it expression. In fact, it is not until long after the establishment of feudalism, and when the bonds of custom are broken, that we find the generally accepted type of self-consciousness, the reflective, introspective philosopher. The earlier self-consciousness which originated social institutions was merely empiric, imitative, habitual, phenomenal, taking itself as a matter of course, and not inquiring into its own essence. It could, therefore, expand and deepen only as it found the social occasion, and this occasion was that gradual increase of population and improvement in the production of wealth which forced upon individuals the recognition of scarcity in successive fields of life as a determining factor in the struggle for existence. Scarcity is a relative situation. Private property in land could not be thought of until land came to be scarce and its possession a condition of survival. So with private property in men, women, children, and tools. It is increased density of population that brings into consciousness the element of scarcity in the several fields of human activity one after the other, and upon this consciousness private appropriation is built at once, thus setting the foundation for social institutions.¹ All social

¹ In an original and discerning discussion on "The Beginnings of Ownership," in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, 1898, Dr. Veblen makes the distinction between "economic" property and that "quasi-personal" fringe of material things which the primitive man conceived as accompanying his own personality, and which had not yet come to have economic value to him.

institutions originated as private property; this differentiates human from animal society; private property is the social expression of the highest unity of man, self-consciousness.

Contrary to this view is the opinion of Professor Giddings, who, in noticing that McLennan affirms polyandry to have been the first marriage sanctioned by group opinion, sets up the criterion that human, as distinguished from animal, marriage is that form of marriage which first receives social acquiescence. "Marriage," he says, "is more than a fact of physiology and more than a relatively enduring cohabitation. Every possible group was tried—which one was first socially sanctioned?"¹

Doubtless, social acquiescence is needed to confirm the particular organization of the family which survives. But is this not true of the animal as well as of the human family? If our psychic distinction between man and animal is correct, then the human family needs not mere acquiescence, but acquiescence *in private ownership*. When this is vouchsafed, then that which was based only on might becomes also a right. Giddings' position respecting the family is maintained by T. H. Green respecting property in general. He holds that a necessary condition which "must be fulfilled in order to constitute property," even of the most simple and primitive sort, is "the recognition by others of a man's appropriations as something which they will treat as his, not theirs, and the guarantee to him of his appropriations by means of that recognition." The basis of this recognition he finds in the "general will"—*i. e.*, "not the momentary spring of any and every spontaneous action, but a constant principle, operative in all men qualified for any form of society, however frequently overborne by passing influences, in virtue of which each seeks to give reality to the conception of a well-being which he necessarily regards as common to himself with all others."²

Here is described, not *private property*, but the *social or moral right* of private property. Holland, looking at it from the lawyer's standpoint, defines such a right as "one man's capacity for

¹ *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March, 1897.

Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, London, 1895, p. 217.

influencing the acts of another by means, not of his own strength, but of the opinion or the force of society." And a *legal right*, after the same manner, is defined as "a capacity residing in one man of controlling, with the assent and assistance of the state, the actions of others."¹

It will, no doubt, be agreed that private appropriation preceded the *right* of appropriation, and this is all that is here claimed. It came as an innovation, resisted by the existing organization of society, and only later, when it had shown its capacity for survival, did it acquire social sanction. In holding, therefore, that social institutions originated as private property, this origin is necessarily placed in advance of the origin of that social consciousness or general will which, through social acquiescence, creates a social or moral right, and still further in advance of the state which creates a legal right; but it is placed after those instinctive and imitative modes of association and appropriation into which the factor of self-consciousness does not enter.

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(To be continued.)

¹ HOLLAND, *Jurisprudence*, pp. 70, 71.

THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL-REFORM MOVEMENT.

WE hear much about socialism, but in this country very few echoes reach us of the equally powerful school of thought which has arisen in opposition to it, under the banner of the Catholic religion. To no student of the social and economic problems of the hour can the nature and aims of so interesting and widespread a phenomenon be a matter of indifference.

The object of the present article is to give a bird's-eye view of the movement for the solution of this class of problems by the aid of the principles furnished by the Catholic philosophy and theology. It will aim to present the view which the promoters of that movement take of its historic relations and significance, as well as a general outline of the theories, the ideals, and the practical expedients which it represents.

The present half century is witnessing a mighty three-sided contest for the social and political supremacy of central and southern Europe, a contest which promises to spread in the end to every part of the globe. The three parties to this struggle are: (1) the advocates of the existing order of things, commonly known as "liberals," without regard to their local partisan affiliations; (2) the party of revolution, in which the collectivists of every school, and even the anarchists, are classed under the general appellation of socialists; and (3) the party of social reconstruction, on historic lines, "in accordance with the principles of the gospel of Christ."

The last named is identical in a general way with the Catholic party, where such exists; and in other places it is a mere school of thought and action, variously designated as "Catholic social reform," "Catholic socialism" (a term now almost entirely abandoned), "Christian democracy," etc.

Under this standard are ranged, more or less definitely and closely, the German Center, the Catholic party of Switzerland, the Conservative party of Holland, the Young Czech party of Austro-Hungary, the Catholic party which has for some years

controlled Belgium, the *Ralliés* in the French parliament, headed by the Count de Mun, and the Catholic party that in Italy takes so active a part in local politics, while still refraining scrupulously, in accordance with the request of the Roman pontiff, from any participation in the election of representatives to the national parliament.

It must not be supposed that the Catholic social-reform movement, even in those countries where it is most developed, is coterminous with the Catholic church. The majority of the Catholics of the world probably still adhere to political "liberalism," either from conviction or force of circumstances, and a few are to be found in the socialist camp. Most of the Catholics of France are, or were until very recently, adherents either of the liberal republicanism now in power there, or of one or another of the old reactionary parties, monarchical or imperialistic. A large proportion of the Austro-Hungarian Catholics are liberals in politics, as are practically all of those in Spain, Portugal, the United States, and the British empire. In the last-named countries this arises from the necessities of the case, as the contemporary Catholic movement has never reached them, and all the existing political parties are of the liberal stripe, with the exception of the still small, but rapidly growing, socialist organizations found here and there. But in the countries where powerful Catholic parties exist there are to be found in all the other parties a number of persons, sometimes small and sometimes very large, who in their personal religion are devoted Catholics. Chancellor Hohenlohe of the German empire is an example of this type. The only socialist member of the Reichstag who professes any religion claims to be a Catholic.

On the other hand, there are a great many Protestants who accept the principles of "Christian democracy," vote with the Catholic parties, and even occupy positions of honor and trust within their gift.

There are, for example, several members of the Reichstag, elected as members of the Center party, and thoroughly loyal to its principles, who have never been, or claimed to be, Catholics

in their personal religion, and are even, in certain instances, members of Lutheran churches.

It would be a great mistake to imagine that the various forms of Catholic social action, or even the definitely Catholic political parties, have as their aim the aggrandizement, by every means in their power, of the Catholic church at the expense of the sects that decline to acknowledge the authority of the hierarchy. On the contrary, these parties and other organizations are endeavoring to secure the triumph, and promote the application, of certain well-defined principles following from the Catholic world-view, and representing, as they believe, immutable laws of nature and of God, which cannot be deviated from without incalculable loss and progressive degeneracy. They are laboring for the common good, for the alleviation of burdens that press on all alike, and it is their sincere conviction that the whole people, without regard to creed or affiliation, will equally profit by their efforts. No one can suffer detriment, they hold, from their movement, save offenders against the laws of justice and charity; and to prevent crime is a mercy to the wrongdoer himself.

To understand the Catholic position it is necessary to grasp the view of religion and of history that it implies. According to this view, the very idea of religion implies unity and the possession of infallible truth. There has always been one, and there can never be more or less than one, true religion. This religion has passed through three great stages on this earth: the patriarchal or initial, the Mosaic or preparatory, and the Christian or perfect stage. From this one church of God, under these three dispensations, all the other religions of the world have broken away: the pagan sects from the patriarchal church, the Samaritan and Jewish sects from the Mosaic church, and the Nestorian, Monophysite, Mohammedan, Orthodox, Jan-senist, and Protestant sects from the Christian church. To this church of God—which, potentially in its earlier stages, but actually in its final one, is catholic or universal in its doctrine, its worship, its jurisdiction, its geographical extent, its adaptability, its representativeness, its sympathies, and in all other

respects—has been committed the guardianship of the whole body of natural and supernatural truth which in any way ministers to human salvation, whether intrinsically accessible to reason or embodied in the divine revelation first given in Eden, renewed under allegorical veils on Sinai, and reaffirmed and completed in the Cenacle. The Catholic church represents, in the view of its adherents, the regenerated human race; it is the kingdom of God on earth, the vast fellowship of those who adhere to the divinely established hierarchy, recognize the divine law, and possess the sacred tradition which is the inheritance of all the celestial illuminations, ripe thought, and instructive experience of all mankind in all ages.

Human nature, like everything else that exists, is essentially good, but since the fall it is afflicted with a weakness and disorder which are the source of all moral and social ills. All human ideas and institutions, religious and secular, are either true and good in themselves, or are a perversion, or rudiment, or type of that which possesses those attributes. No race or tribe of men has ever existed, or can ever exist, which does not possess the gift of reason and at least some fragments of divine revelation.

As all existence and change is dependent on laws and principles which, when reduced to their first terms, are found to spring from the very nature of the Divine Being, it follows that all knowledge, of every order and degree, constitutes one *corpus*, so that the arts are dependent on the sciences, and all the other sciences are dependent on philosophy and theology. It is from theology and philosophy that the first principles of all the sciences are derived, or at least by them alone that these first principles can be verified, correlated, and adequately explained.

If these principles be granted, the conclusion is inevitable that it is only under the ægis of the true religion that true and perfect science can flourish in the fullest degree, or that human institutions can attain to their most complete and salutary development. This fact is strikingly illustrated, the representatives of the Catholic school assert, in the history of human society.

The development of laws and customs and institutions is subject to that law which is the key to the whole history of the created universe—the law of order. The creation exists for the sake of its order, says the great master of the school, Thomas of Aquin. The universe is the overflow, as it were, of the divine goodness, the manifestation and revelation and communication of the perfections of the Godhead.

As an infinite creation is not possible, the infinite goodness expresses itself by an indefinite and progressive diversity of created existences and relations. The multiplicity, mutual coördination, and hierarchical subordination of creatures constitute the order of the universe, which by this alone fulfills the object of its existence. The apparently unlimited tendency to variation which the modern theory of evolution, in all its forms, presupposes, but cannot adequately explain, expresses itself in the manifold types of civilization and the multifarious forms of human organization just as truly as in the multiplicity of animal and vegetable species, and the ever-increasing complexity of chemical and biological structure. Society, like nature, is normally made up of many organisms, and these, in turn, of many organs; it is, like nature, composed of unequal elements, ever tending to still further inequality, and displaying a specialization of function and an integration of structure directly proportional to the degree of development which they have severally attained.

But the units of which society is composed are subject, not only to physical, but to moral laws, and it is upon these that social evolution chiefly depends. All Catholics maintain, as one of the most certain and primary of verities, the liberty of the human will; the power of making an interior choice between good and evil, between right and wrong, without any sort of coercion or restraint. An act in which the will does not freely participate, by at least an implicit consent, is not, strictly speaking, a human act. The condition of human society is not determined, therefore, by the mechanical interaction of blind forces alone, as it would be if all men were constantly the slaves of their passions. The higher reason—that attribute in which the

other animals, however remarkable may be the feats of the memory and imagination and "cogitative faculty" which the schoolmen have never hesitated to concede to them, do not and cannot participate—plays an important part in all human affairs. Where it does not actually rule, this is only because it has voluntarily surrendered its scepter into the hands of the lower powers which were meant to be its subjects and instruments.

Society at large, like the individuals and groups of individuals of which it is composed, is bound to be governed by reason, under pain of failure to attain its proper ends, and of the misery inseparable from such failure. This does not mean the arbitrary conclusions which any particular man or set of men may allege to be reasonable, but the dictates of right reason, which are common to all mankind, so far as they consciously use their reasoning powers, with full knowledge of the facts pertinent to the particular case. Reason requires that society, like the individual, shall so act as to fulfill the object for which it exists. The last end of man, the primary object of his existence, is the most perfect possible participation in the power, knowledge, and beatitude of his Creator—which participation, when fully consummated, is the state which Catholics signify by the word "heaven." All the specific ends for which human society and its component elements exist are subsidiary to that supreme end.

Now, both the order of society in this world and the eternal interests of the individuals which are the ultimate units of which it is composed, require that all human relations shall be governed by the laws of justice and of charity. Justice requires the rendering to every man his due. The rights of man are no mere generalities, but very definite and concrete realities. Every human personality, and every human society, has rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities peculiar to itself. There is no power, or right, or privilege, which does not carry with it corresponding obligations.

Besides the obligations of justice, there are the equally binding, though less definite, duties implied by the virtue of "friendship," which on the supernatural plane becomes charity. Because man is a gregarious animal, and the whole human

race constitutes one society, every individual is, by the law of nature, bound to show a friendly spirit toward all others, even though strangers, and to be ever ready to assist them, in time of need, with his own labor or goods, moral or material, so far as this is possible without neglect of duty, or disproportionate injury to his own family or business. The obligation of mutual assistance, while inseparable from the participation of a common humanity, becomes more imperative in proportion to the nearness of the parties concerned, by ties of blood, nationality, faith, profession, propinquity, or dependence, reaching its maximum force in the case of the members of the same household and family.

While many hints of the normal order of society are to be found in the institutions, laws, and customs of all pagan nations, yet these almost universally display many dislocations, as it were, and fatal perversions and misdirections, which show the accumulated effects of the primordial lesion in human nature, and the subsequent follies and crimes of man. In the pagan world the whole of society is held to exist, or at least is usually exploited in practice, for the benefit of the stronger, wealthier, wiser, more numerous, or otherwise better-equipped classes. This is a direct reversal of the Christian principle, which is formulated by Professor G. Toniolo, one of the most powerful living exponents of Christian social reform, in the following language :

Society exists in a special manner for the comfort and relief of the feeble and the most numerous ; and the generic duty of all to lend themselves to the common good implies the specific duty of those individuals, of those classes, of those normal and legal entities, which, by whatever title, are in possession of a social superiority, to dedicate themselves, in a special manner, to the guardianship and elevation of the inferior classes.¹

The weak do not exist for the sake of the powerful, nor subjects for the sake of the rulers ; but the powerful, and the rulers, and those who are in any way superior, exist for the sake of those who are in a state of weakness, or subjection, or inferiority,

¹ *Il Concetto Cristiano della Democrazia*, estratto dalla *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali e Discipline Ausiliarie* (Roma : Tipografia dell' Unione Cooperativa Editrice, Via di Porta Salaria 23 A, 1897), p. 13.

and by this law they are to be rigorously judged, both in this world and the next.

These are the principles, say the Catholic publicists, that have ever guided the church of God in her social and economic action and legislation. Under the patriarchal dispensation the foundations were laid for all the beneficent institutions that the Gentile world has ever possessed; and so far as justice, and friendship, and order reign in any pagan land, this is due to the tradition inherited from the church of God in prehistoric times; reinforced, indeed, by the dictates of instinct and reason, and the influences of common grace, to say nothing of divine revelations, the possibility of which among the pagan peoples is not denied. The Mosaic law carefully safeguarded the interests of every element among the chosen people, as well as of "the strangers within their gates," and some of its provisions are so strikingly beneficent that their value is appreciated even by some of the social reformers who deny the sacred character of the books in which it is recorded.

The Catholic church has, ever since the time of the apostles, constituted a vast democracy, in the sense of an independent society, which exists for the benefit of all its members, but especially for that of the classes less favored by fortune. The community life of the church of Jerusalem, in its first years, the deaconries found in every large city, the bodies of widows and virgins who were such powerful auxiliaries in the work of the ministry, the granaries and storehouses scattered throughout the Roman empire, the institutions associated with them, such as the almonry (*πτωχείων*) and the hospice (*ξενοδοχείων*), and the legislation against usury and other forces of oppression which received so large a share of the attention of the early ecclesiastical councils, are only a few among the many striking illustrations of the church's constant preoccupation, from the very outset, with the rights and interests of the poor and humble.

After the destruction of the Roman empire the church entered upon the work of building up a new civilization conformed to the laws of nature and reason, and animated by the

spirit of the gospel of Christ. The materials upon which it had to work were the habits and usages of the various tribes of early converted barbarians, together with the inheritance left by the fallen civilization of the Roman empire, which had never ceased to be pagan in its essence. The task was one of prodigious difficulty, but it seemed well on its way to perfect accomplishment before it was interrupted by the Pagan Renaissance.

In the form of barbarian lawlessness on the one hand, and unprincipled Cæsarism on the other, the old pagan traditions survived in the midst of the superimposed Christianity, and ensconced themselves in the sanctuary as well as in the council chamber. But the dominant ideals, the principles held forth by all who professed to have principles, the approved institutions, and the general order of society, so far as peace and tranquillity were effectually secured, presented the broad outlines of a truly Christian civilization, which gave promise of still brighter things in the future.

After the more burdensome part of the work of pacification and reconstruction had been accomplished, and the heroic age of Christendom had been succeeded by the unexampled intellectual activities of the scholastic period, the latent paganism began, with the universalization of learning and the wholesale reproduction of the ancient Greek and Roman classics (to say nothing of the Teutonic sagas), to emerge from the underworld of passion, and atavistic instinct, and old tradition, into the open field of letters, and art, and law. The study of the Justinian code furnished an eagerly welcomed justification of the aggressions of autocrats. The rise of classical purism discredited the whole line of great Christian philosophers, whose language, even in the most favorable instances, seemed uncouth and barbarous when measured by a Ciceronian standard. The living Latin, with the living literature, Christian and pre-Christian, which it enshrined, was crowded aside by the dead languages and literatures of a former millennium, and a new culture sprang up which lived wholly in the remote past, and despised all the Christian ages. A gulf was thus fixed between the learned class and the masses of the people, greater than that

which had existed before the modern languages came into being. The intellectual unity of Christendom was broken up, the unitary world-view of the Middle Ages was shattered, and the various departments of thought and knowledge lost their former coherence and ordination. The overthrow of the Ptolemaic astronomy contributed to the general disintegration of ideas, and the archæological and linguistic preoccupations of the Renaissance period facilitated the rise of a "text-mongering and hair-splitting" type of religion. This historical retrospect, the reader must remember, represents the point of view of the Catholic school.

The rise of Protestantism cut off a large part of northern Europe from even a nominal adhesion to the patristic and mediæval traditions, and engaged all the best intellectual energies of Catholic Christendom in a desperate contest for the preservation of what seemed to it the most essential and sacred elements of the apostolic tradition. At the same time a mighty economic revolution took place, as a result of the vast influx of treasure from America and India; the wholesale redistribution of property incident to the confiscation of the lands and revenues of the church and the ecclesiastical corporations; the suppression of almshouses, hospices, hospitals, colleges, schools, trades-guilds, chantries, monasteries, and convents; and, finally, the incidental annihilation or crippling of a whole group of industries largely dependent upon ecclesiastical patronage. The former tenants of monastic lands, transformed by their new owners into deer parks or pastures, or subjected to a ruinous rack-rent, such as had been almost impossible in the days when the easy-going monks set the pace to the secular landlords, mingled with the stone-masons, glass-painters, bell-ringers, wood-carvers, metal-workers, makers of church books, weavers of precious cloths, sculptors, artists, and artisans of almost every kind, who had been thrown out of employment by the change of religion; and in the dearth of opportunity all alike sank into a lower and lower condition of penury and misery, even where they were not transformed outright into homeless vagabonds. This was the beginning of the modern proletariat; but the situation was

much relieved by the opening up to colonization of new lands across the sea, while part of the surplus population was killed off in the terrible wars which were now waged on a larger scale, and with more ferocity, than ever before since the fall of the ancient western empire.

Absolutely coincident with the rise of the proletariat was that of the "plutocracy." In the later Middle Ages the rights and liberties of every member of society, however humble, and in however servile a condition, were so protected by an intricate network of laws, and customs, and traditions, which no one could defy with impunity, that mere brute force, whether in the coarser form of arms or the more subtle one of wealth, could not long maintain itself in a preponderating position. But the breaking down of the moral sanctions of the Christian religion by the Renaissance; the utter annihilation of the church as a free middle power, invested with the guardianship of the Christian law, which the establishment of Protestantism involved; the relegation of the conscience for guidance to its own individual interpretation of the Bible; the sweeping away of many time-honored local and institutional liberties, and the explicit revival of pagan theories on every hand—all these things conspired to leave the weak a helpless prey to the strong, as they had been before the benign influence of Christianity had made itself felt.

While a large proportion of those who shared in the spoils of the church were already of noble or gentle rank, many persons of low birth were enriched by this means, and were thus enabled to purchase for themselves honors from the venial princes, or at least some degree of standing among the untitled gentry. As the titles to their possessions seemed likely to be invalidated if a return to the old religion took place, the partakers in the "fruits of sacrilege" were united in the bond of a common interest. At the same time the greed for gold, growing by what it fed upon, and no longer hampered by the canon law, or the jealousy for personal and local rights which was one of the chief characteristics of the Middle Ages, led to an unprecedented debasement of coin, the wholesale selling of burdensome

monopolies, and a frightful increase in the practice of usury. As a natural sequence, by a clearly defined process that space does not permit us here to dwell on, there followed in course of time the establishment of standing armies, the growth of national debts, with the concomitant bond system, national banks, and the general destruction of local liberties, together with the rights in common which had contributed so largely to the temporal welfare of the rural population.

Political absolutism and other pagan theories and practices, together with the divorce of statecraft from other arts and sciences, and all the consequent evils, extended even over those lands which still professed to be Catholic. The guardians of faith and morals were only too happy to succeed in preserving the unity of fellowship and the fundamental doctrines of Catholicity, and did not realize that insidious inroads on the time-honored traditions were taking place under their very eyes. Ultimately the same wholesale confiscations of monastic properties and suppression of guilds took place in all the countries of southern Europe that had previously been decreed by the Protestant governments.

All over Europe free thought soon passed from the private interpretation of Scripture to the negation of the whole Christian revelation. Out of the English deism sprang the French philosophy of the *Encyclopædia*, which rapidly spread to all parts of the continent. By the middle of the eighteenth century all the nominally Catholic governments were practically infidel, and what is now known as liberalism reigned everywhere supreme.

The guilds and other institutions that had once been the instruments of liberty were very generally transformed, after the Reformation, even in those cases where royal tyranny permitted their continued existence, into corporate monopolies. The French Revolution, that bloody revolt, under the influence of pagan theories, against the evils which had sprung out of those very same principles, broke up the last remnant of the mediæval social-economic organization, not only in France, but in other parts of Europe, and annihilated the remaining local liberties which had still protected a large part of the provincial population against the rampant state despotism.

Napoleon, the new scourge of God, was a child of the Revolution in every sense, and did even more than the republic had succeeded in doing for the complete destruction of the rights and liberties and social order which had already suffered so many and grievous lesions. The intellectual, social, and economic disruption of Christendom was now complete. The lower classes, which once were as self-respecting and coherent as any other, had been reduced to a shapeless mass—"the masses," as the modern phrase goes—a sort of sociological pulp or pus, and remained utterly isolated from the so-called "classes," which were now distinguished and cemented together chiefly by mere material wealth.

In the meantime, by Quesnay and Adam Smith and others, the "dismal science" had been created—a political economy that utterly ignored the ethical principles which are the very basis of all human society. Against this classical system of social-economic liberalism, as well as against the whole existing order, or rather disorder, of society, a twofold reaction has taken place during the present century, under the pressure of a situation that was becoming unbearable.

Liberalism, the system which, under one or another of its protean forms, has dominated Europe and America for nearly two hundred years past, represents an extreme individualism, limited only by the principle of the absolutely unlimited authority of the state. Those who, while otherwise dominated by liberal ideas, are strongly impressed by the existing evils, have usually sought a remedy in the further exaggeration of one or the other of these features, both of which, from a Catholic point of view, are pernicious in the extreme. The anarchists wish to reorganize society on the basis of pure individualism; while the collectivists seek to enlarge the sphere of state despotism so as to make it coincident with the whole industrial, economic, and social life of the whole people. The former are the successors of the barbarous northern tribesmen and of the robber-barons of the Middle Ages; and the latter carry forward, in a new form, the traditions of the Roman Cæsars and of the Henrys and Frederics of mediæval

Germany. Collectivism, say the Catholics, would be so intolerable a tyranny that it would end in anarchy; and philosophic anarchism, could it realize its dream, would only pave the way to a new imperial despotism. Collectivism and anarchism have very nearly the same theoretic basis, and at present they are for the most part fighting under the same banner, and appear in politics under the single head of socialism.

Liberalism likewise has two leading phases—Cæsaristic and democratic, or rather bureaucratic. The Cæsarism of the *ancien régime* was as liberalistic as the bureaucracy and parliamentarianism of the new; but the former, which was less reflective, less autocratic, less irresponsible, and, at the same time, less specious, than the latter, can hardly be considered to be any longer a distinct factor in politics, save so far as the Russian czardom may be considered to represent it.

Modern liberalism holds, in theory, what the most extreme Cæsarism always assumes, in practice, that all men are equal. Just as in an absolute despotism a prince and a slave must exchange places at the tyrant's nod, so, under the régime of the new liberalism, men are exalted and abased according to the caprices of fortune, without regard to their personal merits. The government considers it none of its affair if the strong prey upon the weak. "Catch who catch can, and the devil take the hindmost," is the principle.

Socialism and anarchism, starting from the same premise of universal equality, demand that this equality shall not remain merely a name, but that it shall either be guaranteed and realized in its perfection by means of a radical reorganization and official administration of society, or else remain unhampered by the existence of governments, which, under existing conditions, cannot fail, they say, to operate chiefly as a means for the perpetuation of economic slavery and the repression of any efforts to obtain justice that may be made by those who are now deprived of even the scantiest means of livelihood.

Alongside the socialist movement there has grown up, as part of a universal revival of Catholic ideals, a movement for a

return to the principles that governed the beautiful Christian civilization which had been in process of formation when the Pagan Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation mutilated and suffocated it. In 1836, three years before Weitling, the tailor of Magdeburg, founded the *Hilferuf der deutschen Kunst* for the propagation of socialism, the immortal Görres established at Munich, in the very teeth of the most fiery of persecutions, the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, as an organ of Catholic political and social principles. In 1848 Baron von Ketteler, afterward bishop of Mentz, delivered the first of a famous series of discourses on the social question, which gave a tremendous impulse to the Christian reaction against political liberalism. Since that date an immense network of Catholic societies and institutions, with more or less definite social-economic aims, have sprung up all over Germany, and the great Catholic Center party has arisen, which for many years has been the largest body in the German parliament, and has used its balance of power so wisely and well as to win the admiration of all its rivals. Immense Catholic unions of artisans and peasants now exist, and much assistance is rendered to the cause by the general Catholic societies, like the *Pius-Verein*, the *Volkverein für das katholische Deutschland*, and the *Borromäusverein*, which latter, for example, having for its object the circulation of Catholic literature, had in 1895 no fewer than 1,709 branches, with 61,310 members.

The movement in Germany has a powerful literary representation. Among the five or six hundred Catholic journals and periodicals, there are a dozen or fifteen special magazine organs of social reform, among which may be mentioned the *Christlich-soziale Blätter*, founded in 1867; the *Arbeiterwohl*, founded in 1880 at Cologne; the *Arbeiterfreund*, published at Munich, Bavaria; and the two organs of the Catholic peasantry of Westphalia, *Die Bauernzeitung* and *Der westfälische Bauer*.

The section of legal and social science of the Görres-Gesellschaft (founded in 1876 "for the promotion of science in Catholic Germany") published in 1887-97 a *Staatslexicon*, or dictionary of politico-social science, from a Catholic point of view, in five

large volumes, which has received the highest laudation even from the most hostile sources.

In the church of Austria, which had suffered the most terrible degradation under the meddlesome and iniquitous rule of the "sacristan-emperor" Joseph II., the germs of a new life began to show themselves on the occasion of the revolution of 1848. The protagonists of the movement were the publicist Jarke, Father Veit (who had before his conversion been a Jewish professor of medicine in the university of Vienna), and especially Sebastian Brunner, who founded in 1848 the *Kirchenzeitung*, through which he continued until 1866 to push forward the cause of Christian social-political reform, fighting especially for the liberty of the church and the restoration of the municipal liberties.

The Catholic social movement has since had a marvelous development in Austria. Among its foremost exponents have been the Baron von Vogelsang, who founded at Vienna in 1879 the *Monatschrift für christliche Social-Reform*; Count von Kufstein, who has devoted special attention to the exposition of the Christian doctrine regarding interest and usury; Prince Ludwig Lichtenstein, an earnest champion of the principle of parliamentary representation of professional interests, and of the establishment of chambers of labor and handicraft analogous to those of commerce; Count Chorinsky, whose chief labors have been in the field of agrarian reform; and Kempfe, who is devoted to the interests of the artisans and the development of workingmen's societies.

In 1892 a national Catholic scientific association, called the *Leo-Gesellschaft*, was organized, having among its other special departments a section of social science, which adopted the *Monatschrift für christliche Social-Reform* as its official organ, and has devoted itself energetically to carrying out the program announced at the outset, under the following heads: (1) the investigation of the social and economic condition of the Austrian people; (2) the initiation of scientific studies in sociology and political economy from a Christian point of view; (3) the study of labor, with a special view to the new attempts at its

organization; (4) the examination, from the point of view of Christian principles, of present social questions, publishing scientific studies on the same in periodicals and in book form; and (5) the promotion of conferences and lectures on social questions. Among the other subjects to which it has given special attention are the emancipation of woman, socialism, and usury. The juridical, historical, and philosophico-theological sections have also done considerable work having important bearings on sociology, economics, and political economy.

In 1873 the Catholic social-reform movement was definitely organized in France by the foundation of the Catholic workingmen's circles or clubs, which soon spread into every nook and corner of the country. Central committees were founded in every town, with sections of propaganda, finance, and external relations, and the collaboration of the upper classes was obtained under the title of active associates, subscribers, and lady patronesses. The movement found able leaders, two of whom, the Count Albert de Mun and the Marquis René La-Tour-du-Pin Chambly, deserve special mention, both for their scientific attainments, their zeal, and their practical self-devotion. New organizations have arisen, even more ardently devoted to the principles of Catholic social reform, such as the circles for social studies, and the Catholic young men's societies, and numerous congresses in the interests of the movement have been held at Paris, Reims, Lyons, and other parts of France.

The circles for social studies were founded four or five years ago, imitating in their organization that of the socialists. Each group contains not more than fifteen or twenty workingmen, and holds weekly meetings for the study and discussion of social and economic problems, at which the presence and assistance of some well informed priest or layman of rank are often invited. The chief promoter of this organization was the indefatigable Léon Harmel, a wealthy manufacturer whose devotion to the interests of his employés and the class which they represent has earned for him the affectionate nickname of "the Father of the Workingmen of France."

All the general Catholic congresses in France occupy themselves seriously with social questions, and coöperate earnestly in the development of the special works for their study and practical solution. Besides these a number of sociological congresses have been held, among which may be named the Ecclesiastical Reunion for Social Studies, which in 1895 took place at Saint-Quentin.

One of the most important social-reform conventions ever held in France was the Congress of Christian Democracy which met at Lyons in 1896. Among the subjects considered was the organization of new committees of study and action, of people's savings banks, professional and trade organizations, the protection of the family and of small properties, the observance of Sunday and other rest-days, the liberty of corporations, the repression of usury, coöperative insurance, industrial pensions, the organization of labor, and the legal representation of professional interests. It declared that the "Christian principles on society, the family, property, labor, and legislation are the foundation of social reform; that the state should respect all the rights of individuals and social groups; that the laws should conform to the laws of justice embodied in the decalogue; and that the gospel should have an important place in primary and superior education."

There are at least six hundred associations aggregated to the "Work of the Circles," over five hundred agricultural societies, and as many rural banks. New committees of the Young Men's National Union are organized every day, and in the whole movement the utmost of enthusiasm is combined with a generous recognition of the necessity of making the fullest use of the twofold light of faith and of science.

A powerful group of periodicals constitute the special organs of the Catholic social-reform movement, accepting without reserve the criteria laid down in the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. This includes *L'Association catholique*, *La Réforme sociale*, and *Le XX^e Siècle*, of Paris; *La Démocratie chrétienne*, of Lille; *La Justice sociale*, and *La Sociologie catholique*, of Montpellier. There are also a few Catholic social-economic organs which are not yet wholly in line

with the accepted Catholic program, being either distinctly monarchical, or else having some infusion of liberalistic or socialistic ideas. Other Catholic publications whose special field is closely connected with this branch of thought and action are the *Revue catholique des institutions et du droit*, and the *Revue canonique*; and there are few among the hundreds of French Catholic journals and periodicals of a general character which do not give more or less attention to social questions and contribute in some degree to strengthen and diffuse the movement. The church of Soissons has rendered particularly valuable services to the cause, notably by means of the *Manuel social chrétien*, prepared and published under the auspices of the Diocesan Commission of Social Studies.

In Italy within the past decade the movement has been thoroughly organized under the powerful *Unione Cattolica per gli Studi Sociali*, whose organ, the *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali e Discipline Ausiliarie*, a monthly of 180 pages, published in the city of Rome since 1893, is one of the best social-economic publications on the continent of Europe, and gives abstracts or notices of all the articles on this order of questions that appear in any publication, of any school and any language, in the whole world. This international review is edited by Mgr. S. Talamo, professor in the Accademia Storico-Giuridica of Rome. Among the other Catholic social-economic organs of Italy are the *Unione Democratico-Christiana*, of Naples, the *Cultura Sociale*, of Rome, and the *Cooperazione Popolare*, of Parma.

Agricultural unions, coöperative banks, young men's societies, leagues for festal repose, "secretariates of the people," associations for coöperative purchase, sale, or production; diocesan federations, and other Catholic social-reform organizations ramify into every nook and corner of northern and central Italy, and are rapidly extending themselves in other portions of the peninsula, though the movement has received a serious set-back by the action of the panic-stricken liberal government in violently suppressing some hundreds of them last year. General Catholic congresses, both of a local and national character, are held with great frequency, and all of them give great attention

to this class of subjects. Several national Italian Catholic congresses for social studies have been held, notably at Genoa in 1892, and in Padua in 1896. One of the foremost exponents of Catholic social-reform principles in Italy is Professor Giuseppe Toniolo, one of the founders of the Union of Social Studies, whose able expositions of "Christian democracy," as he prefers to style it, have had a profound influence all over Europe.

The only European country in which the Catholic party controls the government is Belgium. There liberalism, after holding the reins of power for many years, has been completely routed, every election strengthening the Catholic majority, and witnessing the enlargement of the Socialistic faction in the parliament at the expense of the Liberals. The most notable Catholic leaders in that country have been the bishop of Liège, Abbé Pottier, Professor George Helleputte, and Verspeyen, the great publicist to whose labors, as editor of the *Bien public* of Ghent, the original triumph of the Catholic party was attributed.

The sociological department of the university of Louvain and the Institute of Social Sciences at Brussels are the chief centers of Catholic sociology in Belgium, and the *Revue sociale catholique*, of Louvain, together with the *Annales de l'Institut des sciences sociales*, are the foremost special organs of the movement.

While Belgium, owing to the density of its population, was in more need of social reform than any other country, the republic of Switzerland, especially the Alpine or Catholic cantons, has felt the pressure of the new problems only in a minimum degree. Nevertheless, the Catholic party in that country is well in line with the new aspiration, and, under the leadership of such men as Decurtins and Python, has made large contributions to the movement for the return to distinctly Christian social-economic ideals. One of the most important Swiss organizations devoted to this work is the *Union internationale des études sociales*, of Fribourg, of which the late Cardinal Mermillod was for some time the president.

Even in the Spanish peninsula, where all characteristically Catholic activities are greatly impeded by the condition of servitude to the state from which the churches of Spain and Portugal have suffered for centuries, the new movement is beginning to find a foothold, and is represented, in a mild way, by the *Revista Catolica de las Cuestiones Sociales*, of Madrid, and the *Soluciones Catolicas*, of Valencia.

One of the most marked characteristics of the Catholic social movement, as the reader will have already gathered, is the close bond which exists in it between science and action. Much of its vitality is due to the revival of Catholic philosophy, and there are a number of special magazines devoted to this subject, in the French, German, Italian, Hungarian, and other languages, particularly notable among which are the *Revue thomiste* (Dominican), of Paris; the *Revue néo-scholastique*, of the University of Louvain, and the *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, the organ of the philosophical section of the Görres-Gesellschaft.

The Catholic theological magazines, of which there are at least a dozen in Germany alone, also contribute largely to the intellectual and theoretical side of the movement. The principles of Catholic theology and scholastic philosophy are elaborated and applied to the social sciences in the scientific societies, congresses, and organizations devoted to this subject; while in the general Catholic congresses (in which bishops, priests, nobles, and representatives of all classes of the people meet together on equal terms) and organizations for practical social reform they are carried out in active reconstructive work; and while the greater part of the vast weekly and daily Catholic press, as well as the numerous Catholic periodicals of a general character, on the European continent, contribute more or less directly and earnestly to the propagation of the movement.

It is of interest to note that since 1888 hundreds of Catholic scientific men from all parts of the world have assembled at intervals of three years in the "International Congress of Catholic Scientists," which has met successively at Paris, Brussels, and Fribourg, and will hold its sessions at Munich next year. This

Congress has a section of legal and economic sciences, and its monumental *Comptes rendus* constitute a triennial record of the progress of Catholic scientific thought. Several international Catholic congresses, devoted to special branches of practical economic and social reform, have already been held, such as the Congress on Rural Banks, at Tarbes, and the congresses of Catholic workmen held at Salzburg and Tours in 1896 and 1897.

The leaders of the social-reform movement under the ægis of the church do not consider that the work of research, study, and organization has yet passed beyond its preliminary stage. It is their hope and expectation to establish centers of study and action in every parish in the world, and to federate these in diocesan, provincial, national, and ultimately international organizations, until the whole Catholic body throughout the world, together with that element of the non-Catholics which wishes to preserve society equally from the Scylla of liberalism, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of socialism, either collectivist or anarchical, on the other, shall have been perfectly mobilized, as it were, and the Christian ideals shall have the enthusiastic adhesion and engage the devoted services of everyone who calls himself by the name of Christ. This plan involves the separate organization, local, national, and international, of the persons engaged, in whatever capacity, in each several industry, trade, and profession.

It is not expected that so stupendous a work can be accomplished without some loss. When the new movement shall have become everywhere dominant in the church, it is likely that some defections will occur among the irreconcilable element of Catholic liberals and socialists; but the Catholic cause will doubtless be the gainer by the elimination of this factor of disunion. At least two little currents of revolt are already flowing. A group of French priests of the liberal school have fallen away within the past two or three years, and in Austro-Hungary the dominant German Liberal party is threatening a wholesale secession of German Catholics, as a result of the growing power of the Young Czech party, which makes an uncompromising stand for Catholic principles, and especially for the restoration

of the local liberties which Joseph II. was largely instrumental in annihilating, and which the Liberal party, true to its traditional principles the world over, is bent upon combating to the bitter end. It must be observed, however, that those who in Austria are talking about going over to Protestantism are persons who are notoriously devoid of any personal religion, being infidels and worldlings who are Catholic only by baptism and a sort of legal fiction.

It will be instructive to give, before closing, a more definite view of the ideal constitution of society according to the Catholic philosophy. The Catholic sociologists (*i. e.*, those of the Catholic school, of whatever personal creed, excluding Catholics who adhere to other schools, a distinction that it is essential to keep in mind) reject the theory of the social contract, as well as the theories of the positivist, ethnological, and historical schools, according to which all rights have their source in the good of the species, the natural social tendencies of man, or the decrees of governments. In the words of G. Rossignoli (*Rivista Internazionale*, August, 1898, p. 509):

Natural right, objectively considered, is either the Eternal Reason of God by which man is ruled, or it is only an idle breath; and natural right, taken subjectively, either is the faculty, conceded to man by the Eternal Reason of God, of doing or requiring certain things, or it is only a physical power to coerce others; nothing, in short, but force, brute force.

They hold that the *man* of liberalism and socialism is a chimera; that the real man is a rational animal, destined to an eternity of weal or woe, according to the deeds done in the flesh, and existing in certain definite relations with his fellows, according to his position in the social organism, as a member of a certain family, profession, community, people, etc. The only actual or desirable or possible equality is an equal responsibility of all men before God and man for the performance of the duties, the fulfillment of the obligations, and the due use of the rights and privileges with which they are severally burdened or endowed. These duties, obligations, rights, and privileges, far from being equal, are as multifarious, diverse, and unequal as the possible conditions, situations, relationships, and environments of

a human life. It is only by a due recognition of this diversity that equal justice can be rendered or dispensed. The maximum of true liberty, possible equality, and real fraternity can only be attained in a condition of affairs in which every member of society gives to every other member of society all that which is due him, whether of mental, moral, or material goods, and whether by the law of justice or the law of charity.

Human society is made up of a number of intertwined and superimposed hierarchies, which may be reduced to the spiritual, intellectual, political, æsthetic, social, and economic. It is requisite for the order of society that the masters in each domain shall be duly respected and docilely followed by the rest of mankind, within the spheres of their respective competency, and that they shall assiduously devote themselves to the welfare of the whole community.

It is the function of the spiritual hierarchs to direct all mankind toward its chief and final end, which is the possession of God. It is the function of the intellectual leaders to direct men to the knowledge of truth, which is their proximate end, considered as rational creatures: It is the function of the political rulers and social chiefs to direct men to their end, in so far as they are destined to live in a state of organic and personal association. It is the function of the masters of taste to direct men to their end, considered as beings possessing by nature a love and capacity for beauty, in themselves and their surroundings and their works. It is the function of the captains of industry to direct men to their end, in so far as they are animals, needing nourishment, clothing, and other material comforts, luxuries, and instruments.

The more perfectly the authority of the heads of these hierarchies is recognized and obeyed, in their respective departments, even by each other, the more perfect will be the spiritual, intellectual, political, æsthetic, social, and economic condition of the whole community, and the happier all the individuals composing it will be. So far as that authority is not recognized, a state of anarchy exists, which produces untold waste, discomfort, ugliness, misery, and ruin.

Each of these kinds of authority exists for the benefit of the whole people. The ecclesiastical hierarchy is the guardian and promoter of the spiritual life and moral principle which are the internal bond of society. The intellectual hierarchy insures right thought, which is an essential prerequisite of right volition and right action, in any and every domain. The political hierarchy preserves the public tranquillity, protects the rights, and enforces the obligations of all the individuals and organic groups that make up the body politic, and represents the interests of the community at large in its relations with the rest of mankind. Similarly, the æsthetic hierarchy beautifies all the works of man, and the social hierarchy beautifies and sweetens all human relationships. Finally, the economic hierarchy preserves man's existence, and ministers to him all the material aids needed in the attainment of all his higher ends, near and remote. In this conception it is easy to recognize the outlines of a transcendental anatomy, as it were, of society.

Every group of individuals possesses the same rights and has the same duties that a single individual would have under precisely the same circumstances. The Catholic sociologists insist upon the right of free association, for legitimate ends, and lay special stress upon the family and the professional body, as organic elements of society. The family is older than the state, and has a constitution and a body of sacred rights upon which even the state cannot infringe without crime. Upon the unity, order, and indissolubility of the family, and its conscious continuity from generation to generation, the welfare and progress of the whole commonwealth are largely dependent. The head of the family has, by the law of nature and of God, jurisdiction over his whole household, and is responsible for the spiritual and temporal welfare of all its members. Outsiders temporarily forming part of the household are subject to this authority, and servants, in particular, while bound to show due respect to the members of the family, have a right to be the objects of an almost paternal affection and solicitude.

All those who are engaged in any given trade, profession, or industry constitute, by the law of nature, an economic family,

and all the persons of every degree connected in any way with the same business establishment constitute an economic household. In a normal state of society, all the members of the same economic family are bound together in intimate relations of fraternity and mutual coöperation for the good of their craft and their own spiritual, moral, intellectual, social, æsthetic, and material welfare. The constitution of the economic household is similar to that of the domestic household, and the employer is bound in conscience to consider the interests of all his employés, almost as much as of his own children, while he is entitled in his turn to their filial obedience and respect.

Just as many domestic households may be united in an economic household, so may many economic households be united in a political household or local community. The local community, like other sociological organisms, has natural rights of its own, and may, to an indefinite extent, acquire other rights which cannot be justly infringed upon by any higher political division, even the general government itself, though they may lapse in cases of the greatest emergency, where vital interests of the whole nation are at stake, and there may also be cases in which they are justly forfeited, at least for a time, by official crime.

A mistaken notion is widely prevalent that the Catholic church has a highly centralized organization, and is in favor of centralization. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On the contrary, while in theory the sovereign pontiff has an unlimited authority over the whole church—otherwise the apostolic see would not have secure appellate jurisdiction—yet the church of each nation, each ecclesiastical province, and each diocese is supposed to be governed by laws of its own making, and in practice each diocese is almost autonomous, within the broad limits of faith and morals. At any rate, the Catholic party, always and everywhere, is in favor of decentralization and local self-government; while both liberalism and socialism, in their typical and predominant forms, represent the principle of state despotism, hold that the central government is the source of all rights, and, as a rule, concede only grudgingly and under

compulsion any real share in them to lesser bodies, local or otherwise.

All the republics controlled by *reflective* liberalism (we thus exclude the *naïve* liberalism of the United States) are highly centralized bureaucracies; it is sufficient to name France, Italy, and Mexico. Liberalism imposed on Switzerland at the beginning of this century a much more centralized form of government than that which she inherited from the Middle Ages, and the ill-fated *Sonderbund* was a revolt of the Catholic cantons for the defense of their ancestral liberties. Even in the United States we have witnessed a tendency toward a gradual breaking down of the admirable federative system which we owe to a fortunate necessity at the beginning of our national life. In France the Catholic party demands the restoration of the traditional liberties to the provinces — Brittany, Normandy, Burgundy, Provence, etc.—which were wiped out by the revolutionary government a century ago. In Italy its program includes the restoration of local self-government to the old political divisions, many of which have so glorious a place in history. In Austro-Hungary it is struggling in behalf of the fullest liberty for each of the races and lands that make up that heterogeneous empire. In Switzerland, as we have seen, it stands for the rights of the cantons, against the aggressions of the federal government.

In Spain the holy see opposes the revolutionary plans of the Carlists on the general principle that every *de facto* government, so long as it succeeds in preserving a fair degree of order, and is not guilty of any very gross outrages on the rights of the people, is presumed to be legitimate, as well as on the other general principle that domestic tranquillity is a blessing than which none that can result from a civil war is likely to be greater. Nevertheless the Carlist party is by far the most Catholic political body on the Iberian peninsula, and the most prominent feature of its announced program is the restoration of the local liberties that have been infringed or altogether wiped out under the liberal régime, and the granting of new ones, so as to make each town, village, and province in the kingdom thoroughly self-governing.

Most of the Catholic social-reform leaders are opposed to the modern "parliamentarianism," on the theoretic ground that it does not represent the real man of history, but the fictitious man of Rousseauism; and on the practical ground that it has proved itself a failure, and, far from being a truly representative system, is the most ingenious instrument of irresponsible tyranny that has ever been devised. They advocate corporative suffrage; that is, the division of the electors into professional groups, each of which shall choose its own representatives in the legislative bodies, so that one house of parliament, at least, will be a miniature counterpart of the community at large, containing as nearly as possible the same proportion of professional men, manufacturers, merchants, agriculturists, laborers, etc. This constitutional change is not only on the program of the Catholic union of social studies in Italy and of the Catholic circles of France, but in two countries, Belgium and Austro-Hungary, it has become one of the live political issues of the day. For the most perfect success this system of "representation of interests" requires the complete reorganization of the "economic families;" but, as a committee of the Belgian parliament said in 1893, in a report favorable to the change, "the proposed parliamentary representation of business interests is precisely the most efficacious means of accelerating the economic reorganization of society." The advocates of this "institutional decentralization" claim that it is the only safeguard against the despotic sway of "the plutocracy;" the legislators under the present system representing nobody but themselves, and being, in the very nature of things, the most ready tools of the money interest, so far as this considers it worth its while to make use of them.

The initiative, referendum, and minority representation are generally favored by publicists of the Catholic school, and in Belgium the Catholic party aided in the establishment of the system of plural voting now in force, which recognizes wealth, learning, and other elements of intrinsic or extrinsic superiority, by granting to their possessor one or more additional votes over and above that to which he is entitled by right of his citizenship.

The Catholic party holds that, as rights and duties and needs

depend on special circumstances, all legislation should be devised with full regard to the facts of the particular case, so that no real good may be sacrificed by the unwise application of a general principle, however excellent. On the monetary and tariff questions it takes a moderate and conciliatory stand, so far as it takes any at all. In fact, its position on these questions can scarcely be said to be well defined, its sentiments and program varying in different countries and rarely finding unanimous concurrence. Perhaps its dominating tendency may be to favor bimetallism, either national or international, and to advocate import duties in those cases only where a protection of some native industry or industries seem to be of great importance. So far as the writer is aware, however, no very definite Catholic principles are held to be involved in either of these questions. His personal opinion is that international bimetallism and universal free trade would fit in more harmoniously than any rival solutions with the general Catholic world-view.

The Catholic social reformers insist strenuously upon the rights of property, inheritance, and testament. But they do not object to measures by which the owners of utterly unproductive lands may be compelled to develop them, use them, dispose of them, or pay charges which will make good to society the loss it suffers through their neglect. They also contend, in accordance with the principles of moral theology, that the man of wealth is under obligations to use a fair share of his income, over and above that which is necessary for the support of his family in a dignity becoming their station, in the betterment of the condition of his poor and needy fellow-creatures. They deny that labor is the sole basis of value; two factors concur in it, the bounty of nature and the labor of man—the word “labor” including not only physical exertion, but every kind of activity, mental, moral, or physical, expended in the pursuit of useful ends.

Collective ownership and coöperative industry and trade are favored, so far as they are entirely voluntary; and the title to collective property, even that of a nation, is held to rest on precisely the same basis as that to individual property; for if the right of private appropriation of property, or of any particular

kind of property, land for example, be denied, it at once follows that the state would have no more right to appropriate it, to the exclusion of mankind at large, than any single individual or group of individuals within the state would possess.

The right of the laborer to a due share of the product of his own labor is insisted upon. In the words of Count Soderini:¹

Neither the landowner as regards "land" nor the "capitalist" in reference to "profit" should ever seek for more than what belongs to them in proportion to the "utility" by them afforded and the service by them rendered.

Wages should correspond "with the quality and quantity of the work supplied, and should likewise be in accord with the quality and quantity of the workers' needs."

"The surplus value which accrues exclusively and directly from the labor of the workman the employer cannot under any pretext withhold from him, inasmuch as he would be defrauding him of a part of what belongs to him." At the same time the workmen should take into consideration the condition of the business, and they have no right to demand wages so high as to devour the legitimate profits of the employer.

The effort to obtain the largest possible amount of labor at the least possible wages is criminal. In the words of Leo XIII. (encyclical *Rerum Novarum*): "To exercise pressure for the sake of gain upon the indigent and the destitute, and to make one's profit out of another's needs, is condemned by all laws, human and divine." The wage-workers are entitled to enough free time for the full performance of religious and domestic duties, and for needed recreation and self-culture. This end is attained by the multiplication of rest-days, even better than by the shortening of the hours of labor. Boards of conciliation and courts of arbitration, in which employers and workmen are both represented, are a valuable means of settling disputes in the matter of wages and of hours, or any other differences that may arise. Legislation may be resorted to for the enforcement of the just rights of both parties, but only with the utmost

¹ *Socialism and Catholicism*, English translation, *very crude and defective*, by Richard Jenery-Shee, of the Inner Temple, (London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1896), p. 140.

caution, and in cases where no other means seem availing. Strikes are lawful as a means of redressing real wrongs, and sometimes, in extreme cases, perhaps necessary; but they are always regrettable resorts, and the strikers cannot justly use force to prevent other workmen from taking their places.

The Catholic reformers look very favorably upon the system of paying a fixed wage, proportional to the needs of the employés, and supplementing this with a share of the profits in the case of those who, by long and faithful service, or other special merits, have shown themselves worthy to be so rewarded. There are some who strongly advocate the system of factory councils, in which the most responsible and worthy employés meet together at stated intervals to confer with each other and with their employers on matters of common interest. These may even become true legislative bodies, in certain cases and within due limits, for the institutions in which they exist.

As regards interest for the use of money, an amount may justly be charged proportional to the risk of loss, where such exists. When there is no risk of loss, a small amount may justly be charged to indemnify the lender for the disadvantage he suffers from not having the money to use in other business. But it is a crime to charge usurious interest, or to take any interest whatever from a needy person, so as to enrich oneself at the expense of the sufferings of one's fellow-men. The establishment of *monts-de-piété*, or pawnshops, conducted from motives of charity, and charging only legal interest (usually from 4 to 6 per cent. per annum), has always been a favorite form of Catholic beneficence, and continues to be recommended and practiced by the representatives of the new movement.

Taxation should be as moderate as possible, and should be levied in such a way as not to crush the weaker industries or to increase the burdens of those who, either from wages or their own little properties, have only a bare means of support. A progressive tax on luxuries is not objected to, nor are moderate succession taxes on collateral heirs.

The Catholic social reformers are inclined to favor sumptuary laws calculated "to check the excess of expenditure out of

proportion to individual means." They are also in favor of regulating, and so far as possible abolishing, all unnecessary night work, and the employment of children and women, especially married women, in factories or in any work that overtaxes their strength, despoils them of their modesty, or compels them to neglect their domestic duties. Employers are bound to consider the health of their workmen, and legal measures to enforce this duty are of great importance. The plan, so ably defended by the anarchist Prince Krapotkine, of doing away with the present factory system, by substituting industrial villages, in which each workman can perform his share of the work under his own roof, with the aid of electric distribution of power, finds much favor with Catholic reformers, on account of its tendency to the restoration of family life and the personal dignity of the workman.

The Catholic position on education is well known. It is held that religious and moral instruction is the most important of all, both to the individual and the commonwealth; and all education should be duly proportioned to the capacities and needs of its subjects, and should be directed toward enabling them to fulfill as perfectly as possible the duties of their particular state and condition of life. The rights of the parents are paramount in education, and cannot be justly contravened by either the state or any other outside power, save in extreme cases when they are forfeited by criminal negligence or abuse.

The welfare of the agricultural interest, the foundation of the national life and prosperity, is the object of the special solicitude of the Catholic school, and to it many institutions calculated to promote this end, such as the rural unions, coöperative agricultural banks, institutes of land credit, etc., owe their origin and diffusion.

In the field of international law the publicists of the distinctly Catholic school teach that the rights and duties of governments are analogous to those of individuals, families, and corporations. War is permissible only in self-defense, or in the vindication of undoubted rights. Annexation of territory is allowable only in cases when it is unoccupied, or destitute of any stable government, or has been forfeited by the crimes of the

government to which it appertains, or is no more than an equitable indemnity for the expenses and losses incurred by the victor in a just cause.

The principle of the solidarity of the human race demands that so far as possible all nations should live together in unity, and settle their disputes by arbitration rather than by force. An international court of arbitration is, therefore, eminently desirable, and there are many reasons why such a court should be closely connected with the apostolic see of Rome, which is the only intrinsically international and cosmopolitan institution on earth, which did in fact perform that very function for several centuries, and which is today the supreme court of the world in matters of faith, morals, and worship.

For a thorough understanding of the Catholic position it is necessary to realize clearly that the Catholic church, so far as it is a voluntary factor in social questions, does not stand for the existing order of things. On the contrary, as we have already several times intimated, it agrees with all forms of socialism in protesting against the existing order as unnatural and unjust. In many matters of detail Catholics and socialists can and do agree, as is illustrated by the frequent alliance of the Center and Socialist parties in the German Reichstag, and still more forcibly by the proceedings of the International Congress for the Protection of Labor, which met at Zürich, in Switzerland, in August (23-28), 1897. The project received beforehand the papal approbation, and the Swiss Catholic leader Decurtins was its chief promoter, and one of its three presidents. While the socialists had a majority in the congress of Zürich, there was a large Catholic minority, representing the Catholic workmen of Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Spain, and Italy, and including many priests among its members. The Catholic and socialist delegates found themselves in agreement on a number of the questions which were discussed. While the coöperation was more marked in the congress of Zürich, a number of other congresses have taken place, before and since, in which representative Catholics have collaborated with a more

or less socialistically inclined majority. Such was the case with the International Conference of Berlin in 1890, the Congress of the Swiss Workingmen's Federation held at Bienne, Switzerland, in 1893 (in which the Swiss *Pius-Verein*, with its ten thousand members, and various other Catholic workingmen's societies, with nearly three thousand members, were represented), and the International Congress for Labor Legislation, Brussels, 1897.

The present order of things is revolutionary and anarchical, from a Catholic point of view, and the liberalism which is everywhere dominant is of course conservative of its own work. In most countries on the European continent the "conservative" party represents the form of liberalism which is most irreconcilable with Catholic principles. The advanced wing of liberalism or radicalism usually tends to concur with socialism and Catholicism in those particulars in which the latter are agreed.

The Catholics of the United States usually look upon the church as holding a purely conservative attitude; but the reason of this is that they are all, with a few isolated exceptions, liberals in politics, even those who, like a certain St. Louis editor, are most vociferous in their denunciation of liberalism in all its forms; as there is almost nothing known on this side of the water regarding the principles, the history, or even the existence of the Catholic social reform movement, or any other feature of the prodigious Catholic Renaissance of the present half century. The few learned men who are to be found in the Catholic communion of this country are almost completely isolated, and therefore there is no such thing here as a consensus of Catholic philosophic thought or scientific opinion. Leaders of action are as conspicuous by their absence as leaders of thought, so that the Catholic body cannot be said to have any real coherence. This state of affairs results not only from a deficiency of learning, especially of distinctively Catholic learning, but also from the race hostilities which the common bond of faith has not succeeded in overcoming. But it is inevitable that the "American church" shall, sooner or later, feel the thrill of the new life, and fall into line with its continental sisters.

It is claimed by the Catholic publicists that the recent progress of the non-Catholic sociological and economic science is in the direction of the Catholic system. There seems to be a general reaction against the old economic utilitarianism. Concessions to the claims of moral science are made by the socialism of the chair, the German social-political school, and the Austro-English economists; and every advocate of social reform, from whatever point of view, appeals to some kind of ethical principles. The more hopeful spirits foresee the complete triumph of the new Christian social economics over the rationalistic liberal-classical school, and all other forms of social-economic liberalism, however modified.

It is certain that all over the world the old physiocratic theories that so long influenced legislation are losing their hold on the public mind, and the right and duty of the state to interfere for the protection of the weak against the strong are coming to be recognized, at least in theory. The chief danger, from a Catholic point of view, arises from the fact that the notion of state-omnipotence is so widespread, and that there is so little recognition among non-Catholics and Catholic liberals of the existence of innumerable individual and corporate rights upon which the state cannot legitimately infringe.

The Catholic school notes with satisfaction the growing tendency, even among those who adhere consciously or unconsciously to liberal principles, to favor and initiate private reform measures exactly in a line with the Catholic program. In so doing a course is entered upon which cannot logically stop short, say the "Christian Democrats," of either socialism or a complete return to the Christian social order.

Whatever the readers of the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY may think of the Catholic social movement, they will doubtless be glad to have had the advantage of reading the first general statement of its history, principles, and plans that has thus far appeared in the English language.

MERWIN-MARIE SNELL.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

THE TIME ELEMENT IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS.

POLITICAL campaigns are processes of collective psychology. In the choice of their officers and policies the people deliberate and decide. These two essentials are worthy of study, each in itself, each in its relations to the other. At one end of political evolution, the African selects his chief by the chance spinning of a cocoanut; at the other, the Anglo-Saxon fills many months with alternate hustings and ballotings. Deliberation is a fermentation; decision is a crystallization. Time is the basis for both, but inversely. Opinion, in the forming, suffers less from slowness than from rashness. With a turning and a returning, the subject of thought freely presents every possible side. But the close, the determination, demands precision, regularity, and swiftness. The fruitful inquiry belongs not to the child, but to the philosopher; the admirable action, not to the clown, but to the athlete. Above all, the halting decision and the broken train of reasoning are deplorable; the two ought to be kept sharply distinct, each in its proper place.

In the development of our American methods for choosing public servants these principles have played an improving part. One hundred years ago the idea of a definite legal hour and minute for the opening, and a definite legal hour and minute for the closing, of the polls was scarcely known. A fire, an attack by Indians, or the tardiness of a moderator might delay the start of a town election. The judgment of the presiding selectmen determined when it should close. Philadelphia or Boston could transact the entire business in three or four hours, but rural regions often required as many as five days. In 1789 the New Jersey polls were open for three weeks. As in electing, so in nominating, extreme irregularity prevailed. From the moment that the people began to think of candidates, the process of nomination was continuous and confused. Everybody could nominate. Every day and every hour was in order. By private

letter-writing, by newspaper tickets, by numerous petty caucuses of undefined membership, and by straggling conventions that were but imperfectly representative, the names of the candidates were presented up to the very night before the balloting was to begin.

Out of these primary forms a system has arisen, which now gathers all the caucuses for a county or for a state within the bounds of a single day, substitutes for a dozen conventions of the same party a single convention, and chooses all the members of a national Congress within a rising and setting of the sun. The average American of today thinks of political action in three successive stages—the primary, the convention, the election. The comparatively lengthy periods between and preceding these he assigns to the deliberative processes of the people. He takes that ancient word “campaign” that has echoed the measured tread of armies for two thousand years, and applies it to the movement of democracy.

But with all of a century’s advance, the process of time regulation is incomplete. My object is to make clear this imperfection, to show the abuses therefrom resulting, and to suggest lines of further progress.

Until recently the universal authority for fixing the dates of primaries and conventions has been the party central committee. This committee is not a single central authority. The name is legion. In all the United States, from Sandy Hook to No Man’s Land, the ward, or town, or city, or precinct, or county, or assembly district, or congressional district, or state, is rare that has not from one to half a dozen central committees. Each party has three grades of them—national, state, and county. The subordination of the lower to the higher committee, very loose in general, is especially so on the score of the times for political action. The presidential year affords a complete study of these time relations. Custom, or party rule, requires the national committee to meet and decide the date of the national convention at least six months in advance of the convention’s assemblage. This gives for the primaries and the minor conventions a period of half a year or longer. No sooner has the

national committee set definite bounds to the period—which it usually does at Washington in the December or January preceding the election—than the central committee, in any one of the forty-five states of the union, is at liberty to fix the date of its state convention. This date may be within a month, or may be five months, from the receipt of the national call. Of the Republican state conventions in 1896 the first met in Arkansas, March 3; the last, in Idaho, May 16. Fourteen were held in March, eighteen in April, and thirteen in May. The first three were those of Arkansas, Mississippi, and Florida; the last five, those of Washington, Colorado, Wyoming, North Carolina, and Idaho. Of the Democratic state conventions in the same year, the first met in Oregon, April 10; the last, in Georgia, June 25. Twelve were held in April, seven in May, and twenty-five in June. The first five were west, and the last five east, of the Mississippi river.

The action of the state committee in setting the time for the state convention fixed, in the next place, the outer time limits for the county conventions. If the state committee has granted a latitude of four months, and the state has ninety counties, each of the ninety central committees of these counties may choose a separate day for its county convention. In their haste, a few counties may hold conventions before the state committee has issued its call, afterward adjusting their representation by dropping surplus delegates from their lists. The Illinois county conventions of 1896 extended all the way from January 27, the day before the state committee's call, to April 26, four days before the meeting of the state convention. So, last of all, as each county committee decides the date of the county convention, more or less play is often given to the committees of the towns, or wards, or precincts, for fixing the times of their primaries.

Such have been the general order and conditions of the time game that I am to describe. The infinite number of authorities has meant an infinite variety of practice, and an infinite opportunity for sharp play. Within the limits, the machine of each locality selects for action that date which it deems most advantageous for itself, as against the machines of other political areas. The variety of motive and result can be appreciated only by

mounting in turn the separate pinnacles of the national, the state, and the county politician.

Let a county central committee have attained a state of "harmony" concerning the party candidates to be put into the field for the county offices. It is then impelled to call the county convention upon as short notice as possible, in order to forestall the public opinion of the county. Its "slate" is ready, its delegates in the various precincts are carefully selected; they may all be foisted upon the people by quick, well-concerted action, before the people make up their minds whom or what they want. But the selfish county committee may also be very much alive to the opportunities for the state offices and privileges. Upon this score, an early county convention secures the advantage of the "moral effect," the imitative tendency so strong in human nature. "There is a contagion in example which few men have the force to resist," said Alexander Hamilton. The county that anticipates other counties in pledging itself to a particular aspirant for a given office, say the state-treasurership, starts a "boom" for its favorite. The county that publishes the earliest instructions relative to the state platform furnishes a model for tardier county declarations. The first Republican county convention of Illinois for 1896, held at Olney, January 27, instructed for the gold standard and named William McKinley for president, William E. Mason for senator, and John R. Tanner for governor. The complete fulfillment of this forecast was not altogether a coincidence.

If a candidate secures early conventions friendly to himself in several counties, the "moral effect" of his success is all the greater, as the delegates so early won are the more numerous. He gains even weightier vantage where he early captures a single county that contains a great metropolis. Cities are much more favorable to expeditious and unified action than are rural regions. The main political advantage of the city over the country lies in its special opportunities for association on a large numerical scale.

But county machines sometimes call late conventions. Under the Australian ballot, nominations by petition must be filed a

certain number of days before the election. The county central committees may make such petitioning—as a protest against their nominees—difficult, or even impossible, by holding late conventions, and will do so where the spirit of independent voting threatens their power. Again, if a wise county finds itself feeble or entirely wanting in “timber” for the elective offices, it may aim to secure the appointive offices of the state. To this end it holds off until the seasonable hour, or, it may be, until the last moment. If a point is reached, before the state convention has met, where the statistics from the other counties indicate that this particular county can wield the balance of power, then its convention meets and pledges its delegates in return for the larger promises of patronage incident to such a critical time. If the statistics of instruction from the other counties leave the outcome doubtful up to the very eve of the state convention, the said county chooses at the eleventh hour unpledged delegates, who freely exercise their diplomatic talents in the hotel lobbies and headquarters at the state gathering.

The best recent example of a successful use of all the time conditions by a single county containing a vast city in a populous commonwealth is afforded in the election of John R. Tanner to the governorship of Illinois. For this office three or four other prominent Republicans of the Prairie State had set their caps as early as had Mr. Tanner. But he had transferred his residence from the southern portion of Illinois to the county in which Chicago is situated, the great county of Cook. Himself the chairman of the Republican state central committee, he had cultivated the acquaintance and won the alliance of the leading spirits in the Cook county Republican central committee. Together, therefore, shortly after the call of the national committee for the St. Louis convention, they outlined their plan. They would issue the call for the state convention on the twenty-eighth of January, the day after the county convention at Olney should have declared for Mr. Tanner. They would issue the call for the Cook county convention on the fourth of February. They would hold the county primaries on the fourteenth of February, and the county convention on the fifteenth. With but a week elapsed, the county

committeemen of the powerful and alert central region of the state, and of the remoter Egypt, would scarcely have received the state committee's call before the Cook county committee had acted. With but ten days' notice for the Cook county primaries, the citizens of Chicago—who since then have become exceedingly unfriendly to Governor Tanner, and at that time knew little about him—would be taken unawares, and before they had entertained a thought of the coming election. Secondary to these motives of gaining the time vantage in the state and county fields, the county politicians of Cook were anxious to avoid complications with national politics, for the rich prize of Chicago was already becoming a bone of contention among the presidential aspirants.

Accordingly, by a secret caucus on the third of February, they put the finishing touches upon their county slate, and on the next day issued their call. The lusty outcry of the city newspapers availed nothing. Neither did a denunciatory mass-meeting assembled February 10, on the ringing appeal of a score of the city's most prominent Republicans. The "snap" time schedule succeeded. At once the men who planned it found themselves in control of Cook county's delegation to the state convention; that is, of more than one-fourth of the convention's membership; or, to be exact, of 372 delegates, where the rest of the state was entitled to 963. Of the one hundred and one other counties no one was entitled to more than twenty-seven delegates. This capture of Cook practically ended the contest of the aspirants for the state offices, for, to go back still earlier, these same Cook county managers had, in November, 1895, entered into a conditional alliance with Egypt. They had gone on a railway pilgrimage, had skirted the broad central part of Illinois, had crossed the Mississippi into St. Louis. There they had met one hundred and more Republican politicians of southern Illinois, a section where the petty local manager of both parties yet rules in the old-time satrapic splendor of Jacksonian days. They had pledged the fealty of the hungry Egyptians by dazzling promises of patronage. So, after the Cook county convention, the "moral effect" had its fullest sway. The home stronghold

of the other gubernatorial candidates, the great central prairie region, the strength and hope of the commonwealth, was crushed as between the upper and nether millstones. One by one its counties fell helplessly into line with pledges for the Cook county slate. One by one the other gubernatorial aspirants withdrew their names. Two weeks before the farcical state convention Mr. Tanner predicted his nomination with absolute certainty.

From the standpoint of the county committee one should proceed to the standpoint of the state committee. This body, too, may plan to forestall public opinion. By calling an early state convention it may anticipate the preferences of the people, both as to state candidates and issues and as to national candidates and issues. With regard to the state offices, it may work in thorough accord with one or more county machines against the others. The above case of Illinois is in point.

But in a presidential year the state committee fixes the date of the state convention with an eye mainly to national politics. Its relations with the inferior county central committees are strongly overshadowed by its relations with the coequal central committees of the forty-five other states. Here the play of motives leading to the earlier or the later convention is very similar to that which has been described for the relations of the county committees to each other. Some difference between the state and national fields may possibly be ascribed to the difference between their relative numbers of elective and appointive offices. The state executive has numerous elective offices, while the national executive has but two. With due allowance for recent effects of the civil-service laws, the appointive patronage of the nation is relatively more important than that of a state. Therefore only a few state committees have in view the presidency and the vice-presidency, and the great majority are seeking the presidential appointments—the collectorships, the consulships, or the cabinet seats. The strong, *bona fide* aspirant for the presidency works for the advantage of the “moral effect” by securing an early convention in his own state, and in any other state whose machine may be friendly to his nomination. So much the more fortunate is he in securing the first state that

instructs, if that state has many delegates. Delaware were nothing beside Pennsylvania. States that do not expect to furnish the presidential candidate follow various policies. Southern Republican committees seem to favor early conventions and early understandings with presidential aspirants, wishing, perhaps, to forestall competition with states of stronger influence. A large state often puts off its decision to the last, with a view to exercising the balance of power. This it can accomplish, even with an early convention. If a powerful boss has the state well in hand, he calls an early state convention, and compels it to indorse a puppet presidential candidate, a "favorite son," so-called. By this course he excludes the genuine aspirants, who are making inroads into his preserves, holds the state delegation together until the national convention meets, and then casts its solid vote for whom he will. The Empire State is, of course, the historic ambush ground of "snappers." Roscoe Conkling set a Republican precedent by his convention of February 25, 1880. Twelve years later David B. Hill secured the Democratic delegation, though the real choice of the New York Democracy would have been ex-President Cleveland. The dates of that rapid action tell the story without comment. January 21, 1892, the Democratic national committee issued its call for the national convention of the twenty-first of June. Five days later, January 26, the New York state central committee called the Democratic state convention for February 22. Thus but four weeks were given to party deliberation, where twenty were available. The earliest previous date of a Democratic state convention, April 21, shows the radicalness of this action. County and town committees were correspondingly snappish, and many primaries were held upon but a day's imperfect notice.

Such is the play of advantage within the party. But also, a party's committee fixes the dates of its action with reference to the dates selected by opposing political committees. The committees of parties out of power may favor late conventions in the hope that the party in power will meanwhile make some mistake or meet with some misfortune in the conduct of government.

The politicians of the party that acts later regulate its course according to the course of the party that acts earlier. If one party presents a bad candidate or a platform of glittering generalities, the other may do likewise with impunity. If one party declares for a certain course, the other may make an issue, often exceedingly artificial, by declaring for the very opposite course.

All these motives have worked for variety and irregularity in the times of political action. But opposed to them has been a tendency marked throughout the long history of elective government. It is the trend toward a uniform and intelligently planned time schedule for elections. Its presence is traceable even in the colonial laws of America, notably in those of New England. The constitutional convention of 1787 took, for the day, advanced ground in recognition of time uniformity and periodicity. It fixed the first Monday in December for the regular annual meeting of Congress. It prescribed one and the same day for the meeting of the electors of president and vice-president in all the states. Above all, it made possible further uniform prescriptions as to national elections, by vesting in Congress a supplemental or supervisory power over them.

In exercise of this power Congress passed the law of 1792, which required the presidential electors to be chosen at least thirty-four days before the first Wednesday in December, the date fixed by the same act for their meeting. This was the only congressional regulation until 1845. With this slight limitation, each state, during the first half century of the union, named its presidential electors and congressmen on such days as it might please. The confusion that resulted is epitomized in the proverb of 1825 and onward: "As goes Pennsylvania, so goes the union." To this proverb Ohio and Maine have successively fallen heir. The earlier election in the populous Keystone State influenced unduly the later elections in the other states. With the invention and introduction of the telegraph and the railroad, the evil was accentuated until it became intolerable. To it, as population grew, was added another evil; namely, the migration of voters from one state to another. Having voted at his

home election, the faithful Whig or Democrat of the border crossed the line to assist at the later election in an adjoining commonwealth. In 1844 Alexander Duncan, a representative from Ohio, who claimed to have suffered severely from this pipe-laying, introduced into the national house a bill which provided for the choice of all presidential electors and congressmen upon the same day. He selected the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, possibly for climatic considerations, possibly to avoid the times of state elections. New York was the only state that chose state officers on that date. The states-rights sentiment of the time could not go quite so far, and the law as finally enacted, January 23, 1845, applied only to the presidential electors. It gradually induced the several states to fix the same date for the election of congressmen and of state officers. By so doing, they saved time and expense. The public mind was therefore educated to the idea of uniformity. The Civil War broke down the jealousy of national regulation which had preserved the subject of elections to the sphere of statehood. For these reasons, in 1872, Benjamin F. Butler could, and did, secure, without serious opposition, the enactment of that part of Alexander Duncan's bill which had failed in 1844; namely, the choice of all the national representatives upon the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November.

Probably these legislators thought little of the ultimate effects of their laws. Only now, for one thing, are we beginning to see that a uniform time for the final election has been operating strongly for uniform times of the conventions and of the primaries. Here and there new party rules and new state laws are regulating action more pronouncedly. Mr. Josiah Quincy asserts that "neither party can afford to come very far behind its opponent in the matter of the date of making nominations." In a recent contest the Populist county conventions in seventy of the one hundred counties of Kansas were held on the same day. Tuesday has become "election day" even for state and municipal elections held on other days than the national November date. More than one hundred cities and towns of Illinois hold their spring elections on the same April Tuesday. The primary

laws recently passed in several states show a notable appreciation of time uniformity. Kentucky's law of 1892 operates to the holding of all the primaries and all the county conventions of any given party upon the same days. The Massachusetts caucus act of 1895 provides a two-days' period for all the caucuses of a given party throughout the state. The California law of 1897 and the New York law of 1898 mark the logical goal by prescribing the same fixed date for all the primaries of all parties.

I have referred to the fact that state and national elections were formerly held on separate days to a greater extent than now. The topic of distinct times for national, state, and municipal elections ranks as the second main division of my subject. Elections for the superior and inferior governments are not mixed in other lands as in ours. On this score Mr. Lusk has contrasted the Australian methods with the American. The politics of Massachusetts in 1804 illustrate our purest primitive practice. In that year the selectmen of Boston were chosen on the nineteenth of March; the governor, lieutenant-governor, and council, on the second of April; the members of the general court, on the ninth of May; the presidential electors and congressmen, on the fifth of November—at least four elections within eight months. But, from the beginning of its history, the nation's growth and its absorbing private pursuits have powerfully urged the various states to get through with all the elections of a year at a stroke. Mr. Butler's law of 1872 encouraged the tendency. After that statute had converted the great majority of the states to the national election day for the choice of their state officers, the few lingering "October states" came under the powerful duress of the corruption and demoralization due to the more concentrated efforts of national political parties to secure the "moral effect" of their state elections. Therefore, the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November has become the almost universal time for the choice of both state and national officers. Only eight states now cling to the old variation. They are all numbered among the less populous commonwealths, and three of them hold their state elections in the first half of the year.

The results of this coincidence of times should be fully appreciated. Few citizens can do three things at once. In passing upon three sets of issues and three blocks of candidates together, the average voter invariably sacrifices one interest by making it support another. Of this fact the seekers of the three classes of offices make the most. It offers a paradise of Yankee bargaining. It extracts the quintessence of concession. The city boss is a contented nonentity in state or national affairs, if the rich municipal spoil be left to him. Politicians of the upper ranks give up local duty to win national power. A great editor belabors the corrupt chief of his party in his home state and flatters the corrupter chief in a state that is far away. Cabinet members or United States senators, whose constituents may dwell among the Rocky Mountains, leave their posts at Washington and hasten to New York city to side with bribe-taking city bosses against members of their own parties whose names are synonyms for probity and patriotism. Between the municipal and the national politician stands the Janus-faced state boss, the *entrepreneur par excellence*. He, if he is uncertain of his hold upon the state, buys for it city and national support, giving in return his promise to be merely a tool in city and national politics. If he has the state's committeemen, legislators, and congressmen all securely in hand, he names mayors, commissioners, senators, ministers, and presidents.

The coincidence of the elections for the three grades produces an advanced type of that union of "deals" called a slate. In its simplest form, a slate is a combination of the seekers of the elective offices in a single grade. The numerous offices of Cleveland, for instance, are distributed among its wards, and the numerous offices of Cuyahoga county among its towns. A south Ohioan whose eye is upon the governorship forms alliances with north Ohioans whose eyes are upon the minor state elective offices. Seven states with vice-presidential "possibilities" cultivate the state with a presidential aspirant. But, with a grand mixture of three elections, the advanced type of the slate appears. Four Ohioans join hands and will be mayor of Cincinnati, governor of Ohio, senator from Ohio, and president from Ohio. Behind these

four Ohioans are innumerable other Ohioans all joining hands and shouting. They will be custodians of mints, penitentiary guards, and street sweepers. There are other states besides Ohio. The manager of a presidential aspirant from one state, approaching the central committee chairman of another state, offers to open the way to the United States Senate for him by giving one of the present senators from the said leader's state a seat in the prospective presidential cabinet. A member of the national House of Representatives wants the speaker to appoint him chairman of the committee on appropriations; the chairman of the party central committee in the state that the prominent member represents wants the support of the prominent member's constituents for the gubernatorial nomination; Mr. Speaker wants the party committee chairman to send to the national convention delegates pledged to the nomination of Mr. Speaker for president of the United States. Madam Rumor presents the interesting spectacle of Mr. Speaker in one Washington hotel, the prominent member in another, and the state committee chairman carrying messages and ultimatums between them!

The main defect of American party organization and procedure, now coming to be plainly recognized, is the mixing of national, state, and municipal concerns. Because of this miscellaneousness, the voter constantly faces a choice between two evils, the party leader is powerfully tempted to do evil that good may come, and the unscrupulous politician fastens himself with his base aims upon true statesmen and beneficent public measures. Nation, state, and city have suffered, but the state more than the nation and the city more than the state.

Present efforts to disentangle the affairs of the three by separate times of action are noticeable. In a presidential year the political parties of several states hold two distinct state conventions, one for national, the other for state nominating purposes. Something has been accomplished by state legislation and constitutional law. Kentucky attains the object, perhaps, as completely as any state. By her constitution of 1892, all state and municipal officers are elected in November of the odd years. In one of these odd years the executive officers of the cities, and

in the other the executive officers of the state, are chosen, all uniformly for quadrennial terms. The tenure of the city councilmen and the state legislators is biennial. New York's constitution of 1895 has attracted attention for its divorcement of the municipal from the higher elections.

If by a state election the choice of the governor and most of the other state officers be understood, the laws show nine variations of the relative times for state and national elections, as follows. The state officers are elected :

1. Quinquennially—Utah.
2. Quadrennially and in the same year with the president—Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia; nine states.
3. Quadrennially and in the odd year next after the presidential election—Virginia.
4. Quadrennially and in the even year midway between the presidential elections—California, Kentucky, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming; six states.
5. Quadrennially and in the odd year next before the presidential election—Mississippi, Maryland, Louisiana; three states.
6. Triennially—New Jersey.
7. Biennially and in even years—Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin; twenty states.
8. Biennially and in odd years—Ohio, Iowa.
9. Annually—Massachusetts, Rhode Island.

Ten of the nineteen quadrennial states and two of the twenty-two biennial states avoid the presidential year in their state elections. With these may be counted Utah and New Jersey, in which presidential and state elections only occasionally coincide. The prevalent plan is the biennial election in even years. Twenty-five states choose governors on the presidential election day.

In the light of all the foregoing facts, conditions, and

tendencies, a possible completed procedure may be forecast. An ideal time schedule for political action in the United States ought to provide:

(a) *Entirely separate times for the primaries and conventions of the three grades—national, state, and municipal.* Delegates to a state convention should not be selected at a primary meeting which nominates county or city officers. Delegates to a national convention should not be selected by a convention which nominates state officers. Municipal elections should not be held at the same time with state or national elections, nor state elections at the same time with national elections. There should be three distinct chains of political action.

(b) *Coincidence of times for primaries and conventions of a single grade.* (1) Throughout the union, all the primaries for the threefold object of naming congressmen, presidential electors, and delegates to national conventions should be held for all political parties on the same day. Likewise, all state or congressional district conventions for these national nominating purposes should be held for all parties within a given period of one or a few days. And, finally, all national nominating conventions should be held within a given period of days, with a fixed date for opening. (2) Throughout each state, in the election of state officers, all primaries of all political organizations should be held on the same day, all the succeeding county conventions on the same day, and all the succeeding state conventions at the same time. (3) Throughout each county or city, in the election of county or city officers, all the primaries of all political organizations should be held on the same day, and all the succeeding county conventions on the same day.

With such a basis of separate times for the three grades, and uniform times in a single grade, a thoroughgoing schedule for a quadrennial period, 1900–1904, may be suggested, as follows:

FIRST SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice of national representatives and presidential electors only.

(1) Primaries, second Tuesday in May, 1900.

(2) County conventions, second Wednesday or Thursday in May, 1900.

(3) Congressional district and state conventions, third Tuesday in May, 1900.

(4) National nominating conventions, first Tuesday in June, 1900.

(5) Election, first Tuesday in November, 1900.

SECOND SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice only of county officers, biennial in tenure, and of city officers, biennial in tenure, in cities of twenty thousand inhabitants and over.

(1) Primaries, third Tuesday in March, 1901.

(2) County, city, and ward conventions, third Wednesday in March, 1901.

(3) Election, first Tuesday in May, 1901.

THIRD SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice only of state officers, both quadrennial and biennial in tenure.

(1) Primaries, first Tuesday in July, 1901.

(2) County conventions, first Wednesday or Thursday in July, 1901.

(3) State and legislative district conventions, second Tuesday in July, 1901.

(4) Election, first Tuesday in November, 1901.

FOURTH SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice only of national representatives, 1902.

(1) Primaries, second Tuesday in May, 1900.

(2) County conventions, second Wednesday or Thursday in May, 1900.

(3) Congressional district and state conventions, third Tuesday in May, 1900.

(4) Election, first Tuesday in November, 1900.

FIFTH SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice only of county officers, quadrennial and biennial in tenure, and of city officers, both quadrennial and biennial in tenure, in cities of twenty thousand inhabitants and over, 1903.

(1) Primaries, third Tuesday in March, 1901.

(2) County, city, and ward conventions, third Wednesday in March, 1901.

(3) Election, first Tuesday in May, 1901.

SIXTH SUB-SCHEDULE.

Throughout the union; for choice only of state officers, biennial in tenure, 1903.

(1) Primaries, first Tuesday in July, 1901.

(2) County conventions, first Wednesday or Thursday in July, 1901.

(3) State and legislative district conventions, second Tuesday in July, 1901.

(4) Election, first Tuesday in November, 1901.

The objections to such a program readily occur. It is novel and radical. Local customs and laws, differences of climate, and other diversities argue against a rigid prescription of time uniformity, exact to the day and throughout the union, for the primaries, conventions, and elections of innumerable counties and cities. So of the election of state officers with one schedule of dates for forty-five distinct campaigns. The election laws of some states proclaim an objection by prohibiting any two parties from holding their primaries on the same day. The only argument advanced for this provision would seem to be that it prevents a clash between rival organizations meeting at the same time. Perhaps as clear and forceful an objection as any is the expense and the extra time incident to separate chains of action for the three grades. The bill for printing, rent, and election officers must be greater, and the voters must go to the polls oftener. The constitution of the United States also stands in the way of a complete realization. Authority to fix the times for the choice

of state, county, and city officers has always been conceded to the state legislatures exclusively. An amendment of the national constitution or a mutual agreement of all state law must be necessary to the choice throughout the United States of all such local officers upon uniform days.

What legislation, then, is practicable? Each state has full power to establish time uniformity for the choice of its state and minor officers, and to provide within its own bounds three distinct chains of action. Uniform dates for the primaries and conventions incident to the election of the national executive and representatives are plainly within the scope of congressional legislation. This gives a powerful national initiative and influence. Just as the laws of 1845 and 1872 have drawn the states to their November Tuesday for the election of city, county, and state officers, so a law requiring all national primaries to be held on the second Tuesday in May would draw state, county, and city primaries together. Congress can forestall such an undesirable tendency by forbidding the holding of any primaries, conventions, and elections for the offices of a state or lesser government at the national polling places or by the conventions nominating national officers. It can require separate election officers, ballot boxes, tickets, conventions, and membership of central committees. It can do away with state conventions for the nomination of presidential electors and the selection of delegates to national conventions, and require that they shall be named by congressional district conventions. Some easily devised method of election may procure the choice of a state's delegates and electors at large as the united act of its congressional district conventions, each voting in a separate place. In this way the state convention can be made an exclusively state function. So, also, Congress can effect some further disentanglement and simplification by enjoining the choice of the delegates to these congressional district conventions by the primaries directly, thereby removing the county convention as a link in national politics.

With national evolution have come the knowledge, experience, and organization which justify a fuller legal regulation of

campaigns. With advances in political and social conditions the need of additional checks upon the political manager has grown. His allies have been the increasingly speedier post-office, railway, and telegraph. His mentor has been the news column of the developing daily paper. His growing skill with these instruments, especially in the interesting interval between one election and the primaries for the next, shows that the initial movement yet belongs to the self-avowed candidate in America as elsewhere. His time for the selfish use of the railway, the post-office, the telegraph, and the news column may be curtailed by simultaneity of popular action. Their increased value for his bargainings may be eliminated by distinct national, state, and city campaigns.

In fixing the dates of a time schedule, the legislator may settle the conflicting interests of politics and other pursuits; may give to the nation and to the states campaigns short enough to avoid injury to business, and long enough to educate the electors for the intelligent performance of civic duties; may choose and make permanent such seasons and days as will yield the best weather conditions; may diminish the interference of campaigns with the sessions of Congress and the duties of congressmen; may strengthen the control of the people over the political manager, by placing the primary and the nominating convention closer together, and thereby giving a longer interval between the nomination and the election.

Separation of the times for national, state, and municipal action will relieve presidents from sitting down at feasts with keepers of city gambling dens, and congressmen from campaigning with bullet-headed candidates for state legislatures. It will remedy that interference of political issues which repudiates a president's war policy, because a state administration has been mixed up in canal frauds. It will permit the average citizen to vote with his next-door neighbor for municipal ownership without encouraging that neighbor's tariff or monetary views. It will secure individual attention for each of the three governments. Three distinct types of healthy leadership will emerge. The champion of expanded commerce will not need to clash with the champion

of building and loan associations or with the champion of clean streets.

Time uniformity of action in each separate governmental grade—national, state, or city—prevents repeating or colonizing within each party, and restricts each citizen to the caucus of but one party for any given election. By making the formation of slates more difficult, it encourages the choice of candidates on personal rather than on geographical grounds. It secures equality of opportunity among the aspirants for each office. The unscrupulous cannot avail themselves of snap methods. The still hunt that unduly lengthens the campaign backward from the election is no longer a factor. The contest is exalted to the free plain of persuasion and reason. All the aspirants must come to the line and start fair. "Party harmony" is promoted, since Americans acquiesce readily in a fair defeat. Time uniformity secures equality among political parties. Partisanship loses force when all parties act simultaneously. They feel that, however much they may differ as to means, they are honestly aiming for the same end. Each cannot ask what rival parties have declared, and therefore must ask what is best for the state. Each makes the most of the primary and of the convention, because it knows not just how much its prospective opponents are making of them. Time uniformity secures equality of opportunity among states, and among counties. The unfair leverage of the "moral effect" vanishes. Each county and each state follows its own judgment. The telegraphic momentum of one commonwealth does not divert the course of another. A single county with a million people does not overawe and rout in detachments numerous small counties, each with some twenty thousand farmer folk.

The economic aspects of a simultaneous choice of all state officers, or of all county and city officers, throughout the union are worthy of thought. The interruption of business and commerce would be less if the primaries preliminary to the choice of governors in New York and Pennsylvania were held on the same day. The election of mayors in Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland, and Buffalo on a single day would operate upon the

trade among the cities of the great lakes in the same equitable manner as does the keeping by them of a common seventh day of rest.

The coinciding action of multitudes of electors moves the patriotic imagination. Let the legislator devote a single period to municipal elections, and let a hundred great cities elect at one and the same time—what a quickening of civic life! What an impulse of emulative rivalries! What a gathering of scattered, confused efforts into one steady, distinct movement!

With certainly known and regularly recurring days for the primaries, everybody can take a well-timed preliminary interest in their problems. With time uniformity, whatever hectic spice may be lost to elections through restraint upon the gambling politician is replaced a thousand fold by the increased freedom of the voter. Democracy's danger lies not in an excess of isolated, but in an excess of imitative action. Independence of judgment for the voting rank and file supplies to politics its true and desirable variety.

In fine, intelligent planning of the times for political action may do much to place both men and measures upon their independent merits, or to conserve and to extend that equality upon which the American republic is founded, an equality of voters, of candidates, of political parties, of counties, and of states.

L. G. McCONACHIE.

CHICAGO.

PREVENTION OF MENTAL DISEASES.

PHYSICIANS have always agreed that it is easier to prevent than to heal disease. This axiom finds constant confirmation, especially since hygiene has been tested by the experimental method, and since bacteriology has become one of the principal auxiliaries of medical methods with contagious and infectious diseases. States have become occupied with these questions because they have become urgent, and this interference increases as the field of action becomes more vast. If the physicians confirm this axiom in respect to mental maladies, we are not able to say as much for the states, which, for the most part, stand still with folded hands before the ever-rising tide of mental alienation. If we except the Scandinavian countries, we may affirm that the states which see the progressive extension of human degeneration by the multiplication of causes which tend to develop mental diseases react in too tardy a manner against the terrible evil; and that the measures taken against this arrest of development make themselves felt only in an inadequate degree. It is evident that physicians are helpless in this struggle, unless the state comes to their aid.

HEREDITY.

In studying the causes of mental diseases, and, therefore, of human degeneration, we must mention in the first place heredity. We inherit many diseases from our parents and forefathers, and, too often, we transmit them to our posterity. All, then, who are able to follow the course of men from the cradle, who observe the manner in which they receive their education, their conduct at school, their entrance into the world, can follow the painful plague of heredity, as they are likewise able to observe, within certain limits, its development. It is a great error to appeal to the alienist only when the evil has been fully revealed. It is important that every physician be constantly familiar with

the hereditary traits presented by the families intrusted to his care; but it is still more important that men should be taught to know themselves, to know especially the defective factors of their nature, and particularly those which tend to cause decay of their mental faculties and may be transmitted to their offspring. But these principles will remain unknown, or without practical effects, so long as the states do not take to heart the cause of improving their inhabitants, and do not employ radical measures to extirpate all which works toward the intellectual and moral degradation of the people. It is in combating the hereditary forces that the states are to attain the solution of the greater part of the problem which weighs upon them. Very often, in fact, if observation is inadequate, one is inclined to reduce the causes of mental troubles to physical diseases, cerebral disturbances, advanced age, etc. But when we penetrate the life of the insane or degenerate more deeply by retracing the line of descent, we receive new light. Thus we may come to learn the constitution and temperament of the parents, and if this examination of the children is accurately made, we can make a prognosis and suggest preventive measures. In the same way we can make known to parents the directions which should be followed by teachers and physicians. In fact, only too often the parents refuse to believe that there is any hereditary defect in them, and in such cases it is much better to ameliorate their offspring without their knowledge.

It is not merely when the parents or grandparents have been afflicted with a mental disease that we have heredity. Other nervous diseases, as chorea, hysteria, epilepsy, hypochondria, neurasthenia, or even merely a nervous state more or less pronounced, may introduce a diminished resistance in the cerebral forces and disturb these at the least occasion of injury which may be encountered later in the course of life. The maladies which attack the organism profoundly have generally for cause the debilitation of the nervous system, and this debilitation increases in the offspring if both parents have any serious defect. Pulmonary tuberculosis, gout, cancer, scrofula, or a nervous affection with one of the parents, predisposes to mental

alienation; and this predisposition is at least doubled when both parents are affected by one or more of these diseases.

There is a distinction to be noted in the problem of heredity which is not always sufficiently considered by those who are making this kind of examinations. Too often one concludes that there is a hereditary taint when it does not really exist, except when the parents were affected at the moment of conception of the child, or, at least, for the mother, before the birth of the child. Heredity may exist with the father or mother during a part of the life, and cease in consequence of treatment or healing of the nervous trouble. It may remain latent, and leap over a generation and reappear in the second, if the root of the evil has not been extirpated. Consanguine marriages, and especially those between first cousins, have given birth to feeble-minded children, and to very nervous children predisposed to mental alienation.

WHAT REMEDIES MAY WE OPPOSE TO HEREDITY?

It goes without saying that from the moment when the least derangement of the child's nervous system is discovered, even if this is merely irritability or troubled sleep, special precautions should be taken. If the nervous state depends essentially upon the mother, the child should be confided to a good nurse, and the physician will prescribe a strict regimen for the nurse and for the child. At an age more advanced the child may have night-horrors, or be affrighted at finding itself alone or in darkness, and may manifest caprices or anger. The least emotion, ghost stories, hints of robbers, may produce irremediable evil. Masturbation, a too tender discipline, defective physical care, are further causes of injury. We should kindle affection for comrades and for animals, and repress egoism by all means. All precautions are necessary to conduct the child toward the education suitable to its nature. We must consider the fact that some children are precocious and are instructed with ease, while others are dull, slow, and interested in nothing. Both species of children must be regarded in mental pathology.

Precocious children unconsciously abuse their memory and

faculty of assimilation ; and the parents, or even the teachers, in consequence of self-love and a pride and ambition badly directed, consume these objects of their glory and too often end by precipitating their ruin. Numerous children who might be the happiness and honor of their parents and of those to whom their instruction has been intrusted, have fallen into a state of decadence or intellectual arrest, or have even become insane or demented, because too great demands have been made on their intellectual forces. Some children, good students at college, have been found to be backward and unproductive at the university, or in preparation for commercial or industrial vocations. Some students have obtained their diplomas, *maxima cum laude*, and have been arrested in the course of their liberal career, intellectually, because their personal vanity or that of their parents urged them in pursuit of honor.

Society does not comprehend, at least adequately, that man is a being who can go on unceasingly toward perfection, even to an advanced age ; that his brain does not reach its complete development even at the age of twenty-five years, and that this very precious organ ought to be respected and directed without suspension of function. We have the proof of this in the example of merchants, industrials, advocates, physicians, engineers, etc., who, not having abused their intellectual powers, make a fresh beginning at an age when many of their companions feel that there is an end of their intellectual development.

THE EDUCATION OF THE CHILD OUGHT TO BE MADE THE OBJECT
OF SPECIAL CARE.

The programs of study should be modified in primary and secondary instruction. We do not advise a return to the program of a half century ago ; the child exercised its memory, but apprehended many things which it did not comprehend. Today there are programs more logical, more in harmony with our physical and intellectual nature. We should prescribe for the child the progressive development of all the constituent parts of his being ; all parts have need of instruction and education, suitable to the end which they fulfill in nature. The limbs

are to be exercised; the acts of respiration, circulation, and digestion are to be facilitated; the brain is to be given intellectual and moral exercise suited to the situation of the moment. The physical exercises, care for good air and food, should go along with psychical exercise; and this demands cultivation of the organs of sense, particularly those of sight and hearing. The visual and auditory impressions are to be placed in right relations with the cerebral power. This constitutes an instruction in intuition (*Anschauungsunterricht* of the Germans). Thus the visual and auditory impressions will be firmly fixed, and the cerebral assimilation and the provision of material for the faculty of reasoning will be promoted.

This progressive culture of the intelligence by means of the training of the principal organs of sense is to the youth a very great satisfaction, a real stimulant, since in this way he assimilates only useful things, of which he comprehends the value and necessity.

Frequently it is the teacher's want of understanding which is the cause of the indifference of pupils and of their slowness of movement. It is necessary that the master should know how to make an estimate of the intellectual strength of the pupils. If the most of the students, who are of average ability, can follow the class, it will be necessary for the others, less advanced, that the master should know how to individualize and discover means of awakening certain faculties still dormant in the child.

The program of secondary studies ought to be the continuation of those of primary instruction. Matters of little or no importance should be excluded. Why teach children things of which in coming years they will not hear a word? We should respect the natural tendencies of youth, and we should not hinder the course of studies because they have given proofs of a preference for certain other matters, which may have given the teacher the conviction that this factor will be of no use in the career of the young person's choice, or in the one which his parents have selected for him. Too often it happens that the severity of the master leads to the grief and discouragement of the pupil, and consequently the austere and injudicious master becomes the

cause of a disappointment. The youths are rare who can carry on together the study of languages with history or mathematics, or, if they succeed, it is at cost of great exertion. This is constantly observed in the secondary studies. The masters and parents hardly pretend absolutely that the pupils excel at the same time in all branches of instruction. On the contrary, it is necessary, in the course of their studies, to try to discover their bent, in order, as far as possible, to guide them toward specialization in one kind of studies.

One may object that this is not exactly correct. I readily admit that about the age of fifteen or sixteen years this attitude cannot be rigidly held, and that even later, at the age of twenty years, changes may be produced in the taste or the choice of a career. We cannot stop at these exceptions, regarding chiefly the general truth in the education of youth.

It results from these general considerations, *a fortiori*, that all nervous persons, or those predisposed to nervousness, ought to be ceaselessly guided in their early youth, as soon as any disturbance or irregularity presents itself in the course of their studies and education. The teacher should be informed of the weak sides of those of whom he has charge. Why should there not be impressed on the teacher certain ideas in relation to the difficulties which he may encounter in his mission with children more or less troubled in their nervous systems, or predisposed to this form of disease? Their number is great, and the advantage to the teacher would be enormous and encouraging.¹

Dr. Koch, formerly director of the asylum for the insane at Zwiefalten (Württemberg), has urged many times the necessity of special instruction and education for children of arrested intelligence, and has proclaimed the necessity of creating special schools for them. In Germany, England, and the United States this idea has found many partisans, and the results obtained thus far seem to promise well for the new system. If it has been impossible to give to these undeveloped children a moral and intellectual restoration so that they can receive instruction and

¹ The reader who is interested in this question will find more details in my paper on *The Treatment of Degenerative Psychoses*.

learn a trade suitable to their intellectual ability, none the less have they succeeded in improving them to such a degree that they have been able to regain the intellectual level of other children with whom they have been in class and to move forward with these. They have awakened dormant qualities which, with many children, do not appear until a certain epoch of existence, but which appear earlier in others, who have fortunately met in their way intelligent and devoted teachers who understood how to employ special methods of instruction.

Dr. Keller, of Copenhagen, has undertaken this noble task in Denmark with genuine success, as his excellent recent report demonstrates. In England Drs. Shuttleworth and Fletcher Beach have obtained brilliant results. In the United States the works published by the National Conference of Charities and Correction prove that such rational educational enterprises for the children of the working people deserve encouragement. But in my opinion Germany bears the palm for laborious and incessant labor. During the last four years a journal has been published there for teachers, entitled *Die Kinderfehler—Zeitschrift für pädagogische Pathologie und Therapie in Haus, Schule und sozialem Leben*. This periodical is published under the learned direction of the celebrated alienist J. L. A. Koch; of Ch. Ufer, director of the schools of Reichenbach at Altenburg; of Dr. Zimmer, professor of theology at Herborn, and of J. Trüper, director of the special asylum for feeble-minded children at Sophienbade, near Jena. This journal counts among its collaborators all in the world who are interested in this kind of reform for children, and its scientific contents deserve to be known by all who are occupied with social questions.

In Belgium, although there are four asylums for backward children in this country, there is only one real specialist, Dr. Jean de Maar, of Brussels, who occupies himself seriously with this question. Personally, when I was attached once to the hospice of Guislain at Ghent, I, as well as my predecessor, Dr. B. Ingels, encountered insuperable obstacles in the effort to introduce the new modes of instruction with backward children.

In brief, it has been established that the results obtained are

remarkable, and that governments cannot give too much assistance to these schools for backward children, who, without them, are sure to descend to degeneration and mental complications.

In respect to those who remain incapable of such intellectual and moral progress, it will be necessary to segregate them for life in special establishments, as I have shown in a work published, in 1896, in the *Journal of Mental Science*, "The Need of Special Accommodations for the Degenerate." These unhappy beings are dangerous to society. I have the deep conviction that this would be one of the most hopeful social measures, and would contribute to prevent the increase of mental troubles in the degenerate, and, at the same time, would contribute very much to diminish crime.

A vice exceedingly frequent in schools, and especially in boarding schools, is masturbation. This vice is found most frequently in children poorly endowed in mental and moral faculties. But when many children are crowded together, the contagion of masturbation is much to be feared. One child instructs another in this vice, and a few bad spirits are enough to infect a whole school among the pupils who are ignorant of the terrible and dangerous consequences of masturbation. It is the imperative duty of the director of an establishment to keep his eyes open to repress this evil; and it is the duty of the parents to inform the teachers of the vices of their own children; and on both sides it is important to point out to vicious pupils the diseases to which they make themselves liable. The physicians also have a part to play in these circumstances, because the young people frequently have more confidence in their word than in the advice of parents and teachers.

It is the duty of the parents and teachers to anticipate the physician with the least possible delay. The physician can expose the injurious physical, mental, and moral consequences of masturbation, and the counsels he gives should be attested by facts. The question of masturbation is a leading argument in favor of education at home. We have heard conscientious men, some even interested in boarding schools, declare openly that they wished to see these establishments suppressed, and that it

is the duty of parents to take more careful oversight of their children. We do not doubt the sincerity of this opinion, and all the more because we often encounter in boarding schools even teachers and attendants who permit themselves to be led by unnatural instincts, and who thus contribute to the perversion of youth, and who prove unworthy of the confidence which the parents place in them.

The epoch of puberty is important in the life of boys as well as of girls, when the nervous system is predisposed to mental alienation. It is a stage of existence which ought, during a series of years, to command the close attention of parents and teachers. One should never lose out of sight the unhappy persons predisposed to insanity. There is at this stage an inclination to err by extremes. Thus we should interdict long physical fatigue, unusual walks, exhausting games; we should shun extremes of temperature, great heat or great cold, especially with girls, with whom excess of temperature may influence the menstrual flow, by diminishing, augmenting, or even suppressing it. The study hours will be strictly limited for those in péril. The sleep will be watched. Inadequate sleep is an insufficient restorer of body and mind, and insomnia is often a warning, a forerunner, of some psychical injury. This danger is greater for the girl than for the boy, who is often not affected at this transitional period; he becomes more sensitive when he reaches full development, that is, at about the twenty-ninth year. The girl, on the contrary, is generally considered to be completely developed at seventeen or eighteen years. It follows that for young people of both sexes between seventeen and twenty-nine years of age the need of watchfulness becomes more urgent, because about this age the phenomena are more frequently manifested. But it is at this epoch that young people attack the most difficult passage of life, that they really begin to live, that they find themselves facing the choice of a calling. It is also at this epoch that the affections are enkindled, and that most persons are married. How many young people at this age are prepared to contract marriage, which brings with it the idea of power to provide the material means of living? It is at this period that nervous persons

experience the results of internal and external excitement, and that hysteria appears in the girl. The young people now are subject to the consequences of the nature of the education which they have received; and if they are nervous or predisposed to mental weakness, the moment becomes critical. The parents should guide them by their counsels and especially direct them to a career in harmony with their psychical constitution: a very difficult matter, since it is necessary to be constantly watchful, and to prepare the young persons who are thus predisposed so that they can overcome the threatened evil.

The history of heredity conducts us to *alcoholism*, and these two should be considered the principal causes of degeneration. Authors are unanimously agreed that there is no way of controlling alcoholism without total abstinence from alcoholic liquors. Alcoholic victims are innumerable. We encounter them in all classes of society, as well in the asylum as in the privileged classes. Alcoholism is not merely dangerous in relation to mental diseases, but it is a public evil, because it affects different functions of the human being. France, as well as Belgium, holds the record in this matter. The only good use of alcohol is as an anæsthetic to diminish the sensation of fatigue. It also produces a cerebral excitement which *momentarily* antagonizes moral pain, which dissipates annoyances by inducing an artificial quiet, and this is desired with avidity by those who do not know its consequences.

The popular belief that alcohol imparts energy is a gross error. The proof has been given by many experiments during recent years. Alcohol gives strength to no one. Workmen who believe that the use of water enfeebles and that alcohol sustains them for labor give a wrong interpretation to facts. It is true that, if we stop the use of alcohol as a habitual stimulant, we induce feebleness; but the same thing occurs with morphine takers, with whom deprivation of their poison plunges them into a pitiable state. That which we have affirmed of spirits is true of wine and of all other drinks which contain alcohol. The civilization which developed inside of the Græco-Roman world, that of

the Arabs, does not know alcohol and its results, because its legislator and prophet, Mahomet, forbade the use of wine. Alcohol, as Gladstone has said, makes in our day worse ravages than the three historic plagues—famine, pestilence, and war. It decimates beyond the pestilence and famine; it kills more than war; and it does worse than slay—it dishonors. Famine has become rare. Medicine has vanquished the plague. War is an intermittent evil. But alcoholism is a continual and degrading evil. Some nations release themselves from it by energetic measures, but there is need of a similar energy and courage in other nations to annihilate the greatest enemy of the world. To conquer alcoholism would be to reduce the hereditary causes of nervous and mental disorders to a minimum; and to diminish the number of asylums for insanity, crime, vagabondage, and pauperism; and also, consequently, the orphanages, hospitals, and hospices for the aged. This would be a notable contribution to the physical and moral welfare of the people, and to the happiness of numberless families.

Professor Delman, of Rome, has made a very interesting study of *hereditary inebriety*. One woman, named Ada Jaske, born in 1740, deceased at the beginning of this century, was an old drunkard, a thief, and a vagabond. She left a progeny of 834 persons, of whom 709 have been studied in their history. Of this number there have been 106 illegitimate children, 142 mendicants, 64 sustained by charity; 161 women gave themselves to prostitution; 76 members of this family were criminals, and among them seven assassins. In seventy-five years this single family, according to official estimates, has cost for maintenance, expenses of imprisonment, damage, and interest a sum of five million marks!

This statement deserves special notice; it confirms the importance of improving social education. While many governments and other institutions busy themselves with trifles of instruction, and also impose intolerable burdens on teachers who desire progress, they leave untouched the great questions to which we have called attention.

Many physicians to the insane, and they among the most celebrated, have abandoned the prescription of wines and spirits. Other practitioners have ridiculed the assertion that wines are tonics, and declare that they are more hurtful than helpful. Dr. Koch, who has written splendid and immortal works on degeneracy and prophylaxy of mental diseases, insists strongly on the uselessness of wine in therapeutics. Dr. Wearanden and Dr. Toulouse, celebrated French alienists, take the same view. Hereditary neuropaths especially manifest very often inability to endure alcoholic drinks. And since neuropaths are quite numerous, and among them many are predisposed to insanity, it is indispensable that they should abstain from every drink of this nature.

It is important to note here the objection one may make to abstinence from alcoholic liquors for neuropaths. Many of the predisposed remain apparently insensible to alcohol, while in reality this poison unconsciously inflicts upon them ravages which, at a certain stage of the malady, they are powerless to control. One should show himself much more severe in the recommendation of total abstinence when he deals with persons who manifest neuropathic symptoms. It should not be forgotten that generations issued from neuropaths will be more predisposed to insanity if their ancestors have used alcoholic drinks too freely.

At the end of the last century medicine, assuming a scientific character, began to undertake the study of alcoholism. Legions of authors have occupied themselves with this problem, and all without exception agree in recognizing the danger. It is impossible to cite the names of all in that illustrious company of workers and fighters who see in inebriety a menace against the very existence of the rebellious nations.

Dr. Debone, professor of the medical faculty at Paris, has arranged a comparative table of the consumption of alcoholic drinks. He mentions the quantity of such drinks for every 100 inhabitants:

France	-	-	-	14	liters
Belgium	-	-	-	10.50	"
Germany	-	-	-	10.50	"
Great Britain	-	-	-	9.29	"
Switzerland	-	-	-	8.79	"
Italy	-	-	-	6.60	"
Holland	-	-	-	6.29	"
United States	-	-	-	6.10	"
Sweden	-	-	-	4.90	"
Norway	-	-	-	3.00	"
Canada	-	-	-	2.00	"

The same author cites an aspect more serious for France and Belgium. While in many other countries the consumption of alcohol is diminishing, in these countries it follows a rising scale. Thus, while in France in 1830 the rate was 1.1 liters to 100 inhabitants, in 1898 it was 4.54. In Belgium in 1839 it was 3.6 liters, and in 1894 it was 4.7.

In Holland	{ 1876	6.
	{ 1891	4.1
Great Britain	{ 1852	2.8
	{ 1894	2.2
Italy	{ 1880	.85
	{ 1891	.35
Germany	{ 1837	8.2
	{ 1894	4.4
Switzerland	{ 1878	5.2
	{ 1894	2.9
United States	{ 1860	5.75
	{ 1893	2.85

The number of places of sale in France in 1830 was 281,000; in 1897 it was 500,000.

The injury done by alcohol, in addition to causing insanity and degeneration, is proved not only by the medical profession, but also by the insurance companies. It is important to notice these results. M. Jaquet, of Bâle, in a work on the English insurance companies, declares that three companies for insurance against loss of work by reason of sickness have had, between 1884 and 1889, an average of twenty-six weeks of sickness to each individual; while the treasury of the Sons of Temperance, a society which admits only abstainers, has had during the same period only seven weeks of sickness to each individual; an

enormous difference if we consider that the first three companies are not recruited among the intemperate. These happy differences are also found in certain English companies which make a distinction between the temperance section and the general section; the premium is 28 per cent. lower for the abstainers than for the others. These figures have their value because a good part of the results may be involved to prove that alcohol is a cause of degeneration.

In respect to the proportion of insanity caused by alcohol, one cannot appeal to the statistics of Belgium, which in general do not merit much confidence. French tables mention a proportion of 38 per cent. with men and of 12 per cent. with women. It is evident that this is under the truth, since many cases of alcoholism are not officially mentioned. In fact, there are many inebriates who manifest mental disorders without on that account being shut up in asylums; and there are many insane inebriates who, under the influence of alcohol, have become licentious, quarrelsome, ill-tempered evil-doers, but whose troubles are not judged to be important enough to make confinement necessary. Not all these insane inebriates figure in statistics; but we encounter many of them in prisons, workhouses, etc.

Many of these victims might have escaped this destiny by means of a wholesome mode of living, if alcohol had not diminished their power of resistance in their nervous system. If alcohol has not induced in them insanity, there is no doubt that it has subjected the drunkards to a mental defect which they will transmit to their posterity in the form of imbecility, idiocy, moral insanity, hysteria, epilepsy, future inebriety, criminality, etc. It is sufficient to say that the struggle against inebriety is the most certain prophylactic measure, not only against different kinds of mental disease, but also against various other maladies of the body, against crime, vagabondage, mendicity, etc. The prisons swarm with inebriates, as the hospitals and workhouses abound with vagabonds and mendicants. The orphanages count numerous victims of the inebriety of parents, as well as the asylums for the aged. The French attribute a part of the diminution of births to alcoholism, and it would not be difficult to prove the exactness

of their assertions. Dr. Debone, in his chemical lecture on alcoholism, recalled these good words of Plutarch: "Those who wish to approach woman to beget ought to do it before drinking wine, or at least after very moderate use; because those who are begotten of drunken parents ordinarily become drunkards, as Diogenes once said to a disorderly and debauched young man: "Young friend, thy father begot thee in his drunkenness."

Observations made in Belgium and in France contrast in a remarkable way with the statistics where alcoholism is decreasing. In Sweden, from 1830 to 1834, the annual consumption of alcohol being about 23 liters to a person, there were 59 homicides and 2,281 thefts. From 1875 to 1878, the consumption being reduced to 5.5 liters, there were 18 homicides and 1,871 thefts. In Norway in 1814 there were consumed 5 liters to the person; and there were 294 crimes to 100,000 inhabitants; in 1876, the consumption being reduced to 2 liters, there were only 180 crimes. Sweden and Norway, therefore, prove that the reduction of alcoholism reduces crime. Mental alienation and other maladies and vices due to alcohol have also diminished. We regret that we cannot state the figures of this decrease. Inheritance of evils caused by alcohol has not been merely discussed by physicians. Before them the moralists saw in the ancestors merely a bad example. Today physiological heredity is admitted without doubt. Professor Debone proclaims it aloud. Alcoholism destroys the race in two ways: by augmenting mortality or by producing degenerates. The conviction is supported by indisputable figures cited for countries where increase of population is very high. Germany doubles its population in 91 years; Sweden in 89 years; Denmark in 73 years; Austria in 67 years; Norway in 51 years; while France would require 334 years.

What remedies may be proposed for this frightful evil? Debone says they are of two kinds: counsels given individually to those who are willing to hear, and coercive means applicable to all.

INDIVIDUAL COUNSELS.

One does not know how to approve too strongly the wisdom of those who are content to drink pure water. But if one does

not possess this virtue, he can drink hygienic drinks — boiled milk, tea, coffee. Whatever is said, it is not possible to determine the quantity of alcohol which one can drink with impunity, since we must take account of individual susceptibility. That which seems harmless for one is an abuse in another. It is difficult to say when the quantity is innocent, for a slight excess which may not be noticed, even if it does not affect the brain, may expose other parts of the body to serious injuries. Already many physicians drink water, and it is an established fact that in the banquets of physicians the consumption of wine is half that at other banquets. Many physicians have reduced the quantity of alcohol and wine in their perscriptions, and they do not so frequently recommend wine and beer to nursing women.

Alcoholism may be considered one of the capital causes of mental disorders and human degeneracy. It is against this evil that all should labor with united forces and by all means which tend to annihilate it.

Also the societies for preventing the abuse of alcoholic drinks have great reason to be congratulated. In Holland Dr. Buysch, inspector of asylums for the insane, and in Belgium Dr. Frank, have become valiant champions of the noble cause, and have made appeal to woman and have taught her to comprehend the grand part she can take in social reform by contributing to the contest against alcoholism.

Woman is in a position to fulfill the rôle of a protecting angel, capable of covering with her wings those who are unfortunate and of showing them the lofty way of salvation.

GENERAL MEASURES.

Alcoholism being a public danger, it is necessary to use in combating it public measures, that is, laws and reforms which assist in the struggle. It has been proposed to raise to the highest point the duties on alcohol, to increase the price of licences to wine merchants, to limit the number of drinking places, and to forbid the sale of unwholesome drinks. Thus far none of these reforms has succeeded. Candidates as well as electors have an interest in maintaining present conditions. Dr.

Legrain has demonstrated by statistics that in France there are about four millions of inhabitants who derive some profit from the trade in alcoholic drinks. These millions of alcohol dealers, says Dr. Debone, have an admirable understanding with the other millions of alcohol drinkers whose deepest desire is to increase their malady rather than to cure it.

In America, England, Denmark, and Switzerland numerous women of generous hearts have been found to enter the conflict. It is indispensable that the other civilized countries should follow the beautiful example. Woman is able to act as mother, as sister, as friend. In the home which she exalts by order and delicacy she will provide a center of attraction for her husband, her children, her friends. She will be trusted by the friends of the family, and especially by those who are characterized by an orderly life. She will put forth every endeavor to persuade the members of her family and her acquaintances who abuse or are tempted to abuse alcoholic drinks, and, in case of despair of success, will reject those of them to whom she has no special obligation.

Woman will not only by her social position be able to exercise a great influence on her family, but even when heredity has struck the children she may be able, by careful education, to induce total abstinence from alcoholic drinks, to diminish the tendency to degeneration, and to ameliorate the mental and moral life of those who are dear to her. The moment has not come for a radical law against alcoholism. It is necessary to prepare the people by popular writing and conferences. It is necessary to reach the public before knocking at the door of the legislature. The contest with alcoholism should form a part of political programs, for all parties will accept this article when the multitude has once comprehended the permanent danger and destructive nature of this plague. It is necessary that the physicians and public men should make known their opinions far and wide, that there be unanimity among them, and that they affirm the urgent need of measures which tend to restrict the consumption of alcoholic drinks, and to restrict the use of alcoholic drinks to those which are entirely pure.

History teaches us that it is not unreasonable to seek conquest over a vice by suggestions, and condemnation to a legal penalty is one of the most powerful means. The law should authorize the forfeiture of the rights of a father or mother who is an inebriate; this would be a social protective measure of incontestable value, and one which would cause many husbands and wives to reflect.

Dr. Jouffroy divides the alcoholics into several categories: The category of simple drinkers who do not manifest any mental trouble, or any grave visceral lesion. Being strong, they might be helped by a method which would establish an active habit, in a house of abstinence and labor. Among these patients we should find most of the proselytes who, once healed, would go out to speak a good word to others. The second category includes alcoholics affected by mental troubles, and who suffer from affections of the stomach, liver, or kidneys. Dr. Jouffroy proposes to confine the former in asylums of abstinence, and the others in hospitals of abstinence. The celebrated professor of the faculty of medicine at Paris does not recommend sending all the insane alcoholics to a special asylum; but he proposes to send the incurable, the general paralytics, and demented cases into asylums for the insane in order not to crowd the special inebriate houses.

Dr. Sérieux proposes to collect in a single establishment all alcoholics by classes, according to their physical and mental state, even taking account of their social rank and positions.

Dr. Toulouse, in his excellent book, *The Causes of Insanity*, limits himself to recommending, as conditions of admission to a special institution, the absence of mental disorders or their cessation. This measure, says the author, appears at first sight strange, and yet, if one reflects that the purpose of those houses is essentially to correct habitual alcoholics, it is important to undertake this work under the best possible conditions. It is for this reason that most authors agree on the principle that the disturbances provoked by alcohol are curable. When a person is attacked by a subacute alcoholic delirium, he is sequestered. He is subjected at the asylum for the insane to a régime of

abstinence, which is not so rigorous as it will be in an asylum of abstinence, but which is sufficient to permit him to become sound in mind, if this termination of the malady, in a certain cerebral condition, is possible. Observe that so long as he is delirious he usually remains in confinement, where it is difficult to procure alcoholic liquors, at least in quantity to bring on his disorder. When he is cured comes the moment to send him to a special asylum, where he will be an abstainer, and where he will learn to form habits which will assure against future falls.

The asylum for abstinents, says Dr. Magnan, ought to be a field of suggestion. The physician and his assistants, the employés and nurses, ought to give the example and should drink water alone. It is important that there should be no discordant note, no jesting from any source, to interfere with the action of treatment. The reading of papers, conversation, conferences, all ought to be employed to strike the attention of the sick and to reassure their good resolutions. And when they go out, the treatment is only begun, not completed. It belongs then to another institution, to boards of relief, to help and watch over them.

Awaiting further legislative measures, the temperance societies are doing vast good, and in several countries of Europe their number and influence increase from day to day, and their crusades are by no means near the end. It is necessary to arouse from indifference members of the higher social classes. The inferior classes will not be long in following them.

We merely remind the reader of the abuses of morphine and other drugs which contribute to the increase of insanity. The remedy here is easily found. It would be sufficient to impose a fine on all druggists who dispense such medicines without the prescription of a physician.¹

RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS.

Religious education should be conducted with moderation,

¹ In America the suppression of patent medicines, cigarettes, etc., containing cocaine, opium, alcohol, etc., should be made part of this movement to prevent insanity.—C. R. H.

especially with young children, boys as well as girls. Too frequently certain children, at a moment when the intelligence and judgment are still far from maturity of mental powers, are surfeited with devotional exercises, and their faculties are held to a given point, to the neglect of instruction in other duties to which all men are called. In a general manner education ought to fit for a life in the different directions which people must follow here below in order to occupy with dignity their places in society. Education insufficient for these purposes renders a man incomplete and unhappy and exposed to the inconveniences which occur from imperfection in the education of the senses. Many times the obstacles arising from education have disturbed the nervous system of men, and the asylums for the insane inclose many such victims. Religion should be taught practically and should not be introspective. Many persons trouble their brains with ideas they cannot follow; they feel disturbed and they often disturb others trying to find solutions which cannot be discovered.

CHOICE OF A CAREER.

Young men gradually arrive at an age which requires a certain preoccupation, the choice of a career, of a profession. Girls generally manifest this preoccupation in a less degree. This preoccupation may increase when the parents do not give care to the matter and do not help the children in making a choice. Often by force of circumstances a happy situation of the parents takes away the difficulty. But in another situation, what can be done? Even then the selection is easy if the young man is well endowed physically and mentally; but if any hereditary or acquired defect exists, the choice becomes more difficult, and demands not only all the attention of relatives and educators, but also of the person interested. Any profession which involves great responsibilities ought to be discarded. The future is to be considered and the obstacles which will be met. Very frequently one has seen men succumb who had not a nervous system vigorous enough to cope with the difficulties of the profession. A really nervous man ought to make choice of a

position which permits him every day several hours of repose from nervous fatigue.

MARRIAGE.

Marriage is another important point in the question of preventing insanity. How many young people, consulting merely their own feelings, permit themselves to glide into a union without dreaming of the consequences! They consult neither their parents, family, nor physician! And if their views are asked, often it is too late; the counsels are not heeded; and views opposed to their own are received with bad grace.

It would be an error to believe that one must dissuade from marriage everyone who counts an insane person in the family. We should affirm that there is serious reason for consideration, and it is important in such circumstances that an intelligent physician, accustomed to make psychical examinations, should be informed of the case and express his personal opinion. It too often happens that nervous persons incline to select those who have the same temperament, and that they prefer members of their own family to strangers, whom they do not dare to approach. The danger increases when cousins have parents who have become insane.

A member of a neuropathic family ought to enjoy good health, and should marry a person in strong health, and one whose family has given no reason to suspect any trace of mental disturbance or degeneration. A neuropathic girl should not marry any man who has not a good position and resources sufficient to exclude from the future all reasons for anxiety which might prejudice the material life. The obligation of duty to care for material interests of existence depresses a man who could easily have endured the struggle for life if he could have lived continually in normal circumstances. In addition to all the moral trouble and all the emotions so frequent with married people who are nervous, it is necessary to add another cause of debilitation with women—that is, the too rapid succession of births, which induces physical and mental weakness, and consequently a strong tendency to mental alienation. This is not

only true with those predisposed to insanity, but also with women entirely free from the taint, who from too frequent confinements pay their tribute to insanity.

Certain rather radical spirits wish to legislate on questions of marriage, and to prevent it in the case of those who manifest any hereditary trace. It is certain that with certain persons one could predict the future heredity; but, in considering this vital question, would it be necessary to tarnish the entire family? The solution of this problem is never possible, since we can never fix precisely the heredity of ascendants or the transmission to descendants. With neuropathic parents there may be children who cannot in advance be pronounced tainted, because special precautions have been taken with the physical and psychical education, or there may be among them one or two exceptions where heredity has not been overcome. It should be said decidedly that it is impossible to prove that the procreation of neuropathic, hysterical, and epileptic persons, etc., will be necessarily a procreation of beings who will become insane.

Families careful for their children and desirous of preventing all unhappiness in future generations have at their disposition the physician, who, being consulted on the subject, is able to offer good guarantees after a searching examination. The modern conception of individual liberty never will permit the state to interpose, if either of the persons proposing marriage frankly declares before marriage that certain serious defects have existed in the family. If, on the contrary, a secret is guarded before marriage, the situation changes, and in this case the law ought to authorize divorce for the reason of deception in the contract of marriage. Such unions have naturally as a consequence the production of beings more or less incapable of providing for the maintenance of their existence, of beings sick or degenerate, who remain a charge upon their parents or who must be intrusted to public charity. Such marriages must lead to pauperism. It is not admissible that one of the married pair inflict on the other moral suffering and material sacrifices without being able to appeal to legal measures which impose on the affianced the duty of making reciprocal declarations, when they know

the existence of hereditary or acquired defects, and that without the pain of divorce which the deceived persons might demand. Dr. Toulouse adds that it would be necessary to protect this declaration against indiscreet use by formally interdicting any publication of it. Dr. Toulouse follows this suggestion with other reflections which arise naturally when one seeks means of preventing pathological surprises in marriage. Why not treat marriage somewhat like a contract analogous to that made by a life-insurance company? Companies of this kind impose on their clients a visit from their physicians, who are thus bound by the professional confidence. Marriage also is a contract. Why should not the parties submit themselves to the same obligation? The fear of a medical visit would break off many a negotiation which would issue in a regrettable union.

Sentiments of generosity, certainly hurtful to the welfare of the species, have introduced into the law of divorce, at least in France and Belgium, an article indicating that insanity may not be invoked as a cause of final separation. We should render homage to the good intentions of the legislator who has desired to protect the unfortunate. And yet, at the higher point of view of social defense, and of the prosperity of the nation, this sentiment is certainly not dangerous; but, without desiring that we should entirely reject this philanthropic measure, it might be possible to demand that alcoholics, hardened drunkards who had been condemned for drunkenness or shut up in asylums for the insane several times, should be deprived of their marital right in some degree, and power given to the consort to be freed. The legacy of alcoholism is frightful: candidates for insanity, hysteria, epilepsy, idiocy, criminality, etc., etc.

Education, which includes the environment, would form in this study a very important chapter, if time and space permitted expansion. From cradle to tomb man is subject without cessation to the influence of his surroundings, which increase or diminish his happiness according to the character of the influence and his physical and mental constitution. Even supposing that there is no hereditary taint, no physical poisoning which could induce a certain degree of degeneration, the

influence of the environment may contribute to modify sensibly the nervous system, and to disturb the brain. To cite only one example of the highest order: there are nations which degenerate because they are subject to the influence of a journalism which looks more to personal interest, or to the interest of a party, than to the general interest, that of the entire community.

The external world is full of enemies who tend without ceasing to break down our psychical and moral faculties, as there are foes hidden in our own bodies. The nervous system of man is accessible to a series of injurious causes, and if one part is able to resist with some ease, the other is smitten, and disease ensues. Man must consider the harmful causes that he may prepare himself for the struggle for existence, that he may learn to vanquish the unhappy forces which tend unceasingly to bring him to ruin. We have cited some striking examples when we mentioned alcoholism, undue intellectual labor of children, excessive religious instruction, etc. These exogenous causes may be complicated with endogenous causes which we can name only in a general way; their full description would require a too great extension of this paper. It must suffice to mention the influence of a series of somatic maladies upon the psychical state.

Among the persons who offer the greatest access to mental maladies it is necessary to mention, in the first place, those whose nervous system suffers from birth or from the time of a sickness; and among the nervous troubles which show the greatest predisposition we include neurasthenia, epilepsy, hysteria, chorea, and the tendency to suicide. To this list we must add the people who show constitutional debility or any disease which ends in an exhaustion of physical and nervous force — as tuberculosis, cancer, chloro-anæmia, rachitis, and scurvy. A second category of the predisposed is met in persons whose brain remains incompletely developed, as in the morally insane, imbeciles, idiots, and their offspring. A special treatment is required for each disease, as well for physical as for intellectual and moral education, to provide resistance power against all which may endanger the nervous system. The struggle must be perpetual. For the

elimination of causes is the only prophylactic measure. Mental maladies are continually increasing with the advance of civilization, because this contributes much to the debilitation of the nervous system.

Unhappily it is not possible to the families of the predisposed and to educators to react with sufficient intensity against all the debilitating causes. We have seen in the course of this paper that a good part of the victory must belong to government; it is to those who are responsible for the making of laws for the solution of social questions that we look for the amelioration and happiness of the people. The egoistic interests of political parties ought to give place to social interests, and without wise and devoted protectors governments will continue to expend millions without profit to the people.

Governments neglect too much the light of the arts and, above all, of those who understand the moral hygiene of the masses. Let them abandon their egoistic aims; let them cease to cling to mere personal views; let them go to learn of those who understand the unhappy situation of millions of men who, from not having met in their way benefactors and truly honest guides, finish by falling into physical and moral misery, ending in insanity.

Here we terminate our work. We did not start out to treat the problem of prophylaxy of insanity in a complete manner. We have attacked it only on one side, the social side. Even in this aspect we might mention various gaps, but we are restricted by the length of our article. Yet the reader can see that we have touched the more important points of a social view which ought to be familiar to all who have at heart the progress of society. Perhaps some day each one of these aspects may be studied in this JOURNAL in more ample extension. Society would gain much by giving more active attention to these questions, whose solution would contribute to the amelioration of the human species and to its preservation from many miseries. Prevention is better than cure, and if there should ever come a day for the extinction of the greater part of the causes which engender mental disease and degeneration, the medical alienist would

play an important part. The causes can never be radically suppressed; they are too numerous. The nineteenth century has certainly multiplied and aggravated them. May the twentieth century profit by the miseries of this which will soon come to an end.

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PROLEGOMENA TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

III.

THE NATURE AND TASK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE chief distinction between individual and social psychology is simply one of point of view. The point of view in the one is the individual, in the other the social group. There are other distinctions, but this is the fundamental one. Were it possible to explain everything while maintaining the standpoint of the individual, there would be no demand for and no need of a social psychology. But throughout the organic world group-life is a fact no less tangible and real than individual life. If from one point of view it is possible to see only individuals in the world, from another, and not less objective, point of view it is possible to see only social groups in which the individual appears as an element. Likewise, in the realm of psychical phenomena, we may consider either the psychical life of the individual or the psychical life of the group in which the individual life has its being. Both points of view are necessary for any adequate understanding of human life on its psychical side; they are supplementary to each other, and yield a science which is philosophically a unity. The separation of social from individual psychology is, then, wholly a matter of convenience; merely a division of labor which in no way implies a dualism between the two branches of the science. When the center of interest lies in explaining the psychical life of the group, many facts come into view which in explaining the mental life of the individual are unimportant or not prominent. On this account the existence of social psychology as a separate discipline is justified as a matter of practical convenience, although logically it is but a branch of the general science of psychology.

The individual cannot be isolated from the group in the real world, nor the group from the individual. They are related as the part is to the whole, as the cell is to the organism. Knowledge

of the one is necessary to the understanding of the other; and it is only the possibility of two points of view, of two centers of interest, which makes possible any division of labor between the psychology which considers the individual and the psychology which studies the group-life. So long as the center of interest is in the individual—in explaining his psychical constitution, activities, and development—we are in the field of individual psychology, no matter what the subject-matter that we are dealing with objectively may be. But whenever the center of interest is in the group, in explaining its organization, activities, and development, we are in the field of social psychology. Thus, individual psychology has a perfect right to consider the psychical life of the group in order to throw light upon the individual mind; while social psychology must study the individual, because the whole with which it deals is a complex made up of individual elements. An illustration from the history of biological science may serve to make our meaning clearer. At one time it was thought that in order to understand the organism it was necessary only to study the cell; that from the nature of the cell the development, structure, and activities of the whole organism could be explained. It is now generally admitted, however, that the organism cannot be explained from the point of view of the cell alone, but that the point of view of the organism as a whole must also be taken if we are to understand many things concerning its structure and development. The organism is no longer regarded merely as the sum of cellular activities, but rather as a single process. Thus, modern biology studies the organism as a functional unity as well as an aggregation of cells, using the one point of view to supplement the other. The analogous development in the history of the social sciences need hardly be pointed out. Individualism has assumed to be able fully to explain society from the nature of the individual; but gradually it has been perceived that society itself must be regarded as an organic, functioning unity before the social process can be understood. As to its origin, then, social psychology is simply an expression of the need of considering the social process on its subjective side from the standpoint of

the social whole, just as individual psychology is an expression of the need of understanding the subjective nature of the individual.

If the above positions are correct, it is evident that the only social psychology which is possible is a psychology of the activities and development of the social group, a "functional psychology of the collective mind," as we shall see later that it may be termed. The genesis of the social feelings in the individual cannot possibly be made the subject-matter of social psychology, as some recent writers have attempted to do,¹ if it be once admitted that individual psychology has the right to exploit the whole universe in order to explain the psychical nature of the individual. Nor can the psychology of the behavior of an individual in the presence of another of its own species be called social psychology, for the same reason. Both of these important fields of research, belonging as they do to individual psychology, must be carefully distinguished from social or group psychology, if the latter is not to be involved in unnecessary confusion with the former. Nevertheless, in these two provinces of investigation individual psychology approaches closely to the proper territory of social psychology, and there can be little profit in trying to set up a hard and fast boundary between them, since the one science is necessarily dependent upon the other for completeness of view.

While social psychology may be thus comparatively easily

¹ See especially an article on "Social Psychology and Sociology," by GUSTAVO TOSTI, in the *Psychological Review* for July, 1898. Dr. Tosti seems to recognize the weakness of his position, for he says: "Social psychology is to be conceived as a mere name for a chapter of [individual] genetic psychology." It could not, indeed, be otherwise; for a science studying the rise and growth of the "social state of mind" could not be isolated from general genetic psychology. What we have called "social psychology," however — viz., the law of the phenomena dependent upon the interaction of individual minds — Dr. Tosti calls "sociology." He even goes so far as to speak of the work of Lazarus and Steinthal as distinctively sociological rather than psychological. The quarrel can be, therefore, only one about names; for Dr. Tosti evidently means by "sociology" exactly what we mean by "social psychology." But with a recent writer in this JOURNAL (Vol. IV, p. 671, note) we would like to suggest, *à propos* of such attempts to confine sociology to the consideration of purely psychological phenomena, that biological sociology "may one day wreak a poetic vengeance upon those who are so fond of proclaiming its defunct condition."

differentiated from individual psychology, it would seem less easy to differentiate it from sociology. Is not this psychology of the functioning and development of social groups, it may be asked, just what is meant by sociology? Is not a psychological interpretation of the social process the only "sociology" attainable? Many writers are inclined to answer such questions in the affirmative, but from our point of view the answer is plainly negative. Sociology seeks an all-sided interpretation of the social process, while social psychology gives but a one-sided interpretation. Sociology seeks a complete view of the life of society, and, therefore, considers objective quite as much as subjective factors; it turns to biology as much as to psychology for the explanation of societary facts; it is a synthetic, philosophic discipline which seeks to reach the widest generalizations concerning the life of society through a synthesis of the results of special sciences. Sociology, in brief, is social philosophy, and is no more to be identified with the special sciences from which it draws its materials than general philosophy is to be identified with a summation of the results of the special sciences. Social psychology, on the other hand, deals with but one aspect of the social reality, namely, the psychical life of social groups. It is a special science, though fundamental to all the other special social sciences on their subjective side, just as the biological "theory of population," or demography, may be considered fundamental to them on their objective side. As the fundamental subjective science of society, social psychology is one of the most important elements in that final synthesis of subjective and objective societary facts which sociology seeks to effect.

The beginnings of social psychology as a scientific discipline are to be found in the *Völkerpsychologie* of Lazarus and Steinthal. But the ambiguity¹ in the German word, as well as the semi-mystical philosophy associated with it by some, are not to be

¹ "Völkerpsychologie" is often, *e. g.*, interpreted to mean "race-psychology." But, according to our position, there evidently could be a "race-psychology" only if the race be supposed to form in some sense a single society, a functional whole. Again, if by "Völkerpsychologie" is meant "the comparative psychology of races," it is evidently merely a chapter in genetic psychology, and is not "social psychology," as we have defined the science.

carried over into the modern science. Social psychology, though not disclaiming or ashamed of its origin, must claim a process of growth; as a conception, at least, it has been constantly increasing in clearness and definiteness with the development of the general science of which it forms a branch. In the meanwhile, there has grown up also from the *Völkerpsychologie* of Lazarus and Steinthal a science which studies the socio-psychical phenomena of primitive and savage peoples. This is modern folk-psychology. It may be roughly conceived as being related to social psychology in general as child-psychology is to individual psychology. At any rate, it seeks to find among the so-called nature peoples the simplest beginnings of the complex socio-psychological phenomena of modern societies.

The field of social psychology may be thus marked off with sufficient clearness from other fields of psychological investigation; but the question, some may say, remains whether there is any portion or aspect of reality which corresponds to the territory assigned to the science; whether or not social psychology is anything more than an imaginary, fictitious science without a basis of facts. Hitherto in our discussion it has been assumed that the psychical life of society is such an evident aspect of reality as to be hardly needful of any special process of proof; and such we hold it to be. But the question is, of course, a legitimate one, and demands formal consideration. Is there, then, a collective psychical life, in which the psychical life of the individual is but a constitutive element? Or is the psychical life of society but a figment of the speculative imagination of sociologists; a name for the mere sum total of individual psychical phenomena, not itself an organized unity? In answer to such questions the older social psychologists have rightly pointed to such phenomena as public opinion, the *Zeitgeist*, national ideals, customs, and institutions, language, tradition, and mythologies. They have shown that these are organic growths, and in no sense mere summations or averages of the psychical expressions of individuals. They are, that is, products of a common life which is organically unified, though constituted of individual elements. Without group-life, without a general life-process which includes

all the individual lives of the group, these socio-psychical products could not possibly have arisen. The *Zeitgeist*, for example, is not merely an expression of individual interests and activities; it is much more an expression of the interest and activities of the national or cultural group as a whole. If it rested upon purely individual interests, it would be without a principle of organization and could not manifest those uniformities of development which have been so often noted by philosophers and historians. It is inconceivable, indeed, that any of the phenomena we have mentioned should either arise or exist unless there is some general process back of them which includes and organically interrelates the psychical processes of individuals. The conclusion, therefore, is that there could be no such phenomena as public opinion, the *Zeitgeist*, tradition, social ideals, and the like, if the individuals of a social group were psychically autonomous and independent. But if there is a general social psychical process of which these phenomena are the expressions, then there can be no objection to examining the method or technique of that process; and this constitutes the ample field of investigation for social psychology.

Another argument that has been used to prove the reality of the psychical life of social groups, and especially of nations, has been the appeal to direct experience. Every traveler, even under the homogeneous conditions of modern western civilization, has noted the immense difference between the psychical atmosphere of one country and that of another. He has found on crossing national boundaries, not only different institutions, customs, and beliefs, but he has found different ways of thinking, a different philosophy of life, different ideals, motives, and interests, all so fundamentally at variance with his own, and yet so uniformly manifested throughout the national group, as to suggest that nations as well as individuals have a psychical life, distinct from that of all other nations. These facts have been expressed in such sayings as, "Every nation is a state of mind," and in the common attribution of individuality to states. Of course, the appeal to direct experience in this case proves nothing; it is only worthy of note because it indicates some truth

lying back of the perceptions. The perception that a nation is an individuality, indeed, may be found to have more than a mere metaphorical basis.

But the real proof of the existence of socio-psychical processes is found in the fact that social groups *act*, that they are functional unities capable of making inner and outer adjustments. The fact that the activities of individuals are constantly coördinated into larger group-acts or activities, and that these group-activities vary and succeed one another according to observed uniformities, like the acts of an individual, necessitates the supposition of some principle of organization. This principle of organization can be no other on the psychological side than a psychical process which extends throughout the group and unifies it—though set up, of course, by the psychical interaction of its individual elements. It may be doubted if any group-act can take place without such a principle of organization. Even the simple impulsive reaction of a nation to an injury by a foreign foe presupposes an organized life; and if organized at all, then necessarily on its psychical side. The fact that societies are functional wholes, then, is the fact upon which all proof of the existence of socio-psychical processes must rest; for upon it depends the whole series of phenomena which social psychology investigates—social organization, social institutions, customs, tradition, language, public opinion, etc. Every recognition of the fact that societies are functional unities carries with it implicitly the recognition of the reality of socio-psychical processes. The effort of all sociological writers, for example, has been to prove the reality of a social process, while of late an increasing number have striven to show that this process is essentially or predominantly a psychical one. Thus the reality of socio-psychical processes has been implicitly recognized; and there can be no more objection to framing a science to investigate their technique or mechanism than there is to a science of the technique of individual psychical processes. Such a science is, indeed, inevitable, call it what we may, sociology or social psychology, although the latter name will seem preferable to those who hold, with the writer, that the science is a part of general psychology.

We have styled social psychology the science of the mechanism or technique of socio-psychical processes. Just as individual psychology does not investigate directly the psychical elements of individual consciousness, but rather the mechanism of psychical processes, so the task of social psychology is to examine, not public opinion, language, customs, institutions, and the like, as products of the collective psychical life, but the mechanism of the socio-psychical processes through which these products arise and change. This is no arbitrary limitation of the field of social psychology, but a necessity. Just as it has been found in individual psychology that only the mechanism of psychical processes can be reduced to scientific formulation, so it will be found in social psychology. The work of the latter, then, is the formulation of the method of socio-psychical processes. If it be asked with what portion of the psychical nature of the individual social psychology will particularly deal, when the group is regarded as constituted of individual elements rather than as a unity, the answer is, with the instinctive, impulsive, affective side of the individual. The reason for this reply is plain. The intellectual side of the individual represents the choice of means and, therefore, can be, without danger to the group, individual; but the impulsive, affective side represents the choice of ends, and, therefore, must be, and is, organized more fully into the life of the group. The impulsive, habitual, emotional side of the life of the individual, in other words, is normally submerged, as it were, in the life of his group; while the rational, cognitive side is left freer and so is more peculiarly individual. Social psychology, accordingly, will deal especially with the former, in so far as it considers the individual as an element in the social whole; and while it may not encroach upon the field of individual psychology in its consideration of the impulsive, affective side of the individual, it is just here that an enrichment of the latter science may be expected from the development of a social psychology.

We do not shrink from stating and defending the parallelism between the individual and society which has been freely implied throughout the argument of this series of papers. The

parallelism is of course a functional one, not structural. Like any other parallelism observed in nature, it is good only as far as it goes; it is scientifically useful as a clue in discovery, but it ought not to be converted into a dogma to which all facts are made to conform. The parallelism between the psychical life of the individual and that of society is not a new perception, but has long been made use of by social thinkers. It has recently been restated by Professor Baldwin as a parallelism in functioning and in development¹—the only form, it seems to us, in which it is defensible. Some parallelism between the individual and society is, indeed, almost a necessity of thought. Every attempt to apply psychology in the interpretation of history implies such parallelism. A nation can only be thought of as a functional unity, and so in some sense as an individuality, if thought of as a whole; therefore, any psychological principle which may be used to interpret some movement, some period of development or transformation, in its history will necessarily be a principle which will apply equally to the life of the individual. Hence those who are quickest to deny all parallelism between the individual and society will be found, nevertheless, implying such parallelism in their interpretations of history.

Social psychology, then, in regarding social groups as functional unities, necessarily regards them as individualities or individuals. It does not say that they are individuals; it is not called upon to enter upon the metaphysical question as to what constitutes an individual. It holds to the empirical standpoint, and merely says that *for purposes of interpretation* social groups may be regarded as individuals, because they are found to exhibit the same general laws of function and development. But, while a parallelism in functioning and development may be demonstrable, the social psychologist must ever bear in mind the vast difference between the psychical life of the individual and that of society, especially on the side of structure. The psychical life of the individual is highly unified, both structurally and functionally. In all the higher reaches of organic life individual organisms usually present a unified consciousness;

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, pp. 512-15, 521-3.

but social groups present no such unified consciousness. In them consciousness is discrete, resident in the individual elements, not in a specially differentiated organ. They are, structurally, then, of a much lower type than their individual elements. A socio-psychical process is possible only through the psychical interaction of the individual elements. The unity of the socio-psychical process, therefore, is almost purely a functional one. The failure to perceive clearly this truth and its implication, that the parallelism between the psychical life of the individual and that of society is almost wholly on the functional side, has been, in our estimation, the cause of much of the unreality and seeming absurdity of many attempted social psychologies in the past.

In all that has just been said the organic nature of society is plainly implied. The psychical parallelism asserted between the individual and the social group may, indeed, from one point of view, be regarded as a corollary of the theory that the social group is an organism. We are evidently, then, under the burden of defending the organic theory of society. Just at present this theory is in disrepute, perhaps justly so, because of the absurd extremes to which it has been carried by some of its supporters. But that society is an organism, in the broad sense of that term, no one who has examined all the facts in the case can reasonably doubt. The organic nature of the societal life is as much a fact as the chemical nature of physiological processes, and is just as demonstrable. Properly understood, the proposition should be indeed self-evident. The arguments in favor of this view have been ably stated by several writers,¹ and need not be repeated here; but one or two points may be noted. One is the well-known biological fact that the tendency of living matter is to assume functional, and so organic, relations with other living matter with which it comes into contact. Probably it was thus that multicellular forms arose from the original unicellular forms. Now, it would seem that this principle would continue to act in the case of multicellular forms coming into more or less functional contact with each other through living together in groups. We should expect the individuals of the group to become organically related among themselves, and the group as

¹ See especially MACKENZIE'S *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, chap. iii.

a whole to become so organized as to constitute in a very real sense a low type of organism; and this is exactly what we find. Again, the organic nature of the life of the species is conceded by all biological thinkers; yet the arguments which are used to support this truth could be used with double their force in defense of the theory of the organic nature of societary life. And it is safe to say that no more is meant in principle in the one case than in the other. The organic nature of society is, indeed, the presupposition upon which all social science rests. A science of societary activities, as distinct from a science of individual activities, is absurd if society does not constitute an organic unity. The opposition to the organic theory of society comes from those who are anxious to emphasize the psychical side of the social process. They fail to see that that process could have no psychical side if it were not fundamentally an organic process; that society as a psychical fact presupposes society as an organic fact. The answer to those who wish to regard society merely as a "psychological organization" is, then, that all psychological organization presupposes biological organization.¹

While social psychology must rest upon the organic nature of society as the presupposition of all its investigations, it must distinguish carefully between the fact of the organic nature of society and analogies with biological organisms which may as often be misleading as helpful. The differences between social groups and biological organisms are obvious, and fundamental. Not only are the latter more highly unified, both structurally and functionally, than the former, but there is also a qualitative difference. In the biological organism consciousness is resident in the organism as a whole, while in the social group consciousness is resident in the individual elements, giving these a large degree of autonomy. The result is that, while in the biological organism the principle of organization is entirely physiological, in social groups the principle of organization tends to become more and more psychological as we pass from lower to higher stages of development. In the lowest societies of the animal world only the physiological principle of organization is visible,

¹ Cf. MARSHALL, *Instinct and Reason*, p. 183.

but when we reach the human plane, artificial groups, as it were, based upon interests, purposes, etc., appear within the natural, genetic groups. Although these "artificial" groups are relatively unstable, compared with the genetic groups within which they appear, yet their persistence for considerable periods shows how largely the organization of human society has become psychological rather than physiological. It would, indeed, be easy to show that in the most advanced human societies the principle of organization is predominantly psychological. Human society may, therefore, with propriety be styled a psychical organism¹ — a term which has the advantage of implying at once the organic nature of its life and the dominance of the psychological over the physiological principle of organization. The social psychologist cannot go far astray with such a picture before the mind's eye to guide him in his investigation and reasoning.

The value of a social psychology worked out from the point of view of society as a functioning whole, as a "psychical organism," may be questioned. But the value of any science lies in what it can do. What such a social psychology can do in the way of explaining the life of society, and ultimately in contributing principles for the guidance of practical social activity, is the only answer to those who question the value of the science. We have tried to show in a former paper what social psychology can do in the way of explaining a few of the phenomena of society; but its full value and justification as a science will be evident only when it can show the technique of the entire socio-psychical process. When it can do this, it will be among the most practical of the sciences, and will win the gratitude of humanity, even as the physical sciences have done. The social psychologist seeks no other justification of his labors than such a practical result; and until it is attained he has faith enough in his science to be willing "to labor and to wait."

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¹ The expression "psychological organization," used by Professor Baldwin, seems to us less happy, not only for the reason noted in the text, but because the word "organization" is often used to imply a *voluntarily* formed association, and so smacks of the old contract theory of society.

THE MONOGRAPH OF THE COMMUNITY.¹

IN a former paper² it has been shown that the problems presented by the family can be studied to best advantage in the home. The status of wife, children, and elders; the economic habits; the morals and customs of daily life—these and similar matters should be investigated from a position within the circle of the home itself. Again³ it was claimed that, if a satisfactory statement is to be had of the various questions pertaining to trade organization, division of labor, the relations between employer and employed, scales of wages and prices, adjustment of grievances, etc., etc., the conditions prevailing within the walls of the factory and the workshop may not be overlooked. But with still greater emphasis must it be insisted that the inner nature of the problems of population, immigration, emigration, size of property holdings, centralization of industry, etc., cannot be fully comprehended without a careful study of the individual community.⁴ There lies here a most promising field of research for those who desire to examine closely the fundamental factors of associate life before it has assumed more complex forms; and it is to promote and guide inquiry in this direction that, together with the schedule for the monograph of the family and that for the monograph of the workshop, the schedule for the monograph of the community has been prepared.

However indispensable to the value of the first and the second of the three monographs above mentioned a uniform outline, or schedule, of methods and subjects of investigation may be, it is, if possible, still more necessary to the value of the monograph of the community. The field of phenomena to be observed is larger; the phenomena themselves are of greater complexity and variety. If the investigators of different communities do not confine their labors to the general limits of a uniform outline, their respective researches will take as many

¹From the original article by M. CHEYSSON in *La Réforme sociale* of December 16, 1896. Translated for the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY by RALPH G. KIMBLE.

²See this JOURNAL, Vol. II, pp. 662 ff.

³See *La Réforme sociale*, December 1, 1896.

⁴The word "community" used here and elsewhere in this article is the French *commune* somewhat broadly and adaptively translated.

different directions as there are different personalities among themselves. There could only result from such a course a number of isolated studies possessing a certain value as independent products, but quite incapable of being compared with each other in such manner as to furnish a basis for trustworthy induction. But if the investigators follow a uniform schedule, these local monographs, each preserving its individual flavor, will have been cast in a common mold, and will therefore be comparable with each other. They will readily lend themselves to fruitful coördinations, and thus furnish ground for general conclusions by which the true significance of seemingly aberrant phenomena may be more readily determined.

The schedule for the monograph of the family was given by Le Play himself. But in the absence of a schedule especially adapted to the purposes of the monograph of the workshop, the present writer was emboldened to take the initiative in proposing one designed to supply the deficiency. Like conditions have led him to make the attempt to perform a like service for the monograph of the community. The schedule presented below has already been submitted to several learned societies and has been encouragingly received.¹ Partly because of the nature of these receptions it is again submitted in this place, not as a finished thing, but as a rough outline, criticism upon which is earnestly requested from all who believe in the real value of such researches.

Before giving the full text of the schedule it may be well to put before the reader a brief outline of its main features. A short but comprehensive survey of a community's past is of great advantage in enabling one to gain a thorough understanding of its present. In confining oneself too closely to the present there is a certain danger of missing the historical and logical relations of facts, and of mistaking for fortuitous accidents phenomena having a legitimate origin in conditions prevalent in former days. Hence the advisability of prefacing the monograph proper by a historical introduction embracing the following chapters: (1) *General history*.—Here is set forth whatever is of historical interest in the part which the community in question has played in the great movements of the national life. (2) *Demographic*

¹In 1896 the Société des Agriculteurs de France, after making a thorough examination of M. Cheysson's schedule, approved it and offered a prize of a thousand francs to be given to the author of the best monograph prepared under the specifications of the schedule during the year. For a full report of the results of the contest thus instituted see the article by M. Cheysson, himself the secretary of the awarding committee, in *La Réforme sociale* of August 16 and September 1, 1897.

history.—Under this head are described the chief facts concerning the population of the community in the past, noting carefully deaths, marriages, births (legitimate and illegitimate), together with the force and direction of the currents of migration. Wherever feasible, an attempt should be made to state the causes of variations in these phenomena. (3) *Economic history*.—This should include, for the period covered, an account of the changes in the distribution of wealth, in the methods of developing and exploiting natural resources, and a record of the price fluctuations of the principal commodities produced by the community. (4) *Social history*.—This chapter affords a brief summary of the transformations wrought in the conditions of rural life and in the people's customs, habits, and standards of living.

Following the historical introduction, which will be more or less exhaustive according to the personal inclinations of the student and the quantity of material at his command, comes the monograph itself—a detailed account of the actual present condition of the community. Here will be met for the second time the majority of the problems first encountered in the preliminary survey; but instead of passing them before the mind in rapid review, and with a minimum of attention, they are now made the objects of minute and prolonged investigation based upon the student's personal observation of men and things as they exist in the community in question.

After having surveyed the past in the introduction, and taken an inventory of the present in the body of the monograph, the author may, if he desires, add a sort of epilogue to his work in the shape of a last chapter, in which he can set forth the general conclusions to which he has come as a result of his studies, present his suggestions as to the proper remedies for the evils he may have discovered, and prescribe the reforms which in his judgment would conduce to the peace and prosperity of the community. He may even go farther, if he feels so inclined, and hazard whatever prophecy concerning the future may seem to him warranted by the circumstances of the case.

THE SCHEDULE: *Historical introduction*.—1. *General history of the community*.—2. *Demographic history*.—Births: legitimate, illegitimate. Marriages.—Deaths.—Movement of population.—Emigration, immigration.—Distribution by occupation.—3. *Economic history*.—Division of property.—Methods of cultivation.—Particular usages.—Crops cultivated.—Distribution of crops.—Cleared lands.—Price of land.—Rents.—Price of commodities.—Difficulties besetting agricultural production.—Markets.—Mode of marketing products.—Agricultural associations.—4. *Social history*.—

Characteristics of food, clothing, and shelter.—Morals.—Habits of thrift.—Intemperance.—Indigent members of the community, methods of dealing with.—Charitable institutions.—Societies for mutual aid and improvement.

Analysis of present conditions of the community.—1. *Physical description.*—Situation, climate, soil, moisture.—Means of access to community.—2. *The population.*—Distribution according to age, sex, occupation, and civil status.—3. *Emigration and immigration.*—Currents of emigration; their causes; their direction; their results; do the emigrants return to the community?—Currents of immigration; are they intermittent, periodic, or constant?—4. *Division of property.*—Enumeration of holdings classified as to size.—Ease and frequency with which property ownership is transferred from one person to another.—Sales and executions.—Property held in common.—5. *Methods of management and operation, i. e.,* renting, "on shares," cash, etc.—6. *Different crops cultivated by the population.*—7. *Instruction in agriculture.*—Experiment stations.—Agricultural conferences, etc.—8. *Local industries, i. e.,* other than agriculture.—9. *Methods of remunerating labor.*—Payment in money, in kind, variations in methods due to differing seasons, occupations, etc.—Scarcity or abundance of day labor.—10. *Conditions of the agricultural population* with regard to food, clothing, shelter, etc., of the various classes.—11. *Economic rewards.*—Price of agricultural products and of supplies needed by the population; general economic conditions.—12. *Agricultural associations* of various kinds; for production and sale of products, purchase of supplies, etc.—13. *Frugality and provident habits.*—Institutions for the promotion of thrift and economy.—14. *Methods and means of caring for the dependent, defective, and delinquent members of the community.*—15. *Religious and ethical status of the population*—moral ideals and characteristics.—16. Relations of each class in the community to the others, *i. e.,* between landowners and tenants, the poor and the wealthy, etc.—General welfare of the community and its probable future.

At first thought this schedule may seem somewhat too ambitious. Its proportions are vast, its divisions are vague; but with regard to the divisions, it may be noted that in any given instance they will not all be of equal importance. The schedule, with its divisions, might be likened to an *escritoire* with its numerous drawers and pigeonholes. These various compartments retain their relation to each other and to the whole, yet the user of the desk does not pretend to keep them equally well filled; he places in each only such articles as circumstances and personal convenience may dictate. So with the schedule and its divisions. The latter may retain their respective places in the outline without being put to equal use by the investigator. The characteristics of the given community and the convenience of the student will largely determine the extent to which a particular division will be used.

It was said of the monograph of the workshop that it is more difficult and complex than that of the family; but in the monograph of the community the difficulty and complexity are even more increased. The divisions become broader and less defined; but this must necessarily be so because of the wide differences of the communities for the description of which the schedule is designed to be sufficient. There is another reason for this indefiniteness. It is intended that the schedule shall be a guide, in a general way, to the investigator; it is not thought best to furnish him with an inflexible formula or with an intellectual strait-jacket; hence latitude is purposely left wherein the student is thrown upon his own resources and must exercise his discretion.

It will be clearly evident to all that, if a monograph thus made up is fully to serve the purpose for which it was designed, there must be in it no guesswork, no improvised facts. It is a task of long duration, requiring not only an actual residence on the spot, but also a most lively interest in the community and constant personal contact with all those who are able to aid one in reconstituting the past or in comprehending the present. Especially is it important that one should be in touch with the local leaders of the community, those neighborhood authorities by whose shrewd observations of both past and present one cannot profit too much. But even with such advantages it is only by dint of patient research, great perseverance, and a strenuous holding of his energies to the accomplishment of his purpose that the student will at length be enabled to gather up the scattered and tangled threads of fact and weave them into a web of consistent history, the value of which shall justify his labors.

The task is both difficult and important, but for the one who will faithfully endeavor to perform it, it will develop sources of great attraction and satisfaction. It will more than liberally reward his labors by the discoveries to which it will lead and by the new thoughts and sentiments stirred within him. The community will appear to him in a new light. The vital importance to civilization of the sturdy virtues fostered by rural life will be thrown into clearer relief. The intimate relation existing between the weal or woe of the rural community and the welfare or *ill*-fare of the whole nation of which that community forms an integral part will be more definitely revealed to him than ever before.

The rural community is an organism. It is not the ephemeral product of whim and caprice, but a living thing, whose parts, both in form and function, have come into being as manifestations of that force

whose procedure we are pleased to call evolution. A careful and painstaking study of the rural community will throw a flood of light upon both past and present. Within its narrow circle conditions have their origin which eventually give rise to momentous problems of national life. Thence flow and thither ebb those tides of social activity which determine the existence of the state and shape the destiny of a people. It is there that many of the social forces can be studied in their simplest forms and upon their most circumscribed fields of action. There, if anywhere, will it be possible to subject them to a searching analysis. By a coördinative synthesis of the results of a large number of such studies, made in accordance with a common plan, with a different community as the subject of investigation in each case, the essential characteristics of the rural community can be determined, and it can then be assigned to its proper place among the classified phenomena of associate life.

[For specimen studies of American communities see "Conditions of the Western Farms," by ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, *Johns Hopkins University Studies*, Series XI, pp. 285-370. This study is made from the economic standpoint and falls largely under the head of *economic history* and the economic subheads of the *analysis of present conditions* in Cheysson's schedule.

Another study which partially develops certain of the subheads of the schedule with reference to a given community is *An Analysis of the Social Structure of a Western Town*, by ARTHUR W. DUNN, University of Chicago Press.

In the first three chapters of Book II of SMALL AND VINCENT'S *Introduction to the Study of Society* may be found a study covering quite completely the general field covered by the schedule of M. Cheysson. In *A Catechism for Social Observation*, PROFESSOR C. R. HENDERSON presents (pp. 29-49) a study of a rural community, and the same monograph contains a schedule similar to that of Cheysson. The two schedules may be used together with profit and convenience. See also PROFESSOR HENDERSON'S *Social Elements*, Appendix, for "Directions for Local Studies."—TR.]

REVIEWS.

Outline of Practical Sociology; with Special Reference to American Conditions. By CARROLL D. WRIGHT, LL.D., United States Commissioner of Labor. "American Citizen" series, edited by ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, A.B., Ph.D., Professor of History in Harvard University. Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. xxv + 431.

COLONEL WRIGHT could not fail to produce a notable book upon the subject to which he has devoted this volume. There is no equally available compilation and classification of the information here organized. Like the author's more elementary book, *Industrial Evolution of the United States*, this work will doubtless soon become a constant reliance for Americans who are dealing with the classes of facts to which it refers.

The limitations displayed by Colonel Wright seem to me to be, in principle, two. The former he doubtless regards, not as a limitation at all, but rather as freedom from pedantry and artificiality. It is the "practical" man's disposition to allow short shrift to social philosophy. As he says in the introductory chapter (p. 6), the facts and conditions of which the book treats would be "only illustrations" in a scientific treatise on sociology. He is probably not conscious of the degree to which his exhibit of facts ignores the things which they illustrate, and which alone make the facts worth exhibiting. The teacher who uses the work as a text-book must accordingly be able to supply a social philosophy, or the contents will be of very restricted value to the pupil.

The reader is tempted to conclude that the editor of the series is not altogether free from the same embarrassment. The bibliography which he recommends has faults both of omission and of commission which an amateur in social philosophy would detect. For instance, if Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* is among the seven "sociological books most useful for a library collateral to this work," Spencer's *Study of Sociology*, which is not mentioned at all, is surely more germane to the purpose and method. Again, if a work of the abstract character of Spencer's *First Principles* is properly included in the "Larger

Sociological Library," the omission of Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* is without excuse. Indeed, this bibliography reminds me of the corresponding feature in Stuckenberg's *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*. It could hardly have been the work of an expert sociologist. It detracts from the value of the author's own references at the heads of chapters, because it is indiscriminating and confusing.

The author's own treatment of social philosophy is unfortunate. To be safe in dealing summarily with a great division of thought, one must have it sufficiently in hand to be sure of one's touch. There is lack of perspective, there is no determinable vanishing point in the treatment, simply because of the assumption that sociology may be "practical" without a correlating philosophy. For this reason I would say that Professor Henderson's *Social Elements* is a better guide to "practical sociology" than the book before us, while the latter contains copious material to which the former would furnish interpretation. Moreover, the summary reference to sociology in the first chapter, while subscribing to that view of the scope of sociology which in my judgment is the only tenable one, nevertheless leaves some very incorrect impressions of social philosophy. For example, the author's cavalier repudiation of the organic concept of society as something belonging in an obsolete stage of sociology (pp. 2-4) appeals somewhat successfully to one's sense of humor when taken in connection with the title of Part II, "Units of Social Organism"! There are numerous sociologists who, for some reason, persist in misrepresenting the rôle of the organic concept in sociology, and in pin-pricking other sociologists with imputations which are justified only by fancy. Colonel Wright seems to have appropriated their views without sufficient investigation of their authority. In point of fact, as he illustrates in his own terms, nobody can deal with social relations intelligently today without assuming all that is essential in the organic concept. The only sense in which it is obsolete is that in which the heliocentric theory of our solar system is obsolete, viz.: for all practical purposes it is taken for granted by everybody, hence nobody with any scientific standing cares to waste time discussing with one who doubts it. How much attention shall be given to elaboration of the organic concept in teaching young students of sociology, is a question of pedagogical detail about which there is room for wide diversity of judgment. Among the writers on sociology I have yet to discover the first one who does not betray by implication and as a necessary postulate, whenever an attempt is made to trace out genetic relations, a belief in all that is essential in the organic concept. Whoever professes the

contrary thereby advertises misconception of what the organic concept involves.

It is, furthermore, a trick of certain men to represent the organic concept as identical with a biological theory of society. Colonel Wright surrenders to their claims and thus shows that he has not given very searching attention to the history of sociology. He gives currency to the stupid invention of recent folk-lore that the organic concept and a psychological interpretation of society are mutually exclusive, or at least antipathetic. A thinker of his acumen could not have personally examined the facts without puncturing that silly myth beyond mending. These symptoms point to the conclusion that in the desire to be practical the author has neglected certain important kinds of generalization for other kinds of detail. He has consequently not integrated his material sufficiently to make it in the highest degree practical. Recognizing the philosopher's need of Colonel Wright's type of work, I must protest that he does not show reciprocal esteem for the philosopher's contribution to practical knowledge.

The second limitation which seems evident to me is in the optimism which contrives to extract from the census cucumber an amount of sunlight that it does not contain. On this point I speak as a layman. It may be that Colonel Wright, as a statistical expert, could remove all the doubts which his exhibits raise. It may be that specialists in statistics can easily silence my objections. At all events, I shall venture to raise a few questions. With reference to the United States census, and to quantities of official reports that go to make up the "Contributions of the United States Government to Sociology," there is ample *prima facie* reason for the belief among the plain people that officially sanctioned exhibits of alleged facts are not the reliable basis for social conclusions that they purport to be. No man in the United States has a more attentive hearing than Colonel Wright when he speaks of tendencies supposed to be attested by official figures. It does not seem to me that, in this book, he has discharged the full obligation which his enviable reputation imposes, for he has not given sufficient warning of the snags in the path of students who seek conclusions in the evidence cited. Colonel Wright does not sufficiently emphasize the difference between his belief about tendencies and demonstration of the correctness of his belief in official figures. Is it not true that there is enough hocus-pocus of one sort and another in our censuses to make scientific demonstration impossible on many points about which Colonel Wright speaks with a good deal of confidence?

He may be correct, but the statistical proof that he is correct is not in evidence. Massing the sort of evidence that we have in a way to leave the impression that it amounts to statistical proof is "practical" from some points of view perhaps, but it is neither philosophically nor scientifically nor pedagogically sound. For instance (p. 41): "The number of *families* increased from . . . 1860 to 1870, 45.45 per cent." Is it not a fact that in the census of 1860 the families of three or four million slaves were excluded, while in the census of 1870 they were included? If so, the proposition is obviously inexact. Again: "One-third of the inmates of prisons coming from one-seventh of the population" (p. 352). For commentary on this reference I merely refer to the article entitled "Immigration and Crime," by Dr. Hastings H. Hart, in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, for November, 1896.

On p. 37 Colonel Wright says: "The average age of the population of the United States in 1890 was . . . 25.11 years, as compared with 24.13, in 1880. . . . This rise of average age of the living population has long been going on." Perhaps it has, but the United States census is very poor proof. In the one census the age was taken "at nearest birthday," in the other, "at last birthday." Is not this difference in itself sufficient to account for nearly, if not quite, half the apparent increase, and would not immigration and the decrease in the birth-rate explain most of the other half?

On pp. 253-4 the author claims that the statistics show an increase in the proportion of skilled laborers. The evidence cited is the census of 1860 in comparison with that of 1890. Is not the reasoning made utterly fallacious by the inclusion in 1890 of (say) 3,000,000 descendants of slaves, some 600,000 boys at ages not included in 1860, and 2,000,000 more women than were thus accounted for in the earlier census?

On p. 215 we read: "Not only is the decrease in the number of children [employed] observable in proportion, but in the actual number as well; for in 1870 there were 739,164, and in 1890 only 603,013." Is not this an unwarranted exhibit, from the fact that the larger number at the earlier date included "children under sixteen," while the smaller number at the later date accounted only for those under fourteen and a half?

On p. 213 we find the cheering conclusion: "There need not be any alarm, therefore, as to the encroachment of women upon the occupations held by men." I cannot reconcile this with the showing

in the Eleventh Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, which, if I read it correctly, reaches the result that in the establishments investigated the women were increasing faster than the men, the boys faster than either, and the girls fastest of all.

On p. 311 Colonel Wright admits the incompleteness of earlier censuses (1850-60), but concludes, nevertheless, that "if the total [of wealth] given for 1850 or 1860 should be doubled, the increase is most gratifying." The layman who notices this concession at all may be suspicious enough to ask: "If Colonel Wright thinks it might be in the interest of fairness to multiply the earlier figures by two, how are we to know that three or four would not be the fairest multiplier?" But taking Colonel Wright's own estimate of allowance, and a brief use of the pencil shows that in his judgment a very moderate apparent increase is "most gratifying." If the figures represent only half the total wealth for 1860, the increase was from \$1,028 per capita in 1860 to \$1,036 in 1890, or only \$8. Moreover, we cannot suppress the surmise that if the conventional values were equalized in the two schedules, even the \$8 per head might vanish. In other words, we find so many incomparable tables in the different censuses that our faith in them as scientific demonstrations of anything tends toward the zero point.

Of all the perplexing conclusions drawn or indorsed by Colonel Wright none are more confusing to the layman than those based on the Aldrich report (pp. 228 f.). The author concedes that the report has faults, but to the uninitiated the faults of the report itself are venial compared with the faults of experts who build houses of interpretation upon the sands of the Aldrich statistics.

The mass of wage returns may be too much for non-professional intelligence, but to the uninstructed it seems very remarkable to argue from the series that show the greatest increase from 1860 to 1891, instead of showing the *average* increase, or of admitting that the evidence does not permit demonstration of the average.

The inadequacy of the evidence appears in a case like this (p. 230): "In a well-known establishment in the state of Connecticut compositors who worked by the day received in 1840 \$1.50; in 1860, \$2; in 1866, from \$2.50 to \$3, and the same in 1891." The Aldrich report contains data for four printing establishments, but one of them in the state of Connecticut (Rep., Pt. 3, pp. 330-94). In this establishment no data are given for 1840 or 1860. Colonel Wright seems to have used for those dates the quotations for 1842 and 1857, respectively.

These discrepancies are probably insignificant. It appears, however, that in 1866 there was *one* employé only who received \$2.50. Colonel Wright's authority for stating that the wages in the establishment for that year were from \$2.50 to \$3 does not appear. He further states that wages were the same—*i. e.*, from \$2.50 to \$3—in 1891. We find in the tables, however, that of the twenty-nine compositors employed at that period but one received \$3, while three received but \$2. The wages were, therefore, from \$2 (not \$2.50) to \$3. The average for the establishment is put at \$2.53, not, as seems to be implied by Colonel Wright's showing, \$2.75.

The author quotes no wages for 1872 or 1873, the period just before the panic. As a rule they were higher, if I am not mistaken, than in 1891. Colonel Wright accounts for the higher wages in 1866 by the depreciation of the currency, but the Aldrich report quotes the average premium on gold for 1872 at 109.1. For the Connecticut establishment referred to above, average wages for 1872 are quoted as \$3.05½, and as \$2.53 in 1891. A fall seems, therefore, to be indicated from \$2.80 (gold value) to \$2.53. The average pay of all the compositors in the four establishments of the Aldrich report appears to have been \$2.55 in 1891, whereas Colonel Wright's propositions tend to the impression that the average was much nearer \$3. The fall from an average of over \$3 in 1872 is not mentioned.

Continuing to quote from the Aldrich report, Colonel Wright says (p. 230): "A building firm in Connecticut paid journeyman carpenters in 1840 from \$1.25 to \$1.62 per day; in 1860, from \$1.25 to \$1.75 per day; in 1891, from \$3 to \$3.25 per day. A firm of builders in New York paid carpenters in 1840 \$1.50 per day; in 1860, \$2; in 1866, \$3.50; in 1891, \$3.50." Colonel Wright here correctly quotes the data as given for two building-trades establishments, but he has selected the two concerns which furnish the highest quotation of wages of carpenters in 1891, and which show the greatest increase since 1840 or 1860. I cannot, therefore, understand how he is justified in the implications of the following sentence: "Similar quotations could be made for carpenters and painters in different parts of the eastern states." This would seem to mean that the foregoing quotations are representative, but, if I am correct in my calculation, the average wage of carpenters in all of the building-trades establishments, nine in number, of the Aldrich report, was, in 1891, \$2.75. In like manner, if I understand the Aldrich report, the average wage of the twenty-eight establishments in which carpenters are employed is \$2.56. Yet Colonel Wright's

statement seems to imply that carpenters' wages in 1891 were on the average from \$3.25 to \$3.50.

It would be an endless task to enumerate the different provocations to statistical agnosticism in the Aldrich report, as quoted in the section under discussion. I do not wonder that employés who have had experiences irreconcilable with Colonel Wright's inferences in the trades reported say hard things about professional statisticians.

The author's argument on "Proportions of Skilled and Unskilled Labor" (pp. 253 f.) is another instance which tempts the irreverent non-professional to declare that statistics, like the Bible, may be made to prove anything. The proposition is: "The number engaged in the lowest walks of activity, laborers and the like, is decreasing in proportion, while those employed in higher walks are increasing in number relatively to the whole population." By means of a skillful grouping of persons reported in gainful occupations it is made to appear that the proportion of proprietors is increasing, that the proportions of clerical and skilled labor are also increasing, but that the proportion of unskilled labor is decreasing. This, again, may be true, but we must be excused from admitting that it is proved to be true by the evidence cited. If I read the census tables correctly, Colonel Wright has included in the "proprietor" class several hundred thousand whose income is within the income limits of unskilled laborers. If these classes were rearranged, not by title, but by income, the author's claim would possibly be demolished.

My conclusion, then, about Colonel Wright's book is that the author himself could make it a tremendously useful book of instruction for a college class. He has at command the knowledge necessary to guard against the unauthorized conclusions suggested by incautious use of the data. The professor of statistics at the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Cornell, and a few other institutions would likewise be able to make proper use of this compilation. For the teacher of sociology who is not an expert in the use of statistics, however, our American data are a quicksand. This book does not insure firm footing in walking over it. The author's optimism is inspiring, but is it justified by the facts? Before venturing to use this book, teachers should take the precaution to train themselves severely in the logic of statistical science. They should be equipped with ability to supply the qualifications which will discriminate between what is taken on faith and what is demonstrated.

ALBION W. SMALL.

From Comte to Benjamin Kidd. The appeal to biology or evolution for human guidance. By ROBERT MACKINTOSH, Professor at Lancashire Independent College. Pp. xxiii + 311. The Macmillan Co. \$1.50.

THIS is precisely the sort of book to be expected from an author who confesses that he has been using Kidd's *Social Evolution* as a textbook for a class in sociology. Mr. Benjamin Kidd has about the same standing among the sociologists that Darius Green would have among the physicists. The author's evident assumption to the contrary excludes him from serious attention by the sociologists. Nothing that he can say about the content of sociological thought can have any weight with men who are familiar with the subject. Yet the book is of a sort to have vogue among people who cannot discriminate between writers who are authorities on their theme and those who are not.

It would be difficult to decide whether the author's attitude is most amateurish toward "evolution," or "biology," or "sociology." He knows what he thinks about the "moral consciousness," but he has a rare collection of misconceptions with reference to the thinking of the people who think most responsibly about those other subjects. The process which this type of thinker follows consists of turning a disapproved conception into a bogie and then into a monster. For instance (p. 45), the innocent and scarcely novel suggestion is attributed to "some younger students of sociology" that "one ought to learn from history in what line things are moving, and then to help the movement with all one's powers." Whatever we may think about the adequacy of this formula, we can have little respect for the historic sense of a writer who has nothing better to say of the uses of history than is contained in the puerile retort: "When the first railway tubular bridges were erected—the Britannia bridge over the Menai Straits, the Victoria bridge at Montreal—they were made much heavier than has been found necessary in the light of fuller knowledge. What should we say of the wiseacre who proposed to carry out the principle of lightening railway bridges by constructing them of lace or gossamer?"! By steps like this the author reaches the profound conclusion that "history cannot guide us very securely" (p. 47). On the basis of this result, however, he proceeds in the same paragraph to dogmatize about the positive guidance that history can afford after all. This is fussiness posing as philosophy.

That the book cannot be treated seriously by the sociologists follows further from the author's assumption that the content of current

sociology is to be found in Comte and Benjamin Kidd! All sociologists concede some sort and degree of credit to Comte for formulating the demand for sociology. Almost without exception — indeed, I do not believe there are any exceptions — the sociologists regard Comte rather as a proposer of the sociological problem than as a very large contributor to its solution. On the other hand, I have yet to learn of the first sociologist of any recognized standing who has ever consented to class Benjamin Kidd among sociologists at all. The author's program is, therefore, very much like an attempt to discredit electrical engineering by passing in review, first, the writings of Benjamin Franklin, and, second, an essay on physics composed by a talented, but untrained, government clerk. The one is obsolete, the other has not arrived.

Mr. Mackintosh discusses, in Part II, "Simple Evolutionism — Spencer, Stephen;" in Part III, "Darwinism, or Struggle for Existence;" in Part IV, "Hyper-Darwinism — Weismann, Kidd." The argument is not without force in many passages, as related to the particular author in question. It is utterly without appreciation of the perspective in which these authors are to be seen, if generalizations about "biology," or "evolution," or "evolutionary ethics," or "sociology" are to be ventured. The author builded better than he knew when (p. 278), in summing up his essay, he referred to it as "wanderings."

A. W. S.

L'Année sociologique, publiée sous la direction d'ÉMILE DURKHEIM. Deuxième année (1897-8). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1899. Pp. 596.

PROFESSOR DURKHEIM and his colaborers have rendered a great service to sociology in this publication. Like the first volume, it is largely bibliographical. The two original monographs are: *De la définition des phénomènes religieux*, Durkheim; and *Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice*, MM. Hubert and Mauss. The notices of literature that appeared between July, 1897, and June, 1898, occupy 450 pages. The main divisions of the material are placed under the heads: Sociology: (1) general, (2) religious, (3) moral, (4) juridical, (5) criminal, (6) economic, (7) social morphology.

This is one of the indispensable works for a sociological library, although it does not seem to me that the reviewers always have a point of view which presents the most just estimate of the literature.

A. W. S.

Christian Missions and Social Progress; A Sociological Study of Foreign Missions. Vol. II. By REV. JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co., 1899.

THE author had intended to complete his work in two volumes; he now announces a third volume. While the "Inner Mission" is sometimes treated at home in a sort of apologetic way, and "social work" regarded in conservative quarters as something too worldly for a church, this zealous advocate of foreign missions makes out of this kind of service a powerful argument for the value of such ministries. He seems to believe that if religion really has power to give character and happiness in a future life, it should be able to prove it in this life. Not only does he fill this large volume with materials illustrative of his position, but his ample notes and bibliography open up a mass of information almost startling in quantity. One wishes that his authorities were more frequently civil and non-clerical, since such evidence exists and has more weight with many minds.

The evidence presented in this volume goes to prove that the missionaries in all lands have contributed to the temperance reform; to abolition of the opium traffic, gambling, prostitution, polygamy, slavery; to the elevation of the lot of women and children, and the purification of domestic life; to the spirit of patriotism, industry, and general culture; to the extension of medical science and art in all countries where missionaries have gone.

The most secular and skeptical student of social history is under obligations to consider and give due weight to the array of facts here presented. While the author admits the merit of military conquest, he shows that the fruits of victory cannot be gathered unless the teacher accompanies the soldier and follows destructive activity with constructive labors. British soldiers may stop Arab slavers, but missionaries are needed to transform the ideas and motives of the native populations and build up a higher civilization. Such services cannot be secured for salaries, but only by an enthusiasm which usually seems to the ordinary man something like fanaticism. The annals of military achievement present no loftier examples of courage. This volume is witness to a real social force of immense significance. To ignore this force is unscientific, since it is already powerful, and is augmented every decade and gathers momentum with the years.

C. R. HENDERSON.

Friendly Visiting among the Poor; A Handbook for Charity Workers. By MARY E. RICHMOND, General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of Baltimore. The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. 225. \$1.

SINCE the beginning of the charity-organization movement a great variety of experiments have furnished fairly reliable rules for the friendly visitor. A small book, full of inspiration, yet intensely practical, was needed for the growing company of workers who mediate between dependent families and the comfortable public. Miss Richmond has brought together, from careful reading and successful personal experience, a body of instruction of the highest value. She tells the visitor how to become acquainted with the poor, how to help make the best of a sorry situation, how to spend and save, how to preserve health. The needed directions are clearly stated, and the spirit of the book tends to earnest and effective action.

C. R. H

A Handbook of Labor Literature. Being a Classified and Annotated List of the More Important Books and Pamphlets in the English Language. Compiled by HELEN MAROT. Philadelphia: Free Library of Economics and Political Science, 1899. Pp. 7 + 96, 12mo. \$1.

CONTENTS: Introduction; works of reference; industrial history; monopolies; land question (and single tax); anarchism (and communistic anarchy); individualism and adverse criticism of socialism; socialism; utopias; communistic societies; "how the other half lives," including the sweating system and hygiene of occupation; wages; coöperation and profit-sharing; trade unions; strikes; arbitration and conciliation; hours of labor; unemployed; women wage-earners and child labor; industrial insurance and old-age pensions; labor laws and factory acts; Christianity and the labor question; labor songs; general and collective treatises; labor periodicals; sociological journals; economic monographs; bureaus of labor; bibliographies consulted; addresses of publishers; index to authors.

As will be seen from the above contents, the compiler of this bibliography has given the term "labor" a generous scope in selecting her material for a handbook of labor literature. On first inspection some

will be inclined to wonder, and perhaps find fault, that such topics as "monopolies" and "utopias" should be included; but when the book has been examined more carefully, and the good judgment shown in the selection of titles and the first-class workmanship displayed throughout is appreciated, everyone, I am sure, will wish that the compiler had included in her book the whole field of the social sciences. I fail to see how the book could be substantially improved, except by enlargement.

Miss Marot has made a move in the right direction in paying special attention to government documents on the ground that "the public is, in ordinary cases, reminded of the existence of a book through its publishers and booksellers, while government publications, pamphlets, and reports are lost sight of."

In selecting the "more important books" the compiler confesses that she has met with difficulties. All who have tried it will agree with her that it is a difficult matter to make such a selection; few will agree that her results have been "only partly satisfactory," or anything short of very satisfactory. Of course, it is always easy to find fault with a select bibliography, because no two people "select" from the same point of view. From my point of view the topic "how the other half lives, including the sweating system and hygiene of occupation," is handled the least satisfactorily. It seems to me that it would have been better to divide into two topics, one relating to hygiene of occupation, the other to housing. I think also that the topic or topics relating to housing and conditions of occupation might well be more fully represented. Such works as Octavia Hill's *Homes of the London Poor*, Bowmaker's *Housing of the Working Classes*, *The Poor in Great Cities*, by Woods and others, *Report of the New York Tenement House Committee*, Report of the United States Labor Department on *Housing of the Working People*, would seem to deserve a place along with the titles which the compiler has included.

The characterizations which follow most of the titles seem to have been made with care and are likely to prove very helpful to users of the book.

On the whole, the work is admirable, and it is much to be hoped that the compiler will cover other portions of the field of the social sciences in the same thorough way.

C. H. HASTINGS.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Degeneration, Marks of Degeneration, and Atavism.—In the course of development human beings are wont to present, physically and psychically, certain departures from the norm. The kind and degree of these variations are largely influenced by general racial and environmental characteristics; where these latter factors are numerous and widely divergent we have a broader range within which normal variation may occur than where the race-type is relatively simple and fixed and the environment comparatively stable. It is this determination of the range of normal variation relative to race and environment which is always a step necessarily preliminary to the discovery of the meaning we are to attach, in a given instance, to the terms found in the title line of this paper. A variation which would fall quite outside this range under one set of conditions might fall clearly within it under another. With this necessity of constant reference to general conditions in mind we may venture upon certain tentative formulations embodying, perhaps, essentials of precise definitions to be wrought out with the further progress of science. It is needful to remember also that the terms "degeneration," "stigmata," "atavism," etc., may refer to morphological, physiological, or to psychic phenomena. With perfectly obvious modifications, the statements made here will hold equally well in any one of these three fields. Degeneration is characterized by a marked slowing of the vital activities, together with a lessening power of resistance to noxious influences of any kind. There is an increasing tendency of the whole organism toward physical and psychical inferiority. We have to do with a morbid state of affairs which may arise through diseased conditions in the germ from which the organism takes its rise, or through nutritional disturbances *in utero*, or during the first years after birth. It is through having this pathologic background upon the one hand and through the presence of this lowered vitality upon the other that degeneration is to be distinguished from simple abnormality, which does not of itself imply a proneness of the organism to physical and psychical disease. Degeneration may readily pass over into actual disease, but when it has so done, the disease is not to be called degeneration. Usually the reduction of the vital activities is accompanied by the presence of certain anomalies—the so-called signs of degeneration or stigmata. These are occasional variations only, and those of the morphologic kind are of little or no functional importance; they appear more frequently than do other variations upon those persons to whom for other reasons we apply the term "degenerates." They are generally found in company with other marks of a similar nature, and are not brought about through gross pathologic changes. Definitely localized affections (tumors, strabismus, nystagmus, etc.), local results of brain or nerve disease, etc., are actual diseased conditions, or symptoms of such, and are not to be reckoned as stigmata, which are evidences of widespread disturbances in the nutritive processes and are not always susceptible of having a definite nomenclature applied to them. In every instance it is necessary to know the precise history of the particular case before deciding whether a given anomaly is to be classed with the signs of degeneration. These marks are of importance only where they appear in considerable number and are developed to a high degree, and even then their precise value is problematical. They furnish an indication of the probable inferiority of their bearer; the larger their number and the more advanced their development, the more pronounced may be the statements concerning the degeneracy they indicate. With regard to the meaning of atavism there is more uncertainty than concerning that of degeneration. The anatomists and the zoölogists, who are the most competent judges in the matter, are by no means agreed as to what shall be called an atavism; and with each forward step in investigation the circle of so-called atavisms constantly narrows. The heart of the whole struggle seems to be that atavism may be real or only apparent. Genuine atavism must be a matter of inheritance. In concrete instances this is a most difficult thing to ascertain. The

question always arises, Are we dealing with something inherited from remote ancestry, or with a simple imitation atavism produced in the course of variation? While atavism does not indicate a disintegration of the organism, is not necessarily pathologic, and need not be connected with a general and deep-seated inferiority of the whole being, exactly the reverse is true of degeneration, which invariably results in a final and complete extinction of the line unless crossed with pure blood. This mixing with pure blood is the only source from which help can come to arrest the process of degeneration. Since degenerates are mutually more attracted to each other than to normal folk, and since it is only through crossing with wholesome blood that the fatal course of degeneration can be stayed, it falls out that, biologically conceived, degeneration is a potent instrument of natural selection, furnishing a ready means by which the unfit may hasten their own extinction. While it is true that degeneration and marks of degeneration usually vary directly together, instances are not unknown where the two are dissociated, and we have a high degree of degeneracy present with few or none of the stigmata appearing, or many apparent stigmata with little or no real degeneracy. Although signs of degeneration are undoubtedly more numerous and more pronounced among the criminal and the insane than among normal individuals, thus giving room for the supposition that there is some intimate connection between criminality and insanity upon the one hand and degeneracy upon the other, it is none the less true that in concrete cases the process of inferring from the presence of stigmata the existence of a criminal or of an insane person is something to be undertaken with extreme circumspection. Whether it is true, as maintained by many authors, that degeneration parallels civilization is a difficult question. There are too many hopeful elements in modern life to allow us unreservedly to accept the evil forebodings of such prophets.—G. NÄCKE "Degeneration, Degenerationszeichen und Atavismus," *Archiv f. Kriminal-Anthropologie u. Kriminalistik*, Band I, Heft 3.

The Influence of Marriage on the Criminality of Men.—An investigation, conducted chiefly with regard to criminal statistics, reveals certain facts concerning the respective relations of married and of unmarried men to different classes of crime. These facts may be epitomized briefly as follows: Property rights of all kinds are more generally respected by the married than by the single. The graver offenses against property—robbery, extortion, fraud, etc.—are committed by the married man with comparative infrequency. When he is driven to the unlawful acquirement of wealth or of material goods, he generally chooses some of the less dangerous methods of so doing. Receiving stolen goods, breaking of laws relative to trade, commerce, and public health, forcible detention of pieces of property, bankruptcy, etc., are the forms which offenses against property usually assume among married men. Among those married at an extremely early age (eighteen to twenty-five) trespasses against the rights of property are much more common than among the unmarried of a corresponding age. This is probably explained by the fact that in such marriages poverty, if not a concomitant, is frequently a result. Incendiarism is most largely found among the unmarried, the greatest proportion falling to the account of widowers and single men between the ages of thirty and sixty years. Apart from pimping, bigamy, and incest, the unmarried far outrun the married in the commitment of offenses against morality. In the sphere of crime and offense against human life, the unmarried are greater sinners than the married, though not so markedly so as in the offenses against property rights. Only in the matter of careless and negligent killing and wounding do the married surpass the unmarried. The difference in the criminality of the married and the unmarried grows less with advancing years. Between the ages of fifty and sixty years it is small; after that period it is still less. Only in delicts relative to morality is this not the case. The curves representing the participation of the married and unmarried, respectively, in crime present a very different appearance until an advanced age is reached. With the former the course of the curve is gradually downward from the beginning; there are but few exceptions to this rule. Among the latter the direction of the curve varies with the particular class of offenses we may consider. Generally speaking, however, the curve rises sharply at the beginning, proceeds at about the height attained for some time, then slowly falls. There is a noteworthy difference between the behavior of the curve representing the participation of the unmarried in offenses against property and that figuring their share in crimes

against the person. From eighteen to fifty years the variations in the first are but slight, and the curve maintains a high level throughout the entire period; up to the age of twenty-five the second curve rises, but then falls quickly. The line marking the share of the unmarried in offenses against the state, religion, and order rises steadily till the age of forty years is reached. This constancy of the course of criminality may be ascribed to lack of respect for property rights and for constituted authority; and this lack of respect is itself to be traced to the lack of an established family life, at a time when the man does not so easily bear the effects of a disorderly existence, and cannot, therefore, so readily support himself by his labor. (Of course this observation would not hold in the case of the habitual criminal.) It is of interest to note in this connection that drunkenness claims the major share of its victims between the ages of thirty and fifty years. The criminality of widowers decreases with advancing age. Their share in crime between the ages of thirty and fifty is notably greater than that of either of the other classes mentioned. Their share in such crimes as murder, incest, false accusation, and false witness at this time is especially noteworthy. It has been said, in attempted explanation of this fact, that widowers are, as a rule, ill situated financially, but there appears to be no satisfactory evidence that this is true. Statistics do not prove that widowers belong to the poorer classes in any unusual degree. Widowers are especially prominent in offenses against property; but they also stand first in the series of those guilty of other classes of crime. The loss of the wife very frequently leads to mental derangement, and it is probably true, as well, that certain types of self-control are peculiarly difficult for this class to exercise. In general, there is a greater decrease in criminality of the married the longer they have been in the married state. This conforms with the fact that the larger share of the births, together with the large outlay incident thereto, fall within the first decade of married life, and we observe further that it is the offenses against property which most rapidly fall away with advancing years among the married. Among the restraints which marriage places upon the criminality of the married man is the fear of bringing disgrace upon the family and lasting shame to the children. The temptation of the married man to indulge in the pleasures of the public house is less than that of the single man, for, while the family very largely furnishes all the wholesome pleasures afforded by the public house, it also demands for its proper maintenance too large a share of the man's income to allow him to spend any considerable sum elsewhere. With the need of defending and supporting a family, there comes, too, increased respect for religion, law, and property—the defending and supporting institutions of society. And last, but not least, to be mentioned among these deterrent effects of marriage upon the criminality of the married male is the influence of the constant and intimate association of the man with a member of the sex the criminality of which is very low when compared with that of his own.—FRIEDR. PRINZING, "Der Einfluss der Ehe auf die Kriminalität des Mannes," *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, II. Jahrg., Heft 2.

Race in the Etiology of Crime.—Although savages possess a very vague notion of crime, still there are tribes which show a greater criminality than other tribes. In India there exists, for example, a tribe whose profession is to steal, while Spencer cites several peoples who are inclined to honesty and truthfulness, and who do not practice the law of retaliation or commit cruelty. The documents which serve to demonstrate ethnic influence upon crime in the civilized world are, however, less uncertain. We know, for example, that a great part of the thieves of London are natives of Ireland or of Lancashire. Again, in Italy there exist criminal centers, and in nearly every province there is some village renowned for having furnished an uninterrupted series of special delinquents. The most famous among these is the village of Ardena in the province of Rome, of which Sighele says: "Ardena is distinguished by a number of assaults, homicides, assassinations, six times greater than that of the average of Italy, and of highway robberies thirty times greater. The cause is . . . above all heredity." In his *Homicide* Ferri clearly demonstrates the ethnic influence upon the distribution of homicide in Europe. In Italy, according to statistics of 1880-83, there is an evident predominance of homicide among the populations of Semitic race and of Latin race, compared with those of the Germanic, Ligurian, Slavic, and Celtic races. It is particularly to African or oriental elements that Italy owes the origin of

its numerous homicides in Calabria, Sicily, and Sardinia, while where the Germanic races are predominant homicide is least frequent. Sicily offers a striking example of ethnic influence upon homicide. The Greek provinces of Messina, Catania, and Syracuse have a less amount of homicide, while those provinces which contain much Arabian blood show the greatest amount. Sardinia surpasses Sicily in the number of crimes against property, probably owing to its preponderance of Semitic blood. In France also we see ethnic influence upon crime. Assassination, rape, and crime against property all show a different ratio in the Gallic, Iberian, Cimbrian, Belgian, and Ligurian races, which make up the French population. The Ligurian peoples in France furnish the maximum of revolutionary leaders and of geniuses, while the Cimbrian and Iberian races furnish the minimum of both. Again, in France and Italy everywhere there is observed a preponderance of crime in the provinces where dolichocephaly is the rule. Also the blonde-haired element in the population seems to furnish in general fewer criminals than the brown- and black-haired elements. The influence of race upon criminality appears in all its evidence in the study of Jews and Gipsies, but for each of these in a quite different sense. In nearly every country the Jews show a smaller ratio of criminals in proportion to their number than the remaining elements of the population. In certain crimes, however, they have the largest ratio, such as smuggling and counterfeiting. Especially in those countries where Jews have been given their political rights the tendency is for crime to diminish among them. The Gipsies, on the other hand, are an example of an entire race of criminals, and reproduce all their passions and vices. They have the improvidence of the savage and the criminal; they have a horror of the least exertion and undergo hunger and poverty rather than submit to the slightest sustained labor. They are superstitious, and are addicted to orgies; they are ferocious and assassinate without remorse in order to steal; their women are very clever at theft, and are addicted to prostitution. In whatever condition the Gipsy is, he preserves always his habitual impassiveness; he seems never to be preoccupied with the future, and lives from day to day in an absolute immobility of thought, while to him authority, laws, rules, principles, precepts, and duties are notions insupportable.—CESARE LOMBROSO, "La Race dans l'étologie du crime," in *L'Humanité nouvelle*, April, 1899.

A Family Librarian.—Ever since the formation of the American Library Association it has become more and more the fashion to employ trained librarians in public and institutional libraries. To the Northwestern Library Association, No. 5, E. Washington street, Chicago, is due, however, the credit of preparing a bibliographical work which becomes in itself an expert librarian in every home in which it is placed.

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A CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL FACTS BASED UPON SOCIAL NEEDS OR TENDENCIES.¹

Collective needs or tendencies	Functions	Institutions	Pathological facts
I. So-called material needs.	Nourishment, clothing, shelter.	Various devices: hunting, fishing, pastoral life, agriculture, industry.	Social inertia.
	Victualing, exchange, transportation, communication.	Commercial and colonial institutions, transportation companies, railway and navigation companies; posts and telegraphs.	do.
	Social economy.	Money, credit; public treasure; appropriations and taxes.	Bankruptcies; frauds; smuggling.
	Hygiene.	Medical and pharmaceutical service; lazarettos, hospitals; cemeteries; public cleaning service.	Devices for the ruin of the public health; alcoholism, debauchery.
	Police and collective defense.	Police; army and navy; diplomacy; spy system.	War; treason; crime.
	Reproduction of social forms; social heredity.	Marriage, family; educational institutions.	Depopulation; infanticide; prostitution; political struggles.
II.			
Needs: (a) of the intellect (<i>esprit</i>).	Collective curiosity, social imagination; public opinion; common sense; collective judgment; objective knowledge.	Press and book-stores (newspapers, publications, books).	Superstition.
		Literary meetings; academies, theaters.	Error; excess of imagination.
		Science; learned societies; libraries, laboratories, etc.	Ignorance.
(b) of the emotions (<i>cœur</i>).	Social emotivity; æsthetic and religious sensibility.	Holidays; games; funeral ceremonies; amusement societies; artistic societies. Religions, cults, and churches.	Enthusiasms, panics; institutions for debauchery; fanaticism.

¹G. L. DUPRAT, "Morphologie des faits sociaux: II. Classification des faits sociaux," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, March, 1899.

A CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL FACTS BASED UPON SOCIAL NEEDS OR TENDENCIES.— (*Continued.*)

Collective needs or tendencies	Functions	Institutions	Pathological facts
<p>III.</p> <p>Need of activity in common.</p> <p>and of exercise of the collective will.</p>	<p>Labor; division of labor; competition and co-operation.</p> <p>Government; legislative and judiciary functions.</p>	<p>[Slavery, serfdom servitude?]; corporations, syndicates; labor-bureaus.</p> <p>Legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies. Ministries; royalty; government. States, cities, federations, communes, families. Elections.</p>	<p>Strikes; coercion.</p> <p>Anarchy; political troubles; revolutions.</p>
<p>IV.</p> <p>Tendencies properly social.</p>	<p>Respect for moral beings.</p> <p>Help for the weak.</p> <p>Solidarity and charity.</p>	<p>Property. Tribunals and juries.</p> <p>Houses of correction. Politeness and manners. Educational institutions.</p> <p>Alms-houses; funds for relief and old-age pensions. Works of moral helpfulness.</p>	<p>Theft. Violation of liberties.</p> <p>Immoral legislation. Poverty and mendicity.</p>

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

SPECIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY NO. 3.

PLAY AND AMUSEMENT.

Compiled by AMY HEWES.

This bibliography is made up of titles selected from standard book lists. Owing to the variation in the periods covered by such lists and in the accuracy and fullness of the entries, corresponding variations are to be expected in the bibliography. Moreover, the compiler not being a professional bibliographer, it is probable that there are undesirable omissions and inclusions which an expert would have avoided. It is hoped, however, that the list may be useful to those who are interested in the rapidly growing literature of play and amusement, but have not the time to search through fifty or more volumes of book lists. The bibliography is intended to cover in general: American books from 1876 to date (1898), English books from 1832 to date, French books from 1840 to date, German books from 1890 to date. But numerous titles of an earlier date selected from library catalogues, etc., have been included. As a special German bibliography of the literature of play and amusement was published in 1896 (see Seydel's *Katalog der Turn-, Sport- u. Spiel-Litteratur* on page 135), it was decided to include only the more important of the German titles between 1890 and 1896. It may also be observed that of the vast amount of literature on the subject of sport only a comparatively few representative books have been chosen; not because sport has no important relations to the play instinct, nor, indeed, that its interesting development from the latter does not invite investigation from the psychologist, but because, from his point of view, the large number of technical treatises on sports would offer but few contributions. The same is true of gaming and games of chance, etc. In the third place, it has been impossible, of course, to include such special subjects as the drama, dance, etc. Within these limits the aim has been to make the bibliography exhaustive.

One of the uses suggested and kept in mind during the compilation was the great and untried opportunity to study in the historical development of play and amusement the social conditions therein reflected. There is great truth in the test of a nation's civilization by the things at which its citizens like to laugh. There is great truth also in the growing recognition of amusements of an appropriate nature as one of the most efficient means of elevating the condition of the very poor in our great cities. Few indeed have awakened to a sense of the immense force here contained.

It is to be regretted that it has been impossible to include, because of limited space, the numerous and important contributions to these subjects which are to be found in the very valuable magazine articles which have appeared of late years. The greater number, however, may be quite easily looked up in Poole's *Index*. The thanks of the compiler are due to Mr. T. R. Croswell, of the Stevens Point Normal School, Wisconsin, for permission to make use of a bibliography of play which he had collected in the preparation of a doctor's thesis on the subject. Mr. Croswell's thesis will appear in a forthcoming number of *The Pedagogical Seminary*.

Abbreviations: B. = Berlin; Bo. = Boston; C. = Chicago; F. = Frankfurt a. M.; Fr. = Freiburg; L. = London; Lp. = Leipzig; Ph. = Philadelphia; St. = Stuttgart.

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THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF NEW YORK POLICE COURTS.

UPON this subject there is no accurate printed information: the law requires a statistical report to be made yearly by the city magistrates, but upon examination it appears that the reports are made up by a police clerk of limited statistical ability, with an apparent intention to give as little useful information as possible. Owing to an oversight both in the laws of 1895 and the charter of 1897, the Board of Magistrates of the second division of Greater New York (Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond) is not required to make such a report, so that the figures available are for the first division only.

Since the docket of cases is not open to the public, it is not only impossible to find out what cases are called on a particular day, but equally so to learn what has been the disposition of each case. Cases come on with great rapidity, sometimes one a minute, averaging from forty to seventy per day in the different district courts; not infrequently several of a similar nature come on simultaneously—in batches, as it were—as where two or three women are brought in together for soliciting on the streets. The offenses may not have been committed at the same time or place, but it is more expeditious to dispose of them in a lump. In addition, there is the confusion created by a dozen or two police officers, five or six police clerks, roundsmen, attendants,

prisoners, and a motley audience of onlookers in the court, all of whom talk more or less continuously. What the magistrate says can seldom be heard more than ten feet away, while the witnesses and prisoners must come close to the desk to be heard at all. In the midst of such confusion, noise, and incessant movement no one can hope to understand the procedure of the court clearly without some legal training, and perhaps not even then without close connection with the court itself.

By chap. 601 of the *Laws of New York State* for 1895, the old justice courts were abolished and the Board of City Magistrates substituted. Under the charter of Greater New York the police divisions are two: the first division composed of the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, the second of Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond. The present account is limited to the first division, *i. e.*, Manhattan and the Bronx. For this division there are seven districts and twelve judges, appointed by the mayor in 1895 for a term of ten years, at a salary of \$7,000. Previous to 1895 the justices were elected, and received a salary of \$8,000. By the charter of Greater New York, 1898, magistrates receive a salary of only \$6,000. It is interesting to contrast the salaries of five Boston magistrates, who receive an average of \$4,000 per year. A police magistrate, under the new charter, must be a resident of the city, and must have been admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the courts of the state at least five years previous to the date of his appointment. Other officers of the court are:

Police clerks, who are appointed by the Board of Magistrates for a term of four years, at a salary of \$2,500 per year. The police clerk must give bonds to the amount of \$5,000.

Stenographers: seven, one for each district, appointed and salary fixed by the board.

Interpreters: seven, one for each district, appointed and salary fixed by the board.

Thus the amount of political patronage which each magistrate has under the present law, during a ten-year term of office, is six clerkships, one stenographer's, and one interpreter's position—not a large amount; but the total patronage of the *board*

amounts to forty-two clerkships, plus fourteen other offices—a very considerable number of unusually desirable positions.

In New York city in 1897, 112,637 persons were arrested, of whom 76,859 only were held, committed, or convicted in these courts; that is, of all those arrested only 68 per cent. were held. It is interesting to note that just ten years ago the same percentage was held, and that the per cent. steadily decreased to 54 per cent. in 1894; from 1895 the percentage rapidly rises again to 68 per cent. It is impossible to say whether the decrease in the proportion held was due to leniency, laziness, or partisan favoritism, but it may be surmised that it was the result of all three.

The magistrate has the power of summary proceeding in such matters as disorderly conduct, intoxication, violation of corporation ordinances, vagrancy, sabbath breaking and insanity, ungovernable child, abandoning or threatening to abandon family, suspicious person, etc. As such cases constitute 79 per cent. of the total number brought into court, no others need be considered; the other 21 per cent. are such as assault, attempting suicide, burglary, larceny, homicide, robbery, cruelty to animals, keeping disorderly houses, and violation of various other laws; these are held to be finally tried in other courts and only appear in the magistrate's court in the primary instance.

Nearly 40 per cent. of all cases in this court are for "disorderly conduct," which includes all offenses that directly disturb the peace either by noise or indecency. Of this number women have 9 per cent., which is almost wholly for intoxication, bad language, and soliciting on the streets. If we add the 15.7 per cent. of cases listed under the separate head of "intoxication," for 3 per cent. of which women are responsible, there is a sum total of 55 per cent. attributable to disorderly conduct, for 12+ per cent. of which women are responsible. That is, more than one-half the total work of the court is under this head, and one-eighth of it is attributable to women.

"Violation of corporation ordinances" stands next, with 16 per cent. This comprises such offenses as not carrying a light on wagon or bicycle, and many other minor misdemeanors, not coming under the sanitary law.

Third in the list is "vagrancy," at 8.6 per cent.; a comparison of the figures for the last ten years shows that there has been a steady increase in the number arrested and convicted for this offense. This is partly due to the work of the Charity Organization Society, which has a special officer detailed to oversee the fourteen regular police officers whose duty it is to arrest all beggars and vagrants. Other minor offenses which the judge may dispose of finally, appearing in the table as 1 per cent. or less of the total, are sabbath breaking (chiefly keeping shops open and selling goods in violation of the law), ungovernable child, disorderly persons (abandoning or threatening to abandon family), and "suspicious persons." Concerning this last class the magistrates' report for 1897 says: "Many persons are arrested under suspicious circumstances, such as well-known criminals mysteriously loitering about the streets at night, or frequenting crowded places, or persons having property in their possession for which they can give no good account, nor of themselves. Frequently such arrest is the first step in the detection of some crime, which is investigated, the proper complainant found, a formal complaint taken, and the prisoner held for trial. In many instances such arrest prevents the commission of crime. During the year the total number of such cases amounted to 1,897, of which 1,885 were discharged and 12 cases are pending." It may be that this is a necessary means for the prevention of crime, but it would appear to place an extraordinary power of torture in the hands of the police officer. Doubtless ex-criminals need to be watched for the protection of society, possibly as a deterrent measure, but so long as the police force remains an irresponsible body, moved chiefly by private motives, such power will be more or less abused.

There is no way of ascertaining accurately the number of children and young persons who come into the police courts, as no statistics are published in the report except of those committed to institutions. These are not kept in confinement at the station house, but by the Gerry Society, and an officer of the society comes into court with them to suggest to the magistrate where they should be sent. From observation it appears,

however, that those committed to institutions through the Gerry Society are a very small proportion of the young persons appearing in court. For the majority of children under sixteen no particular safeguards or preventive measures are provided, except such as the judge may devise. The moral atmosphere of the court and the station house is in itself a contamination to any child. A simple and perfectly practical remedy for a part of these evils would be to confine all persons under sixteen years of age in separate cells, out of sight and hearing of other prisoners, and to give them a separate examination in court as soon after arrest as possible.

If all offenses in these courts be reclassified roughly by their social significance, the results are as follows:

<i>Personal vice</i> and self-indulgence, including intoxication, solicitation, keeping disorderly house, and disorderly conduct	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	per cent.
Carelessness of public regulations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	" "
Roving and thriftless disposition	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.6	" "
Thieving	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	" "
Violent temper (indicated by assault, and cruelty to children)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	" "
Carelessness of family relations, ungovernable child, cruelty, abandonment, etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	" "
								90.6	" "
Miscellaneous	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.4	" "
Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100	" "

From the table it appears that the police and the police court are the regulators of personal conduct in society. As society has become more and more complex, the license of the individual has been progressively curtailed, and the police power has been correspondingly enlarged. As a result, the machinery necessary to regulate public personal conduct has been elaborated without being perfectly adapted to its purpose. Such power is not a trivial or minor matter which society can leave to regulate itself, but is an immense and increasingly important factor in social development, for which no adequate machinery of administration is yet provided. Mayor Hewitt, in his message in 1888,

declares that "the position of police justice is more important to the community than that of judge of the Court of Appeals; the latter finally settles the law, but the former applies it in the first instance, in nearly all cases affecting the life, liberty, and property of the citizens." Mr. Conkling, in *City Government in the United States*, says: "The police magistrate is generally an absolute autocrat in the cases that come before him." To illustrate: in two different districts, on successive days, the magistrate sentenced two women, both "old-timers," for soliciting on the streets; one received a fine of \$10 or ten days, the other a fine of \$500 or six months. The usual penalty for this offense is from \$3 to \$10 fine. This demonstrates, not only the autocratic power, but the widely inconsistent sentences of the magistrates, upon which there appears to be no check except the extreme limit of the law.

There are, too, extraordinary contrasts in the manner, tone, and general behavior of the magistrates. Magistrate No. 1 is an excellent lawyer, but cranky and severe; he lost his temper frequently; complained of the drafts from the windows, while the police guyed him almost openly. A wife appeared before him complaining of abandonment; the husband, on being called to give his testimony, vituperated the wife; the wife "jawed" back, and the magistrate scolded them both, much to the entertainment of the onlookers. He seemed to have a special grudge against foolish, incoherent, and tearful women, though his manner was certainly calculated to frighten out of the prisoner or witness whatever sense she had.

Magistrate No. 2 was a cheerful person, with a rich foreign accent and a lively manner. As one of the police officers in court said: "He plays to the gallery." Magistrate No. 3 was much like No. 2 in manner, but without the accent, and his gay demeanor was attributed to his former experience as a newspaper man. Both Nos. 2 and 3 listened to each prisoner with the ironical, indifferent air of one who had heard all that before and who knew the man lied; neither took the least pains to get from the prisoner what he really had to say in his own behalf, or to give it reasonable consideration. Both signed papers incessantly

while hearing each case, and made facetious, sometimes positively vulgar, comments in the intervals. This kind of spice was evidently much enjoyed by clerks and officers, while the impassive, sodden, tearful, or defiant prisoner took it as a matter of course. Magistrate No. 4 in a quiet, gentlemanly manner glanced at the papers containing the charge, secured the name of the prisoner, addressed him as "Mister" or "Madam," stated the charge, and heard what the prisoner had to say. His patient and deliberate ways were calculated to inspire confidence. He made no sarcastic or witty comments, and, although obliged to work very rapidly, as all the magistrates must, made an evident attempt to grasp the case and to do it justice.

It would seem obvious that a magistrate should be a good lawyer; yet when it is remembered that 79 per cent. of the cases in his court are never appealed, it can be seen that there is not the stimulus to professional ambition which exists in every other court. The contrast between the civil and criminal magistrates, in this respect, is marked. The magistrate sets the social tone of the courtroom; it is therefore of the utmost importance that he should be, above all, dignified and *self-contained*—not playing to the audience either by sarcastic witticisms or by trite and superfluous moralization. If he be really just, he must be patient and must have a thorough knowledge of human nature. A refined and interested manner is of great value in getting at the character of the first offender especially. In short, the police magistrate should be a man of learning, character, experience, and judgment.

Second only in importance to the magistrate is the roundsman who introduces the prisoner to the justice, repeats what he has to say, and acts as general intermediary. The roundsman in the court of Magistrate No. 1, whose irascible temper has been described, was a model officer: patient, kind, reasonable; repeating what the faint-hearted prisoner said, as: "I was drunk, your honor!" or, "It'll be a meritorious act if you'll be aisy on me, your honor!" or, "I've nothing to say, your honor!" He assisted the prisoner to understand what the judge meant, or to make up her mind, or sometimes suggested to the judge that she

was an "old-timer." Such an officer is invaluable in securing a fair trial to the prisoner and a full hearing of the case to the magistrate, not to speak of the real missionary kindness which he has opportunity to display. In other courts, when the same officer performed his duties in a purely mechanical manner, the result was much less satisfactory.

Ninety-six per cent. of all cases appearing in the magistrates' courts are by arrest "without process" — that is, without a warrant. This puts the whole matter of arrest in the hands of the patrolman; and, more important still, the patrolman becomes the chief and usually the sole witness against the prisoner. The prisoner is absolutely powerless against the officer's testimony, unless he bring other witnesses or have a lawyer, which he seldom does. It is well known that the patrolman is often bribed, especially by keepers of disorderly houses and by prostitutes, and the reason is sufficiently apparent in the fact that the judge bases his decision in nearly every case on the patrolman's testimony. It has been said that the poor are dependent for the enforcement of their rights and liberties upon the police court, but the court is primarily dependent upon the patrolman for the material of its decisions. Character in a patrolman is, therefore, of as much importance as in a judge. What the patrolman generally is, is well known: a political henchman, dependent for favor and promotion upon the work which he can do for his party. This work consists in winking at the misdemeanors of favored keepers of saloons and disorderly houses, in helping to "let off easy" all who are protected by the favor of political leaders, and in being virtuously severe and industrious where it will do his party no harm. Until the police force is composed of wise, conscientious, decent men, nothing more than a caricature of justice is possible.

The first step in the reform of the magistrate's court is the reform of the police force itself. It must be (1) taken out of politics absolutely; (2) it must be adequately paid, because its duties require a high quality of character, as well as physique and training; (3) its tenure of office must be for good behavior; and (4) it should possibly have retiring pensions as reward. Such a

police force would insure that no citizen should get into the police court who does not belong there, and that 33 per cent. of all arrests should not be discharged, as at present.

The second step in the betterment of police courts has already been taken in New York city: the magistrates are appointed by the mayor in order that the responsibility may rest obviously and definitely with him and his party; the appointment should be for good behavior, instead of for ten years. No lawyer of real ability is likely to accept such an appointment when he knows that at the end of it he must work into a new line of his profession. Ten years of police-court practice under the present conditions would almost unfit a man for any other sort of law work.

The number of courts should be sufficient so that the magistrate may give proper attention to each case. In the second district in New York the judge has an average of sixty-eight cases per day throughout 365 days in the year, while in the sixth district there is an average of forty-five cases per day. At present Essex Market court is much overcrowded, beside being in an old, dilapidated, unsanitary building.

Visitors who have no real business in court should be excluded. Day after day the courtroom is filled with hangers-on, who look at the procedure as a sort of free theatrical performance. A woman, with three decently dressed children, sat through the whole afternoon, although she had no personal interest in any prisoner. Many people came there day after day for amusement and a comfortable place to sit. The only advantage in the present noisy and confused procedure of the court is that the audience is not so much contaminated as it would be if it could hear and understand.

Sixty per cent. of the persons appearing in the six courts considered were foreign born. The patrolman and the magistrate are the foreigner's chief instructors in the character of government and the rights and duties of citizenship. What sort of political education does he receive, what sort of respect for democratic institutions does he attain from these sources? What wonder that he becomes the blind, irresponsible victim of the

ward-heeler and the spoilsman! He sees those unmolested who "stand in" with the patrolman of his party; he sees criminals brought to justice by men often no less criminal than themselves; he sees government, justice, democratic freedom travestied by an undignified politician on the bench.

Besides the necessary legal and administrative reforms, one thing stands out preëminently: Character, judgment, good temper are the prime qualifications to be desired alike in magistrate and officer. Our political organization and social administration must be such as to insure these qualifications in its officers. Whatever the laws may be, a good judge and a good policeman make a good court.

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A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER IV.

COERCION AND PERSUASION.

WE have seen that private property originates with the emergence of self-consciousness and scarcity. We are now to see that this is a social relation based on coercion. In distinguishing coercion from persuasion we enter a field of subtle and elusive errors and frauds. Coercion operates through motives—so does persuasion. But where shall we draw the line between the two kinds of motives? They are, indeed, everywhere blended and overlapped. Society and the social sciences have depended upon instinct and intuition to separate them in thought, and as a result they have been separated only as dictated by prejudice, class-feeling, sentiment, and self-interest. There is need of scientific distinction based on psychology and sociology.

Coercion, as has already been said, is not force. It holds force in reserve, and, in so far as actual force is necessary, the aim of coercion (*i. e.*, the services of the coerced) is defeated. Neither is it conquest. Conquest is only the physical exercise of force which precedes coercion.

Coercion, again, is not knowledge nor skill. Man overcomes nature, not by coercing her, but by "obeying her." That is to say, he understands her ways of working and then moves her different materials in such juxtaposition that their own inner forces of attraction, cohesion, gravitation, heat, etc., will work out the result he has in mind. This the economists call "the production of wealth," but it is properly only a limited section of production, that of the purely technical processes. It is an expression of man's knowledge and skill, constituent parts of self-consciousness, indeed, but different from coercion. In a related class is man's control over wild animals. He controls them by knowledge of their ways, by skill in daily dealing with them, and also by force; but he does not command them and

exact obedience. Domesticated animals he truly controls by coercion. His own children show the transition from control by knowledge and skill while they are babes, to control by force at times, then to coercion, and lastly to the highest form of control, that by persuasion and education.

If we examine the most elementary form of coercion as found in the earliest wife-capture, or slavery, we find it to consist of a command, express or tacit (in the language of Austin), accompanied by a power and a determination, recognized by the subject person, to inflict evil in case of disobedience or to award good in case of obedience. This command is definitely limited. It is not a command to know or to know how. It is not a command to believe, or think, or imagine, or invent, or feel, or will; nor to be well or sick, strong or weak, big or little. It may be such in form, if issued by a fool or a bigot, but in the nature of the case it cannot reach directly the psychic or physical constitution and functions of the subject. It is only a command to act or to forbear certain acts. The proprietor who gives the command has in the first place appropriated the slave as the readiest means of promoting his own interests. What these interests are is with him a matter of opinion, of desire, even of erratic and useless desire. His commands, whether they inure to his own benefit or not, are the expression of his wishes. In other words, what he commands is simply services. He may conceivably give orders merely to show his power, or he may give orders in drunkenness, hallucination, or eccentricity; but the predominant quality of all commands, taken in the large, is the desire for the services of those under control in promoting the wishes and opinions of the proprietor. This is the grand aim of private appropriation, and it may, indeed, seem at first a truism to assert it in this way, but its significance lies in the fact that the only external field where mere opinion or wish can get itself incorporated in tangible results is that of controlling the services of others. In consumption it is human products and human efforts that are used up. The individual finds free expression for his own character only as he consumes the services of others. Nature's products are irregular, inadequate, and, for both the

higher spiritual and the baser immoral wants, wholly lacking. Food, clothing, shelter, literature, art, religious beliefs, luxuries, intoxicants, poisons, are all simply the services which other people are continually offering to the individual. In consuming them he controls their services. And in doing so he is simply expressing his choices. But choice is the very core of self-consciousness. Here is the close relation between property and self-consciousness, each of which is the cause of the other. The progress of society and of the person may, with truth, be said to be the increasing range and variety of choices open to self-consciousness. The modern man who can choose all the way from food and clothing to pianos, paintings, and books, is far more deeply conscious of his own inner nature than the savage whose only choice is between food and hunger. It may be objected that the criterion of self-consciousness is the personal character of the one who chooses, rather than the range of choices. But both go together. One's capacity to choose (the biological brain capacity having been developed) is the outcome of an education which from childhood to manhood has consisted simply in opening up to him step by step the wider and wider ranges of choices which the services of his fellow-men afford. These services in civilized society are embodied mainly in material products — food, books, buildings, etc.—these are vehicles of personality, the tangible commodities in which human services are preserved for consumption. But the primitive man, devoid of commodities, begins to have a wide range of choice only when he has someone to serve him directly. T. H. Green says¹ that appropriation, being one condition of the existence of property, "implies the conception of himself on the part of the appropriator as a permanent subject for whose use, as instruments of satisfaction and expression, he takes and fashions certain external things, certain things external to his bodily members. These things, so taken and fashioned, cease to be external as they were before. They become a sort of extension of the man's organs, the constant apparatus through which he gives reality to his ideas and wishes." Green here has in mind the modern man

¹ *Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 214.

with his wealth of material products made by society for his use and enjoyment. The statement is highly ideal and elliptical, and represents the *aim* of private property, but omits its concrete basis. The latter is simply some sort of control over the services of one's fellows by which they are moved to furnish him with the material means for his "satisfaction and expression." This basic fact of private property is veiled by the wage system and the practice of purchasing commodities on a world market. But when we come back to its origin in wife-capture and slavery, we see it plainly as coercive control over others for one's personal satisfaction. In that primitive stage of appropriation it is plainly his servants who are the "extension of his own organs," "the constant apparatus through which he gives reality to his ideas and wishes." And, whereas, without these services, his only range of choice is that which is open to his own bodily and psychic powers, his new range includes the bodily and psychic powers of those who obey him.

But this is not all. Seeing that neither can he make a choice nor can his servant execute the same except as they both have knowledge and skill in the control of nature's forces and materials, and seeing that this knowledge and this skill are mainly copied from others, it follows that choices and services are dependent upon the social progress up to this time in the technical processes. The master in commanding and the slave in serving simply use the tools or imitate the processes which they find already adopted around them. The slave is, therefore, the means of appropriating to his master the social products of his time. And this, indeed, is all the master wants. He does not care for the unwilling act of service in itself (except as it may increase his show of power), and would, perhaps, do away with it if these social privileges and products which he craves could come to him through another route when he merely wishes them.

We have, then, the following chain of facts and events: (1) the personal character of the master as the outcome of his heredity, education, habits, beliefs, prejudices, and so on; (2) a wish, as the particular concrete component of his character; (3)

a choice, as the outgoing reference of his wish toward the variety of objects and activities which his social environment affords him; (4) a command, as an expression of his wish to, or its tacit recognition by, a person competent in bodily and psychic powers and social equipment to obey; (5) a service, as the appropriation to the master through the slave of the social objects of his wish; (6) coercion, as the guarantee that his mere wish will be thus satisfied.

Coercion, therefore, is simply a means of commanding and securing for consumption the services of others. The same is also the aim of persuasion. We must now seek a criterion which will clearly distinguish the one from the other.

The word "sanction," originally applied to the binding religious quality of an oath, has been extended by the jurists to mean obedience enforced by law through rewards and penalties; then by the utilitarian moralists to mean the sources of pleasure and pain which, in turn, are the motives to conduct; and finally by the psychologists, like Baldwin, to mean "all the reasons which are really operative on the individual, in keeping him at work and at play in the varied drama of life."¹ With so broad a definition, it is necessary to divide and subdivide the many sanctions of life according to some basis of classification. Baldwin marks off the "biological" sanction as the unconscious ground for action found in the functions of the physical organism. With these we have nothing to do. But the conscious sanctions are either "personal," "the reasons which a man sets before himself for the activities in which he engages," or "social," "the reasons for action which bear in upon the individual from the social environment." It is Baldwin's purpose to show that there is no antithesis between these two classes of sanctions, for both of them, including the sanctions of sovereignty, are really the personal sanctions of the "average man." Now, it is questionable whether much is gained by so broad a definition of sanctions. It is preferable to limit the word to the social sources of motives originating in the environment,

¹"Mental Development," *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 359.

and to choose another word for the personal response. The word "motive" has also this double meaning, referring either to the external object or occasion for action, or to the internal susceptibilities. In the present discussion its meaning will be restricted to the latter. Seeing now that both society and self-consciousness are founded on mutual services, we may define a sanction as any expectation suggested by one person (the agent) adequate to arouse in another person (the subject) motives leading to acts of service. On the side of the agent we have sanctions, on the side of the subject motives and susceptibilities. These are now to be examined in turn, with reference to the two grand divisions of each, coercion and persuasion.

The usual classification of legal and penal sanctions describes them as punitive and remuneratory—the former the attachment of a penalty to a command, the latter the offer of a reward. From the sociological standpoint the classification is inadequate. The remuneratory sanction may be either coercive or persuasive, and punitive sanctions may be further divided. The following analysis of social sanctions is proposed as applicable to both public and private coercion and persuasion, remembering that in all social and psychic phenomena the motives are blended and overlapped, and can be separated out, not in actual examples, but by predominant characters.

1. Corporal sanctions. Based on expectation of physical penalties: the infliction of death or bodily pain and detention in case of disobedience.

2. Privative sanctions. Based on expectation of material penalties: the dispossession of property, fines, the reduction or discharge from position in case of disobedience.

3. Remuneratory sanctions. Based on expectation of material rewards: the bestowal of property, revenues, appointments, promotions, for obedience.

4. Reprobatory sanctions. Based on the expectation of social penalties: the bestowal of blame, hatred, social ostracism, for disobedience.

5. Approbatory sanctions. Based on social rewards: the bestowal of praise, approval, friendship, love, for obedience.

The foregoing grouping of sanctions is in the order of coerciveness. The corporal sanctions depend on *direct* bodily control over the subject, as in slavery and punishment. The privative sanctions are *indirect* coercion through control over the external necessities, comforts, or luxuries of life, or over the opportunities for procuring these. The remuneratory sanction may be either coercive or persuasive, depending on its relation to the privative sanction. Generally, he who has power to grant rewards has also power to take them away. Here the two sanctions are not differentiated. The predominant quality is, therefore, that of coercion, since the sanction which bears upon necessities overshadows that which appeals to ambition, and where the two are tied inextricably together the former gives character to the whole. The remuneratory sanction in such case is coercive by virtue of the lack of a third choice. The subject person is shut up to the two alternatives of accepting reward for service or going without altogether. But when for any reason the agent is prevented from falling back on the privative sanction, his appeal must take on the character of persuasion, whether it be of the material or social kind. This is one of the parts played by the state, as will appear later, in differentiating the privative from the remuneratory sanctions, as in guaranteeing minimum conditions, such as minimum wages and security of employment. In this way the coercive element of the remuneratory sanction is taken away, and it becomes more distinctly persuasive.

The reprobatory and approbatory sanctions are wholly psychic in character. They offer nothing to the subject except the regard or disregard of the agent. The power to arouse motives depends on no external means of enforcing obedience, either by bodily pressure or by deprivation of material necessities. For this reason they are distinctly persuasive in character. The agent, in relying upon them, can appeal only to the active beliefs and desires of the subject. This compels him to cultivate in himself such qualities as entreaty, eloquence, and reasoning. Coercion, on the other hand, is the power to drive to an act of service by arousing through tacit or avowed threats the fear of bodily pains or material privations. The agent with such power

is, therefore, not careful of the qualities in himself which he exercises in order to secure the services of others.

From the standpoint of the subject it is the part of sanctions to arouse motives leading to acts of service. Here the question concerns, not the nature of the sanction, but the susceptibility to suggestion. Individuals differ widely in personal character, disposition, bias, responsiveness. For our present purpose the different kinds of susceptibility may be grouped upon two different principles of classification: first, with reference to institutions; second, with reference to coercion and persuasion. Upon the first principle of classification, susceptibilities are primary or institutional, and secondary or supplementary. The institutional susceptibilities are those primary beliefs and desires, already mentioned in chap. 2, which form the psychic basis on which the several institutions are successively built up. The religious susceptibilities are the belief in moral perfection and the consciousness of guilt; the domestic susceptibilities are sexual and parental love; the political are common national or class consciousness; the industrial are consciousness of future wants and love of work. These susceptibilities, blended and homogeneous in primitive man, are separated out by the division of labor, and they become each the motive which holds its peculiar institution together.

Secondary susceptibilities are those which modify the responsiveness of the primary, and give that tone or bias to personal character which fits or unfits individuals for social life in general or for specialization in a particular institution. They are such qualities as cheerfulness, appetite, sensuality, thrift, avarice, curiosity, intelligence, pride, ambition, indolence, self-interest, love of life, antipathy, devotion, and hundreds of other finer and rougher shades of character which an exhaustive analysis would reveal. The above institutional susceptibilities, together with the secondary ones, are the motives which are appealed to by persuasion. Here, however, the second principle of classification is called for.

Individuals differ in wide degree with regard to the amount of coercion or persuasion needed to move them to action. There

are qualities which render their subjects peculiarly susceptible to coercion, such as servility, fawning, venality, covetousness, timidity, deceptiveness; others, to which persuasion more effectively appeals, as devotion, magnanimity, heroism; others, not easily influenced by either coercion or persuasion, as stoicism and stubbornness. Besides these there are external circumstances influencing susceptibility, such as climate, rank, wealth, or penury, friends and relatives, education and forms of government.¹ Now, it is to be noticed that this grouping of susceptibilities does not affect the nature of the coercive and persuasive sanctions. The question with which we are now concerned is not one of casuistry, to discover in any given individual whether he is moved by coercion or not, but it is a question of the *relative* coerciveness of the different sanctions. This is the same for all individuals, no matter what the absolute amount of coerciveness exercised in any particular case. We are not inquiring whether Miss A is compelled to marry Mr. B, but whether women in general under similar circumstances are more subject to coercion than to persuasion. The latter is the social significance of coercion, the former is a certain individual grouping of sanctions and susceptibilities. Our grading of susceptibilities, therefore, does not affect the preceding analysis of sanctions.

There is, however, an intimate connection between the two. Coercion is not a single act, but a social system—as such it is educational. It produces in master and subject the very qualities which render the one able to exercise it and the other susceptible to it. The one becomes haughty, intolerant, commanding; the other servile, obsequious, deceptive. The evil of coercion does not consist in *unwilling* service, but in the low personal character which it cultivates. The slave, born and reared as such, and with no idea of freedom, obeys his master with willingness. It is not that he is consciously coerced in any particular act, but that the system has kept him so low in manly qualities that he

¹ Were there space and occasion, we might draw up a table of beliefs, desires, and susceptibilities, like BENTHAM's "Table of the Springs of Action," but with reference to the above classification. Bentham uses the terms "exciting causes," "bias," "circumstances influencing sensibilities," but I have attempted to avoid his hedonism. See *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 21, 22, 197 (Edinburgh, 1843).

knows not that he is being coerced. On the other hand, the persuasive system educates the qualities of persuasiveness—eloquence, reasoning, politeness—and the qualities of responsiveness—devotion, love, heroism, ambition.

Returning now to the question of sanctions, it is to be noticed again that in primitive slavery or polygamy all the sanctions are blended, undifferentiated, centered in one man and annexed to commands in varying proportions. The coercive, although the most patent, is not therefore the most powerful. Wife and children prefer slavery to freedom, for freedom means death, but slavery means protection. Persuasive sanctions depend not only on the susceptibilities, but also on the circumstances of the one who responds. The fact that coercion is inadequate to sustain private property is also vividly shown in the appeal of the proprietors to religious sanctions. Fetiches, taboos, ancestors, penates, hearth fires, were all summoned as persuasive means of protecting owners against the owned and unpossessed. And with the growth of conquest and empire the religious sanctions became more and more pervasive, organized, and awe-inspiring. But the coercive sanctions, when thus blended, tend, as already intimated, to overshadow the others and to give character to the relationship, both from the side of the proprietor, as the means of expressing his personal character, and from the side of the servant, as suppressing his personal character. It also furnishes the basis for a new organization of society which shall take the place of kinship. Before developing this phase of the subject we may sum up our conclusions on the nature of coercion and persuasion as follows:

Coercion is a command, express or tacit, issued by a determinate person with power to enforce obedience on others by means of external material or bodily suffering. It differs from persuasion in that the latter does not depend primarily on material means for inducing compliance, but mainly on direct psychic influence. It differs from the commands of public opinion, or general will, in that these are issued by indeterminate persons, and their enforcement is problematical. It differs from the so-called commands of God, or conscience, in that these are not

true commands, but are personal susceptibilities which must be appealed to through persuasion, public opinion, or coercion.

CHAPTER V.

ORGANIZATION.

We are now to inquire how it is that coercion, originating in the homogeneous blending of all the sanctions and all the social institutions at the time of the earliest emergence of self-consciousness, contributes to the succeeding evolution of society. The problem is to follow out in the growth of chieftaincy and monarchy the accompanying differentiation and organization of the sanctions.

The institution of private property enormously increased the food supply and population. Hostile tribes were thrown into contact. The thirst for conquest seized upon the more daring spirits who yearned to free themselves from the kin-communism of the tribe, and to appropriate for themselves more peaceful tribes and nations as their personal property. Or, religious fanaticism, suddenly marshaling together disjointed tribes and peoples, inflamed them with the common desire to conquer obedience to their faith. Whatever the motive, the central fact to be observed is that the motive is common to those who join together. Otherwise there could be no joint action. It is common beliefs or desires that bring men together and move them to those large constructive acts which reveal force and power.

But this is not enough. A mob may have common desires. But, as long as its individuals are acting each for himself at cross purposes, their individual forces, no matter how powerful, will end only in equilibrium. To accomplish results they must be organized, that is, guided by one man. Further, if the mob is to become a conquering army, the leader must have, not only persuasive, but also coercive power over individuals. He must be clothed with sanctions which he can promptly enforce. His resources in enforcing them are the common desire of his followers who obey his commands. These he does not coerce, but persuades to do his bidding, by playing upon the personal

sanctions that spring from the common desires of each. By persuading the mass of his army they clothe him with coercive sanctions over individuals. He orders traitors to be killed. He appoints, promotes, and reduces his lieutenants. He distributes material rewards, and determines the pay of all beneath him. When finally his conquest is successful, and the army has settled upon conquered peoples, we find the following organization and differentiation of sanctions radiating out from the will of the monarch: corporal sanctions, applicable to the conquered peoples and the intractable elements of the conqueror; privative and remuneratory sanctions, including appointments, promotions, reductions, and removals, and control over the material sources of livelihood, applicable to the warriors and their chiefs; persuasive sanctions, applicable to the courtiers, favorites, and chief holders of fiefs, and also supplementary to the sanctions controlling all the other subordinate classes.

The organization of society is yet very loose. The thirst for private appropriation must precede the rise of public spirit. As soon as conquest is accomplished and the soil distributed among the chiefs, each becomes more or less a sovereign, and rids himself of the coercive sanctions of the king.

In the feudal organization of society, when thus first loosely thrown together (having omitted the minor stages which intervened since the original emergence of self-consciousness), we have the next extension of the principle of private property, the private appropriation of land. Primitive common property in land, so called, is not properly entitled to that designation, seeing that it did not spring from self-consciousness. It was simply the common use of land, which, in its abundance, attracted no more attention than did air and water. Animal instinct is adequate to mark off hunting-grounds, and to defend them against other animals. And, if we choose by metaphor to read into the minds of animals our refined and abstract self-consciousness, we may assert that they have developed the institution of property. But such would be only a metaphor. So, in our advanced civilization, after having developed the idea and the institution of property, we are tempted to read back into the

mind of primitive man a conception of which he was incapable. But the growth of population, the necessities of agriculture, the efficiency of organization, led to the private appropriation of land by the only persons who were in a position to appropriate it—the conquerors and chiefs of tribes. In settling upon a fixed territory we find a decisive step in the organization of the modern state, but it must be borne in mind that this step could be taken only by extending the principle of private property. The state originates as private property, like other institutions. The feudal proprietor was owner of the land, of the serfs, of the highways, the mill, the bakery, the courts of justice, and every tangible object and personal relation that could be brought under his control. Even the king or overlord was but one among many private proprietors.¹ He was not a sovereign in the modern sense, because, first, he did not receive his title by hereditary right, but was elected by the barons. In this his position but conformed to the feudal idea of property, wherein the estate reverts to the overlord, and the heir enters only on his own personal oath of fealty. But, second, the king was even more restricted by custom, which ruled in those days the lowest and the highest more rigidly than constitutions. Custom was, indeed, the constitution. The rights and privileges of property, the possession of coercive sanctions, the grading and subordination of classes, were all minutely bounded and guaranteed by custom. Within these bounds the private proprietor was autocratic; and the king as monarch was supposed to have no additional powers beyond those which belonged to him as a landed proprietor, except to organize the military forces, to support them by his prerogatives, and to declare and execute the custom of the land. That he could enact a law repealing the custom was inconceivable.

But, as we know, political and industrial conditions were against the permanence of this loose organization. The anarchy of the period, resulting from the private sovereignty of the

¹ "The king, it is true, is a highly privileged, as well as a very wealthy person. Still his rights are but private rights amplified and intensified." (POLLOCK and MAITLAND, *History of English Law*, I, 209.)

feudal lords, forced upon the people the longing for a united government with adequate coercive powers, and the rapid changes in industry following the rise of commerce and manufactures, the introduction of money, and the fluctuations of prices, broke down the rule of custom, and permitted the king to infringe more and more upon its precincts. Thus feudalism gave way to absolutism. The theory of absolutism made the will of the sovereign the sole law of the land, and the fiction arose that custom itself was law only on the ground that "what the king allowed he commanded."

Thus, in the rise of absolutism with the Tudors in England and Louis XIV. in France we have reached the culmination of the natural evolution of private property. The monarch or despot is the sole proprietor of all the land, and the administrator of public affairs. His will is now called law, because it controls many people of all classes. But in theory he is still a private proprietor, and in fact also, because the sanctions which he controls are exactly those corporal and privative sanctions controlled by the primitive proprietor. They have, however, in the process of centralization, become differentiated, as above indicated.

The following characteristics are now to be borne in mind in summarizing the foregoing rapid survey of the evolution of coercion :

1. The growth of monopoly, or exclusive jurisdiction. Professor Ward has pointed out that in animal and plant life the stage of free competition is only brief, incipient, and transitional, and that it terminates in "something that can very properly be called monopoly." "The tendency of every form of life, as soon as it acquires superior powers, is to drive out everything else and to gain a complete monopoly of the sources of supply that surround it." The human animal has become paramount in his particular environment in harmony with this general law governing all living things.

2. But in addition to the biological law of monopoly we find the sociological law of centralization. Herbert Spencer has

¹ *American Economical Association*, Vol. X, p. 48.

shown that "in societies as in living bodies increase of mass is habitually accompanied by increase of structure. Along with that integration which is the primary trait of evolution, both exhibit in high degrees the secondary trait of differentiation."¹ The biological form of this statement conceals the true character of social integration, namely, centralization and subordination, based on private ownership and coercion.

A different defect is found in Ward's account of social structures. He finds the dynamic agent—the agent that causes change in structure—to be feeling. Feeling leads to effort. Effort consists in the "removal of obstacles to the satisfaction of desire," and desire is "the underlying cause of all social progress. It transforms the social environment. It modifies social structures and originates new ones. It establishes constitutions."²

We must, of course, allow that desire is the underlying cause of social change. But in doing so we must give such a broad definition to desire that that term becomes meaningless. Ask the schoolgirl why she did so and so, she answers: "'Cause I wanted to." But *why* did you want to? "Just because I wanted to." This answer is not adequately specific, whether advanced by the girl or by Mr. Ward. We must discover not merely that desire causes change, but why it is that desire causes this or that particular change. Now, the true immediate cause of organization is not desire, but necessity. Increase of structure does not remove the obstacles to happiness, but as often the reverse. It brings subordination, which lessens happiness. Workingmen do not join trades unions because they enjoy it, but because they must. So with capitalists organizing trusts, patriots in founding a nation. The compelling force is the increasing density of population and the increasing struggle for existence. Organization is simply the means whereby those having allied interests are brought together under command of a single will, so that their combined energies are directed promptly on a given point of attack. Survival comes to the organized group, and in the

¹ *Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 459.

² *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 178.

course of time the surviving group becomes larger and larger, and its machinery of organization more and more inexorable and despotic. This is necessary for the sake of survival. Social institutions are not picnics or fishing clubs. If they were, they would quickly fall apart. They are organized for struggle, survival, and supremacy. There is iron in them. They are based on the coercive sanctions intrinsic in private property, which is the social expression of self-consciousness and the origin of social institutions. Herein social organization is fundamentally different from physical or biological organization.

These sanctions, radiating from one man, give, on the one hand, unity, power, and survival to the social organization, and, on the other hand, increased scope and freedom to the mere wishes, choices, commands, and personal character of the autocrat. In the long run centralization may bring happiness to the subordinates, which seems to be the main justification of organization in the eyes of Spencer and Ward; but whether it does so or not is a matter of secondary importance. Survival first, happiness afterward. The latter can receive no attention whatever until the period of conflict has passed and coercive organization has achieved unquestioned supremacy. Those individuals and classes who reverse this order and seek happiness first are both immoral and increasingly extinct. Abraham's polygamy was justifiable because necessary, Brigham Young's was immoral because only utilitarian.

3. The coercion exercised by the monarch is not absolute and unlimited, but is conditioned by the character, circumstances, and stage of civilization of his subjects. He represents the organized coercion of society, but coercion is only one of the controlling social relations. Equally important are love, reverence, hunger, inertia, custom, and multitudes of petty local and private quests. As long as his coercion does not infringe too far upon the daily lives of his people, and they are secured in a measure of their customary beliefs and enjoyments, their entire strength, otherwise unorganized, is vouchsafed to him and appears in his hands as the coercive sanctions and the subordination of individuals to his wishes.

This evolution of society and coercion has grown out of unreflective, imitative, customary, and traditional ways of thinking and living on the part of the entire mass of people. There has been no literature (except as it may have been handed down from a former civilization), no philosophy, no science. Industry has been mainly agriculture, and trade has been barter. Religion has been natural or ethnic, as distinguished from ethical, and government has never been troubled with problems of abstract justice or the rights of man. It is the period of naïve, empiric, imitative, unreflective self-consciousness, corresponding to the childhood and youth of the individual. The psychic distinction between this and the succeeding or reflective stage is of such prime importance for the theory of sovereignty as to require at this point a careful examination.

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[*To be continued.*]

FACTORY LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN IN CANADA.

BEFORE entering upon the subject proper, it seems necessary to make some comments upon the manufacturing interests of the country under consideration. A mere presentation of the protective laws would seem to place Canada in a bad light when compared with Great Britain and the United States. But, when read with an intelligent understanding of her position among the manufacturing nations of the world, odious comparisons cannot be drawn.

Although Canada is not primarily a manufacturing country, yet the manufactures of certain portions are worthy of attention. Like other new countries,¹ the vast agricultural interests are the most prominent. Canada, as a united colony, is new, the first of last July marking the thirty-second year of her birth. And this is but a short time in which to develop industries. The great part of the Dominion yet in its infancy may have before it a future in which untold wealth shall be gained from its manufactures. The mighty prairies of the Northwest may yet have great manufacturing centers. The Klondike gold may build great cities on the western wilds. But all this is suppositious. What exists now is the vital question.

The smaller and the older Canada, too, looks chiefly to agriculture, mining, and fishing for its revenue, but manufacturing is receiving some share of attention, particularly in Quebec and Ontario. In the maritime provinces it is not of the same importance. Canning factories for the preserving of fish and fruit, and cotton and woolen factories, and sugar refineries, are the most prominent.

With such a condition of affairs, it is not surprising that factory legislation should not have attained the proportions that it has in England and the United States. In both of these countries we have nearly a half century of struggle before any legal attempts were made to lessen the evils connected with factory life.

¹No attempt has been made to include an account of the manufactures of the separate colonies prior to the formation of the confederation in 1867.

The shocking brutalities practiced upon the employés in British factories in the early part of this century have no parallel in Canadian history. The factories here have grown up gradually, and at no time has there been a literal emptying of the country into manufacturing towns, as was the case in New England forty or fifty years ago. Manufacturing industries in Canada are on the increase, as is seen by examination of the censuses of the last three decades. Small industries are continually springing up, and the number of large ones has greatly increased. The actual increase for the Dominion for the last twenty years is as follows :

Year	Number of establishments	Value of articles produced	Number employés
1871.....		\$221,617,773	187,942
1881.....	49,731	309,731,867	254,894
1891.....	75,968	476,258,886	370,256

The census of 1871 does not give the number of establishments, and the figures for that year are for only the four original provinces. Since confederation there has been a steady growth of factories. The growth has been rapid, too, when we consider the population of the country and its increase during the same period, which is as follows :

Year	Population
1871 - - - -	3,635,024
1881 - - - -	4,324,810
1891 - - - -	4,833,239

The increase in the twenty years has been about 25 per cent. (.24+). The increase in the number of factory operatives for the same time is just double (.49+); an increase certainly well worthy of attention; and when we consider that a large proportion of these operatives are women, the importance of studying protective legislation becomes evident. There were in 1891—and the numbers have not since decreased—75,968 industrial establishments, employing 370,256 workers; of these 70,280 were

women and 7,076 girls under sixteen years of age. The tabulated statement below shows how this number is distributed through the various provinces:

Province	Number of establishments	Employés			
		Women	Girls	Men	Boys
British Columbia	770	1,331	157	9,615	404
Manitoba	1,031	541	31	3,279	102
New Brunswick	5,429	4,750	568	19,513	1,844
Nova Scotia	10,496	6,566	625	25,734	2,040
Ontario	32,151	32,835	2,482	123,527	7,872
Prince Edward Island	2,679	1,309	192	5,766	643
Quebec	23,037	22,898	3,018	84,936	6,537
Territories	375	50	3	994	34
Canada	75,968	70,280	7,076	273,424	19,476

NOTE.—Boys and girls are youths from fourteen to sixteen years of age; men and women all over that age.

This table shows that about one-quarter of the employés in the whole country are women and girls, and it is the legislation for this large and important class, numbering 77,356, that we shall now proceed to examine. We may first take up the four original provinces, beginning at the east and with the oldest one.

The story of protective legislation in Nova Scotia is soon told. There is none. But this does not necessarily imply a sluggish state of public morals; it is the result of a comparatively small manufacturing industry, with a correspondingly small call for female labor. Yet, surely, 7,191 women and girls are worth governmental care. The number in itself is small, but when we remember that each one represents a present or a future home, it grows in importance.

In the province the ten-hour day, or sixty hours per week, is the rule generally adhered to by employers; but the fixing of time rests wholly with them. No gross abuse of this power appears, and troubles between employer and employed have rarely occurred. The factories are not large, and are located in small towns where public sentiment would not permit the imposition of inhuman tasks.

Adjoining Nova Scotia, and prior to 1774 a part of it, is the province of New Brunswick, which we shall next consider.

Here we find conditions similar to those in the peninsula. Lumbering and agriculture claim the largest share of the people's attention, and the manufactures do not furnish any very considerable part of the provincial revenue. We find here only 5,318 women workers, and they, as their sisters in Nova Scotia, are dependent upon the leniency of their employers for fair treatment. There are no factory laws, only the penal code to prevent brutal acts.

Next we pass to Quebec with its 25,916 female operatives, and here we find a very good code of factory laws, with special provisions for women and children; and we have two women inspectors whose duty lies wholly among the women employés. They have the rather imposing title of "inspectresses of industrial establishments."

The following is a summary of the laws, taken up under three heads:¹ I, inspection provided; II, hours of labor; and III, sanitary regulations.

I. INSPECTION PROVIDED.

This was provided in 1889, and inspectors are appointed by the lieutenant-governor in council. (52 Vict., chap. 30.)

II. HOURS OF LABOR.

1. No girl or woman shall be employed in any manufacturing establishment or workshop for more than ten hours in any one day or for more than sixty hours in any one week, unless it be for the sole purpose of making a shorter working day on Saturday.

2. One hour shall be allowed each day for meals, if the inspector so direct, but such hour shall not be counted as a part of the working time.

3. The day of ten hours shall not begin before 6 A. M., nor continue after 9 P. M.

¹ This is the method of treatment adopted by the writer in an article on "Factory Legislation for Women in the United States," *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, September, 1897.

4. The inspector may, if he sees fit, prolong the employment of children, girls, and women [to twelve hours per day], providing the working day does not begin before 6 A. M., nor continue after 9 P. M., under the following circumstances :

(a) When any accident, which prevents the working of any industrial establishment, happens to the motive power or machinery.

(b) When, from any occurrence beyond the control of the employer, the machinery, or any part of the machinery, of any industrial establishment cannot be properly worked.

(c) When any stoppage occurs from any cause whatsoever.

5. Employers must keep a register showing the period of each day and week that children, boys, girls, and women are employed, and the hour at which they commenced and finished working.

The text of the foregoing may be found in 57 Vict., chap. 30, secs. 3025, 3026, and 3027.

III. SANITARY REGULATIONS.

These are not enactments made especially for women, but for all employés, regardless of age or sex. However, it seems fitting to cite them here to show that the health of the women operatives is not neglected.

1. Industrial establishments must be built and kept in such manner as to secure the safety of all employed in them.

2. They must be (a) kept in the cleanest possible manner; (b) sufficiently lighted; (c) have a sufficient quantity of air for the number of persons employed; and (d) provided with effective means for expelling the dust produced during the course of work, and also the gases and vapors which escape and the refuse which results from it. (57 Vict., chap. 30, sec. 3021.)

3. The lieutenant-governor in council may classify as dangerous, unhealthy, or incommodious such establishments as he considers dangerous to the health of the operators, especially children, young girls, and women. (Same as above, sec. 3053.)

The following sanitary measures were approved by the governor in 1895 :

(a) All apartments must be well aired.

(b) Thermometers shall be kept at spots indicated by the inspector.

(c) Meals must not be eaten in workrooms.

(d) Employers must provide a place where workmen can warm their food and in bad weather eat their meals sheltered from cold, rain, or snow.

(e) Good water and facilities for securing individual cleanliness must be provided.

(f) Suitable and separate closets for the sexes must be furnished.

(g) Women and children must be forbidden to do any operation connected with belting or other modes of transmission.

Besides the above there are a great many measures for the protection of the workmen from machinery, fire, and other dangers, but it is not necessary to enumerate them here. A sufficient number have been specified to show that the sanitary regulations of Quebec are very complete, and, if fearlessly enforced, should render the factory laborer practically safe as far as life and limb are concerned. But accidents do occur, and a great many of them, as seen from the inspector's report. In 1897 we find reported 254 accidents, 24 of which were fatal. Out of the whole number injured only 13 are reported as being women, and none of these died. This is probably owing to the kind of work in which they are engaged. One hundred and fifteen accidents, ten of which were fatal, were due directly to explosions, mainly of boilers, and women are not employed in work which would expose them to such danger.

The latest reports of the inspectors are of a roseate hue, and, if not too highly colored, prove that factory administration in Quebec is of a high order.

As far as women are concerned, the protective legislation compares very favorably with the best that is found in the United States. For here we find only five states regulating the hours of labor of adult women, *i. e.*, women over twenty-one, while thirty-two recognize the importance of fixing a time limit for all under eighteen, or for "children and young girls," in the

language of the Quebec law. The sanitary regulations are in advance of any others found on the American continent.

Taking up the laws of Ontario in the same manner we have:

I. INSPECTION PROVIDED.

This was provided in 1885 (47 Vict., chap. 39), and provision is made for the appointment of a woman inspector at the discretion of the lieutenant-governor in council.

II. HOURS OF LABOR.

1. Ten hours per day, or sixty hours per week, shall be the legal period of work.

2. The hours per day may be differently apportioned for the sole purpose of making a shorter day's work on Saturday.

3. Employers shall allow each child and young girl and woman not less than one hour for meals, but such time must not be considered a part of the ten hours.

4. The inspector may permit overtime where accident, occurrence, custom of, or exigency of trade demands it; provided no young girl or woman shall be employed before 6 A. M., nor after 9 P. M., excepting in factories for canning or desiccating fruit, where the time may be extended, under certain limitations, during the months of July, August, September, and October.

5. That the hours shall not be more than twelve and a half in any one day, nor seventy-two and a half in any one week, and that such exemption shall not comprise more than six weeks in any one year, and that, in addition to the hour allowed at noon, an extra three-quarters be given between the hours of 5 and 8, when work continues until after 7 P. M.

6. Notice of hours of labor must be posted where women and girls are employed.

7. Employers must keep a register showing exact duration of overtime, if any.

III. SANITARY REGULATIONS.

1. Every factory shall be kept in a cleanly state and free from effluvia arising from any source whatever.

2. Factories must not be overcrowded.

3. Proper ventilation must be provided.
4. Suitable and separate closets and other conveniences must be provided for the sexes.

The text of the foregoing may be found in the Ontario Factories' Act, secs. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 28. (47 Vict., chap. 39, as amended by 50 Vict., chap. 35; 52 Vict., chap. 43; and 58 Vict., chap. 50.)

We also find general measures for protection against fire and dangerous machinery. In the inspector's report for 1896 there are 174 accidents reported, only seven of them being to women. Here, as in Quebec, this is owing to the kind of work in which women engage.

In Ontario laundries, bakeshops, and stores come under inspection, the last two by separate acts. This is certainly indicative of great progress in Ontario, as it gives us the most extensive legislation of the kind in America. But the force of inspectors is wholly inadequate. There are four inspectors for 32,151 establishments, with 266,716 workers, and only one woman to look after the interests of 35,317 women operatives.

In the western country the necessity for legislation has not been sufficient to attract attention.

From the above it would appear that a study of factory legislation for women in Canada simplifies itself into a study of the laws of Quebec and Ontario.

Summing up, we have the following table:

Provinces	Number of female operatives	Number of inspectors	Number of women inspectors	Number of operatives to one woman inspector
British Columbia.....	1,488
Manitoba	571
New Brunswick	5,318
Nova Scotia.....	7,191
Ontario.....	35,317	4	1	35,317
Prince Edward Island.....	1,401
Quebec	25,916	8	2	12,958
Territories	53

Should we be satisfied with this condition? The number of women workers is steadily increasing, and we have reason to believe that it will continue to increase. The provinces should

be awake to the fact that it is easier to prevent abuses than to rectify them; easier to protect strong women than to care for wrecked ones; easier to guard the mothers of the next generation than to provide homes for deformed and imbecile children a few years hence.

Where the evils connected with female labor are not great, it seems to the provinces a needless expense to provide for factory inspection. Expenses could be limited by placing the work in the hands of local authorities, who could report to a central office. But the appointment of *inspectors* is not enough. There must be *women inspectors* where there are women employés. The greatest trials and hardships of a factory woman's life can be told only to one of her own sex. Everywhere the importance—the necessity—of women inspectors should be insisted upon. This is being recognized by all thinking people. The leading women in Canada discussed the matter at a meeting of the National Council several years ago, and on their records stands the following resolution: "That the National Council do recommend all local councils to unite in a petition for the appointment of women inspectors for factories and workshops." And their appointment is looked upon with favor by men. In his report for 1896 the president of the Board of Inspectors of Industrial Establishments for Quebec, in commenting upon the appointment of the two women inspectors in his province, says: "We have but to congratulate the government on this experiment, by which it manifests all the interest it takes in the wives and daughters of workingmen, and the protection it wishes to give them."

It is to be hoped that at no distant date all the provinces of Canada will take steps to regulate the employment of women in the factories. All operatives would thereby be the gainers. Improved conditions for women mean a like improvement for men. No country at any time has attempted to regulate the labor of adult men in factories, as protective legislation has always centered around the weaker classes—the women and the children—but in every case the men have gained by these class enactments. The strength of a nation lies in its workers,

and whatever is conducive to their good should be regarded as a necessity.

But Canada's watchword is progress, and we may feel sure that she will not be slow to recognize the importance of protecting her women workers from the inevitable evils arising from the rapid growth of manufactures. The time has passed when women depended upon their frailties for protection, but a new and better era is at hand when the working-woman may demand fair treatment in behalf of her womanhood and humanity.

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SOCIAL AND ETHICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.¹

THE contents and main results of Professor Baldwin's book, *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, are now, doubtless, so familiar to students of social and philosophical questions that it is needless for me to give any detailed account or analysis of it. The bulk of it is taken up with the attempt to show that the "principles of the development of the individual apply also to the evolution of society." It maintains that the organization of the knowledge, of the conduct, of the ideals, of the individual person is effected not "exclusively by private tests," but by a kind of social dialectic, a process of "take and give" and "give and take" between his social environment and himself, by a process of imitation and successful invention on the basis of "social heredity" and enforced adaptation to changes in the environment. Then, in the second place, that the "general fact of human social organization" may be conceived in the very psychological terms and principles that characterize the process of personal mental organization—that, in other words, the "so-called dialectic whereby the child comes to a knowledge of himself by building up a sense of his social *environment*, may also be looked at from the side of social organization;" that, in short, the mental and moral organization of the individual, and social organization itself, may and can be explained by the same psychological principles. The *results* of the book are manifold, and I shall below refer to some of them in detail. The two chief results seem to have assumed, by general acclamation, places that were waiting for them in the constructions of contemporary science. The first one—that the self must be conceived as a "socius," as a bipolar unity, as either term of an antithesis, as an *ego* or an *alter*, as one term or end of a personal relation

¹ Read before the American Psychological Association, New York, December 30, 1898.

arising out of a common or identical thought-content or action-content—has already been accepted as a fact by the sociologists, and may be found doing duty under its own technical appellation (the “socius”) in the recent manual by Professor Giddings, of Columbia, called the *Elements of Sociology*. And the second — *that society is a “psychological organization”* — fits on, as a kind of coping-stone marked with the *imprimatur* of a master-worker in the realm of mind, to the edifice that French and American sociologists have in the last ten years erected on the ruins of the biological sociology of the preceding two decades. Mr. Baldwin has thus done at least two things, either one of which would give him a place in the annals of scientific progress — shown, in the first place, with greater completeness and greater exactitude than any recent psychologist, the part played by social contact, by social action and reaction, in the mental development of the individual; and shown, in the second place, the broad and deep psychological foundations of the greatest idea of this century, an idea that has a great rôle to play in the next century — the idea, namely, that the progress of society depends upon psychological factors.

Unlike Professor Dewey,¹ I must confess to having received, from even a first perusal, the impression that Mr. Baldwin’s book did actually, from its author’s point of view, achieve the object of his endeavors; the exhibition, to-wit, of social organization and personal mental organization under the same psychological principles, the principles of imitation and generalization, of habit and accommodation, and so on. I did find it somewhat long and somewhat unduly discursive and lacking in symmetry and proportion, but I attributed these defects to the fact of its being an investigative and pioneer *essay* rather than a didactic treatise. One of the first things about it that please is its classical recognition (for after recent articles by Professors Titchener and Münsterberg we may call this very recognition classical and imperative) of epistemological principles, that is, self-imposed strictures about method and subject-matter. With Mr. Baldwin

¹ See *Philosophical Review* for November, 1898, “Discussion” by PROFESSORS BALDWIN and DEWEY; also *New World* for October, 1898.

himself, I think that Professor Dewey's criticism and discussion of *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, important as it is from the point of view of the reorganization in several of our leading psychological conceptions involved by the essay, tends very largely to overlook its professed point of view. Mr. Baldwin distinguishes carefully both his method and his matter from the method and matter of other psychologists, and would be the first to denounce the idea that he is to be held responsible for initial definite conceptions about the nature of personality (a thing that Professor Dewey finds to be sadly lacking), or the nature of mind and mental processes. Questions "about the nature of mind," he has told us in his first volume, and in his second too, are largely independent of questions of origin. If Mr. Baldwin is, perhaps, somewhat more dogmatic about his contention that society is a "psychological organization," seeming by this very dogmatism to be speaking rather as a sociologist than a psychologist, we must bear in mind, what many of us know to be a fact, that the provinces of sociology and psychology for the present actually overlap, and almost coincide as to their common effort and desire to find the psychological basis for the phenomena of social organization and social progress, and that the sub-title of Mr. Baldwin's book informs us that it is a study in *social psychology*.

Mr. Baldwin's point of view is genetic, the form of that method which (to use his own words) "inquires into the psychological development of the human individual in the earlier stages of his growth for light upon his social nature, and also upon the social organization in which he bears a part." In regard to this point of view, we ought, I think, to congratulate ourselves upon the successful employment to which it has been put by our author, and upon the extent to which he has enriched positive psychology by his observations and experiments. It is only natural, perhaps, that the genetic method should have led to the conclusion that the reality of the self consists in process and progress rather than stable equilibrium or peculiarity of personal content, but this is a result to which everything in post-Kantian philosophy and psychology that has followed the lead of Schopenhauer rather than that of Herbart has been tending. It is

itself a net contribution to the psychology of personality, and an impartial critic of Mr. Baldwin's book would probably confess that what Professor Dewey finds to be the ever-recurring circular process and argument from the self to society and from society to the self, and then back again, is its chief positive result and contention, and not its conspicuous defect. Mr. Dewey finds that Mr. Baldwin first assumes the self on the one hand and society on the other, and then tells us that in our mental development we oscillate and react from the one to the other. While the sense of effort at overcoming difficulties revealed in Mr. Baldwin's argumentation may tend to support this contention, it is hardly a description of the book from its own point of view — the *genetic* one. Mr. Baldwin does not exactly assume the self and society; he assumes the fact of mental development, studies it in its genesis and growth, and finds that it involves the conception and the reality of the self as a *socius*, as one term or the other of a common thought or action-content. I am perfectly aware that these dialectical phrases about the self being one term of a relation in a common thought or action-situation have an illusive metaphysical character that is somewhat difficult to manage; yet, if we patiently wait until the end of Mr. Baldwin's investigation, we shall find in his account of the final conflict between the moral man and society an underlying belief in the reality of human personality as something more than mere implication in a social situation or mere conformity to social process.

Nor, to make another point about his genetic method, is Mr. Baldwin merely justified in the conclusion he arrives at from the employment of that method; but he lets us see that he is amply justified in using the genetic method as a method. From his successful exhibition of the fact that organization and system are worked into the personal self only by the "social dialectic," he has shown us that it is impossible to understand the nature of consciousness and conscious process apart from the genetic point of view. I wish to emphasize this point, because it so fully harmonizes with a good deal of important matter that has very recently been put forward, by such writers as Stout and Titchener

and Mr. McDougall, on the nature of psychological method and the nature of conscious processes. While it is, indeed, becoming every day clearer and clearer that no single man can write a book upon psychology in general, it is becoming more and more imperative for all psychologists to arrive at some common agreement regarding the nature of mental or conscious process, so that the public may understand what is meant by psychology as the study of psychical or mental processes. In this last important book upon psychology we have the most definite confirmation of the idea that there can be, in the words of Mr. W. R. McDougall,¹ no complete science of conscious processes as such, or rather (and more definitely) of the idea that conscious processes cannot be understood apart from the idea of function or genetic development. What I mean is that the time has come for both philosophers and psychologists to do all they can, by their definitions of consciousness and mental process, to disabuse the mind of the average man of the idea that *we human beings possess consciousness for any other reason than the one reason that we may do something with this consciousness*. Mr. Dewey complains that, when we read Mr. Baldwin's book, we are always reading about a "projective," or a "subjective," or an "ejective" self, and never about any one personal self in the proper sense of the word; always, as it were, about a *shifting* and never about a stable self. Now, again, this touches the main point of Mr. Baldwin's investigation. There is no self that is not an effort to accomplish something, to eject the "within" outward, or to subjectivize what is apparently without; and there is no consciousness or conscious intelligence that is not an effort to "understand a complex situation," and to guide the action of the individual out of such a situation. Mr. Dewey is only too true to fact in saying that it is not always clear what Mr. Baldwin means by the projective self, and that this perplexes the reader, but there can be no misapprehension of Mr. Baldwin's main contention that there is nothing stationary or stable about the self but the process of its growth in a social environment and its imperative duty of affecting that

¹See *Mind*, January, April, July, 1898: "Essays toward the Improvement of Psychological Method."

environment. "The *ego* of which we think at any time is not the isolated-and-in-his-body-alone-situated abstraction which our theories of personality usually lead us to think. It is rather a sense of a network of relationships among you, me, and the others, in which certain necessities of pungent feeling, active life, and concrete thought require that I throw the emphasis on one pole sometimes, calling it *me*, and on the other pole sometimes, calling it *you* or *him*." After Mr. Baldwin's work we see clearly the meaning in such a definition of psychology as Mr. Stout's: "Psychology is the positive science of mental process," a mental process being one in which certain new adjustments are made out of the preëxistent *tendencies* that make up the natural self; and the test of consciousness being apparent newness of situation or difficulty of adjustment, there being in reality no line of separation between neural and conscious process. In other words, we rise from a study of Mr. Baldwin's book with a fresh conviction that the point of view of *dynamogenesis*—the genetic point of view—is an absolute necessity to anyone who is arriving at clearness and exactitude in his conception of the self, or of consciousness, or of mental process.

It is, I am convinced, only a firm hold of this point of view that enables us to understand the uniqueness of Mr. Baldwin's work. For, to be sure, there is nothing unique in the idea that, as we say, the content of the self is social, or largely social. Plato and Aristotle discovered that, and Bentham and Mr. Leslie Stephen and scores of other people state this truism or platitude in modern phraseology. It is not, however, from the side of *content* that Mr. Baldwin has insisted on what is common to the self and others, but from the side of *form*, from the side of personal mental organization: he has shown the necessity of the social dialectic to the formal organization of a man's own tendencies to action, or of a man's own self-development and self-knowledge. His book is from first to last psychological in so far as his subject is mental process and its organization; *only*, the factor of mental organization whose workings he exhibits to us is a relatively new one—not the well-known ethical self, nor the epistemological self, nor the logical self, nor the metaphysical self, nor the

æsthetic self, but the social self. He has shown us with psychological exactness the working of a new dialectic in the growth of the mind—the real or action dialectic of a self whose competing tendencies to movement are harmonized and balanced by the social forces of imitation and accommodation and invention, and so on.

As to positive psychology proper, the importance of the book lies, it seems to me, in the fullness of detail with which the relations of the thought-process to the movement or action-process are worked out. Our own sense of the "general" (this is a point in which Professor Dewey entirely concurs) is in entire accordance with the philosophy of *association* and *suggestion*, always assumed to be motor attitude; and from the general exposition of a "man's interests as the intellectual reflection of his habits," and a man's habits as motor phenomena to be explained out of earlier activities, and a "man's wants as a function of the social situation," we gain an insight into the real truth of the two formulæ, (1) that what we do is a function of what we think, and (2) that what we shall think is a function of what we have done. It is only when we bear in mind the detailed completeness of Mr. Baldwin's study of the relation of thought to movement, not only in his second, but also in his first volume on genetic psychology, that we can see the possibility of *imitation* playing, in his eyes, the rôle of the chief "method" in the process of social development. Imitation is to him a peculiar "circular" order of reaction, by virtue of which the organism discharges certain repetitions of movements that further life-processes. Applied to the individual it denotes that process by which he modifies his sense of himself by following out the action-suggestions that come to him from those round about him. And applied to society it indicates that process by which society appropriates or generalizes the thoughts of individuals by reproducing such of those habits and actions to which the thoughts of individuals lead, as tend to further social development. We are, as individuals and as a society, subject to imitative tendencies, because we are subject to suggestion, and because such suggested actions and movements as further our development

tend, by virtue of that expansive reaction-movement which is characteristic of all living beings, to reinstate or repeat themselves in our psycho-physical organism. Imitation, in short, to Mr. Baldwin seems to denote the *quasi*-circular character of the action and reaction-process that continually goes on between man and his social environment. To Mr. Dewey it is rather an effect than a *cause* of social development, and to others it is only *one* of many factors in social development. There are, as we know, classical precedents in French and American writers for its use as the social process *par excellence*, but perhaps it would be fairer to Mr. Baldwin to say about him—not that he is another advocate for the imitation theory of social progress, but that he is a psychologist who has shown us what must be comprised under imitation, if we would take it (for want of a better word or conception) to describe that assimilation of the action-suggestions of individuals by society, which is no doubt a fact and a necessary means of social progress. If we think of how the world assimilated the teaching of a Socrates, or of Christ, or of a Darwin; of how it generally does assimilate, first the external characteristics, and then the actions, and the points of view of great men and their methods of “going to work,” we shall perhaps agree that it is the only way by which the world in general appropriates the *thoughts* of individuals—the *matter* that, according to Mr. Baldwin, constitutes the *chief matter* of social organization.

This very idea that *thought* is the chief matter of social organization, and that consequently society may be regarded as a psychological organization, has today, after the many years of our devotion to evolutionary philosophy, such a bold and novel character that it naturally rivets the attention of all readers and critics of the volume. It is a proof of Mr. Dewey's breadth and candor of mind that he refuses to accept without criticism an idea which will of course be so welcome and so gratifying to all idealists and to the social philosophy of idealism. It is *too* good, as it were, to be true. The matter or the material of social organization is not thoughts, it seems, but *men*—men and women and their activities, and such aggregations or organic groups of

men as nations, tribes, laborers, capitalists, the governed and their governors, and so on. But then, again, we remember that Mr. Baldwin's standpoint is the genetic one, and at once his apparent dogmatism about the *force of ideas* or *thoughts* seems somewhat less dogmatic. He is *not thinking* (he reminds us)—to use the language of Tönnies—of *companies*, but of *societies*, and, moreover, of society as *human* and *psychical* and "*personal*," and, further still, of society as *progressive*. And what is it, he holds, that makes society progress, if it be not the thoughts of individuals or the thoughts that arise in them in consequence of their efforts at social conformity and social and personal evolution? These thoughts, to be sure, he tells us, take the form of ethical ideals. Thus, if we agree to Mr. Baldwin's contention from his own genetic standpoint, we shall not stumble over the apparent dogmatism of the closing sections of the book. The idea that society is a psychological organization is at once a new conclusion and yet a very old one—as old as the *Republic of Plato*. Of course, we must allow to Professor Dewey and other critics that Mr. Baldwin himself seems somewhat to desert his own *genetic* point of view—and his own early frank recognition of "epistemological considerations," when he puts forward his theory that the matter of social organization is *thoughts* as a direct answer to the problem of sociology, and puts forward his psychology of personal and social growth as the thing which the sociologists have been seeking in vain. I am bound to say that I think he is perfectly right in this, and that he has by his investigation killed, as it were, two birds with one stone—he has given us a true theory of personal, mental, and moral development, and at the same time laid down the basis for the sociology of the future. Only I go back to my point about the positive value and character of Mr. Baldwin's whole book and whole psychology, and beg to insist that his theory of the organization of society by the thoughts of the wisest and best individuals is not to be dissociated from his psychology that thoughts cannot become the matter for new thoughts save in so far as the actions to which they lead are tested on the side of their social-survival value. It is a conclusion from his psychology of the relation of thought to movement that society

cannot have true thoughts about itself *save in consequence of right actions*, and the teaching of the book is that, for the initiative in action that goes beyond convention and law and custom, society is dependent upon the truly inventive individuals in its midst, *i. e.*, the morally inventive—the individuals who have a *genius* for action and for thoughts that are morally and socially fruitful.

The closing reference to the value and the reality of the thoughts about duty that individuals may and do have is, to my mind—as indicated earlier—a counter-active to everything in the book, and in the legion of contemporary books upon social ethics and social psychology and philosophy, that seems to merge the individual in a mere relation of *ego* and *alter*, in any action-content, any mere set or order of common duties, any mere “common thought-situation,” any mere “moving-equilibrium,” of social force in conflict with or in union with cosmic force. The closing suggestion and affirmation that, in the case of a final conflict between social requirements and an individual’s own conception of his duty—that, in *such a case*, “*nothing can be done*,” that the individual must be left to do what he conceives to be his martyr duty, and that society must be left to mark the nonconformity of the individual by the hemlock, or the cross, or the bullet, or the ostracism that is so hard to bear—all this is the best possible proof that Mr. Baldwin has, to his own mind, been describing, not a mere logical dialectic, but a real process of action and reaction between individual persons and their environment, and that he would not put forward his theory of the *socius* as a dogmatic definition of personality. The last emphasis of his essay is upon personality, and upon the whole reality of personality as consisting in a possible unswerving and immediate response to duty, duty having, as he rightly insists, *no complete* logical sanction. That is, the reality of a personal being is made to consist in a necessary progression in the direction of duty; and the whole content of duty is made to consist in an active and progressive personal relation to a world of persons. No sounder view of personality or of conscience has ever been taken. The merit of it, in Mr. Baldwin’s case, consists in his having

maintained it in battle with the mountainous waves that have been raised by the idea of social evolution and the social organism, and what not. His genetic standpoint, adopted by him at the outset for the purely logical reasons of distinction and command of subject-matter, has a future in the sense that it may be adopted as affording real ground, real *terra firma*, to the teacher of ethical science, as well as to the expounder of psychology and philosophy. It is positively healthful for people to be told that there is no reality about their personality unless they continue to progress, and that they cannot possibly progress *alone, without taking others along with them*; for without the progress of others they will be devoid of any possible confirmation of their own progress, and without any of the possible stimuli to new efforts and new actions, resulting in a new organization of their own personality, in which alone their reality consists.

This last remark leads us to repeat deliberately what no careful reader of the volume can fail to perceive—a thing that Professor Dewey also strongly emphasizes—that Mr. Baldwin's book has a vitality that is altogether broader and deeper than that of any special study, however penetrating. It is one of the most important constructive works that have appeared in the psychology and philosophy of the last decade.

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INFLUENCE OF THE PUBERAL DEVELOPMENT UPON THE MORAL CHARACTER OF CHILDREN OF BOTH SEXES.

EVERY organ of the animal economy exercises upon this, as a whole, a variety of influences. Some of these are of a nature more especially dynamic. In virtue of these influences the life of the organ is maintained in relation, by means of the nervous conductors of sense, with the central nervous system, from which, by reflex action, it may be diffused to the other parts of the body. Exaggerated in certain special pathological and physiological conditions, this action is not absent even in the usual conditions of life, although it often escapes observation.

Another kind of action, to which Brown-Sequard and D'Arsonval particularly called attention, is of a biochemical nature, and has recently been brought into greater prominence by the therapeutic applications advocated by these authors. This consists in the fact that each organ, or rather each part of the organs, through the fact of its own functional activity, as well as from its own organic life, elaborates and secretes on its own account special products and ferments, of which the blood becomes the collector, and by this path they come to influence the other cells and parts, rendered in this way solidary.

We have, then, in the nervous system and in the blood two collectors of the various forms of energy developed by the organic life and functionality of the organs, by means of which each of these comes to influence powerfully the life of the others. How and to what degree this influence is exerted is still obscure for many organs; for others, on the contrary, as for the thyroid gland, light begins to appear, through repeated observations and experiments, the close relations being now well known which connect the condition and the presence of this gland with cretinism and with mycœdema. Equally well known, at least in part, are the relations which connect the development of the genital organs with the physical conditions of the organism.

At the epoch of puberty, when the organs of generation attain their development and are awakened to functionality, notable changes occur in the physical character of young people. The stature in this period undergoes remarkable oscillations. There is first a period of repose and gathering of strength, as it were, in which its increase is very slight; then follows a period of rapid growth, which in the girl usually takes place between the fourteenth and the fifteenth year, while in the boy it takes place usually between the fifteenth and the sixteenth. According to my investigations,¹ the average increase of stature in girls in the year of greatest growth has reached eleven centimeters; in boys the average increase was eight centimeters. There follows another period of sluggishness, in which the sexual hair grows, and the voice changes, becomes deeper in man and higher in woman. In this period also the capacity of the thorax increases, the muscular system is developed powerfully in man, the adipose tissue in woman, who receives therefrom roundness and beauty of form, while there is established in her the ovulation associated with the menstrual discharge, and in the male the spermatic secretion begins. And that these changes are in close dependency on the development of the organs of generation is proved by the fact that when, either from natural condition or accidental cause, the organs mentioned are atrophied or injured or destroyed, these modifications are lacking.

I had in my charge in the asylum two individuals with the genital organs atrophied. In one of these, aged thirty-three, the voice was thin, the beard was lacking. The other, still in the asylum at the age of more than forty years, is entirely beardless, and without hair on any part of the body except the head, the eyebrows, and the eyelashes. His voice is a falsetto; manly energy is lacking.

Castration of males before the age of puberty also prevents the development of the beard and the larynx, and produces the same effects as the spontaneous arrest of the development of the generative organs. Dupuytren, dissecting the corpse of a man

¹ ANTONIO MARRO, *La pubertà studiata nell' uomo e nella donna*, etc., p. 13. Torino, 1898.

made a eunuch in early childhood, observed that the larynx was a third smaller than that of complete men of the same age and size. The glottis was very small and the laryngeal cartilages little developed, as in a child. This is the reason why eunuchs keep their treble; and a barbarous speculation used to mutilate the boys destined to become singers in the Sistine Chapel. Muscular force also undergoes a check in eunuchs; old age comes upon them early.

To these organic modifications in the physical conditions correspond others in the psychic field. If we wish to investigate the quality of the modifications in virtue of which the development of the organs influences, first biologically and then organically, the entire organism, we find that the characteristic of the dynamic effects provoked by the genital organs is, in the male particularly, the active vascular dilatation, which locally favors the act of generation, while in general it impresses upon the organism the real character of youth, the general vital turgidity. On this basis rise the various psychic manifestations characteristic of youth: the vivacity, the rapidity of the mental processes, and consequent variation of the state of the mind, with limited field for reflection, which requires the fixing of the mind upon a determined number of images. The expansive emotions, and in general all the sthenic passions—joy, impetuosity, courage—have for their biological basis this vascular dilatation, and in this we find, both in normal and in pathological conditions, the moving principle of the conduct of the individual during this period of life, especially so far as it reflects the sexual instinct. Taking into account the conditions required for the satisfaction of the sexual instinct, either in the zoölogical scale or in man himself, it will not be difficult to admit, as I indicated in the International Congress of Criminal Anthropology held at Geneva in 1896, that the said instinct arises in the form of a complex emotion which sets in movement two mechanisms—the one internal and visceral, which serves in material and natural satisfaction of the instinct, the other external and expressed in the aggressive tendencies against the obstacles which oppose its satisfaction. In other words, I say that the particular emotive state created by the nascent

generative activity calls forth, not only emotions in direct relation with the satisfaction of the sexual instinct, but also an emotive state which is manifested in the tendency to combativeness, a complementary means to the satisfaction of the instinct itself.

The reality of such a fact is evident in the various degrees of the zoological scale, and it is a matter of daily observation that bullocks, cats, dogs, and monkeys, which before the puberal development were quiet, easily managed, become afterward indocile and more or less dangerous, according to the species. At the period of œstrus these animals are all more pugnacious and more ready for violent reaction. Even the dog becomes less obedient to the voice of his master.

In man, also, are observed evident manifestations of this natural condition. In his early years it may be admitted that his greatest relative cerebral activity is produced. On the physical side we observe that the forehead, the part of the skull corresponding to the cerebral hemispheres, and the brain itself are developed more rapidly in infancy than at any other age; also on the psychic side it is a fact that the immense quantity of mnemonic images with which the brain is enriched, and the labor of association of ideas which takes place in one's mind, are beyond comparison with those of the other ages, in which, however, the fruits of this are in a certain way gathered. We have also a proof of these truths in the criminal tendencies of children. Their most frequent fault is lying, a kind of cheating, a crime characteristic of civilized man, while deeds of violence are characteristic of the barbarian. At the time of puberty, however, together with the accelerated development of the genital organs, we observe the rapid growth of the skeleton; the vital capacity is increased; lungs, larynx, frontal cavity grow rapidly. And this development, quite evident in the white man, is much more so in the negro, who, at first orthognathous, becomes prognathous, acquiring a physical character of greater bestiality. The osseous projections which offer the muscles points of firmer insertion become more evident, giving the youth that virile appearance which constitutes one of the secondary sexual characteristics.

No wonder, then, that, in man also, tendencies to violence develop in correlation with the physical conditions, especially in the degenerative state which most depends upon atavic conditions. Batef had already noted how the Indians in Brazil, easily managed in their early childhood, become at the age of puberty intolerant of any restraint.¹ Every day we hear of assaults and murders provoked by the sexual excitement and the passions which accompany it, and criminal statistics go to prove that these crimes, and in general violent criminality, are displayed especially at the time of the sexual development and of the maturity of youth. As appears from my studies on criminals laid before the congress of Geneva, crimes involving personal violence, which are almost altogether lacking before the age of fifteen, when criminality against property is already developed, quickly reach a high percentage in the period following, so that at the age of twenty-five they have already reached the half, and in this same period are found eight-tenths of the mixed offenses of highwaymen, which are counted among the crimes against property. In the prison itself the most frequent infractions of discipline—resistance to the guards, acts of violence against the furniture—occur among the young prisoners.² Only a few months ago, in a case tried at Vercelli, a mother testified that her son, an excellent young man, amiable, laborious, and helpful to the family, became, after he had been enticed into relations with a woman of evil life, lazy, thievish, and violent, going so far as to beat his own mother. The same thing has been observed in other young men. In my opinion the sodomy of degenerates cannot be referred to any other cause than the instinct of combativeness, and, therefore, of cruelty, which is developed along with the sexual instinct and reappears abnormally with it, and is exercised upon the object of the passion instead of being exercised upon rivals, in virtue of that law, called *transfest*, stated by Sully.

Paolo, a painter, a young man of eighteen years, and of good disposition, at a ball becomes acquainted with Catherine R., a

¹ SPENCER, *Sociology*, Vol. I.

² ANTONIO MARRO, *I caratteri dei delinquenti*, p. 267. Torino, 1887.

woman of loose morals, separated from her husband. The relations between the two last for some time in spite of the opposition of the family, until Catherine, after having given Paolo the syphilis, grows cold toward him and excites his jealousy by taking another lover. Paolo complains of his abandonment, but she repels him with contemptuous words. In exasperation he seizes a razor and with two strokes cuts her throat, killing her. He then turns the weapon against himself and inflicts two great wounds in the left side, one of them penetrating the pleural cavity.

There are numerous cases of amorous couples who drown the transports of their embraces in a violent death. Another proof of this observation of the impulsivity of the sexual instinct is found in the decidedly morbid acts developed in the period of puberty. In the cases of psychosis of puberty observed and published by me, it is remarkable that the patients who reveal an especial exaggeration of the sexual instinct by obscene words and tendencies always exhibited tendencies toward combativity and cruelty. During his convalescence one of these challenged his nurses to a wrestling match, in which they would throw each other upon the ground. On the contrary, the only case in which these tendencies were lacking was precisely that one in which there were no erotic tendencies, and the patient could be cured at home.

In woman, in whom coquetry takes the place of combativity in the struggle for love, we find lacking this criminal tendency to fierceness. The appearance of violent criminality is, furthermore, much later, and rather in connection with maternity, under the form of instinct of defense of one's offspring.

These same conditions—more copious cerebral irrigation and consequent psychic hyperæsthesia—could not fail to be suggested, though in an inferior degree, even in normal conditions. And such a fact was clearly revealed by a series of investigations of the conduct of young people of different social conditions and both sexes. The first investigation was made upon the young people in the *Casa Benefica* of Turin, in which are received waifs, orphans, and children abandoned by their families. These children are received between the ages of ten and fifteen, and some

of them have already been before the criminal courts; therefore their conduct, if not their character, bears the impress, not only of their age, but of the conditions of life in which they were before entering the institution. This state of things must naturally bring with it an inevitable cause of perturbation, in so far as the disciplinary influence of the life of the establishment could not count for all, in equal manner, as moderator of the tendencies characteristic of the various ages of the different children. The younger the child was when he entered the establishment, the more benefit he must have received from it in the regulation of his conduct. An examination of the conduct of the children in the institution gives the following result:

CONDUCT OF THE CHILDREN OF THE CASA BENEFICA, CLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO AGES.

Age (years).	Good.	Medium.	Bad.
10	50 per cent.	20 per cent.	30 per cent.
11	66 " "	25 " "	8 " "
12	61 " "	17 " "	20 " "
13	60 " "	32 " "	7 " "
14	70 " "	14 " "	14 " "
15	65 " "	30 " "	4 " "
16	66 " "	13 " "	20 " "
17	50 " "	28 " "	21 " "
18 & 19	70 " "	20 " "	10 " "

Now, in this table, examining the good-conduct column, we see that it presents two minimums, one in the youngest age, the other about the relative maturity of the young men, that is, about the age of seventeen. We also observe that the same column shows two maximums, of which one corresponds to the age of fourteen, the other to the age of eighteen, which is usually the last passed in the home by the young men. In the bad-conduct column we find the maximum in the youngest age, and this could not be otherwise, as the children of that age cannot yet have received a disciplinary benefit from their stay in the home, which they have just entered. They also preserve still intact the germs of their naturally bad dispositions, which not only have had no correction from education, but have received in

addition, from bad example and from all the harmful physical and moral influences undergone, an incentive to greater development. Hence we note a diminution in the number of bad marks which presents irregularities which are, perhaps, connected with the greater or smaller number of boys admitted at a greater age. What is important to note, however, is the noticeable number of bad marks at the age of sixteen or seventeen, that is to say, in the two years which precede the last of the stay in the institute, which last year, on the other hand, is distinguished by the small number of bad marks.

The division of the same young men as regards conduct, not according to age, but according to the state of puberty, as appears from the growth of hair on the pubis, or the lack of it, gives the following results :

Years, age of the boys.	Number.	Good conduct.	Medium.	Bad conduct.
10, not pubescent,	10	50 per cent.	20 per cent.	30 per cent.
10, pubescent,	—	— “ “	— “ “	— “ “
11, not pubescent,	13	66 “ “	25 “ “	8 “ “
11, pubescent,	—	— “ “	— “ “	— “ “
12, not pubescent,	34	61 “ “	17 “ “	20 “ “
12, pubescent,	25	56 “ “	— “ “	— “ “
13, not pubescent,	25	56 “ “	40 “ “	4 “ “
13, pubescent,	4	75 “ “	— “ “	25 “ “
14, not pubescent,	18	66 “ “	16 “ “	16 “ “
14, pubescent,	9	66 “ “	11 “ “	22 “ “
15, not pubescent,	10	60 “ “	30 “ “	10 “ “
15, pubescent,	13	77 “ “	23 “ “	— “ “
16, not pubescent,	8	62 “ “	12 “ “	25 “ “
16, pubescent,	22	68 “ “	18 “ “	13 “ “
17, not pubescent,	—	— “ “	— “ “	— “ “
17, pubescent,	14	50 “ “	28 “ “	21 “ “
18 & 19 not pubescent,	—	— “ “	— “ “	— “ “
“ pubescent,	10	70 “ “	20 “ “	10 “ “

It will appear that in the years thirteen and fourteen the impubescent have the smallest portion of the bad marks, while those who begin to show signs of puberty have a large share. In the two following years, however, the larger proportion of bad marks is supplied by those who do not yet show signs of puberty; so that it would appear from these examinations that

either precocity or too great delay in the development of puberty is wont to manifest itself in the individuals most inclined to present serious anomalies in their conduct.

The second investigation of the psychic conditions of the young men during the years of the puberal development was directed upon the students gathered in the national academies (*convitti nazionali*),¹ by means of questions addressed to their directors.

The investigation was double, that is to say, one series of questions was directed to classifying the conduct of the young men in regard to the class which they attended, and the other to obtaining the same classification with regard to the age of the individual.

The directors of the national academies to whom the double series of questions was addressed were thirty-nine. The directors of five schools gave either no reply or an evasive one, while, on the contrary, the other thirty-four were polite. The answers to the first question, in regard to the conduct of the students grouped according to classes, amounted to twenty-nine, while the answers concerning the conduct of the students according to their age amounted to thirty. In the second set some directors included also the students of technical schools, omitted in the first.

I had been guided in choosing the first form of inquiry by the hypothesis that the class attended represented, within certain limits, the proportionate degree of mental development of the various students composing the class, which ought to a certain extent to correspond to the various degrees of physical development, varying in different individuals, and to some extent in different regions of the country. But from the answers received from some of the directors I was convinced that the variations in age among the students in any one class were too great to give me a sufficiently faithful representation of the conduct of the students in relation to the puberal development, the principal object of my investigations. For this reason I started the second inquiry, based on the age of the students.

¹The *convitto* is a boarding establishment, maintained by the state, whose boarders are studying in the gymnasium (grammar school) or in the lyceum (high school).—TRANSLATOR.

In sending out the blank for the classification of conduct I had called attention to the fact that the indications of conduct should extend to all the various factors of it: discipline, application to studies, bearing with companions, and morality. I must observe that not all the directors gave to the various gradations of conduct the same value, and hence they proceeded from different criteria in their classification. The reports may be divided in this regard into two categories. To the first belongs that of Dr. Prevesio, director of the national academy of Turin, who wrote: "In determining the conduct, account is taken of the will and diligence in scholastic duties, as well as of the bearing and discipline in class and out, besides morality. If we considered only morality and deportment, the praiseworthy would be in larger number. The imputation of bad conduct does not imply immorality or perversity through malice or precocity in doing evil, but especially neglect of duties and slowness of improvement."

The reports of the second category, on the contrary, gave to the qualification *bad* a more serious meaning. Thus Professor Tosi, head of the academy of Prato, wrote me: "I have not marked any student *bad*, because, either by good luck or from my way of looking at it, it has seemed to me that I had none such. I call bad those who are refractory to education. And if ever in other years I have had one or two, I have hastened to send them back home. I have classified as medium those characterized by uncertain morality, by less goodness of sentiment, by incorrect bearing, by lack of docility."

The directors who indicated a greater number of bad conducts among their pupils generally inclined to the first point of view, while those directors seemed to give the second interpretation to the word "bad" who included under this head a smaller number. The pupils indicated by the latter usually count as so many cases, more or less evident, of moral insanity, congenital usually, which is often susceptible of being more or less corrected by the profound modifications of character which take place during puberty, while in other cases it lasts the whole life, receiving from the puberal revolution an impulse to more

serious manifestations. In fact, the director of the academy of Aosta, Professor Lanei, wrote that of the two bad pupils he had there one was expelled, while the other was improving.

One first result of my double inquiry I obtained from the letters with which some directors wished to accompany the sending of the table of conducts. Here are some of them :

"I can give a general opinion which cannot be erroneous: the boys are good, excellent, when they begin in the gymnasium ; they begin to become restless and ill-behaved in the second and third gymnasium class ; in the upper gymnasium class they calm down a little and become more sensible. In the lycée, in general, they are quiet and serious." (G. B. dal Lago, director of the Liceo-Ginnasio of Taranto.)

"The boys up to eleven or twelve years, as a general thing, have no character ; rare are the cases where they show a personality ; they do not like to be ruled, directed, corrected. Between thirteen and fifteen their inclinations appear, and this is the most dangerous age. Animality, sensual needs, manifest themselves, and reason is not so developed that one is able to act effectively on it and constitute it a controller of the urgent instincts ; but after fifteen the case is different ; one may reason with the young men, and if their nature helps them, they are almost always saved. When their nature fails, every effort is in vain. In general, the boys of the dangerous age are found in the third (military) division of the students, and in school partly in the fourth, partly in the fifth class." (Professor L. Gambarale, Lucca.)

"The greater number of the pupils whose conduct is not satisfactory," writes one of these directors, "is found among the medium class, because the smaller boys make trouble, but are rarely bad ; the older boys, however, would be really bad if they were not in a boarding school. From my long experience I can assert that boys are generally restless from the thirteenth to the sixteenth years, and that all are more lively and more restless, according to their individual characters, in the spring. I have two observations to make in regard to conduct. One, that this makes me especially apprehensive during the months of April

and May; the other, that restlessness and indocility seem to become contagious and common both in the schools and in the boarding houses in certain days of atmospheric agitation. But in defense of the scholars I must add that this nervousness does not appear exclusively in them."

This reference to the influence of the physical upon the moral is repeated in other letters. Thus one of the directors considers conduct correlative, not only with the age, but also with the intellectual development, and states in confirmation that he was obliged, last year, to expel for bad behavior two fifteen-year-old boys who were on a very low plane of intelligence and instruction, and were still in the elementary classes.

Discordant notes were not lacking, however:

"The results for good or evil," wrote Dr. Avancini, "depend, in my opinion, almost entirely on the way the boys are treated. It is unfortunate if, in reproof or punishment, gentleness, moderation, and justice are wanting. With these qualities, the bad become medium and even good; without them, the good themselves may become worse than the worst."


"The bad boy is an invalid who needs the tenderest care," wrote to me Professor Paolo Giorgi, of Reggio Calabria.

The results of the double inquiry are sufficiently important and conclusive. In the first inquiry, out of a total of 3,025 pupils, 2,067 (or 68.30 per cent.) were marked good, 773 (25.55 per cent.) medium, and 185 (6.11 per cent.) bad.

In the second inquiry the results appear somewhat modified. The total number is 3,012. Among these those of good conduct number 1,948 (64.67 per cent.), 784 (26.02 per cent.) of medium conduct, and 280 (9.29 per cent.) bad. We find, therefore, a somewhat larger number of bad conduct, due partly to the different standard adopted by those directors who answered only the second inquiry, and partly to the fact that in the first classification many directors had considered almost exclusively the scholarship of the pupils, while in the second inquiry the other factors of conduct were taken into due consideration.

Coming now to consider the conduct in the various ages of the young students, it will not be difficult for us to meet the

inconvenience of the diverse criteria with which the pupils are classified in conduct. It is evident that the error must reside in the manner of measuring the distance which separates abnormal conduct from normal, so that those who by some were considered simply medium by others would have been called bad. If, therefore, we include in one single class all the good conduct,



and in another the abnormal, medium, and bad, we shall be able more easily to form an idea of the variations presented by conduct in the various ages, in spite of the different criteria used in judging them.

From this point of view I found that in the first inquiry the number of good conducts rises in the second year of attendance in the classical schools, as compared with the first year; in the third year I found a diminution again, and this diminution continued until it reached the lowest point of good conduct in the

year of the fourth gymnasial class. The following year the proportion was notably increased, but this increase was not maintained. I found, in fact, that the proportion of 73.73 per cent. reached in the fifth (or highest) gymnasial grade fell to 68.39 per cent. in the first lyceal grade. I consider the reason of this to be that in the first grade of the lyceum there are many students from private schools and those of other localities, or from boarding schools where there are only the gymnasial grades; and these new pupils, subjected to a discipline to which they were not accustomed before, do not make a good showing at first, and hence the smaller number of good marks in that year, from reasons not entirely dependent on the age.

In the second inquiry, following the proportional number of good conducts in the various years, I obtained a very significant graphic curve. The good conducts in the first years gradually decline, till they reach their minimum at the age of fourteen years, to rise again to higher levels in the successive years, as may be seen from the table on the preceding page.

Now, comparing the ages in which we note the minimum of the *good conducts* in the students and in the young men of the Casa Benefica, we soon see that there is a notable difference: the *bad conducts* among the students show a remarkable precocity in comparison with the young men of the Casa Benefica. What I had observed in my examination into the nature of the latter class I found also in the deportment marks of the former; and as in the Casa Benefica this assumes a remarkable precocity in the well-fed classes in comparison with the others, so in the boarding schools the precocity of the *bad conducts* is also an indirect result of good nourishment, which brings on the precocious arrival of that crisis, disturbing temporarily the moral equilibrium of the youth, exposing him to easier infractions of the rules, to less activity in his studies, and sometimes to censurable acts of sensuality, thus making it more difficult to maintain good deportment. Only later do we find high averages of good conduct, and rather in the youth in good hygienic conditions than in the others. My observations were not very different from those of Sikorski on the young Russians. Studying

the pupils of the military gymnasia, he found that those refractory to education were, according to their ages, divided in the following proportions :

Of the age of 11 ½ years	-	-	-	-	2.5	per cent.
" " " " 12	"	-	-	-	6.1	" "
" " " " 13	"	-	-	-	23.7	" "
" " " " 14	"	-	-	-	20.0	" "
" " " " 15	"	-	-	-	21.0	" "
" " " " 16	"	-	-	-	6.2	" "
" " " " 17	"	-	-	-	1.2	" "

In Russia, as is well known, the development of puberty is early, either on account of the character of the race or on account of the use of stoves.¹

In the feminine world I have studied the character and the conduct of the girls in the Barolo Home in Turin. In this institution are received poor girls, already delinquent, who propose to reform and return to an honest life. The same cause of perturbation exists for them as for the boys of the Casa Benefica. As they are admitted at every age from eleven to twenty years, although the other conditions exist required by the rules of the establishment, the disciplinability must naturally present variations which depend upon other factors than the age, especially upon the frequent lack of education up to the time of admission.

"The most difficult age to govern," said to me a man who had charge of the education of the inmates, "is always that from fourteen to sixteen years; the girls at that age are regular little devils (*veri demonietti*); they blaze up for the least reason; they would tire the patience of a saint."

The prevailing characteristic of girls of this age is the eagerness to make themselves interesting, and this is natural. Coquetry is an integral part of the character of woman. Nature and social conventions have assigned to her a rather passive part in sexual choice. Hence the need of attracting the attention of others is instinctive, and in this her choice can fall only on the means left

¹ DR. L. DUNAUD, *Report of the Fourth International Congress of Hygiene and Demography*, Vol. II, p. 408. Geneva, 1883.

at her disposition. When she has lost, or has never had, the power of shining among her companions through her own beauty, the showiness of her clothing, or the richness of her jewels, she will try to make herself interesting by the grace of her bearing and movements, the expression of her countenance, or even the oddity of these, with affected coyness, with exaggerated susceptibility, and so on. In the home not a few resorted even to means not likely to put them in the most favorable light, pretending to be stupid, silly, or sick, caring little for the way they made themselves conspicuous, if only they did not remain in the shade.

Classifying, from the reports received, the conduct of the inmates according to their various ages and according to the state of puberty indicated by the appearance of the menstrual flow, I obtained the following table:

CONDUCT OF THE GIRLS IN THE BAROLO HOME (TURIN).

Age	Condition	Number	Good	Medium	Bad
11	without menstruat'n	6	4 = 66%	1	1 = 16.6%
11	with "
12	without "	7	1 = 14%	6
12	with "
13	without "	5	2 = 40%	2	1 = 20%
13	with "
14	without "	7	3 = 42%	2	2 = 28%
14	with "	4	2 = 50%	2 = 50%
15	without "	4	3 = 75%	1
15	with "	7	3 = 42%	1	3 = 42%
16	without "	3 (?)	2	?	?
16	with "	8	6 = 75%	2
17	without "
17	with "	8	2 = 25%	6 = 75%
18	without "
18	with "	30	15 = 50%	13 = 43%	2 = 6%

From this table it would appear that good conduct is maintained better and longer in the girls without menstruation, while the deficiencies are marked in the girls with menstruation, and especially at the age of fourteen and fifteen, when there is observed a decided prevalence of bad conduct. After this stormy period of life, the conduct is seen to have a tendency to regulate

itself, there being an increase in the number of good and medium, while the bad disappear almost entirely.

I could get only very limited information about the normal girls of other educational institutions. Reports came to me from two institutions, one in our city (Turin), one abroad. In the Turin institution the girls, to the number of thirty-five, are divided, according to conduct, as follows :

CONDUCT OF THE GIRLS, ACCORDING TO THE AGE AND THE PUBERAL DEVELOPMENT.

Age	Puberal development	Number	Good	Medium	Reprehensible
13	without menstruat'n	1	1
13	with "	1	..	1	..
14	without "
14	with "	6	2	2	2
15	without "	2	1	1	..
15	with "	6	1	3	2
16	without "
16	with "	7	3	3	1
17	without "
17	with "	2	1	1	..
18	without "
18 and over	with "	10	7	3	..

It is obvious that *reprehensible* is taken in a relative sense, that is, with respect to study and the performance of tasks as well as to the observance of discipline and bearing toward fellow-students, without implying conditions which, naturally, would be incompatible with continuance in a school of high rank.

To these data I may add those which show the conduct of the pupils of the educational institute of Romanshorn, Switzerland. For these students, however, the conduct was judged separately in its real factors, that is, discipline, application to study, and morality. By morality Miss Lolli Kofer, director of the institute, designates the sum total of the active moral qualities, such as abnegation, generosity, love of truth, constancy, delicacy of conscience, noting expressly that as to morality in the common acceptance of that word all of her pupils, without exception, leave nothing to be desired.

CONDUCT OF PUPILS OF THE GIRLS' SCHOOL OF ROMANSHORN, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO ITS REAL FACTORS.

Age	Condition	Number	Discipline			Application			Morality		
			Good	Medium	Bad	Good	Medium	Bad	Good	Medium	Bad
13	without menstruat'n	5	5	1	4	..	5
13	with "	1	1	1	1	..
14	without "	7	6	..	1	3	4	..	5	2	..
14	with "	5	5	3	2	..	2	3	..
15	without "	7	7	1	4	2	5	2	..
15	with "	16	13	2	1	6	9	1	13	3	..
16	without "	1	1	1	..	1
16	with "	7	6	..	1	1	6	..	5	2	..
17	without "
17	with "	3	3	3	3
18	without "
19	with "	6	5	1	..	1	5	..	6

The small number of observations does not make it possible to show the peculiarities of the conduct of the girls for individual years. We can, however, observe how, in general, their regularities of conduct correspond with the first years of the puberal development; at sixteen years we do not find in either institute more than one single pronounced anomaly of conduct, while the age of fifteen still presents a relatively large number of them. After the age of sixteen there are not observed in either institution conspicuous irregularities of conduct in any of its factors.

Judging from these data, it would appear that in woman the period of the maximum irregularity of conduct coincides with the period of the maximum development of the skeleton, or with the establishment of menstruation. Hence, it depends on two factors: the maximum assimilation of nutritive material on the part of the skeleton, and the agitation provoked in the central nervous system by the arrival of the impressions of the genital organs in activity of development. This second factor explains the prolonging of the period of agitation in girls even after the arrival of the accelerated development of the stature. On the whole, comparing the two sexes, the irregularities of conduct are less frequent and less serious in girls than in boys.

In the work of Roussel¹ containing the results of the investigation ordered by the senate of France on the charitable and correctional institutions for orphans and minors in France itself and in other countries, we find a comparative examination demonstrating such a fact, carried out under the best conditions of comparison.

Roussel gives in this work the proportional list of punishments and rewards given the male and female inmates of the reform schools of Ruisselède and Beernem in Belgium, governed by the same rules.

In the period of time from 1860 to 1879 the average number of rewards and punishments for 100 inmates was :

Boys.	Girls.
Punishments, 31.1 per cent.	Punishments, 25.7 per cent.
Rewards, 31.3 per cent.	Rewards, 31.7 per cent.

While in active good conduct the proportions almost balance, still with a slight excess in favor of the girls, we observe that the girls have a considerably smaller number of punishments. Not only the number but the inferior gravity of the offenses punished is in favor of the girls, as we see from the following figures :

OFFENSES PUNISHED.

	Boys.	Girls.
Quarreling and fighting -	53.90 per cent.	17.4 per cent.
Idleness, negligence - -	1.80 " "	21.3 " "
Untidiness - - - -	10.70 " "	24.7 " "
Disrespectful words - -	0.41 " "	14.6 " "
Indecent acts and words -	1.00 " "	0.24 " "
Refusal to work - - -	0.82 " "	1.26 " "
Various infractions of rules -	19.00 " "	19.9 " "
Theft and attempted theft -	9.60 " "	0. " "
Attempts and plots to escape -	1.70 " "	0. " "
Escape - - - - -	0.72 " "	0. " "

A characteristic fact in the comparison between the punishments of the boys and the girls, besides that of the varied

¹ THÉOPHILE ROUSSEL, *Enquête sur les orphélinats et autres établissements consacrés à l'enfance, etc.* Paris, 1881.

proportion in the two sexes, is given by the different nature of the offenses which called forth the punishment: while in the boys active offenses prevailed—quarreling, fighting, thefts, and attempted thefts—the girls, on the contrary, surpass the boys in the number of what we may call passive or negative faults: idleness, negligence, and untidiness. The girls are more numerous in only one class of active offenses—sins of the tongue.

This psychic hyperæsthesia which in the male youth especially accompanies the development of puberty, and gives an indication of its appearance by the atavic spirit of combativeness in the degenerates, and among the normal youths by the restlessness which alters their conduct, constitutes the first powerful leaven of progress, in so far as through the law of *transfert* it becomes capable of arousing and maintaining the employment of force in the new directions in which is developed the social struggle for love no less than for the preservation of life. Where the sympathy of the woman is seen, thither runs the activity of man. In the degenerate classes, both higher and lower, where physical force, reckless daring, are more highly prized than anything else, we have the violent criminality in full bloom: murders and robberies in the lower classes, and in the upper classes the duel.

In proportion as the lot of woman becomes better among the nations, and she is more free to follow the maternal instinct, better educated, better advised on the choice of a husband, we see the man apply himself with greater energy and perseverance to the acquirement of the wealth and social position which make him preferred by the woman. The profiting by these tendencies even from the first years of puberty, that is, the turning to the benefit of the education of the young man, and to the profit of society, the new condition presented in him, is the greatest mark of ability in the persons appointed to direct the activity of the young. All our life long emotion is the steam engine placed at the service of our activity. Ideas, the cerebral patrimony, have only a limited part in the regulation of our actions; the real impulse, the living force, which guides them comes from the emotions; whence, the stronger and more strongly felt are these, the greater the activity to which they may urge the man. The more

numerous and powerful the emotions of a sthenic nature that animate a given labor, the greater will be the physical and moral ease in executing it and maintaining it at length.

"Take a boy," wrote Paulo Fambri, "and say to him : 'I want to see how you run ; go straight to that wall.' If you have some authority over him, he will obey, but with little enthusiasm, and hardly without changing capriciously speed and direction, and taking his ease about resting, if the distance is a little long.

"But if, instead of one, you take three or four boys, and after getting them in line you say to them, 'When I clap my hands the second time, start, and we shall see who will be first,' the running will be lively, and each one will put into it all his breath and energy.

"Best of all, if you announce and show them some prize for the winner, readiness becomes enthusiasm, and often mischievous enthusiasm, since you will often see these boys, just as at the races, try to get in one another's way and block one another, even at the risk of hurting themselves."¹

In the conditions in which the emotions reign supreme in the life of man, on account of the scantiness of the ideative field, the activity shows itself especially impulsive, as that which partakes of the nature of the determinant, and such is generally the spontaneous activity of the child or of the savage. The savage, incapable of attending to the labor of the fields or of any other nature for a few hours, dances for many consecutive hours, hunts entire days, gives himself up to the fatigues of war for many hours and days, without showing signs of weariness. The two essential instinctive tendencies which are at the base of all human action, that of self-preservation and that of reproduction, act powerfully and directly on the mind of the savage. In hunting and fishing the objective is evident : it is the speedy satisfaction of the instinct of self-preservation which prevails in such employments. In the dance it is the satisfaction of another sentiment, that of vanity, a sentiment in direct relation with the sexual instinct ; and it is also this which generally presides over the games which have over professional labors the advantage of

¹ PAULO FAMBRI, *La ginnastica billica*, pp. 158, 159. Roma, 1895.

being much more pleasing and considerably more tolerated. In the dance the savage has two aims: to show off before his women and his tribe in a way to waken admiration, with satisfaction of his own vanity; and to make an impression, by means of his contortions, of the demonstration of his agility, vigor, and skill, on the enemy so as to frighten them. A savage alone, who did not see himself admired or observed by anyone, would soon lose his admiration for the dance, just as without the following of the prey he would not care for the running to which he gives himself up in order to hunt.

In man at the age of puberty the sexual emotion awakes powerfully, while active social life opens before the young man, with all its exigencies. The development of the character required to satisfy the new conditions; the compenetrating of the two sentiments, that of self-preservation and that of reproduction; the fusion of complex physical, intellectual, and moral qualities, of needs with sentiments, cannot take place except with real labor. From the conditions in which this takes place at the age of puberty will arise the most powerful influences on the future life of the young.

The most powerful among the emotions, namely the sexual, which in this epoch is supreme, must be made to serve to keep awake the activity of man and direct it within the bounds which the social welfare requires. The attempts to suppress this emotion pregnant with dangers can serve only to corrupt the nature of man; they vitiate his mind with fancies harmful to the development of a solid character, when they do not open the way to vicious, anti-natural vices. Seguin criticised the separation of the sexes in the earlier years. The harmfulness of such a separation is still greater in that age in which, as the character of the person is forming, it is necessary that it should not miss the advantage of one of its powerful factors.

The daily separation of the two sexes in special boarding schools or in special factories is exceedingly favorable to the growth of tendencies contrary to nature and is harmful to the regular development of the youths of both sexes. (It is in Athens where the women lived separated from the young men

that pederasty flourished.) Certainly the too prolonged association of the two sexes is not exempt from dangers and inconveniencies, but it is not by systematically avoiding dangers that one best succeeds in fortifying oneself against them. It is necessary that the sexual emotivity should not receive precocious satisfaction which would be harmful, but that it should be maintained alive by the presence of the two sexes, so that each one might awaken in the other the instinctive inclination and the sentiments most adapted to prepare for the social strife for love, as it is agreed that this should become the basis of social fellowship. In the present social condition some of the factors of the struggle for love are subjective, others ejective, which emanate from the individual to exert an influence on the surroundings among which he lives; and others, more particularly, objective. The spirit of independence and of individual liberty, intelligence, moral power, beauty, and the other physical qualities which exert a power of attraction, social eminence, and wealth, constitute altogether the patrimony that man must cultivate and maintain with his own activity, sustained by the sexual emotion.

The greater irrigation of the nervous system, and the elevation of the sentimental tone which, as we have already observed, is in direct dependency on the puberal development, constitute in themselves a preparation for this strife. Very interesting and highly instructive in this regard is the case of infantile gigantism observed by Sacchi in his clinic at Genoa. In a boy of the age of five and one-half years there develops a tumor on his left testicle of a coccidinic nature. With the appearance and development of the tumor occur noteworthy physical and moral phenomena. The organs of generation attain a precocious development. The young man grows rapidly in stature; the pubis is covered with hair as in the period of puberty, and the thighs and breast also are covered with hair; the beard appears on the face; the voice of the child changes; his muscular force increases enormously, so that at the age of nine and one-half years he was capable of lifting from the ground and placing on his shoulders the weight of a quintal; in short, the characteristics of puberty appear. At the same time the boy, whose character

was gentle and affectionate, of rather feminine ways, becomes serious, attentive, and diligent in study. No longer fond of the company of boys of his own age, no longer fond of amusements, but with evident fondness for the opposite sex, although not a masturbator. In school he had the first place for conduct and for study. When he committed any fault, he could be easily corrected if reproved politely, but he was rebellious and resisted obstinately when threats were used. When the violence ceased, the obstinacy also ceased. At the age of nine and one-half years the tumor was removed. A month after the operation the hair began to fall from the beard, from the breast, and from other places. His voice gradually became childish again; the sexual tendencies vanished, and the boy, who had become more timid and shy, returns to the company of his own age and childish diversions. He became more disobedient to paternal correction, though attentive and studious in school. The muscular force diminished notably, and the development of the genitals was checked.

Sikorski relates that in Russia the disobedient boys of the schools depending on the minister of war are never definitely expelled from the schools. Those who show a profound moral corruption, or who exercise a pernicious influence on their companions, are sent from the other progymnasias and gymnasias to the progymnasium of Volsk, in the province of Sarahoff, which operates as a school of correction, and here they are kept until their education is finished. The progymnasium keeps its pupils, even when they have already completed their studies, until they are entirely corrected. By the age of seventeen almost all the bad boys are corrected, and it is a rare thing to find at Volsk a boy of eighteen.

Under the puberal development the love of liberty and of independence grows so powerfully as to awake to action the inhibitory centers which before were powerless to check the impulses that kept the conduct irregular.

In the boys of the Casa Benefica in Turin, as we have seen, the conduct at seventeen or eighteen years tends to become regular, so that all abandon the establishment after having gained

by their labor a little money, and with the inalienable patrimony of the profession they have learned.

For the acquirement of agility, of force, of beauty, physical exercises are the more useful because they are wont to exercise so great an attraction upon youth, and the sexual emotion maintained by the presence of persons of the other sex may aid not a little in maintaining alive the labor of acquiring such qualities.

But where this emotion must especially aid the youth is in his apprenticeship for the acquisition of wealth by means of regular and remunerative labor. The ready remuneration of labor which satisfies the sentiment of independence and of liberty, which flatters the self-love of the young man, and permits him to bear into the sexual life the fruits of his own labor, is the first condition of the development of character in the young man. Where it fails, true education is impossible. Our official reformatories are the best proof of it. Connected with that powerful emotion, the sexual, the ready remuneration of labor gives to this the more attraction, the more the savage experiences it in his daily occupation. Wealth is a necessity for the strife of love as for that of life. It is necessary to spend in order to satisfy the first needs that the young man feels in order to make himself beautiful, to win the favors of the person loved by means of gifts, just as it will be necessary later to have money to provide for the exigencies of a family. The mental representation of the first acts by which the young man shall have known how to provide for this need, bound to the so powerful influence that provokes them, will control the character of the person.

If the young man was accustomed to await from the bounty of others the means of satisfying these little and great needs of the period of puberty, his own character will bear the impress of such insufficiency. It is for this reason that from the career of studies, as it is in our country, are created, not only the social declasses, but also the moral waifs, young men, that is, accustomed to expect from intrigue, from shrewdness, and from the protection of others that success which they have not the power of securing for themselves by the aid of labor. The sooner

young men are directed toward an end directly and speedily productive by their labor, the more there is impressed upon them the aspiration toward self-help — the basis of the potentiality of a nation. The greater liberty which Anglo-Saxon girls enjoy is certainly not the smallest factor in the superiority of that race.

The young man is best stimulated to the acquirement of the social virtues necessary in order to create a new family, namely, the labor of acquisition of wealth and the virtue of preserving it.

The virtue of saving represents in the economic field the reproductive activity of the physical, in so far as it marks in the individual the capacity of providing, not only for his own needs, but also for those of his growing family.

Among the nations which are distinguished for precocity in marriage we have, in the first place, those of the Slav race (Russians and Greeks), after whom come immediately the Anglo-Saxon.¹ Hence we find united the nations which have most elevated the sentiment of individual liberties and of independence, such as the English and the North Americans especially, and those who live under the most absolute despotism, like Russia. In the latter country the precocity is very great, inasmuch as 32 per cent. of the husbands marry before the age of twenty. However, as we observe how the marriages occur, we find a very important difference. The Russian does not gain the wife himself. The greater part of the Russian population, namely 90 per cent., belongs to the country, where the greatest number of the inhabitants is devoted to agriculture. For this the precocious marriage is an economic need. The Russian makes haste to give his son a wife in order to have one work-woman more. Wife and husband contribute the unity of a working force, because agricultural labors as practiced in Russia require the coöperation of the strength of the man and of the woman.

The Russian laborer who, without the labor of conquest, and while still beardless, receives a wife from paternal authority,

¹ A. MARRO, *La pubertà*, p. 493.

cannot reach the feeling of independence and of individual liberty which animates the American. He maintains himself in such a degree of civility as to support the confiscation of every liberty, not only political and religious, but even domestic, as happens in the industrial convents, where the master lodges and feeds his workmen, regulating their life by the sound of a bell—the hour of rising, of going to work, of eating, of going to bed, forbidding them to live where they please, to eat as they please, and also to dispose according to their own desire of the hours free from work.

Among the Anglo-Saxons and North Americans it is the parties interested who seek each other in order to get married; the precocity of marriages in these nations is an indication of the spirit of individual enterprise which, stimulated by love, early leads the young people to the acquisition of those conditions which permit the forming of a new family and becomes a very important factor of the strong character which distinguishes such nations.

DR. ANTONIO MARRO.

PROLEGOMENA TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

IV.

THE CONCEPT OF THE SOCIAL MIND.

It must be admitted that the concept of a social mind does not appeal to the "plain man." If the "plain man's" judgment were our criterion of science, social psychology, along with the theory of a luminiferous ether in physics and many other notable theories, would have to be consigned to the limbo of speculative fancies of over-erudite philosophers. There are others to whom, while not "plain-minded," the idea of a social mind will seem scarcely less absurd, either on account of some habit of thought or on account of a philosophic bias. Those who have been in the habit of associating with the word "mind" all that is usually implied in the English word "soul" will naturally be horrified on being told that societies have "minds." Again, a thorough-going individualist, fortified with a monadistic, Leibnizian metaphysic, is hardly to be expected to find proof for the existence of socio-psychical processes in the facts of societary life; for, according to his philosophic bias, are not individuals original and indestructible entities "without windows in their souls"? However, the social psychologist would get along very well if he had only to struggle with these two types of the learned and with the "plain man." But there is a third type of the learned whom he may well despair of convincing. These are those persons who, while able to see details, are not able to see the wider facts which connect the details. They cannot see unity in multiplicity, the whole process lying back of the more visible portions, or, as the old adage puts it, "the woods for the trees." They are not to be blamed for this, for their defect is due to their mental constitution rather than to an acquired bias. But because certain minds cannot see the truth in the perceptions which social psychology is trying to enforce is no reason for rejecting them as mere fancies. This is especially true of the conception of a "social mind." The term is undoubtedly

an unhappy one in many ways, as it tends to express too much, but a better one has unfortunately not yet been found. Let us see in the light of our past reasoning what content it can be given, and what the probable facts are which it is meant to cover.

The old-time individualist, as we have already hinted, has an easy way of disposing of the concept of the social mind. According to him, every man stands, as it were, upon a pedestal of his own. The individual is isolated, is unconnected with his fellows, save in a mechanical way. Even communication is regarded, either as quite inexplicable, or as a sort of semi-mechanical process by which ideas are converted into signs and transferred in some mysterious way from one mind to another. The psychical life of the individual is left by individualism, in a word, far more an unconnected fact than his physiological life. To anyone with such a bias the concept of a social mind, whatever content it be given, must appear as nonsense. But philosophical individualism, even in its modified forms, is as much an anachronism in the light of modern science, especially modern anthropology and ethnology, as the theory of special creation is in biology. Not only the form, but also largely the content of the psychical life of the individual has been shown to be due to his membership in his group, to the fact that he is a functioning element in a larger functional whole. The special creationist and the individualist may each persist in his theory, but neither can longer influence the tide of thought.

At the opposite extreme from individualism we find a theory equally unjustified by the facts. This is a curious mixture of mysticism and the mediæval logical realism, according to which the social mind is an entity distinct from and above the minds of individuals. Like the "soul" of mediæval philosophy the social mind is conceived of as a mysterious entity, which has a life of its own, independent of individual lives, yet in some way ruling or overruling the latter. Whether anyone ever seriously held such a theory in recent times may be doubted, but it is practically the theory which has been imputed to many of the pioneers in the field of social psychology. The mere statement of the theory is sufficient to indicate its absurdity, and likewise

the absurdity of assigning to the term "social mind" such a content as it would imply.

Between these two extreme views lie a number of theories which may be considered either as modifications of the one or the other, or as representing independent points of view. We shall notice but two of these, though they are characteristic. The first is Professor Giddings' theory of the social mind. Professor Giddings identifies the social mind with "the simultaneous like action of the minds of like socii."¹ He says: "To the group of facts that may be described as the simultaneous like mental-activity of two or more individuals in communication with one another, or as a concert of the emotion, thought, and will of two or more communicating individuals, we give the name social mind. This name, accordingly, should be regarded as meaning just this group of facts and nothing more."² Again: "*In its simplest form*, the social mind is nothing more or less than the simultaneous like responsiveness of like minds to the same stimulus."³ The social mind, then, according to Professor Giddings, reduces itself to the "like responsiveness of like minds to the same stimulus." There is no reference to a psychical process interrelating individual psychical processes; there is even no reference to a common life-process. Men might as well be so many radiometers exposed to the stimulus of the sun's rays. They would still exhibit the phenomena of the social mind in its simplest form, according to Professor Giddings' definition. The conception is mechanical, it is unorganic; it is, in fact, individualistic in a high degree. The individual is here still conceived as the independent entity which individualism has always asserted him to be. This is probably not due to Professor Giddings' individualistic bias, but rather to the individualistic and mechanical character of the psychology which he has adopted, and which colors all his thought quite as much as his theory of the social mind.⁴ In common with the psychologists from whom he

¹ *Elements of Sociology*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁴ In his earlier work (*Principles of Sociology*) and in places in the work from which we have quoted, it is fair to say, there are implications that the social mind is something more than "like responsiveness of like minds to the same stimulus;" but these are not carried out, and the general impression of his readers is as we have stated it.

borrowed his psychology he has committed the fallacy of mistaking the results of a process for the process itself. Professor Giddings' attempt to fix the content of the term "social mind," then, we cannot accept as satisfactory, for it is not based upon an organic view of the psychical life of society, and, indeed, it makes a social psychology logically impossible.

The other theory of the social mind which we wish to notice is that represented by Tarde, Le Bon, and to some degree by Professor Baldwin. They make the essence of the social mind to consist in the processes of suggestion and imitation. We cannot go into an elaborate criticism of this theory here, but must reserve such for a later article. It is sufficient to point out that this theory is also a diluted form of individualism, making men copying machines of one another, as it were, by leaving out of account the reference of suggestion and imitation to a common life-process. It is true that these writers have pointed out a part of the actual socio-psychical process, but they have mistaken this part for the whole. By disregarding the connection of the processes of suggestion and imitation with the common life-process, that is, by disregarding the organic aspect of the societary life, they have left the social process quite unconnected with anything else in the universe, making it seem an arbitrary and almost artificial affair; at the same time they have set the individual upon his old pedestal as the entity from which all things in society proceed. Professor Baldwin has in part perceived these errors. He has perceived the mechanical character of imitation when at its purest, and the lack of a principle of organization in the mere imitative process.¹ More important still, he has perceived that social suggestion is a development in social life. He says: "Social suggestibility could not be the original form of man's [social] life, for then there would be an absolute gulf between him and the animal world, in which instinctive equipment in definite directions is supreme."² But Professor Baldwin does not dwell upon these perceptions, and his theory of the social process is in form, at least, almost as individualistic as

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, p. 479.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

Tarde's. He makes imitation the sole method of that process, although the two passages to which we have just referred argue directly, it seems to us, against so doing. If there is any validity at all, however, in Professor Baldwin's criticisms of Tarde's sociology, one is certainly justified in rejecting as unsatisfactory a definition of the social mind purely in terms of imitation and suggestion.

If the positions taken in criticising the above theories are sound, it is evident that the social mind must be correlated with the societary life-process. The social mind is the psychical process which mediates the new adjustments in the group life-process. It is a *social* process, because it mediates the adjustments of a functional unity which is made up of individuals. The "social mind" is, in brief, a convenient term for the socio-psychical process. Just as in the most recent individual psychology the term "mind" has come to mean, not an entity, but a process, so in social psychology the term "social mind" must mean, not a societary "soul," but a societary process. In both cases the term expresses the unity of the process—the fact that the many visible psychic processes are aspects of but a single unified process. But the individual mind, as we have already pointed out, is highly unified, not only functionally, but structurally; while the unity expressed by the term "social mind" is only a low order of functional unity. This distinction is important; but while it may render the term "social mind" in a certain sense inappropriate, it does not make the fact expressed by the term any the less real. The social mind, then, is an expression of the fact that society is an organic functional unity. The unity of socio-psychical processes which it implies corresponds to the unity of organic processes within the social group. Without the organic unity of society there could be no social mind in any intelligible sense of the term; for a basis for unity of development in the socio-psychical process would be entirely lacking. Moreover, the unity of the socio-psychical process is secured far more through habit and instinct than through suggestion and imitation. Indeed, the latter are but special forms of the former. Now, habit and instinct manifestly presuppose physiological organization, physiological continuity and unity. In

the case of society, therefore, as in that of the individual, there is no psychological organization without biological organization—a truth which has already been pointed out, and which ought hardly to need emphasis in this age of biological science. The social mind, then, is to be conceived as the psychical side of the societary life-process; and its functioning and development have strict reference to the biological side of that process.

The relation which the social mind bears to individual minds, and, in general, the relation which socio-psychical processes bear to individual psychical processes, may be illustrated by the analogy of the organism. The relation is qualitatively exactly that which obtains between cellular processes and the processes of the organism as a whole. In the same sense in which it is right to speak of general organic processes as over and above cellular processes, it is right to speak of socio-psychical processes as over and above individual psychical processes. But in both cases it is probably better to speak of the wider process as immanent in the narrower. If from one point of view the activities of the organism appear only as the activities of its cells, from another point of view the activities of the cells appear only as elements in the activity of the organism. The two points of view are evidently the two aspects of a single reality and cannot be opposed to each other. The case is exactly the same with socio-psychical and individual psychical processes. The socio-psychical processes are simply the individual psychical processes under the aspect of the larger functional whole in whose psychical activity they appear as elements. The social mind, then, is immanent in the individual mind, and both are aspects of a single reality.

We are now prepared to examine the meaning of the phrase "social consciousness." In the widest sense of the term, it is evident that all consciousness is, from one point of view, "social consciousness." If what has been said concerning the relation of the social to the individual mind is true, there is no consciousness that is not social consciousness in one of its aspects. However, there is a narrower use of the term which is quite justifiable. At a certain stage of social and mental development the members

of a social group become conscious of their solidarity as a group. This "group-consciousness," like the consciousness of the individual, manifests itself only when there is an interruption in group-habits—only when it is necessary for the group as a whole to make some new adjustment. This consciousness or feeling of identity on the part of the members of a group may be regarded as the social consciousness *par excellence*, as it is that part of the consciousness of the individual which is particularly concerned in the functioning of the group under difficulty, that is, when some problem confronts the group as a whole. Or, if we choose to consider all consciousness as social consciousness, as we undoubtedly may do from one point of view, then consciousness of social solidarity, of group unity, may be regarded as a sort of social self-consciousness. Such social self-consciousness, like the self-consciousness of the individual, tends to become more continuous and more vivid as the process of development advances, since the nature of that process is to increase the complexity of life-conditions, and thereby the number of problems requiring new adjustments to be made. In a word, it shows the same laws of function and development as individual consciousness in general. This is the "social consciousness" which is referred to by most writers on social psychology; and as it is peculiarly the expression of the socio-psychical process, it may justly be regarded as entitled to the name, although its position in the socio-psychical process, as well as its relation to the individual psychical process, must not be forgotten. Manifestly there is no sense other than the two mentioned in which the term "social consciousness" can be used with reference to reality. The socio-psychical process is not highly unified both structurally and functionally, like the psychical processes of the individual, and so does not form a single unified consciousness, a single center of experience, like the individual mind.

There is no social consciousness, then, which is apart from or more than individual consciousness. The individual, not the social group, is, and from the very nature of the process of development must always remain, the center of experience. These propositions are so self-evident that it seems almost absurd even

to state them. Yet many of the decriers of social psychology have made social psychologists guilty of saying the very opposite. Neither do these propositions affect in any way the truth of the propositions previously advanced concerning the nature of the social mind and social consciousness. What social psychology stands for—and accordingly also the concepts “social mind” and “social consciousness”—is the perception that a single process may go on through several “centers of experience.” The admission of this truth is the admission of all that the terms “social mind” and “social consciousness” essentially imply. Of the three possible meanings of the phrase “social consciousness,” then, the two first mentioned are alone legitimate from the standpoint of reality. The first is perhaps in strictest accord with the definition given of the social mind, while the second has the advantage of both popular and scientific usage, and of standing for a peculiar manifestation of the societary life.

The concept of the social mind, then, is not meaningless, although it does not mean that society presents a unified consciousness, much less that it is ruled over by a mysterious entity resembling the “soul” of theology and metaphysics. The content to be given to the concept is, as we have seen, that of a process which unites the processes of many minds into a functional whole, and which mediates the activities of the group as a whole. It is to be regarded as an expression of the common organic life-process of the group, of the fact that the group constitutes an organic functional unity, not as something imposed upon, or separate from, the life-process. The social mind is a convenient name, therefore, for the psychical side of the societary life-process considered in its unity, and is a well-nigh indispensable term in social psychology for referring to the unity which must be thought of as the subject of psychical changes in the societary life. With this conception of the social mind the meaning of such terms as “social consciousness,” the “popular will,” the “*Zeitgeist*,” “public opinion,” etc., becomes clear, while social psychology is freed from any taint of mysticism and becomes as positivistic in its spirit as modern individual psychology.

THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS.

SEVERAL years ago I prepared for this JOURNAL¹ a sketch of "Anti-Monopoly Legislation in the United States," in which I endeavored to trace the origin and growth of the sentiment against capitalistic combinations and to form some estimate of the value of the laws which had been enacted to prevent them. The conclusion then reached was that the popular opposition to the so-called trusts was based in part upon an unreasoned acceptance of the *laissez-faire* doctrine implied in our earlier political philosophy, in part upon the fear of the political consequences of the concentration of vast economic resources in a few great corporations, in part upon the real and fancied injustices and hardships brought about by the trusts already formed. As to the efficiency of the laws, it was held that, while they might harass trade to some extent, they would one and all fail to accomplish the real end in view.

The outcome has justified this view. The laws were already proving unserviceable three years ago, and they have now been almost wholly discredited in the public mind. From the end of the year 1893 to the beginning of 1899 there was no important anti-trust legislation, partly because of the apparent failure of laws already passed, but chiefly because very few large concerns were organized during the period of business depression. But with the return of prosperity and the tremendous expansion of American manufactures, many gigantic organizations have been formed; and the public mind has become more alarmed than ever before. Accordingly, a new attempt has been made in several of the states to stop the movement. Laws have been passed by the states of Arkansas, Missouri, Texas, and Michigan, which are supposed to represent the perfection of anti-trust legislation.

The first of these acts, that of Arkansas, approved March 6, 1899, was bodily incorporated in the more extensive law of Texas, and the Arkansas description of "conspiracy to defraud"

¹ Vol. II, pp. 411-25.

was copied by Missouri in her thrice-amended act; while Michigan has taken her definition of a trust from the Illinois law of 1893, which, in turn, was based on the original Texas law of 1889. This tendency to copy is an indication at once of the common feeling in the various localities and of the lack of ingenuity on the part of most of the legislatures in grappling with the problem. It is to be noticed that these most drastic laws were enacted by agricultural states. The demand for anti-trust legislation was strong enough to secure the introduction of bills in nearly all the legislatures which met last winter; but in states whose manufacturing interests are large, *e. g.*, Indiana, these were easily disposed of. The tendency of the leaders of both political parties to look with favor upon strong anti-trust declarations is an evidence of the widespread feeling on the subject. This widespread interest should be a stimulus for the widest possible discussion of the possibilities in the way of public control of great combinations.

A summary of the four laws above mentioned will give us a view of the most advanced legislation yet enacted on this subject: (1) A trust is defined as the union of two or more persons, firms, or corporations, whereby capital, credit, property, skill, trade, custom, or any other valuable things or possessions, are combined,¹ for the purpose of restricting trade, limiting production, preventing competition, increasing or reducing price, fixing a standard price, or in any way interfering with free competition in any business whatever.² This trust may be formed by agreement or contract, the ordinary methods of partnership or corporation, the holding of trust certificates, or shares of stock of another corporation,³ resulting in the union of distinct firms or corporations or their property and rights.⁴ (2) The persons or corporations which enter into such combinations for the purposes named shall be adjudged guilty of conspiracy to defraud⁵ and

¹ Texas act, sec. 2.

² Michigan, sec. 1; *cf.* Illinois definition, this JOURNAL, Vol. I, p. 420.

³ Michigan, sec. 10; Texas, sec. 2.

⁴ Texas, sec. 6.

⁵ Arkansas, sec. 1; Missouri, Act of April 18, 1899, sec. 1; Texas, sec. 1.

conspiracy against trade.¹ (3) The penalty for this offense is (a) a fine of not less than fifty dollars² nor more than five thousand dollars imposed upon the offending firm or corporation for each day the offense is kept up;³ (b) a similar fine or imprisonment for six months to one year inflicted upon the offending agent or officer of the trust;⁴ (c) forfeiture of franchise or license to do business;⁵ and (d) the invalidating of contracts, whether between members of the trust⁶ or between the trust and its customers; and if payment is made to a trust for any of its wares, the amount may be recovered.⁷ (4) Refusal to buy from or sell to any concern for the reason that it is not a member of the trust,⁸ or selling at less than cost of production, or giving away commodities for the purpose of financially injuring competitors,⁹ shall not only constitute a violation of the anti-trust act, but shall render the offender liable to the injured party twice¹⁰ or three-fold¹¹ the amount of damages actually sustained. (5) The interest of the prosecuting officers is enlisted by the grant of one-fourth of the fine recovered.¹² (6) Cases involving trusts shall have precedence of all other court business, except criminal cases where the defendants are in jail;¹³ or a peremptory order may be issued by the supreme court for an examination by the attorney-general whenever the latter deems one necessary.¹⁴ (7) In order to secure

¹ Michigan, sec. 4.

² Michigan, sec. 4. The other states make the minimum fine two hundred dollars.

³ Arkansas, sec. 2; Texas, sec. 5; Michigan, sec. 7. The older Missouri law has same fine.

⁴ Michigan, sec. 4.

⁵ Arkansas, sec. 3; Texas, sec. 7; Michigan, sec. 2; Missouri, Act of April 18, sec. 1.

⁶ Michigan, sec. 8; and implied in all the laws.

⁷ Texas, sec. 12.

⁸ Missouri, Act of May 10, 1899, sec. 1; Texas, sec. 6.

⁹ Texas, secs. 3, 4.

¹⁰ Michigan, sec. 11.

¹¹ Missouri, Act of May 10, sec. 4.

¹² Arkansas, sec. 5; Texas, sec. 9.

¹³ Arkansas, sec. 6; Texas, sec. 10.

¹⁴ Missouri, Act of May 4, 1899, secs. 2, 3.

control over foreign corporations, the latter, before they can do business in the state, must procure a license therefor after proving that their articles of incorporation are in harmony with those granted by the state to its own corporations;¹ must furnish bond sufficient to cover possible damages;² and must annually send to the secretary of state affidavits showing that they are in no way connected with any form of trust.³ Failure to comply with these regulations, or violation of the anti-trust law, will be punished with the prescribed penalty, and the right to do business in the state will be forfeited.⁴ When officers of a foreign corporation are ordered by the court to testify or produce books, and fail to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against such corporation in the case pending.⁵ The other features of the new laws concern mere matters of detail, or attack special kinds of combinations, *e. g.*, boards of underwriters in Arkansas, Missouri, and Texas, and press associations in Texas.

The above summary of the recent laws gives us a composite law which comprehends all of the latest devices for the uprooting of trusts. Thus far politicians have proposed no more efficient scheme as the basis of their pledges to the people. It may, therefore, well serve as the point of departure for a consideration of the whole question involved. No objection can be taken to the heavy fines and harsh method of sweeping the offending concerns out of existence. Granting the desirability of suppression, and these methods cannot be considered too drastic. Neither can any fault be found with the policy which would compel foreign corporations to become fully amenable to the laws which govern home corporations. Under any circumstances it is desirable that this should be done.

But when we come to the description of the acts which

¹ Missouri, Act of May 23, 1899, secs. 1, 2, 3. Many states have similar provisions.

² Arkansas, sec. 4.

³ Arkansas, sec. 4; Texas, sec. 8.

⁴ Arkansas, sec. 3; Missouri, Act of April 18, sec. 1; Texas, sec. 8; Michigan, sec. 3.

⁵ Missouri, Act of May 4, secs. 1, 2.

constitute the offense against public policy, all of the laws betray a fatal weakness; and it is because of this that the monopolistic movement has gone on practically unchecked by all laws. The thing at which the laws are designed to strike is the vast accumulation of productive resources which renders the competition of small concerns hopeless. But none of the legislatures have yet dared to strike directly at the main fact; and if they did, constitutional limitations would render the law void. Therefore, falling back upon old legal principles which have no real bearing upon our present problems, but which can stand the constitutional test, the laws are made to forbid the union of two or more concerns engaged in the same business in order to keep alive competition. Now, in reality, it is *competition*, not *combination*, which creates the monopoly. Under the anti-trust laws, no two competitors, however feeble, are permitted to unite their forces; but no amassing of capital, however great, is forbidden to the new corporation just forming, or to the old corporation which is growing wealthier by distancing competitors, provided none of its capital comes from the absorption of other corporations pursuing the same line of industry. So long as great industries, as such, are not prohibited, trust promoters will doubtless have ingenuity enough to get around the laws forbidding agreements and coalitions; and if they cannot evade such laws, the competitive wars will simply be carried on a little longer, until one great corporation survives amidst the wreck of many small ones.

That competition, rather than combination, is the important factor in the formation of trusts is shown by the history of every one which has yet arisen in the United States. In every case the coalition has been formed either after an approximate monopoly had been realized by one concern which had distanced all competitors, or because the competition had become so fierce that it was evident that some would be ruined, though it did not yet appear which would survive. Under the former condition, the organization of a trust is simply the formal recognition of an accomplished fact, though the weaker competitors are not wholly crushed and the stronger avoid some of the losses of continued competition. The real danger here is that the

dominant corporation, in its haste to end the process which must lead to a trust anyway, may give to the smaller competitors so large a share of the stock of the new company that the financial strength of the latter may be lowered by the necessity of earning dividends on capital stock represented by worthless plants. A stronger monopoly may sometimes be formed by allowing competition to run a little longer, when the weaker competitors will be wholly eliminated, and a conflict with the anti-trust laws avoided. Under the second condition—ruinous competition among producers of approximately equal strength—combination is as clearly secondary to competition as in the case just considered. Manifestly, two competing companies would not organize if each did not expect to gain by the competition. With a rapidly expanding demand, competition between these companies may be practically eliminated. The price of the product may be run up as high as the upper marginal demand, and still both plants may be fully occupied. But if the market is limited and the two producers actually begin to compete with each other, one must sooner or later gain the ascendancy, though both may be seriously injured in the conflict. If, then, a *modus vivendi* is reached before the actual trial of strength has come, combination is but slightly anticipating the outcome of competition. While the social loss from the destruction of small competing plants is small, that from the destruction of one of two large, evenly matched concerns, like the Carnegie and Illinois steel companies, would be almost beyond computation. To avoid such disaster combinations are frequently formed even before any serious effects of competition are felt; or, before either party is pushed to the wall, an agreement is reached, as in the case of railway pools. Such monopolies being the natural result of our competitive system, it does not seem that the law should interfere with the peaceable measures which moderate the last stages of the conflict.¹

¹ Another class of combinations—that which results in the absorption of companies which are started with the express purpose of being absorbed—requires no attention here. It is, of course, the possibility of damage to the older company, not the question of the extinction of the new one by competition, that enters into consideration.

Illustrations of the tendencies just described are easily found. The sugar trust, one of the greatest of our great monopolies, was built up by competition. Only in the later stages of its development were combinations formed. The crisis of 1873 and 1877 destroyed nearly all of the refineries of the country. But the Havemeyers, running their own West Indian fleet, using the most improved machinery, and controlling ample capital, were only strengthened by the storms which swept away all competitors. By their superior strength they had already been able to cut prices so low that even a slighter commercial disturbance would have shaken down all other refineries. Since that time the methods usually ascribed to trusts have been employed in absorbing competing refineries, when it appeared cheaper to absorb them than to crush them by competition. The sugar trust exists, however, because the margin between its cost of production and the necessary selling price is so wide; not because a few men have formed a conspiracy in restraint of trade. A better illustration of the way trusts develop is found in the case of a certain company¹ which manufactures a food product and whose trade brands are familiar to every traveler from the Rockies to the Rhine. This concern sells over three-fourths of the total output in its line, has large resources, its trade repute is unexcelled, and it supplies a demand which is susceptible of indefinite expansion, especially abroad. Its superior economic strength enabled it to press its competitors, and some of the latter readily accepted the offer of a "promoter" to bring about a combination. Such an arrangement was agreed to by all parties; but the rapacious demands of some of the smaller concerns for their worthless plants soon caused the stockholders of the big company and the new subscribers for stock to drop the scheme. Shortly afterward a new plan was taken up by which the large company was to be reorganized without taking in a single competitor, but by increasing the capital stock and using the new capital to be subscribed by some English investors to

¹ More specific reference in this case would be improper, since personal relations with this company enable me to state facts concerning a deal which is not yet consummated.

construct more modern and better located mills, and thus decrease the cost of production and increase the output. If this plan is carried out, a stronger corporation and more complete monopoly will be effected than would have resulted from the other proposed combination; *and yet not a single clause of the anti-trust laws of any state will be violated in the least.* The future of the small competitors, however, is not very bright.

So, then, we find the anti-trust laws, thus far enacted, wholly inadequate to prevent the real thing against which they are directed, however much they may uselessly harass industry. If the monopoly, or huge corporation, is to be gotten rid of, laws and constitutions must be so modified as to strike it directly, instead of trying to reach it through the limitation of contracts and combinations. But the question at once arises: Is the great industry in itself undesirable? Is it the large plant, or the fact of irresponsible power, against which our laws should be directed in the interest of public policy? More and more, it seems, in spite of the growing popular opposition to trusts, there are coming gleams of recognition of the advantages of large, and even monopolistic, industries. Mayor Jones, of Toledo, in a recent communication to the *Chicago Record* expressed an opinion which is becoming more general when he said there is "neither sense nor reason in the attempts to destroy the labor-saving machines by legislation." Mr. Hewitt's testimony before the Industrial Commission, last April, was to the same effect: "Corporations have continued to grow, and at the present moment they threaten to absorb the entire industrial business of the country which is capable of being administered by centralized management. This is precisely the direction which I anticipated, and seems to me to be in accordance with the evolution which has taken place within the last half century, and which may be in accordance with a natural law, if there be natural laws involved in the progress of modern civilization." The expressions of these two men, occupying in general the opposite extremes of all possible positions, are reflected by an increasing number of newspapers in their more lucid intervals.

For it is becoming apparent that, whatever may prove true

in the future, the trusts have not, on the whole, thus far raised prices. The possible danger in this direction, of which I shall speak later, undoubtedly has much to do with popular opposition, and justifies precautionary measures; but in the main the chief promoters of anti-trust legislation have been those who have been displaced or injured by the improved methods of production introduced by the trust. While public sympathy may justly be expressed for these unfortunates, even taking the shape of pensions — no more justly, however, than for workmen displaced by improved machinery — every argument against the trust put forward by this class is testimony to its value as a labor-saving machine. For example, the president of the Commercial Travelers' Association testifies before the Industrial Commission that, because of the concentration of business in the hands of a few great producers, 35,000 salesmen have been thrown out of employment, and 25,000 more have suffered a reduction of salary. He estimates that the annual loss to salesmen is \$60,000,000, to the hotels \$28,000,000, and to the railways \$27,000,000. Allowing for exaggeration, the salesmen, hotels, and railways are doubtless learning how the hand-weavers and spinners felt when the spinning-jenny and the power-loom were invented; but society is as little likely to set aside the new improvement — unless the trust is getting all the benefits. The following serious words from a funny writer¹ sum up the situation admirably: "Two factors, and two only, have operated to this end [cheapened comforts and raised wages]: labor-saving machinery and organization. The former was the first to be felt. And you have always fought it. Away back, when someone first learned to make a bronze hatchet, you fought him because his invention threw thousands of honest stone-hatchet makers out of work. And you said the invention was no good, anyway: that a man could brain his neighbor just as handily with a good, honest stone hatchet as with one of those new-fangled things. But the engine came on. You have been butting it ever since. Some of you can still remember how you fought steam-power. . . . It would ruin the freighters and

¹ *Puck*, editorial entitled "Butting the Engine," June 7, 1899.

stage-owners, and take away the employment of thousands of honest hostlers and drivers. This is no joke; you did say just that. And it did do a part of what you prophesied; but where steam-power threw one man out of work, it made work for ten thousand. . . . Organization, in the industrial sense, is a science of later birth. But you are simultaneously profiting by it and fighting it, exactly as in the other case. The growth of organization, from the time the cottage system gave way to the factory system down to the most powerful trust you can think of, has been a gradual but constant manifestation of the one way to make life easier. The only difference between a trust and a mere business firm of two or three men, remember, is in size; there is no constitutional difference. That is why no statute law can ever be framed under our federal constitution to 'reach' the trusts. Men have found simply that on a large scale they can produce more cheaply than on a small scale. . . . 'But a trust kills competition and forces up prices,' you say. Now, we know that a trust has no philanthropic purpose. It is composed of men who are in business to make all the money they can, like all business-men. But it has to be a philanthropist, in spite of itself; for superior ability to compete, as a result of superior methods and organization, is the very life of a trust. . . . It is true that the aim of a trust is to kill competition, but so is the aim of the smallest country merchant. But it never has been killed, and the great organization is as powerless to do it as the weakest individual. . . . Competition may be lessened in spots; never killed. . . . The commercial trust that cannot in the long run undersell its competitors will go to smash." The main fact about the great organization is that it cheapens production, just as labor-saving machinery has done; and with the abundance of capital that is always seeking investment, the apparent monopoly can be maintained, in the long run, only by taking advantage of the cheaper methods of production to keep prices below the competitive point.

But, continuing our consideration of the advantages of the great industry, we may note that not only is this the natural outcome of the competitive system and an improvement similar

to an invention, but even the formal combination which is forbidden as a conspiracy may frequently be of great social advantage. The absorption of weaker competitors, provided they are not over-capitalized, may save some manufacturers and merchants who have previously taken a worthy part, from the hardships of crushing competition, and thus prevent a great deal of social friction. Not only so: a coalition among competitors, even before they have been driven to the trust-forming stage, may be of such advantage in solving serious social problems that, far from prohibiting it, it may seem desirable to promote it. I refer here to a combination which would secure some of the results attained by the trade alliances which have been formed under the inspiration of Mr. E. J. Smith, of Birmingham, England.¹ This movement has for its object the organization of a whole trade on lines somewhat similar to the old guilds. The necessary cost of production is found by a careful examination of experts. This cost estimate includes uniform working expenses, transportation rates, commissions, discounts, minimum profit, etc. A minimum selling price is then set, and any underselling or departure from regulations concerning grades of commodities is punished by a heavy fine. Readjustments are made every six months. Provided due care is taken to shut out shaky concerns whose cost of production would raise the necessary minimum, a double advantage can be derived by society from such trade combinations. First, the trade itself is protected from the sudden revolutions caused by cut-throat competition. While weaker producers will doubtless be eliminated in time, the transition is gradual, and much of the suffering for which our sympathies are now stirred is avoided. A minimum wage is stipulated, hours of labor are likewise guaranteed to the workmen, and wages are to rise on a sliding scale as prices rise above the minimum. In the second place, the consumers gain by immunity from the scamping and adulteration of the unrestricted competition. Confidence in the merits of Mr. Smith's plan was expressed by Joseph Chamberlain in the following words: "I do not know whether

¹ For a rather full account of this movement, see special *Consular Reports* for June 6, 1899, prepared by Mr. W. T. GRIFFIN, the U. S. commercial agent at Limoges.

you are aware that, within the last year or two, he has carried out, in connection with the trade in which he is interested, a great social experiment, the results of which have been truly marvelous. Into a trade in which formerly everyone, whether workman or employer, was dissatisfied, he has brought contentment. Wages, I believe, have been increased, profits have become larger, and, curious to relate, the demand and the production have increased at the same time. This experiment, I believe, is capable of great development." This plan accomplishes in a more systematic and less speculative manner what the American trade combinations are doing. In many cases, perhaps in the long run in all, it may be necessary that competition should do its perfect work by eliminating all but the strongest; but if the transition may be rendered less violent by the American combination or the English alliance, it is against public policy to enact laws containing the features common to all of our anti-trust legislation.

Turning now to the evils, not of coalitions, but of great industries, we find two which demand legislation and seem to suggest their own remedy. These are the opportunity to exploit the public, within limits, after the great industry has secured a practical monopoly, and the stock-jobbery which mercilessly fleeces the legitimate investor in the securities of the corporation. The second of these evils attracts relatively little attention, and is, perhaps, of less importance than the first, but it is serious enough to demand the attention of our lawmakers. If our capitalistic system is to continue, it is highly desirable that the ownership of our great industries should be as widely diffused as possible. Dr. Albert Shaw is of the opinion that in time small investors will hold most of the stock of the great American corporations, as they now do in France. But at present a few promoters can secure a majority of the shares of a corporation for "services rendered," and do about as they please with the capital actually paid in by the minority stockholders and bondholders. Everybody knows that since the fad for trusts began—for the hard-headed American investor is stampeded by fads as easily as the schoolgirl—a large proportion of the

capitalization of many huge combinations has been water. The manipulation of this stock, not the carrying on of the industry, is the main interest of the promoters. Their fortunes are made before the capital stock is squeezed; after that time the real investors may make the best of what is left, or, perhaps, be forced to submit to a "reorganization." These operations, besides being dishonest, unsettle values, temporarily increase the cost of production, and subject labor to the possibility of the collapse of the industry in which it is employed. Evidently, the great prizes are for the most unscrupulous and those least concerned in the industry involved, whereas the advantages should fall to the largest possible number of honest investors, and preferably to those who are connected most directly with the processes of production. Mr. Hewitt, in the statement from which quotation has already been made, said: "My own view is that, when industry has been sufficiently centralized and the ownership widely diffused through the distribution of shares, the workman will gradually acquire these shares and control the property which they represent. In fact, I cannot see any other outcome for the present movement toward the consolidation of industrial enterprises than the transfer of the control to those who are actually engaged in the work of operation." Whether this expectation is utopian or not, and without reference to this particular outcome, the stability of business, the gains from large accumulations of capital, and the interests of the honest investor, all depend upon some kind of public regulation of great industrial corporations.

The more prominent evil—the exploiting of the consuming public because of monopoly advantages—is none the less real because it is not so great as is popularly supposed. It is undoubtedly true that most of the commodities produced by the trusts are sold for less than they could ever be obtained for under the old system. Even if the monopoly becomes absolute—which has probably never yet been the case—it still feels the regulating force of competition. In the first place, if the price rises above a certain point, competitors will surely spring up again to drag it down. The old competitors were driven from

the field by low prices. They will return again, or others will take their places, if prices rise high enough to leave them a margin of profit over their greater cost of production. In the second place, if no competitors were likely to enter the same field, the price would still be limited by other kinds of competition. The commodity may not be an absolute necessity to very many consumers; then a rise in price will lead to a ruinous decrease in the demand. Men would not consume many oranges at fifty cents apiece. The commodity, while satisfying an inelastic demand, may yet be replaced by something else which can render approximately the same satisfaction. Kerosene oil at a dollar a gallon would have but a limited sale. The consumers would either revert to tallow candles for illumination, or would find it cheaper to turn to electricity or gas, even if private plants had to be introduced.

But after all of this is said—and the most pronounced apologist for the trust can say no more—there is still a margin for exploitation. It is true, as *Puck* says, that the only difference between a mere business firm and the trust is in size. But this is a capital difference. The size of the trust is itself sufficient to create a limited monopoly which can exploit the public to a certain extent purely in the interest of the managers. The most objectionable monopolies, it is true, are those which are protected from the kind of competition above described, either by governmental arrangements, such as tariffs and patents, or by natural monopolies of transportation facilities. Mr. Havemeyer is of the opinion that the customs tariffs are alone responsible for the trust, and multitudes share this opinion. M. de Rousier, in one of the most thorough studies of trusts,¹ holds that all trusts are due to these artificial conditions. According to him, if we should assume such a control of the railways as to render discriminating rates impossible, and should remove tariff protection and patent rights when these tended to shut out competition unduly, the trusts would disappear. Now, these are undoubtedly potent causes of the most objectionable of our monopolies, and the remedy for the evil is easily found, and the

¹ *Les Industries monopolisées aux États-Unis*, pp. 320-27.

neglect to apply it inexcusable. But beyond this the mere bigness of the trust is sufficient cause for alarm and for legislation to regulate it in the interest of the public. It is true, as we have said, that competition will always spring up again if prices rise above the competitive level. But it must be remembered that the plant which can hope to compete with the trust at all must be immense, must represent a fixed investment which cannot be withdrawn when prices again fall to their normal level. Now, if free capital could compete with the trust, competition would remain perfectly automatic; but since capital must be sunk in apparatus which is useless for any other purpose, and since the plant of the established concern is already amply able to supply the ordinary demand, the trust may run prices considerably above their normal point, *i. e.*, may exact from the public a profit far above the average that capital can secure from non-trust investments. Furthermore, the established trust may have built up such a reputation for its products that a competitor who could manufacture equally cheaply would be unable to affect its prices. The food company which I have used as an illustration of the way in which trusts may be formed is earning dividends of 10 to 25 per cent. on its actual investment, and yet competitors scarcely touch it at all. Even if they can manufacture as economically and produce as good wares, they must sell their product at from 10 to 50 per cent. less than the large concern receives. While, then, their competition may affect prices to some extent, they must run for years without profit before they can reduce the profits of their competitor to a fair average. These conditions hold of all commodities which reach the consumer through retail trade, and must make capital pause before it enters the lists to bring down prices.

The fact that prices are below what they were before the trusts were formed does not settle the question in favor of those institutions. Prices ought to fall continually, and should fall in every case until the profits on the actual investment reach a normal rate, usually but slightly above the rate of interest on good securities. Take away the stock-jobbing element, and

industrial securities should represent as little risk as any others, and should pay no higher dividends. Then in some way a regulating force should be found which would keep profits at the normal level and give the consuming public the benefit of improvements, except generous managerial compensation, in lower prices. And even if prices have continued to fall after the trust has been formed, the fact that in a few cases the public can be exploited is an evidence of irresponsible power that is sufficient cause for public concern.

The foregoing analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of trusts suggests in general the course which legislation should take with reference to them. First, the laws already enacted which seek to destroy this great labor-saving machine should be repealed. In the next place, the evils would be remedied by some system of public control which would throw some safeguards about the legitimate capital investment, and some system of taxation which would tend to regulate prices by absorbing all profits above an average amount. The second of these remedies would necessarily involve the first; for the actual earnings of the trust could not be ascertained without some rigid system of inspection, similar to that to which the national banks are now subjected, but having regard for a different set of facts. Mr. Havemeyer in his famous statement before the Industrial Commission said that he thought it would be a good plan to expose the business books of the great corporations to government inspection. While manufacturers have shown a tendency to keep their accounts secret, there would doubtless be no legitimate objection to a regular system of oversight which would make no necessarily private matters public, but would give inexorable publicity to any crookedness in the management of that which is truly a *trust*.

The plan which I suggest for the control of trusts I offer with some diffidence, but with the conviction that it would be both efficacious and feasible. It is a system of graduated income taxation by the national government, with the rigid supervision of the accounts of corporations which such a system would necessitate. Of course, the national government could bring under

such control only those trusts which are engaged in interstate commerce; but the only ones which need national control are these. The only local monopolies which need regulation in the interest of the public are those which hold public franchises, and these may easily be controlled by a rational system of franchise management. If others should arise, the system of national control could be adapted to state needs, just as many of the states have already adopted the essential features of bank supervision from the national banking laws. All of the great trusts are engaged in interstate commerce, and most of them would find it impossible to break up into numerous state concerns for the supply of local demand. If they did, they would be brought under the regulation of competition again, or would be controlled by the state laws modeled after the national system.

To enact such legislation the "interstate" and "general welfare" clauses of the constitution would not have to be stretched any more than they already have been. The decision against the last income-taxation law would probably have no bearing upon this question. If careful consideration should reveal constitutional difficulties in the way—which I do not now see—it would be easier to carry a constitutional amendment granting Congress power to inaugurate such a policy than it is to beat around as we have been doing and subject business to all kinds of uncertainties, in the hope that we may some time find a way to deal with the trusts. A tax upon the plants of the trusts would increase the cost of production; but a tax upon surplus earnings, preferably a graduated tax, would secure for the public every kind of control of the trusts that is in any way desirable, and at the same time would leave a wide margin for freedom of individual initiative and insure progressive improvements in the interest of economical production. The honest investor, meanwhile, will be protected from dishonest manipulators by the supervision by government inspectors, which would be a necessary part of the plan. The small investors, among whom many of the producers themselves should be found, will receive moderate profits; managerial talent can still be properly compensated;

the public will receive the benefits of progressive improvements; and the fluctuations and uncertainties of the great industrial organizations will give place to "steady-going methods under strict public regulation."

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODESTY AND CLOTHING.

NO ALTOGETHER satisfactory theory of the origin of modesty has been advanced. The naïve assumption that men were ashamed because they were naked, and clothed themselves to hide their nakedness, is not tenable in face of the large mass of evidence that many of the natural races are naked, and not ashamed of their nakedness; and a much stronger case can be made out for the contrary view, that clothing was first worn as a mode of attraction, and modesty then attached to the act of removing the clothing; but this view in turn does not explain an equally large number of cases of modesty among races which wear no clothing at all. A third theory of modesty, the disgust theory, stated by Professor James¹ and developed somewhat by Havelock Ellis,² makes modesty the outgrowth of our disapproval of immodesty in others—"the application in the second instance to ourselves of judgments primarily passed upon our mates."³ The sight of offensive behavior is no doubt a powerful deterrent from like behavior, but this seems to be a secondary manifestation in the case of modesty; and I hope presently to show that the genesis of modesty is to be found in the activity in the midst of which it appears, and not in the inhibition of activity like the activity of others; and that it has primarily no connection with clothing whatever.⁴

Professor Angell and Miss Thompson have made an investigation of the relation of circulation and respiration to attention,

¹ WILLIAM JAMES, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 435.

² "The Evolution of Modesty," *Psychological Review*, Vol. VI, pp. 134 ff.

³ JAMES, *loc. cit.*, p. 436.

⁴ Darwin's explanation of shyness, modesty, shame, and blushing as due originally to "self-attention directed to personal appearance, in relation to the opinion of others," appears to me to be a very good statement of some of the aspects of the process, but hardly an adequate explanation of the process as a whole. (DARWIN, *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, p. 326.)

which advances considerably our knowledge of the nature of the emotions.¹ They say:

When the attentive process runs smoothly and uninterruptedly, these bodily activities [circulation and respiration] progress with rhythmic regularity. Relatively tense, strained attention is generally characterized by more vigorous bodily accompaniments than is low-level, gentle, and relatively relaxed attention (drowsiness, for instance); but both agree, so long as their progress is free and unimpeded, in relative regularity of bodily functions. Breaks, shocks, and mal-coördinations of attention are accompanied by sudden, spasmodic changes and irregularities in bodily processes, the amount and violence of such changes being roughly proportioned to the intensity of the experiences. (P. 45.)

Now, emotions represent psychological conditions of great instability. Especially is this true when the emotion is profound. The necessity is suddenly thrown upon the organism of reacting to a situation with which it is at the moment able to cope only imperfectly, if at all. The condition is one in which normal, uninterrupted, coördinated movements are for a time checked and thrown out of gear. (P. 46.)

And again, in concluding their admirable study:

All the processes with which we have been dealing are cases of readjustment of an organism to its environment. Attention is always occupied with the point in consciousness at which the readjustment is taking place. If the process of readjustment goes smoothly and evenly, we have a steady strain of attention—an equilibrated motion in one direction. The performance of mental calculation is a typical case of this sort of attention. But often the readjustment is more difficult. Factors are introduced which at first refuse to be reconciled with the rest of the conscious content. The attentive equilibrium is upset, and there are violent shifts back and forth as it seeks to recover itself. These are the cases of violent emotion. Between these two extremes comes every shade of difficulty in the readjustment, and of consequent intensity in emotional tone. We have attempted to show in the preceding paper that the readjustment of organism to environment involves a maintenance of the equilibrium of the bodily processes, which runs parallel with the maintenance of the attentive equilibrium, and is an essential part of the readjustment of the psycho-physical organism.

The more motile organisms are constantly, by very reason of their motility, encountering situations which put a strain upon the attention. The quest for food leads to encounters with

¹JAMES R. ANGELL and HELEN B. THOMPSON, "A Study of the Relations between Certain Organic Processes and Consciousness," *University of Chicago Contributions to Philosophy*, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 32-69.

members of their own and of different species ; the resulting fight, pursuit, and flight are accompanied by the powerful emotions of anger and fear. The emotion is, as Darwin has pointed out, a part of the effort to reaccommodate, since it is a physiological preparation for action appropriate to the type of situation in question.¹ The strain upon the attention, the affective bodily condition, and the motor activity appear usually in the same connection, and, from the standpoint of biological design, the action concluding the series of bodily activities is of advantage to the organism.

In animal life the situation is simple. Whether the animal decides to fight for it or to run for it, he has at any rate two plain courses before him, and the relation between his emotional states and the type of situation is rather definitely fixed racially, and relatively constant. Even in the associated life of animals the type of reaction is not much changed, and is here also instinctively fixed. But in mankind the instinctive life is overshadowed or rivaled by the freedom of initiative secured through an extraordinary development of the power of inhibition and of associative memory, while, at the same time, this freedom of choice is hindered and checked by the presence of others. The social life of mankind brings out a thousand situations unprovided for in the instincts and unanticipated in consciousness. In the midst, then, of a situation relatively new in race experience, where advantage is still the all-important consideration, and where this can no longer be secured either by fighting or running, but by the good opinion of one's fellows as well, we may look for some new strains upon the attention and some emotions not common to animal life.

I do not think we can entirely understand the nature of these emotional expressions in the race unless we realize that man is, in his savage as well as his civilized state, enormously sensitive to the opinion of others. The longing of the Creek youth to "bring in hair" and be counted a man; the passion of the Dyak of Borneo for heads, and the recklessness of the modern soldier,

¹ The paralysis of extreme fear seems to be a case of failure to accommodate when the equilibrium of attention is too violently disturbed. (See Mosso, *La Peur*, p. 122.)

"seeking the bubble reputation at the cannon's mouth;" the alleged action of the young women of Kansas in taking a vow to marry no man who had not been to the Philippine war, and of the ladies of Havana, during the rebellion against Spain, in sending a chemise to a young man who stayed at home, with the suggestion that he wear it until he went to the field; and the taunts of the Australian women, three or four of whom, Grey relates, can by their jibes and songs stir up forty men to a pitch of madness against a neighboring tribe over some imaginary wrong—all indicate that the opinion of one's fellows is at least as powerful a stimulus as any found in nature. To the student of ethnology no point in the character of primitive man is more interesting and surprising than his vanity. This unique susceptibility to social influence is, indeed, essential to the complex institutional and associational life of mankind. The transmission of language, tradition, morality, knowledge, and all race experience from the older to the younger, and from one generation to another, is accomplished through mental suggestibility, and the activity of the individual in associational life is mediated largely through it.

Now, taking them as we find them, we know that such emotions as modesty and guilt are associated with actions which injure and shock others, and show us off in a bad light. They are violations of modes of behavior which have become habitual in one way and another. In an earlier paper¹ I have indicated some of the steps by which approvals and disapprovals were set up in the group. When once a habit is fixed, interference with its smooth running causes an emotion. The nature of the habit broken is of no importance. If it were habitual for *grandes dames* to go barefoot on our boulevards or to wear sleeveless dresses at high noon, the contrary would be embarrassing. Psychologically the important point is that when the habit is set up, the attention is in equilibrium. When inadvertently or under a sufficiently powerful stimulus we break through a habit, the attention and associative memory are brought into play. We are conscious of a break, of what others will think; we anticipate

¹"Sex in Primitive Morality," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. IV, pp. 774 ff.

a damaged or diminished personality; we are, in a word, upset. We may consequently expect to find that whatever brings the individual into conflict with the ordinary standards of life of the society in which he is living is the occasion of a strain on the attention and of an accompanying bodily change.¹

A minimum expression of modesty, and one having an organic rather than a social basis, is seen in the coyness of the female among animals. In many species of animals the female does not submit at once to the solicitations of the male, but only after the most arduous wooing. I shall refer to this again in a later paper, and the following instances will be sufficient in the present connection: "The female cuckoo answers the call of her mate with an alluring laugh that excites him to the utmost, but it is long before she gives herself up to him. A mad chase through tree tops ensues, during which she constantly incites him with that mocking call, till the poor fellow is fairly driven crazy. The female kingfisher often torments her devoted lover for half a day, coming and calling him, and then taking to flight. But she never lets him out of her sight the while, looking back as she flies, and measuring her speed, and wheeling back when he suddenly gives up the pursuit."² There is here a rapid shifting of attention between organic impulse to pair and organic dread of pairing, until an equilibrium is reached, which is not essentially different from the case, in human society, of that woman who, "whispering, 'I will ne'er consent,' consented." In either case, the minimum that it is necessary to assume is an

¹ Without making any attempt to classify the emotions, we may notice that they arise out of conditions connected with both the nutritive and reproductive activities of life, but it is possible to say that such emotions as anger, fear, and guilt show a more plain genetic connection with the conflict aspect of the food process, while modesty is connected rather with sexual life and the attendant bodily habits, and for convenience of treatment I am using the term "modesty" in this restricted meaning.

² GROOS, *The Play of Animals*, p. 285. The utility of these antics is well explained by Professor Ziegler in a letter to Professor Groos: "Among all animals a highly excited condition of the nervous system is necessary for the act of pairing, and consequently we find an exciting playful prelude is very generally indulged in" (GROOS, *loc. cit.*, p. 242); and Professor Groos thinks that the sexual hesitancy of the female is of advantage to the species, as preventing "too early and too frequent yielding to the sexual impulse" (*loc. cit.*, p. 283).

organic hesitancy, though in the case of woman social hesitancy may play even the greater rôle. Pairing is in its nature a seizure, and the coquetry of the female goes back, perhaps, to an instinctive aversion to being seized.

Our understanding of the nature of modesty is here further assisted by the consideration that the same stimulus does not produce the same reaction under all circumstances, but, on the contrary, may result in totally contrary effects. A show of fight may produce either anger or fear; social attention may gratify us from one person and irritate us from another; or the attentions of the same person may annoy us today and please us tomorrow. Mere movement is, to take another instance, one of the most powerful stimuli in animal life, and, if we examine its meaning among animals, we find that the same movement may have different meanings in terms of sex. If the female runs, the movement attracts the notice of the male, and the movement is a sexual stimulus. Or the movement may be a movement of avoidance—a running away; and in this way the female may secure contrary desires by the same general type of activity. Or, on the other hand, not running is a condition of pairing, and is also a means of avoiding the attention of the male. Similarly modesty has a twofold meaning in sexual life. In appearance it is an avoidance of sexual attention, and at many moments it is an avoidance in fact. But we have seen in the case of the birds that the avoidance is, at the pairing season, only a part of the process of working up the organism to the nervous pitch necessary for pairing.

But without going farther into the question of the psychology of wooing, it is evident that very delicate attention to behavior is necessary to be always attractive and never disgusting to the opposite sex, and even the most serious attention to this problem is not always successful.¹ Sexual association is a treacherous ground, because our likes and dislikes turn upon temperamental traits rather than on the judgment, or, at any

¹Old women among the natural races often lose their modesty because it is no longer of any use. Bonwick says that the Tasmanian women, though naked, carefully avoided indecent postures, but that the old women were not so particular on this point. (BONWICK, *The Daily Life of the Tasmanians*, p. 58.)

rate, upon modes of judgment not clearly analyzable in consciousness. An openness of manner in the relations of the sexes is very charming, but a little more, and it is boldness, or, if it relates to bodily habits, indecency. A modest behavior is charming, but too much modesty is prudery. Under these circumstances, when the suggestive effect of bodily habits is realized, but the effect of a given bit of behavior cannot be clearly reckoned, and when, at the same time, the effect produced by the action is felt to be very important to happiness, it is to be expected that there should often be a conflict between the tendency to follow a stimulus and the tendency to inhibit it, a hovering between advance and retreat, assent and negation, and a disturbed state of attention, and an organic hesitancy, resulting in the emotional overflow of blushing when the act is realized or thought as improper.¹

But however thin and movable the partitions between attraction and disgust, every person is aware of certain standards of

¹ A wholesale unsettling of habit is seen when a lower culture is impinged upon by a higher. The consciousness of other standards of behavior causes new forms of modesty in the lower race. Haddon reports of the natives of Torres Straits: "The men were formerly nude, and the women wore only a leaf petticoat, but I gather that they were a decent people; now both sexes are prudish. A man would never go nude before me—only once or twice has it happened to me, and then only when they were diving. The women, according to my experience, would never voluntarily expose their breasts to white men's gaze; if caught exposed, she would immediately cover her chest or turn around; this also applies to quite young girls, less so to old women. Amongst themselves they are, of course, much less particular, but I believe they are becoming more so, and I have been gravely assured that a man 'can't' (*i. e.*, must not, should not) see a woman's breasts. . . . I have not noticed any reticence in their speaking about sexual matters before the young, but missionary influence has modified this a great deal; formerly, I imagine, there was no restraint in speech, now there is a great deal of prudery; for example, the men were always much ashamed when I asked for the name of the sexual parts of a woman, even when alone or in the presence of one or two men only, and I had the greatest possible difficulty in getting the little information I did about the former relationships between the sexes. All this, I suspect, is not really due to a sense of decency *per se*, but rather to a desire on their part not to appear barbaric to strangers; in other words, the hesitancy is between them and the white man, not as between themselves." (A. C. HADDON, "The Ethnography of the Western Tribe of Torres Straits," *Jour. Anth. Inst.*, Vol. XIX, p. 336.) Bonwick says also: "I have repeatedly been amused at observing the Australian natives prepare for their approach to the abodes of civilization by wrapping their blankets more decently around them and putting on their ragged trousers or petticoats" (*loc. cit.*, p. 24).

behavior, derived either from the strain of personal relationship or by imitation of current modes of behavior. The girl of the unclothed races who takes in sitting a modest attitude, covering herself, perhaps, with her hand, is acting on the result of experience. She may have been often annoyed by the attentions of men at periods when their attention was not welcome, and in this case the action is one of shrinking and avoidance. She doubtless has in mind also that all females are not at all times attractive to all males, that female boldness sometimes excites disgust, and that the concealment of the person may be more attractive than its exposure. This more or less instinctive recognition of the suggestive power of her person and her corresponding attitude of modesty have been assisted also by her observation of the experiences of other women, and by the talk of the older women. I may add the following instances to make it plain that the sexual relation is the object of much attention from both sexes in primitive society, and furnishes occasion for the interruption of the smooth flow of the attention and the bodily activities. Describing the use of magic by the male Australians in obtaining wives, Spencer and Gillen add: "In the case of charming, however, the initiative may be taken by the woman, who can, of course, imagine that she has been charmed, and then find a willing aider and abettor in the man, whose vanity is flattered by the response to the magic power which he can soon persuade himself that he did really exercise." If this attempt at suggestion failed, we should have a case of lively embarrassment in the woman, and her discomfiture would be heightened if the other women and men of the community were aware of her attempt. Similarly on Jervis Island in Torres Straits, "if an unmarried woman desired a man, she accosted him, but the man did not ask the woman (at least so I was informed), for, if she refused him, he would feel ashamed, and maybe he would brain her with a stone club, and so 'he would kill her for nothing.'"²

If we recall the psychological standpoint that the emotions

¹ *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 556.

² HADDON, *loc. cit.*, p. 397.

are an organic disturbance of equilibrium occurring when factors difficult of reconciliation are brought to the attention, and if we have in mind that the association of the sexes has furnished so powerful an emotional disturbance as jealousy, it seems a simple matter to explain the comparatively mild by-play of sexual modesty as a function of wooing, without bringing either clothing or ornament into the question. But modesty has, in fact, become so bound up with clothing that it is difficult to think the two apart. I wish, therefore, to examine the conditions in race history which have brought the organs of sex into attention, and to note what forms of attention are favorable to the development of clothing, and what has been the effect upon attention of bringing clothing into a relation with the person.

There is, first of all, a very widespread attention to the male organs of sex at the time of puberty, in connection, generally, with the initiation ceremonies, which fall also at this time. Circumcision is the form which this attention takes for the most part. This is sometimes performed by the boy himself, sometimes by a friend, but generally as a part of the public initiation ceremony; not, indeed, by the priests or medicine men, but by those in charge of the ceremony, or by relatives or guardians of the boy. I think that there can be little doubt that the suggestion of Ploss,¹ carefully developed by Andree,² is correct, that this ceremony is a part of the manifestation of tribal interest in the education and preparation for life of another man and warrior. The boy was at this time admitted to the ranks of the warriors and of the married men; the initiation, in general, marked the completion of his education for manhood, and the circumcision was of the nature of assistance rendered to nature in the completion of his organic preparation for marriage. A similar attention to the growth of young women is seen in the ceremony of laceration, as it occurs, for instance, in Queensland,³ where the women allege that this is the object, and in the ceremony

¹ H. PLOSS, *Das Kind in Brauch und Sitte der Völker*, Vol. I, 368.

² R. ANDREE, "Beschneidung," *Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche*, Neue Folge, pp. 166 ff.

³ W. E. ROTH, *Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines*, p. 174.

for promoting the growth of the breasts of the girl, which, in addition to laceration, is practiced in Central Australia.¹ This simple type of attention to sex is an expression of a general interest in the activities of life and of reproduction, without any implication of modesty or dress.

Another occasion for attention to the organs of sex and attendant bodily habits is spirit interest in them. As a part of their belief in sympathetic magic, primitive men in many cases thought that they could be contaminated or weakened by the presence of women, and they particularly dreaded the blood of women as a likely carrier of the influence. In his papers on sexual taboo Crawley gives the following instances:²

Amongst the Damaras men may not see a lying-in woman, else they will become weak and will be killed in battle. In Ceram menstruous women may not approach the men lest the latter should be wounded in battle. In some South American tribes the presence of a woman just confined makes the weapons of the men weak. The same belief obtains among the Tschuktschoi, who accordingly remove all hunting and fishing implements from the house before a birth. In the Booandik tribe, if men see women's blood they will not be able to fight. In the Encounter Bay tribe boys are told from infancy that if they see menstrual blood their strength will fail prematurely. . . . Amongst the Maoris, if a man touches a menstruous woman, he becomes *tapu*; if he has connection with her, or eats food cooked by her, he becomes *tapu* an inch thick. Amongst the Pueblo Indians, women must separate from the men at menstruation and before delivery, because if a man touch a woman at those times he will fall ill. An Australian, finding that his wife had lain on his blanket during menstruation, killed her and died of terror in a fortnight.

The spirit element comes out somewhat more clearly in a statement by Tregear of the Maoris: "The walls of a house are sacred. A chief would not lean against a wall, or, indeed, enter a house, if he could help it, except his own. It is said that the walls are made unclean by the Maori women hiding in the clefts the cloth polluted by the menses—this is called *kahukahu*, and engenders the *kahukahu* evil spirits mentioned above;"³ and

¹ SPENCER and GILLEN, *loc. cit.*, p. 459.

² "Sexual Taboo," *Jour. Anth. Inst.*, Vol. XXIV, p. 124. I omit his references.

³ E. TREGEAR, "The Maoris of New Zealand," *Jour. Anth. Inst.*, Vol. XIX, p. 118.

Campbell gives some instances of the relation of sex organs to superstitious practices among the somewhat higher (chiefly the Hindu) religions, and adds:

The belief on this point is a case of the great early religious law, the unwilling is the spirit-caused. To the early man both the local physical and general mental effects of the promptings of the sex appetite imply the entrance and working of some outside spirit. In later religious thought the effects are explained as due to possession by Venuses, Loves, or nymphs. In another view the cause is Satan warring in man's members, or the old Adam goading to sin. Since, therefore, the private parts are great spirit haunts, they can be used as spirit housers. Therefore the private parts are lucky. The belief that the private parts are especially open to spirit attacks seems to be the origin of physical decency. The private parts are kept hid, lest the evil eye or other evil spirit should through them enter the body.¹

In view of this we might well suspect that the first expression of modesty in connection with bodily habits would be found in women, and that the origin of clothing might be found in the efforts of women to cover themselves at those times when exposure of their persons would be particularly dangerous and displeasing to men. Puberty and menstruation are, indeed, the occasion of a large amount of attention to the girl. She withdraws from the camp, or is isolated, because her bodily state is looked on as an illness, and illness is regarded as spirit-caused. She was treated at this time among the natural races essentially as she was treated under the Mosaic law, as unclean, and there can be no question that modesty had a particular development in relation to this fact in the life of woman, but the modesty was not associated with the organs or functions of sex as such, but with a set of superstitions attached to these. And there is certainly no coincidence between the first menstruation and putting on clothes, nor are clothes put on and taken off with reference to any particular periods in the life of woman. The only clear connection, indeed, between menstruation and clothing is that the girl often wears some sign of her marriageability after the first menstruation on her head or body in the way of an ornament; but this is not specially likely to be worn on the loins, and is in

¹ J. M. CAMPBELL, *The Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XXIV, p. 263.

its nature an advertisement of puberty and not a concealment of it.¹ But in many of the lowest tribes the girl wears no clothing either before or after puberty.² There is no reason to believe that menstruation and childbirth were ever sufficient, even in connection with superstitious belief, to cause women to put on clothing; but they were occasions of bringing bodily habits more sharply into the attention, and stimulants both to modesty and to clothing, though the original causes of neither.

It sometimes happens that a people otherwise naked covers the sex organs just sufficiently to protect them from insects. Karl von den Steinen reports that the Trumai Indians of Brazil gather the foreskin over the gland of the penis, and wrap it around with a string and tie it securely; and the neighboring Yuruna cover the gland with a sort of thimble or cornucopia of straw. For the same purpose apparently the Kulishu place the præputium under a string passing around the waist and hold it securely there.³ Waenheldt had previously noticed that the Bororo of Paraguay "bind the glans by means of a fine thread round the belly to protect themselves from insects and be unimpeded in running."⁴ The need of some kind of protection of the sex organs is greater because the natives sit on their hams when resting, thus bringing the pubic region close to the ground, which swarms with insects. Von den Steinen and his companions were annoyed by the bites of insects in just those parts of their persons which the Indians protected. The women wore a covering about the size of two fingers (seven centimeters long and three centimeters wide) attached to two strings passing around the hips and tied around the waist, and a third string passing between the legs. This had the same protective value as the devices of the men, and von den Steinen thinks it was used as a bandage at menstruation, this being regarded as a sickness. These "uluri" of the women were delicately made and ornamented, and

¹ Cf. PLOSS, *Das Weib*, 4. Aufl., Vol. I, pp. 297 ff.

² SPENCER and GILLEN, *loc. cit.*, pp. 460 and 572.

³ KARL VON DEN STEINEN, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, p. 192.

⁴ Quoted by v. d. Steinen, *loc. cit.*, p. 193.

obviously had an attractive as well as protective value, but the women showed no embarrassment, but rather astonishment, when von den Steinen asked them to remove them and give them to him. When they understood that he really wanted them, they removed them and handed them to him with a laugh. This is a case in fact where there is a beginning of clothing without a beginning of modesty, the utility aspect of the covering being up to this point alone in consciousness. The case is not different from that of the Fuegian, who wears an otter skin over his shoulders for warmth, but has no covering about his loins.

But the showing-off instinct, expressing itself in the ornamentation and display of the body, has done more than anything else to bring the organs of sex into attention, sometimes by displaying them and sometimes by withdrawing them. The waist, in common with the neck, the wrists, and the ankles, is smaller than the portion of the body immediately below it, and is from this anatomical accident a suitable place to tie ornaments, and the ornamentation of the body results incidentally in giving some degree of covering to the organs of sex. A minimum expression of a connection between ornamentation and sex organs is seen in Australia: "The pubic tassel is a diminutive structure about the size of a five-shilling piece, made of a few short strands of fur-string flattened out into a fan shape and attached to the pubic hairs. As the string, especially at corroboree times, is covered with white kaolin or gypsum, it serves as a decoration rather than a covering."¹ I do not imagine that in this particular case the Australian had in consciousness any connection between this form of ornamentation and sexual attraction. The pubic hairs formed a convenient place to tie the ornament. Photographs of groups of these men show that quite as likely as not the pubic region is not ornamented at all. About half the men in the groups photographed by Spencer and Gillen have this part of the body ornamented or dressed, and an equal number have not. But the sex dances of the Australian tribes are, for our purpose, the most instructive means of attraction

¹SPENCER and GILLEN, *loc. cit.*, p. 572.

which they employ. These dances generally precede the lending of wives and other periodic relaxations to sexual restraint which characterize these people, and which are thought by some students to be conclusive evidence of a previous state of sexual promiscuity. The object of the dances is, of course, sexual suggestion, and the interesting feature to which I refer is the fact that in some forms of the dance the organs of sex are displayed, and in others they are concealed, and with precisely the same suggestive effect. The sex dance of the central Australians described by Spencer and Gillen is an example of the most common general type of this dance: "Each one [of the young women] is decorated with a double horseshoe-shaped band of white pipe clay which extends across the front of each thigh and the base of the abdomen. A flexible stick is held behind the neck and one end grasped by each hand. Standing in a group [before the men] the women sway slightly from side to side, quivering in a most remarkable fashion, as they do so, the muscles of the thighs and of the base of the abdomen. The object of the decoration and movement is evident, and at this period of the ceremonies a general interchange, and also a lending of women, takes place, and visiting natives are provided with temporary wives."¹ In other Australian tribes, at any rate, the men perform a suggestive sex dance, of which the women are spectators, and a similar pairing off follows. In contrast with this, we find that precisely the contrary means is used to produce the same suggestive effect. Bonwick says that the Tasmanian and Australian women wore a covering of leaves or feathers in the sex dance, and removed it directly afterward.² And Roth says of the Queenslanders: "Phallocrypts, or penis-concealers, only used by the males at corrobborrees and other public rejoicings, are either formed of pearl shell or opossum string."³ And again: It is needless to point out that with both sexes the privates are only covered on special public occasions, or when in close proximity to white settlements."⁴ We saw a moment ago in the "uluri" of the Brazilian women a use of clothing without

¹*Loc. cit.*, p. 381.

³*Loc. cit.*, p. 113.

²*Loc. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴*Ibid.*, 114.

modesty, and in this second form of the sex dance we have what may be called an immodest employment of it.

Another suggestive use of clothing is the use of just a sufficient amount to call attention to the person, without completely concealing it. I need not refer to the fact that in modern society this is accomplished by, or perhaps we should better say transpires in connection with, diaphanous fabrics and décolleté dresses, and the same effect was doubtless accomplished by a typical early form of female dress, of which I will give one instance in Australia and one in America: "Among the Arunta and Luritcha the women normally wear nothing, but amongst tribes farther north, especially the Kaitish and Warramunga, a small apron is made and worn, and this sometimes finds its way south into the Arunta. Close-set strands of fur-string hang vertically from a string waist-girdle. Each strand is about eight or ten inches in length, and the breadth of the apron may reach the same size, though it is often not more than six inches wide."¹ "A fashionable young Wittun woman," says Mr. Powers, "wears a girdle of deer skin, the lower edge of which is slit into a long fringe, with a polished pine-nut at the end of each strand, while the upper border and other portions are studded with brilliant bits of shell."²

When habits are set up and are running smoothly, the attention is withdrawn; and nakedness was a habit in the unclothed societies, just as it may become a habit now in the artist's model. But when, for any of the reasons I have outlined, women or men began to cover the body, then putting off the covering became peculiarly suggestive, because the breaking up of a habit brings an act clearly into attention. And when dress becomes habitual in a society whose sense of modesty has also developed to a high degree, the suggestive effect is so great that the bare thought of unclothing the person becomes painful, and we have the possibility of such a phenomenon as mock modesty. But, so far as sexual modesty is concerned, the clothing has only

¹ SPENCER and GILLEN, *loc. cit.*, p. 572.

² WESTERMARCK, *History of Human Marriage*, p. 189.

reinforced the already great suggestive power of the sexual characters.

In speaking of the relation of sex to morality,¹ I have already shown that the morality of man is peculiarly a morality of prowess and contract, while woman's morality is to a greater degree a morality of bodily habits, both because child-bearing which is a large factor in determining sexual morality, is more closely connected with her person, and in consequence also of male jealousy. Physiologically and socially reproduction is more identified with the person of woman than of man, and it has come about that her sexual behavior has been more closely looked after, not only by men, but by women—for it would not be difficult to show that women have been always, as they are still, peculiarly watchful of one another in this respect. This twofold scrutiny of men and women, her own greater sexual responsibility, her greater physiological affectability, and the fact that in the process of wooing she has had to encounter the advances of the sexually more active and sometimes unwelcome male, are responsible for woman's characteristic sensitiveness on the score of her bodily habits.

I fail to find in this study any confirmation of the disgust origin of modesty. We saw a minimum expression of modesty in the courtship of animals, where the modesty of the female was a form of fear on the organic side, but the accompanying movements of avoidance were, at the same time, a powerful attraction to the male. And we have in this, as in all expressions of fear—shame, guilt, timidity, bashfulness—an affective bodily state growing out of the strain thrown upon the attention in the effort of the organism to accommodate itself to its environment. The essential nature of the reaction is already fixed in types of animal life where the operation of disgust is out of the question, and in relations which imply no attention to the conduct of others. If any separation between the bodily self and the environment is to be made at all, it is putting the cart before the horse to make out that modesty is derived from our repugnance at the conduct of others, more immediately than

¹ "Sex in Primitive Morality," *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, Vol. IV, p. 787.

through attention to the meaning of our own activities. The fallacy of the disgust theory lies, in fact, in the attempt to separate the copies for imitation derived from our own activities from those derived from our observation of the activities of others.¹

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¹ The ethnological example cited by Ellis in confirmation of the disgust view of modesty—that of the embarrassment of the Brazilians when von den Steinen ate in their presence—cannot be regarded as fortunate. I quote his explanation of the custom: "Whenever there is any pressure on the means of subsistence, as among savages at some time or another there nearly always is, it must necessarily arouse a profound emotion of anger and disgust to see another person putting into his stomach what one might as well have put into one's own." (ELLIS, *loc. cit.*, p. 138.) Crawley, on the other hand, says that this custom is due to the primitive idea "that the attributes assigned to the individual who is feared, loathed, or despised are materially transmissible by contact of any sort. It is, perhaps, connected in origin with a physiological aversion to contact with that which is unusual or harmful. This transmission of properties can be effected by any method of contagion or infection, and through any detached portion of the organism. In the particular connection of commensality the virus, if it may be so called, is transmitted to food by the touch, and especially by the saliva." (A. E. CRAWLEY, "Taboos of Commensality," *Folk-Lore*, Vol. VI, p. 130.) In this view it is *dangerous* to eat with others in public. "In Tanna no food is accepted if offered with the bare hands, 'as such contact might give the food potency for evil.' In New Zealand one can be 'bewitched' by eating or drinking from the calabash of an ill-wisher, or by smoking his pipe. . . . When a man is sick, he is invariably questioned by the doctor, for example, whose pipe he smoked last." (CRAWLEY, *ibid.*, p. 137.) Without questioning that fear of contagion is the obvious basis of the habit of eating apart as found in all parts of the world, I am inclined to think that, if we could get back far enough, we should find as a minimum basis of eating apart the mere avoidance of rivals for food, as we see it in animals. But, at any rate, it seems clear that fear, whether in this simple sense or in the more special sense claimed by Crawley, is the immediate basis of the habit, rather than gastric disgust.

REVIEWS.

The Races of Europe. A Sociological Study. With Supplement containing a Bibliography of the Anthropology and Ethnology of Europe. By WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, Ph.D. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1899. 2 vols. Cloth, \$6.

TO THOSE who are in any way interested in the racial development of Europe, or in the historical and social movements which are intimately bound up with racial questions, and especially to those who have endeavored to get light upon some of these most important aspects of European civilization by reference to the maze of contradictory material on the subject scattered through all kinds of books and journals by all kinds of writers, this new work by Dr. Ripley will be most welcome. "Containing little that may be called original, strictly speaking, it represents merely an honest effort to coördinate, illustrate, and interpret the vast mass of original material—product of years of patient investigation by observers in all parts of Europe—concerning a primary phase of human association: that of race or physical relationship" (Preface, p. v). The object of the book, as specified by the author, is to "disentangle" the forces represented by physical environment and race from the "intricate mass of forces working in and through each other," and "to analyze them separately and apart, as if for the moment the others were non-existent" (p. 2). Dr. Ripley has faithfully and skillfully performed his task. The enormous labor expended by the author is fully made manifest by a perusal of the work, and by the very complete and well-arranged bibliography printed by itself in a volume of 160 pages. While the conclusions derived from the critical examination of all this material leave room for difference of opinion in some cases, the result on the whole is very satisfactory, and gives evidence of a fair-minded and judicial examination of all the facts.

The basis of the whole work is anthropological. Before it is possible to determine the influence of the racial factor—temperament, etc.—in the historical and social movements of Europe, such as the movements of population, etc., and before it is possible to distinguish

between the influence of environment and that of race, it is necessary to define very clearly what the races of Europe are, to determine their present distribution, and to trace their past history. It is this consideration that justifies the introduction into a "sociological study" of a mass of anthropological material that becomes tedious to the ordinary reader. The author, be it said, has succeeded in making this material as entertaining as it can well be made. And its introduction has made the book as valuable for the student of pure anthropology and ethnology as for the student of social problems. The three physical characters chosen for the determination of race are the cephalic index; pigmentation, especially of the hair and eyes; and stature. The cephalic index is the most reliable character, since it is not subject to modification by environment, nor by artificial selection. Stature is subject to such modification most of all, and is, therefore, the least reliable of the three characters. Other characters are used in some cases to support the evidence of the three fundamental characters named. From a study of these anthropological data, collected by observers in all parts of Europe, both among the living and among the remains of prehistoric populations, the author establishes the existence in Europe of three fundamental races; the white race being, in reality, three races. This classification is, in general, in accord with the conclusions of the best modern anthropologists, though there are some who would classify differently. The author mentions in particular the most recent attempt to classify the peoples of Europe into six main and four secondary races; but he justly maintains that this attempt of Deniker "is rather a classification of *existing varieties*" than of races. From the varied nomenclatures suggested by different writers for these fundamental races, the author chooses "Teutonic" to designate the long-headed, tall, and blond race whose center of dispersion seems to have been in Scandinavia, or about the Baltic, and who have pushed their way down into central and western Europe; "Mediterranean" for the long-headed, short, and dark race which has, from earliest times, centered about the Mediterranean, though at one time it was quite widely distributed over Europe; and "Alpine" for the round-headed race of medium stature, and with a tendency toward brunetness, which entered Europe from the east at a very early time, separating the other two races. This is the race frequently called Slavo-Celtic, and is characteristic of the Alpine highlands.

After a chapter devoted to the general distribution of the three races, the author analyzes the populations of the various countries of

Europe. The modern nations of Europe are compounds of these three racial elements, and the geographical distribution of the racial characters seems to follow definite laws. But here enters one of the greatest difficulties of an investigation like this of Dr. Ripley's: it is often extremely difficult to determine whether the physical characteristics of a population are due to the race of the inhabitants or to the action of environment. With the present inadequacy of our knowledge of the effect of environment upon physical growth and of heredity, we cannot help feeling a suspicion, in many cases, of conclusions drawn from a few physical characters. We hasten to say, however, that Dr. Ripley has more thoroughly examined all the data extant than anyone else, and that he has shown a rare caution in submitting his conclusions. In spite of acknowledged difficulties, he has not only mapped out the racial geography of the continent in considerable detail, but he has also been able to show the direct and indirect relations, in many cases, between this racial distribution and the food conditions.

Although a large part of Dr. Ripley's book is taken up with anthropological details, the real object of the book is to analyze two of the fundamental elements of the social phenomena of European development—the element of race and the element of environment. From this point of view, he has done what many another writer has failed to do: he has recognized, in the first place, the extreme complexity of social phenomena viewed as a whole; in the second place, with reference to the particular elements of the problem which he has set out to study—race and environment—he has been able to give each factor its due in relation to the general problem. The social philosophy which attributes everything to environment is a back number: environment is only one of the conditions. But the anthropologist who, on the other hand, would attribute everything to race is just as greatly in error. The question has become much like that with reference to the superiority of one or other of the sexes; sides have been taken in the discussion, only to find that there is no room for comparison between the two. In his two chapters on "Social Problems" the author has done much to put this question in its right light. While recognizing the fundamental influence of temperament, he points out the fallacy into which many recent writers have fallen of attributing to race alone the social phenomena which are characteristic of the habitat of that race. His theory is "that most of the social phenomena we have noted [frequency of divorce, suicide, etc.], as peculiar to the areas

occupied by the Alpine type, are the necessary outcome, not of racial proclivities, but rather of the geographical and social isolation characteristic of the habitat of this race. The ethnic type is still pure for the very same reason that social phenomena are primitive" (p. 529). With reference to the theory that the unusual tallness of city populations indicates that the Teutonic race manifests a tendency to migrate into the cities, he collects a "formidable array of testimony" to show that "the tendency of urban populations is certainly not toward the pure blond, long-headed, and tall Teutonic type. The phenomenon of urban selection is something more complex than a mere migration of a single racial element in the population toward the cities. The physical characteristics of townsmen are too contradictory for ethnic explanations alone. A process of physiological and social, rather than of ethnic, selection seems to be at work in addition" (p. 559).

There are many things of interest in the book aside from the main discussion. There is a chapter on "European Origins," in which the probable sources of the European races and the European culture are discussed. The "Aryan question" here again comes up for a brief but clear statement of the facts as they exist at present. A chapter is devoted to the Jews and Semites, the conclusion of which is that "the Jews are not a race, but only a people after all. In their faces we read its confirmation, while in respect of their other traits we are convinced that such individuality as they possess—by no means inconsiderable—is of their own making from one generation to the next, rather than a product of an unprecedented purity of physical descent" (p. 400). In other words, he attributes the persistence of the Jewish type to an artificial selection, and gives evidence to show that the Jewish features persist, in spite of much intermixture with other peoples. The question of the intermixture of the Jews with other peoples is still disputed by some authorities, among others by the eminent authority on the Jews, Mr. Joseph Jacobs. Another chapter is given to a discussion of that interesting people of the Pyrenees, the Basques. Dr. Ripley maintains that the round-headed variety on the north slopes of the Pyrenees comprises the purest representatives of the group. He follows Collignon in his theory of the origin of this peculiar people as an offshoot from the Mediterranean race. The peculiar facial features and the breadth of the head above the temples are attributed, as in the case of the Jews, to an artificial selection among an isolated people. The last chapter of the book is of peculiar interest at this time—"Acclimatization: the Geographical Future of the European Races." After a

discussion of the general problems of acclimatization and the aptitude of the various European nationalities for life in the tropics, the author says : "Summarizing the views of authorities upon this subject, the almost universal opinion seems to be that true colonization in the tropics by the white race is impossible" (p. 585). "In the face of such testimony there can be but one conclusion: to urge the emigration of women, children, or of any save those in the most robust health to the tropics, may not be to murder in the first degree, but it should be classed, to put it mildly, as incitement to it" (p. 586).

A special word should be added with reference to the very complete bibliography of the *Anthropology and Ethnology of Europe*, published as the second volume of the work by the Boston Public Library ; to the large number of maps which greatly enhance the value of the book ; and to the superb collection of portrait types.

ARTHUR W. DUNN.

The Life of William Morris. By J. W. MACKAIL. Two volumes, illustrated. Longmans, Green & Co. Pp. viii+375, 364.

For many, interest in William Morris has centered around some special point of his work, and acquaintance with his life has been made by reading various studies, each portraying some one line of his activities. It is now a satisfaction that the telling of all these pursuits and triumphs in chronological order is made into both an alluring life story and also a complete narrative with logical sequence. The task has been an exacting one, the demands made upon the chronicler of a most unusual kind. Morris' genius and endeavors were so multi-form that it is required of his biographer to possess sympathies for widely different energies and ideals, and most varied powers of judgment and appreciation. The best has been done, we think, in that the chosen biographer, Mr. J. W. Mackail—the son-in-law of the late Sir Edward Burne-Jones—entered upon the work at the desire of this lifelong friend, and the biography is written from a human standpoint.

The enthusiastic saga-convert, F. Buxton Forman, author of *The Life Poetic, as Lived by William Morris*, may not hold the same estimate each time in the literary field, and Mr. Bernard Shaw may claim the right to deny some statement regarding socialistic dogma, as he does with quite amusing wit in his own review of the biography

published in the London *Daily Chronicle*. There Mr. Shaw gives the following interesting paragraph :

His literary judgment leads him astray when socialism is the topic. For example, in the futile joint-socialist manifesto drafted by Morris in 1893, and reduced in committee by himself, Mr. H. M. Hyndman, and the present writer, Mr. Mackail detects the hand of Mr. Sidney Webb! He declares that "it fairly represents the moderate and practical views which Morris held in the last years of his life." As a matter of fact, it contains, under cover of certain plausible sentiments, no views at all; and though this is exactly what "moderate and practical" usually mean in England, it was not in the least what they meant to Morris.

However, even if some of his decisions are thus challenged, Mr. Mackail has shown skilled judgment and discernment.

Morris, through his sixty years of record, proved himself an unwonted worker, and developed a compelling and ennobling theory and religion of work, while both by deed and by writing he related himself to the development of popular social philosophy. It is in this view of his life that his biography must be noticed in a journal of sociology. These special social energies we may consider for our convenience under (1) personal traits and anecdotes; (2) his association with the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings; (3) the conduct of his business; (4) his relation to the socialist movement; (5) his social writings.

1. Early in his college associations there was a dream of forming a brotherhood, with some ideal of renunciation and sacrifice, which preceded and yet lent its influence to the later formed band which had learned that service is better than sacrifice. Of this period the biographer says :

By the end of that year (1854) the religious struggle which seemed likely for a while to land both Morris and Burne-Jones in the Roman church was practically over, and with this clearing of the air social ideals rose to a more important place. Price and Faulkner brought to Oxford actual knowledge of the inhuman conditions of human life in the great industrial areas; their special enthusiasms were for sanitation, for factory acts, for the bare elements of a possible life among the mass of their fellow-citizens. At Birmingham school a considerable section of the upper boys were awake to the crying evils of the period; social reform was a common topic of conversation. The surroundings impressed indelibly on those who lived in them the ground truth that all true freedom, all living art, all real morality, even among the limited class who are raised out of the common level by wealth

or circumstance, finally depend upon the physical and social conditions of life which exist for the mass of their fellow-creatures. It was not till long afterward that this view of the matter took full hold of Morris, the country-bred boy, the easy liver, and born aristocrat. But its influence was already sufficient to insure him against the belief that salvation lay in dreams of the past or in isolation from the common life of the world.

The next year, while making a tour of the cathedral towns of France with Burne-Jones, Morris shows in his letters his tendency toward future ways of thought, regarding both life and architecture. After describing in a style worthy of his future prose romances the lovely French country, he exclaims: "But we had to leave it, and go to Rouen by a nasty, brimstone, noisy, shrieking railway train that cares not two-pence for hill or valley, poplar tree or corn poppy, purple thistle or white convolvulus; . . . that cares not two-pence either for tower or spire, or apse, or dome, for it will be as noisy and obtrusive under the spires of Chartres or the towers of Rouen as it is under Versailles or the dome of the Invalides; verily, railways are *abominations!*" It was on this journey that "walking together on the quays of Havre, late into the August night, Morris and Burne-Jones at last took the definite decision to be artists. Morris did not graduate as a professional architect, nor in all his life did he ever build a house. But for him, then and always, the word 'architecture' bore an immense, and one might almost say a transcendental, meaning."

Just after this, in a long letter to his mother, acquainting her with his decision, he says: "In any work one delights in, even the merest drudgery connected with it is delightful too." Years later, in 1881, his horror of pleasureless labor provoked these words: "If I were to work ten hours a day at work I despised and hated, I should spend my leisure I hope in political agitation, but I fear in drinking."

2. One cause to which, it is well known, he gave much time and skilled attention was the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, or, as Morris himself styled it, the "Anti-Scrape Society." Writing of the year 1877 Mackail says:

Almost without knowing it Morris was now beginning to take part in public action and political life. . . . His innate socialism—if the word may for once be used in its natural sense, and not as expressing any doctrine—was and had been from his earliest beginnings the quality which more than any other permeated and dominated all he did. In this year it forced itself into two different channels, which would by ordinary people be distinguished from one another as belonging to the fields of art and politics, but which to Morris

himself, to whom both art and politics, except in so far as they bore directly on life, were alike meaningless, only represented two distinct points at which the defense of life against barbarism could be carried on. . . . The Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings has had a long, a quiet, and not a useless life; and has, directly or indirectly, saved many remnants of the native art of England from destruction.

Part of a letter he wrote the *Athenæum* in this cause reads: "What I wish, therefore, is that an association should be set on foot to keep a watch on old monuments, to protest against all 'restoration' that means more than keeping out wind and weather, and by all means, literary and other, to awaken a feeling that our ancient buildings are not mere ecclesiastical toys, but sacred monuments of the nation's growth and hope." Mr. Mackail says the principles of the society are given by Morris with unsurpassed lucidity and force in the statement issued by it at its foundation. Of this statement the first and last paragraphs read:

Within the last fifty years a new interest, almost like another sense, has arisen in these ancient monuments of art; and they have become the subject of one of the most interesting of studies, and of an enthusiasm, religious, historical, artistic, which is one of the undoubted gains of our time. Yet we think that if the present treatment of them be continued, our descendants will find them useless for study and chilling to enthusiasm. We think that those fifty years of knowledge and attention have done more for their destruction than all the foregoing centuries of revolution, violence, and contempt.

It is for all these buildings, therefore, of all times and styles, that we plead, and call upon those who have to deal with them to put Protection in the place of Restoration . . . to resist all tampering with either the fabric or ornament of the building as it stands; if it has become inconvenient for its present use, to raise another building rather than alter or enlarge the old one; in fine, to treat our ancient buildings as monuments of a bygone age, created by bygone manners, that modern art cannot meddle with without destroying.

Referring to a later utterance, of 1892, Mr. Mackail says further: "This has had little public circulation, but gives his best literary qualities, his power of lucid statement, his immense and easily wielded knowledge of architecture and history, his earnestness, his humor, and his mastery of biting phrase, with a perfection that is hardly equaled elsewhere. This was the paper on Westminster Abbey, written by him for the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings. Its immediate occasion was a proposal then being discussed for the 'complete restoration' of the interior of the abbey. This proposal was one the mere

mention of which roused him into fury." "It may seem strange," Morris here writes, "that whereas we can give some distinguished name as the author of almost every injury it has received, the authors of this great epic itself have left no names behind them. For, indeed, it is the work of no one man, but of the people of southeastern England. It was the work of the inseparable will of a body of men, who worked, as they lived, because they could no otherwise, and unless you can bring these men back from the dead, you cannot 'restore' one verse of their epic."

3. Regarding the conduct of his business there are new assertions made and interesting anecdotes given. In Vol. I, p. 150, is printed much of the first circular issued by the firm of "Morris, Marshall, Faulkner & Co., Fine Art Workmen in Painting, Carving, Furniture, and the Metals." It contains pertinent paragraphs, and concludes with these words: "It is believed that good decoration, involving rather the luxury of taste than the luxury of costliness, will be found to be much less expensive than is generally supposed."

At the opening of the Merton workshops in 1881, the circular issued is written of with some fullness by the biographer, and gives data regarding times when Morris' business suffered (?) in conflict with his rigid practices in the "protection of ancient buildings." "When Dean Stanley asked him to execute a window for Westminster Abbey, and upon his refusal cited the Vyner window in Christ Church as a precedent, Morris replied that even that window, the excellence of which as a piece of modern work he did not affect to deny, was an intruder where it stood, and alien in character and sentiment from the building in which it was placed. . . . In accordance with Morris' theory, he laid down a self-denying ordinance with regard to supplying painted windows for ancient buildings—self-denying, doubly, because not only did the resolution injure, and for a time cripple, this branch of the business, but because the result in three cases out of four was simply that the owner or guardians of the mediæval building went somewhere else, and the window was filled with glass as much inferior to his in color and design as it was alien from the spirit of the Middle Ages. . . . By abstaining himself, however, he hoped to set an example that others might gradually follow, and perhaps his action has not been wholly without effect."

Regarding the question of his own genius being altogether the cause of his general business success, "Morris always insisted it would have worked just as well and with much greater certainty, if instead of

the solitary man of genius at the head of the work there had been a living inherited tradition throughout the workshop. . . . He carried on his business as a manufacturer, not because he wished to make money, but because he wished to make the things he manufactured. In every manual art which he touched he was a skilled expert; in the art of money-making he remained to the end an amateur. Throughout he regarded material with the eye of the artist, and labor with the eye of a fellow-laborer."

Many paragraphs indicate the growth of his influence, some words of which may be cited. Mr. Mackail writes:

About Morris himself a group of artists and craftsmen were gathering who, without following his principles to their logical issues in joining any socialist organization, were profoundly permeated with his ideas on the most fruitful side, that of the regeneration, by continued and combined individual effort, of the decaying arts of life. . . . This group of craftsmen were drawn together from many different quarters, and worked in very various methods; but, each in his own sphere, all alike consciously aimed at a renaissance of the decorative arts, which should act at once through and toward more humanized conditions of life, both for the worker and for those for whom he worked.

4. Regarding the three years of his life in which he entered most actively into spreading the social views he held, both before and after the propagandist period, many enlightening pages are written. Of the year 1877, in connection with the outcome of active interest in the Eastern Question, the biographer writes:

When the crisis in the East was fairly past, it left Morris thoroughly in touch with the Radical leaders of the working class in London, and well acquainted with the social and economic ideas, which, under the influence of widening education and of the international movement among the working classes, were beginning to transform their political creed from an individualist Radicalism into a more or less definite doctrine of State Socialism."

Of a letter written that year it is noted: "There is the old keen eye for scenery, but there is also a new tone, that of the social observer, one might almost say the political theorist."

When on the point of leaving Kelmscott Manor for the city in the fall of 1880, he writes:

I can't pretend not to feel being out of this house and its surroundings as a great loss. I have more than ever at my heart the importance of people living in beautiful places; I mean the sort of beauty which would be attainable by all, if people could but begin to long for it. I do most earnestly

desire that something more startling could be done than mere constant private grumbling and occasional public speaking to lift the standard of revolt against the sordidness which people are so stupid as to think necessary.

The progress of his mind toward active socialism during these two years is recorded in the private letters when he sets down his thoughts or his belief from one day to another with complete transparency. Through many fluctuations of mood, one may trace a gradual advance. Some people, even among those who knew him well, thought of his socialism as a sudden and unaccountable aberration; or, at all events, fancied it a movement into which he flung himself in a sudden fit of enthusiasm, without having thought the matter out, and acting on a rash impulse. How much this is the reverse of the truth becomes plain when one traces the long struggle, the deep brooding, through which he arrived at his final attitude, and notes the distaste and reluctance which he often felt for the new movement, which at other moments shone out to him as the hope of the world.

Another of his statements in this year is: "All political change seems to me useful now in making it possible to get the social one." Further on, while giving the chronicle of 1882, Mr. Mackail notes:

While it is true to say that during these months Morris was moving toward socialism, it would also be true to say that socialism was moving toward him.

Noting the authors who had educated him and moved him in those days, the biographer says:

More's *Utopia* had no inconsiderable influence over him; much more, it seems, than the professedly socialistic treatises — Marx' *Capital*, Wallace's *Land Nationalization*, and the like, which he had been rather dispiritedly ploughing through. Socialists more versed in economic theory than himself were inclined to accuse him of sentimentalism, and in this, as in other spheres of activity, the demands of the romantic imagination were as imperious in him as ever.

After recounting his most energetic work in writing and speaking for the cause for three successive years, his relinquishing some of these active duties is spoken of thus:

His principles had changed little when he became a declared socialist; they changed even less now. He held as strongly as ever that education toward revolution was the end to be steadily pursued. But the terms "education" and "revolution" had begun to shift and enlarge their meaning. As the strain of an excessive concentration on a single task relaxed, the joy of work returned in a fuller measure. "It is right and necessary" — such was the claim he had made consistently from the first on behalf of human life — "that all men should have work of itself pleasant to do; nay, more, work done without

pleasure is, however one may turn it, not real work at all, but useless and degrading toil." The educational, no less than the creative, work which he did in the latter years of his life resumed the pleasurable quality, which for a time, under the compulsion of what seemed an overpowering duty, had been almost beaten out of it.

5. "As to poetry," he writes in October, 1879, "I don't know, I don't know. The verse would come easy enough if I had only a subject which would fill my heart and mind." Then followed most of the social writings, which are more numerous than one at first thought reckons. The list, fairly complete, runs as follows: *Dream of John Ball*; *Editorials for the Commonweal*; *News from Nowhere*; *Socialism, Its Growth and Outcome*; *Art and Socialism*; *Signs of Change*; *Hopes and Fears for Art*; *Chants for Socialists*; *The Tables Turned*; *Pilgrims of Hope*; *Poems by the Way*. Here I may refer to the index of the biography, which is generally good and complete, but lacking in failing to refer adequately to Morris' own writings.

Regarding different social writings, some of his biographer's words follow:

At a meeting held at Exeter Hall on the 16th of January, 1877, Morris appeared for the first time as a writer of political verse. "Wake, London Lads," a stirring ballad written by him for the occasion, was distributed in the hall, and sung with much enthusiasm.

The Dream of John Ball is spoken of as "the flower of his prose romances, the work into which he put his most exquisite descriptions and his deepest thoughts on human life." This was first published in the *Commonweal*, 1886-7.

Of the year 1890 Mr. Mackail writes:

With infinite patience Morris continued for some time yet to meet the demand made on his purse to meet the expense of the *Commonweal*; and it was after his removal from the editorship that he contributed to it the successive chapters of his romance *News from Nowhere*. In the last chapter of this Morris showed he had "read the influences" of his beautiful Kelmscott Manor "in its entirety, clearly."

It is a curious fact that this slightly constructed and essentially insular romance [*News from Nowhere*] has, as a socialist pamphlet, been translated into French, German, and Italian, and has probably been more read in foreign countries than any of his more important works in prose or verse. . . . The immediate occasion which led Morris to put into a connected form those dreams of an idyllic future in which his mind was constantly hovering was no doubt the prodigious vogue which had been obtained the year before by an American utopia — Mr. Bellamy's once celebrated *Looking Backward*. The

refined rusticity of *News from Nowhere* is in studied contrast to the apotheosis of machinery and the glorification of the life of large towns in the American book; and is perhaps somewhat exaggerated in its reaction from that picture of a world in which the phalanstere of Fourier seems to have swollen to delirious proportions, and state socialism has resulted in a monstrous and almost incredible centralization.

Indeed, a merely material earthly paradise was always a thing Morris regarded with a feeling little removed from disgust. That ideal organization of life in which the names of rich and poor should disappear in a common well-being was in itself to him a mere body of which art, as the single high source of pleasure, was the informing soul.

"Mr. Bellamy worries himself unnecessarily," he had said in an article in the *Commonweal* on this very work and its ideas, in June, 1889, "in seeking, with obvious failure, some incentive to labor to replace the fear of starvation, which is at present our only one; whereas it cannot be too often repeated that the true incentive to useful and happy labor is, and must be, pleasure in the work itself." That single sentence contains the sum of his belief in politics, in economics, in art.

Mr. Mackail has admirably related "the rare instance of a man who, without ever once swerving from truth or duty, knew what he liked and did what he liked all his life long."

RHO FISK ZUEBLIN.

Annals de l'Institut International de Sociologie. Tome V, contenant les travaux de l'année 1898. By V. GRAW and O. BRIÈRE. Paris, 1899. Pp. 511.

THIS publication is becoming an annual, whether the body whose transactions it was primarily intended to report holds a session or not. The contents of the present number are as follows:

"Plan de la sociologie," G. de Azcarate; "L'induction en sociologie," René Worms; "La théorie organique des sociétés: défense de l'organicisme," J. Novicow; "La personnalité libre," C. N. Starcke; "Du droit pénal répressif ou droit pénal préventif," Pedro Dorado; "La vengeance privée," Raoul de la Grasserie; "Sur le droit de coalition," Albert Jaffé; "Formation et évolution du langage," Charles M. Limousin; "L'adaptation est-elle la loi dernière de l'évolution humaine?" F. Puglia.

The first three and the last of these papers are of special interest to the general sociologist. Professor Azcarate makes a commendable attempt to outline the scope of sociology. The result falls short of

the mark proposed by those sociologists who find analytic and genetic interpretation abortive unless it leads to a teleological section of sociology. Even M. Worms, in describing the classes of laws which it is the province of sociology to seek, does not find room for laws to apply in conscious and reflective progress. Mr. Novicow's paper fills 153 pages, and is the most elaborate defense of the "organic concept" that has yet appeared. I cannot escape the feeling that it is very largely love's labor lost. As has been said so often, all that is worth contending for in the case is virtually accepted by everybody, even those who scoff at the idea. The rest will either take care of itself in due time, or it is accident and exaggeration that cannot be dropped too soon. This paper should, however, be compared with a recent monograph by Dr. H. Kistiakowski, *Gesellschaft und Einzelwesen, eine methodologische Studie* (Berlin, 1899), especially pp. 19-31. This author, too, has made a distinct contribution to the analysis of our material, although he numbers himself with those who find it necessary to oppose the organic theory in terms, while positing all its essentials, and making them more evident in the body of his discussion. The organic concept controversy seems to me to have done more than all the other phases of sociological discussion put together to impeach the sociologists' sense of humor.

Professor Puglia's brief paper appears to have been suggested by Professor Vaccaro's book, *Les bases sociologiques du droit et de l'état* (vide this JOURNAL, Vol. IV, p. 103). His thesis is: The law of "adaptation" is doubtless a general law of the life of beings, and men among them are consequently subject to it, but for man, for human nature, it is a *specific* law. There is a law superior to that of adaptation, a law which should be considered as the supreme law of our existence, viz.: the law of *progress* or of *perfection* (*perfectionnement*). On the whole this volume is a valuable addition to our literature.

A. W. S.

Mr. Lex, or The Legal Status of Mother and Child. By CATHARINE WAUGH McCULLOCH. Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1899. Pp. 81.

THIS little book shows that married women still have their grievances against the law. In England as well as in this country the old common law of husband and wife, the law of coverture, which has been aptly summarized by saying that husband and wife were one,

and that one was the husband, has been superseded by far-reaching statutory enactments, which place the wife, as far as property capacity is concerned, substantially on a par with the husband. It is true that the wife still holds a position subordinate to her husband in her relation to the children of the marriage. Mrs. McCulloch describes the miseries resulting to Mrs. Lex and her children from the exercise by Mr. Lex of his legal rights as the head of the family. The picture is a harrowing one, and the author is careful to show the legal justification of every abuse of marital and parental authority on the part of Mr. Lex by references to statutes and decisions of Illinois. Conceding the statements of law to be correct in every point, it would not follow that the author has made out her case. Marriage is a community relation in which there can be no majority rule. In case of disagreement between father and mother as to the exercise of parental rights, the law must either support the authority of one or undertake to decide for itself. Our law, like that of all other countries, recognizes the superior authority of the father, interfering only in cases of gross abuse. It is difficult to see how it could assume any other position. The only other alternative would be to accord the supreme authority to the mother, and we have not come to that point yet. The old common law was unjust, in that it ignored the rights of the mother entirely; but equity modified the harshness of this rule from an early date, and it is now the tendency of the courts to deny any absolute right of parental control, and to check the abuse of parental power, where the welfare of the child requires it. Naturally, however, such power of interference will not be exercised except in extreme cases. This principle operates in favor of the mother as well as in favor of the child. It will not and cannot remove the possibility of hardship and injustice within certain limits. Mrs. McCulloch has shown the possible abuse of the power of the father under the law; she might have equally shown the possibility of greater abuses of the power of both parents over their children; but would she therefore argue that the parental power should be altogether abolished? The two cases seem to be entirely parallel. It is, however, not to be denied that the law is capable of improvement in minor particulars, and the author has done well to call attention to some anomalies and unjustifiable relics of the past, as, *e. g.*, the barbarous theory of the action for seduction. The book is well written, and will undoubtedly find many readers who do not otherwise care for legal literature.

ERNST FREUND.

The Development of Thrift. By MARY WILLCOX BROWN, General Secretary of the Children's Aid Society of Baltimore. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. 222. \$1.

THE author has brought together from many reliable sources a very valuable fund of information about various savings agencies, building and loan associations, popular banks, provident loan societies, mutual insurance and friendly societies. The principle of thrift is defended against criticism, while its limitations are clearly recognized. The little book is well adapted to the needs of friendly visitors of charity organization societies, and to all who believe in seeking to promote self-reliance and who desire to know the best available methods.

C. R. HENDERSON.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Problems of Criminality.—I. "Is there a law of the transformations of the notion of crime?" It is a question not of real transformations of morality and of criminality, but of changes in the *notion* of morality and crime. The difference between the notion of crime held by our earliest known ancestors and that of more modern times is not so great as at first appears. The Ossetes of the Caucasus preserve better than any other existing people of Aryan origin the primitive institutions. Accepting the generalizations to which a study of this people leads, it seems to result that "among all ancient nations living in the state of the clan and the tribe, and even in the first epoch of city organization, crime was conceived: (1) not as an individual act, reproachable to the author alone, but as a collective deed, imputable to a whole collection of individuals; (2) not as the voluntary violation of a law, but as a simple material injury, no matter whether voluntary or involuntary." But the offenses which give rise to vengeance, crimes with respect to which no distinction is made between the author and his relatives, between the voluntary and the accidental, are not true crimes; they are deeds of war, accidents of the chase, committed to the injury of a man or a group of men, to be sure, but outside of the social group of which the author of the injury is a member, and outside of which there was primitively no relation of duty or of right recognized. The obligations of clan to clan long remained fragile, and their violation aroused only alarm on the material side.

But besides these pseudo-crimes, which became true crimes only with the lapse of time by the superposition of the city upon the clan, by the enlargement of the social circle, there was from the beginning a category of true crimes, committed between relatives, within the family or clan. These were under the jurisdiction of the domestic tribunal. Crimes committed within this sacred circle were imputable only to their author, and they were punishable only when they were intentional. Vengeance was not demanded under these conditions; society would be inimical to itself if it punished the death of one of its members by the death of another. Banishment was sometimes the lot of the guilty person, and if he escaped this penalty his lot was hardly more enviable; the public contempt into which he fell often drove him to voluntary exile. Thus there have existed, side by side, two vastly different species of punishment, the one inter-familial, the other intra-familial; one has not evolved from the other, but both have evolved independently and parallel. They have acted and reacted upon each other, and in a given time and place one or the other may have the ascendancy.

The punishment inflicted by the domestic tribunal, tinctured with sympathy and mildness, was gradually assumed by royal, imperial, or national tribunals; and as the royal judge often treated the offenders as enemies rather than as rebellious sons to be brought back to the fold, we find the element of vindictiveness again appearing. The notion of crime has remained the same, in its essentials, from the origin of societies. Yet it has been purified. The enlarging of the social circle has had for its effect to give to the notion of crime a meaning less and less particular and more and more general. Homicide, for example, has a larger social interest than formerly, one indication of it being the establishment of treaties of extradition.

II. "Is there a law of transformations undergone, not with respect to the notion itself of the crime, but with respect to the nature of the acts to which this notion has been successively attributed?"

Certain acts have always been considered as crimes; such, for example, are homicide and robbery committed against a member of the same social group. But this is not saying that these crimes have always been considered as major crimes. The greatest crime has always been that which has at once aroused the greatest alarm and the most lively indignation, that is, which has appeared most seriously to injure the lives and the interests of the collectivity, and to shock most severely the sentiments

born of beliefs. The question is, therefore, whether the causes which modify beliefs and desires succeed each other in a constant and irreversible order. There are certain constant tendencies: First, the social group tends always to enlarge, involving considerable changes in the mutual relations of the members of the group. In proportion as the internal population increases at the expense of the external population, the difference between the two, with reference to duty and crime, becomes attenuated. The larger a social group becomes, the more vague becomes its limits. The distinction between interior and exterior crime then becomes a mere shade. In the small and compact clan, surrounded by enemies and filled with superstition, the first duty is the solidarity of every member with the group, and piety toward the protecting deity. The first and most odious crimes are, therefore, treason and impiety. It was the same under the régime of the cities. When the era of empires came, it was not so much divine high treason as royal and imperial treason which constituted the greatest of crimes. The highest crimes were then political, while, at the present day, to say that a crime is political is to extenuate it. In the course of time the greatest duties became, not to obey an order, but to fulfill a contract, either tacit or formal; hence the greatest of crimes became the violation of a fundamental social convention, by force or by improbity. Homicide and robbery, always criminal, then became the most worthy of public censure.

When the group becomes so large that the members do not know each other, the bond of social fellowship becomes feeble and does not contrast so strongly as formerly with the absence of every moral bond in the relation of group to group. In modern civilized society it is only when we come in contact with much inferior races that we feel ourselves altogether morally irresponsible, and abuse our power. The need of colonization by civilized races is stimulated by the desire to treat the stranger as game, to enslave him, and to domesticate him after conquering him. Much active criminality, out of employment in Europe, finds a career in enterprises of this kind. Another criminal outlet open to the civilized is found in politics. When the greater part of the men included in the group-consciousness is unknown to us, a new personage appears, an impersonal personage, the public. In dealings with the public we wink at licenses that we would reproach severely in personal relations with acquaintances. Politics becomes civilized brigandage, enlarged and attenuated; colonization, too often, is brigandage exported and organized. Just as wars have become more destructive and murderous, though less malignant and ferocious, so crimes have gained in power of harm-doing what they have lost in spitefulness and atrocity.

To comprehend the transformations of criminality it is necessary to take into account two orders of considerations: (1) those which concern the successive enlargements of the social circle (which has been considered); (2) those which concern the interior changes which the social group has undergone in consequence of the accumulation of discoveries and inventions. New inventions and new beliefs give rise to new crimes. Political crimes, consisting in the propagation of sedition and revolt, have increased in power immensely by the development of means of communication. Formerly dependent on the voice of an orator or a preacher, they are now propagated by the press and through journals.

What are the qualitative and quantitative variations in criminality, brought about by the passage of a people from one stage of culture to another? M. de Candolle maintains that the greatest amount of criminality was to be found, not in savagery nor yet in civilization, but in barbarism. But there is not sufficient evidence of this. It is rather a change of conditions, a crisis of progress, which results in an increase of crime. As to the qualitative variations of criminality, in proportion as a people becomes civilized, that is, urbanized and industrialized, its criminality becomes less and less vindictive and violent, but more avaricious, more crafty, more voluptuous. In our own century, cupidity inspired 13 per cent. of the crimes from 1826-30, 22 per cent. from 1876-80, and 31.87 per cent. from 1891-5. Vindictive crimes decreased in the same proportion.—G. TARDE, "Problèmes de Criminalité," in *Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle*, July, 1898.

American Trusts.—A dozen years ago the American public suddenly awoke to the fact that the supply of some of the commodities of commonest use had come to

be controlled by a number of organizations which seemed to be able to fix prices without regard to competition. Two or three of the largest and most conspicuous had assumed the peculiar juridical form known as a "trust," a word which has continued to be commonly used for all capitalistic combinations of a supposed monopolistic tendency, whether they take that peculiar legal form or not. The discovery of their existence led to a popular demand that the several governments of the states and of the union should enforce what the lawyers declared to be the principles of the common law with regard to conspiracy in the restraint of trade. Anti-trust laws were passed by some twelve or more state legislatures; and in 1890 by the United States Congress itself with regard to interstate commerce. Although, in the new wave of business confidence, there is a fresh movement on the part of capitalists engaged in industry toward far-reaching and all-embracing combinations, there is not, in the original and exact sense of the word, a single "trust" in America. The "trust," properly so called, was nothing but an easy legal mechanism for arriving at an end which could equally well be achieved by other means. It was this: The shareholders of a number of joint-stock companies all handed over their stock, and with it their voting powers, to a small board of trustees, receiving in return certificates representing the amount deposited. Externally each company, or "corporation," retained its independent constitution; but henceforth its management was in the hands of the trustees, who acted nominally on behalf of the shareholders of that particular company, but really directed the operations of all the establishments according to a general plan. The attempt to enforce the supposed common law and the invention of new penalties in obedience to popular outcry have resulted in making it impossible for a number of companies or individuals to enter into formal contracts of certain particular kinds to restrict production and fix prices. What we have to look at, therefore, in the United States is not a particular form of association, but all such capitalistic monopolies—or (where the control of supply does not amount to a monopoly) all such market dominations—as are able so far to govern supply as to have the power of fixing prices without any immediate fear of competition, either domestic or (thanks to the tariff wall) foreign. There is a distinct tendency toward the extension either of combination or of more or less complete amalgamation of interests to more and more branches of industry, as well as toward the growing solidification of that increasing number of combinations which manage to survive. The student of the operation of the force of self-interest under modern conditions of production on a large scale can find no more instructive reading than the series of monographs which American economists and their pupils have devoted to the history of a number of the monopolized industries. The movement toward some mitigation of the influence of competition in the determination of price is very widespread in American industry, and is one of the chief directions in which the force of self-interest, which but recently made only for individualistic competition, is now making itself felt. The "trusts" represent but the culmination of this movement, which takes a hundred forms. The "great industry" of modern times, so long as it is carried on under conditions of individualistic competition, has certainly inevitable consequences of the gravest character. The tendency to periodical crises, due to a want of coincidence between supply and demand, is reinforced by the increasing use of fixed capital. The formation of "trusts" is, in the main, simply an attempt to lessen and, if it may be, avert altogether the disastrous and harassing effects of cut-throat competition. Their formation has, in most instances, followed upon a period of overproduction and consequent depression. The success of the combinations tends at present toward the creation of a régime of what the French call patronage. But the great captains of American industry are not all of them mere money grabbers. Many are in their way industrial statesmen. No large generalization as to the ultimate issue of industrial development can be made. In the case of the Standard Oil monopoly, the development has already reached a point at which, on the purely economic and administrative side, there could be little objection to the government taking over the business—if only there were a government politically capable of the task. In countries where the monopolizing movement is well under way the governments should assume the duty of, in some way, controlling prices. The principle of public determination of maximum rates and maximum dividends has already been recognized in various countries in various directions; and it will doubtless have to be carried farther. But, before this can be

done with any chance of tolerable success, any country which thinks of attempting it must provide itself with a fairly efficient administrative service. In view of contemporary conditions, two duties are incumbent upon the economist. One is the anticipation and formulation, by an effort of the economic imagination, of the sort of problems which are likely to arise in a society where prices generally are no longer determined by competition. The other is the duty of the economist to ascertain, for the guidance of the public, what the actual conditions are in his own country in the matter of industrial organization.—PROFESSOR W. J. ASHLEY, "American Trusts," in *Economic Journal*, June, 1899.

A Year of State Deficits.—One feature in public finance is remarkable because of its prevalence throughout the civilized world—the growing disparity between government revenue and expenditure. The situation raises the question of national revenue in a form other than has been recognized. Are the existing taxes failing to obtain revenue from the people, and must a new system be devised for enabling the governments to obtain what they need, even assuming there is no marked increase in the amount of expenditure? In the countries of southern Europe, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the existence of a deficit in the national budget has come to be regarded as something to be expected. Only a little above these countries in its fiscal character stands France. This people has long had the largest debt and the heaviest taxation per capita of any civilized power, and the inability to make the revenues meet the rapidly increasing expenditure has become greater each year.

Germany is in a better position, as increasing burdens can be shifted to the confederating states. No matter what the deficiencies in revenue from imperial taxation may be, it is made good by being quoted among the different states. That there should be a limit to this process is only natural, for a demand much heavier than usual would lead the states to ask whether the advantages of confederation were worth the money they required.

Austria-Hungary has been so disturbed in its domestic politics that its finances are in a greatly disordered condition. Even England faces a deficit after a long term of adequate revenue and a small surplus to be applied to the reduction of the debt. Believing that the command of the sea is essential to her very existence, Great Britain must maintain that command at any cost.

Outside of Europe, Japan is the country presenting the most interesting budget features. A recent report on the finances of that country contains a note of warning that is as applicable to the United States. "Financially Japan's military success over China seems likely to prove a heavy and constant burden." The outlay to which the country has pledged itself for productive and unproductive works to be carried through within the next ten years far surpasses 100,000,000 yen.

Australia, Argentine, Brazil, Chile, India, and Mexico tell much the same story of rising expenditures, increasing debts, and uncertain revenues. In the United States the daily returns show the increasing deficit, and the extravagance of the last session of Congress has become recognized. Russia is still juggling with her official budget statement, showing a surplus in the face of enormous taxation, crushing the life out of the people, and vast undertakings in Asia which may involve war and will certainly mean heavy expenditure. There is no immediate prospect of any halt in the demands made upon the governments for expenditures. The idea has become popular that the United States government must take the initiative in many costly undertakings, such as the Nicaraguan canal, the construction of a railroad the length of Cuba, the building up of a merchant marine through subsidies, and the encouragement of navigation interests by an extension of the navigation laws, giving a monopoly of the coastwise trade to American vessels. This policy is an extension to our new dependencies of the protective tariff policy so closely maintained at home. The United States, already suffering from a deficit, enters upon a career of development which involves an almost hopeless disparity between income and expenditure, so long as existing methods of obtaining national revenues are maintained.

After this survey of the leading nations of the world it is refreshing to turn to a country where the treasury is conducted so as to take as little as possible from the people. In Egypt the treasury flourishes, and debt and taxes have been brought to a

reasonable minimum, and the economy of the country is developed every year toward strength and independence. The Soudan has been reclaimed from barbarism, the fellah has become a peasant proprietor, and enjoys a commercial freedom and importance which would have been thought impossible less than twenty years ago. Egypt is in the position of a railroad in the hands of a receiver; its government must continue, but its finances are under a foreign control, and subject to the regulations of more than one power. Herein lies the whole problem. A people may spend freely on business principles in directions where the cost is returned many times over in public welfare. But politics or interested partisanship introduces an element that is ruinous to the public good and debauching to the public service.—W. C. FORD, "Year of State Deficits," in *Publications of the American Statistical Association*, March, 1899.

Fanaticism as a Source of Crime.—When belief, on its emotional side, rises to such a height as to interfere with the normal evolution of the psychic life, it becomes fanaticism. As phases of the development of such one-sidedness appear intense intolerance of the beliefs of others, and that degree of desire to save one's own soul which halts at no crime considered as a necessary means of reaching the end in view. It is in this phase of its growth that fanaticism becomes a source of crime. The results of an analysis of a series of legal actions involving prosecution for crime supposably committed under the spell of fanatical religious beliefs serve to illustrate this point. Thus, the Convulsionists, a sect existing in Paris about 1760, were wont to crucify members of their order, in emulation of the crucifixion of Jesus, in the belief that the souls of the surviving members would be saved by the sacrifice of their fellows. In 1817 the "Päschelians," an Austrian sect, murdered a man, his wife, and their daughter, under the delusion that the trio, who refused to go with the fanatics, were possessed of the devil. On the following day they crucified one of their own number, a girl of eighteen years, who had offered herself for the death, in imitation of the death of Jesus, in order to save the souls of her fellow-believers. In 1823 the leader of a Pietistic circle in Switzerland, after having dispatched her sister, who gave her life as a means of saving the souls of her relatives, was crucified by her followers at her own command, in order that she might die, rise again after three days, and restore to life the sister whom she had slain. In 1865 two mothers, adherents of the "Holy Men," slew their sick children, believing them to be victims of demoniacal possession. In 1875 a Hungarian miller, belonging to the "Nazarenes," killed his son as an offering for his own sins, after the fashion of Abraham. In 1870, in Irkutsk, Russia, one of the "Schismatics" convinced himself by prayer and fasting and much scripture-reading that to save his soul he must be crucified. Accordingly he attempted self-crucifixion, and succeeded so far as the circumstances of the case would permit. In 1830, in the government of Perm, Russia, a peasant killed his child as an offering for sin, and buried the body in an ant-hill. Likewise, in the government of Vladimir, another peasant killed both his children in due Abrahamic form, and while the babies bled under the father's knife the devout mother celebrated the service by reading aloud selected portions of the twenty-second chapter of Genesis. In 1854, in the government of Tamboff, Russia, a peasant, convinced that to save his soul a man must have a sin to repent of, killed a neighbor with an ax in order to satisfy this highly imperative condition. It is a part of the creed of the "Wanderers," a Russian sect, that Antichrist rules in high places there, and that, accordingly, good men must have naught to do with governmental affairs of any sort. In conformity with this belief, a man murdered, in various ingenious ways, twenty-five men, women, and children, including his own wife and babes, in order to free them from the danger of losing their souls by suffering the contaminating contact of the government census-taker. This occurred in 1897. The "Deniers," another quite interesting Russian sect, believe that evil taints all earthly good, and that the only escape is death. In 1825 sixty of these men, strong in the faith, after having murdered their wives and children, permitted themselves to be put to death, one by one, by their leader. The "Scourgers," who also form a widespread and influential sect in Russia, in obedience to the behests of their "saviors" are in the habit of indulging in human sacrifice, cannibalistic feasts, erotic dances, and other lewd procedures as an extremely efficacious method of keeping the hand of evil from off their immortal souls. So the "Muckers" of Königsberg

and the celebrants of the Black Mass in Paris afford further examples of the use of a ritual of eroticism, coupled with a practice of the most abandoned and obscene behavior, to promote the eternal welfare of the soul. A fitting conclusion to this series of instances cited in proof of the thesis that fanaticism may become a source of crime is afforded by the account of the notorious "Skopzi." A belief in the practice of castration as a necessary means of saving the soul is a cardinal tenet of their faith. The diabolical cunning and ingenuity displayed by them in accomplishing, with or without the victim's consent, this maiming operation upon young and old alike make them at once the most dangerous and the most despicable of criminals.—AUG. LOEWENSTEIN, "Der Fanatismus als Quelle der Verbrechen," in *Archiv f. Kriminal-Anthropologie u. Kriminalistik*, Band I, Heft 3.

The Present Organization of the English Factory Inspection.—Reference may be made to four principal points in which the organization of English factory inspection appears worthy of imitation: (1) Strict uniformity, combined with the principle of legalization of state officials; hence the greatest centralization of administration and decentralization of the work of inspection. (2) The far-reaching authority of inspectors; their independence of other authorities, and the consequent increased possibility of independent, powerful interference. (3) The range of requirements as respects qualification which admits the selection of forces from the most diverse classes of society and the most diverse vocations. (4) The appointment of trade physicians and their centralization. The number of officials, which is out of all proportion to the rapid increase of their obligations, is insufficient in England as elsewhere. Besides the trade physicians should be considered the sanitary inspection by men and women, which, however, is thorough only in a few places. The recent improvement in trade statistics shows more clearly than ever the lack of proportion between the number of officials and the great and increasing duties of the most diverse nature. Now as formerly, this lack of proportion between the work to be done and the workers is the most serious obstacle in the realization of the protection of workmen. This applies especially to non-factory laborers. It is just from these non-factory laborers, especially domestics, for whose legal protection thus far only weak attempts have been made in England, that the largest number of those three hundred thousand London families and the inhabitants of the slums of other great cities, which live on eighteen shillings a week, are recruited. The problem of poverty is most closely connected with the existence of this unorganized and uncared-for labor. The fight against the sweating system by means of protective ordinances adapted to its diverse elements on the basis of thorough investigation, and by trade inspection which in its organization and numerical strength shall correspond to some extent to its immense task, will probably be one of the most important factors in the struggle against the impoverization of the great mass of people whose life is in strange contrast to our civilization.—HELENE SIMON, "Entwicklung und gegenwärtige Organisation der englischen Fabrikinspektion," in *Jahrbuch, Schmoller*, 23. Jahrgang, Heft 2.

Democracy.—There are three distinct charges against it:

1. Democracy perverts the understanding by its aprioristic tendencies. It induces a sort of paralysis of the brain which neither permits men to see nor to comprehend facts as they present themselves in life. Men positively grow stupid. For the democrat all the terms of politics and philosophy change their meaning. Everything must converge toward the satisfaction of the masses. The only wrong is to allow oneself to be right against the people. They speak to us of justice, of equality, of liberty; their mouths are full of grandiloquent words, but these words are deformed by secret intentions and receive tacit meanings which are not found in the dictionaries. "Solidarity," *e. g.*, is simply a matter of extracting influence for the poor against the rich.

2. Democracy flatters itself to be a government of opinion, a principle altogether false. Even this principle it is neither able nor knows how to enforce. A government of opinion would be only a government of weathervanes. We do consult opinion in a certain way, but nothing is more contrary to common sense than that political direction is turned over to it. Opinion is only one factor in the political

problem; it is not the only principle. The development of the press has created a public whose influence cannot fail to be felt, but it is not a part of the despotic régime under which it acts. It is more curious, perhaps, that today, when the influence of democracy appears unlimited, when in principle its rule is absolute, its sentiments and desires are less respected than a hundred and fifty years ago. For democratic government has a philosophical program, some ambitions of progress which it forces itself to realize, and the smallest article of which the good people are incapable of comprehending. It is just under the rule of opinion that they avoid the exact opinion of electors, and that the *referendum* is held in suspicion, when logically it ought to be the first institution of democracy. But when the government sees a squall, when opinion scrutinizes, asserts itself, accumulates and precipitates itself like a torrent, then it abandons itself to the current, anxious only to retain its place, waits to learn what will happen and how things will turn out, at the risk of shipwrecking the country. The last year we saw this same public opinion recall the envoy of Admiral Camara and his squadron, without any strategic reason and contrary to all the intentions of government. In truth a singular neglect of the interests of the state is necessary to applaud democracy as a government of opinion.

3. Finally, democratic government is no better organized than any other government for the safeguarding of individual rights; and, what is worse, it is by its institutions less organized to effectively protect them. The democratic régime, especially when it is parliamentary, rests on a series of antinomies which tend to crush the individual, and even to negative the advantages which are the *raison d'être* of any system. We know how majorities insolently suppress the rights of minorities. In Canada, *e. g.*, the English had to admit that if the privy council of the queen had not intervened to render justice to the Catholics in the matter of the schools of Manitoba, the majority parliament of Ottawa would never have recognized their wrongs. If, therefore, parliaments, to be honest, must see themselves subjected to paramount tutelage, we have a right to ask: Of what use is democracy, and what is really democratic in the matter? However, what we desire to emphasize is not that the caprice of the majority can do wrong to the minority, for when even the caprices multiply and succeed each other indefinitely, democracy can always hope and maintain that some day the progress of education will bring about the end. No, that which is striking in democracy is that it neither allows nor can allow the redress of wrongs of the government toward the individual. We believe, firmly, that with only a little study of popular government under its various phases, and with perfect disinterestedness, one will always conclude that it is a vast mystification; that it rests on a series of misunderstandings, deceptions, antinomies, hypocrisies, childish vanities. That it has not already fallen under public contempt is due to the fact that politics has not the importance in the life of the people which politicians and men of letters, who are directly concerned, pretend. No one can predict the destiny of democracy. It gains ground every day. The more it commits faults within, the more it seems to obtain adherence without in the countries where it rules; as if it was unwilling to look at the delusive side of these deeds and heroic achievements. The kings and emperors who still rule seem to retain a precarious authority, and are only playing with a power whose hours are numbered. It is possible that democracy will prevail in all the territories of our civilization. In France, notably, the cycle of the old monarchies, of the kind that neither the royalty of the Bourbons nor the empire of the Bonapartes can resuscitate, seems closed. But we need not grant that democracy ought to be established in the world. We do not admit that in the perpetual changes in the eternal growth of things, the one only definitive, immutable institution should be the most irrational, the most unskillful of all; that which subsists only by force of pretentious sophisms and artful expedients, contrary to its very principle. We are forcibly persuaded that democracy will have its end; that it will terrify all living interests and all respectable rights, if it pushes its doctrines to their limit, or if it disengages the greater part of its energies by indifference; if it rests secure in a happy satisfaction or only occupies itself in vainly playing with power. Everything has its normal end in this world, and it is infinitely probable that we shall one day see flourishing again new dynasties which will begin with Cæsarism or tyranny, such as we see in antiquity and revived in the fifteenth century. The peoples will then have a new period of monarchy, which will probably be followed by a new awakening of democratic aspirations; or they will

give advantages to popular government which it has not in reality; or they will forget the examples of today, as we forget those of former times; for, of all memories, the shortest is the political. I refuse to believe that a form of government of which we say so much evil with justice, in an age of freedom, will be the best and last effort of humanity in the matter of politics.—RENÉ DE KERALLAIN, "La Démocratie," in *La Réforme sociale*, June 16, 1899.

Progress of the Socialist Spirit in France.

I.

Recent writers upon the socialist movement, being interested particularly in the action of its leaders, have left the bottom of the question untouched. Interest has centered upon results and passing phases rather than upon causes. But socialism is not the product of the imagination of single leaders more or less deluded, but a widespread social force—an idea of voluntary organization—arising with the modern modes of production and exchange, and with the political and humanitarian doctrines of the French Revolution.

There are three inseparable elements in the movement:

1. The struggle of the proletariat for economic autonomy. This is the basis of all socialism.
2. The struggle of the proletariat for political power.
3. The spread of the general doctrines of human rights promulgated by the theorists.

It is especially in the severe economic and moral conditions of the life of the proletariat that the terms of the socialist problem are located.

II.

In the sixteenth century the workmen of certain industries, in order to escape the burdensome regulations of their masters and wardens, began to form special societies, which had neither legal nor religious nor social sanction, and were therefore revolutionary.

The members of these organizations did not understand how to maintain themselves in their associations, being constantly engaged in stupid hostilities toward other similar groups. But these were the foreshadowings of the bourgeoisie.

Of these growing shadows the legislature of 1791 seems to have had an exaggerated fear, passing a law abolishing such corporations. The law, *Le Chapelier*, prohibited all association and coöperation among workmen for the purpose of protecting their own interests, on the ground that such association was an infringement of the liberties of the *entrepreneurs*, and thus the movement toward autonomy in the labor world was arrested.

In a study entitled *Le Mouvement syndical*, M. Bourdeau says: "It [the Revolution] had made the workman free, but it condemned him to isolation, prevented him from associating, and from voluntarily limiting his liberty; between the individual and the strongly centralized government it tolerated no organized force. And this state of affairs has tended to maintain in France the spirit of revolution."

The workmen of the Revolution always conceived of the republic as an exclusively political régime; they never comprehended that direct action of the proletariat with a view to social reforms could exist aside from political action of the whole people. Revolutionary Jacobinism had taken the position that there could be no such thing as autonomous labor organization. But the economic difficulties becoming serious, and obliging them to rely upon themselves for the securing of their immediate interests, the democratic and republican ideas came, thenceforth, to inspire them in their efforts to ameliorate their lot, or, if need be, radically to change the situation.

In the insurrections of Lyons of 1831 and 1834 the conflicts between capital and labor for the first time issued in bloodshed, the causes of which were decidedly economic. Since 1830 the growing activity of the workmen in favor of the republic, the increase in the number of socialist writers, and the tendency of the proletariat to

organize itself as a homogeneous force with the purpose of establishing a new economic order, are manifest in many ways.

Communism is the alpha and omega of socialism. It is the doctrine which is most easily comprehended among its advocates. In 1848 communism was very much in favor among the workmen of Paris and Lyons.

About 1864, articles 414 to 416 of the penal code were modified to allow labor associations; and it was shortly before this that the international labor movement was started. The effort was for the enfranchisement of the workmen by the workmen themselves. In 1869 and 1870 the International began to have considerable influence both in political action and in propagandist theories.

Since the labor congress of Paris in 1876, that of Lyons in 1878, and that of Marseilles in 1879, a new aspect of the movement appears, viz., a struggle of the workmen for *moral* autonomy. The members of the proletariat were becoming more *conscious* of their interests and of the whole social situation.

III.

Today those who think that the socialists are concerned wholly with state action deceive themselves. The socialists believe also in the possibility of establishing a new general social order arising directly from their deliberations, which will be of a different character and have different powers from the actual state, and which will succeed it naturally at a given time. The truth is that through all the proletariat the idea of a general social reform is spreading, and finding representatives (1) in the syndicates, (2) in the parties organized for propagandist and electioneering purposes, and (3) in an unorganized party which makes itself felt only at times of elections.

At the socialist meetings and special conventions are discussed today, with considerable amity and tolerance, such questions as the remedy for involuntary idleness, the means for assuring work for all, for securing the eight-hour day, the right of association and of labor insurance, and for establishing a minimum living wage. And these questions represent not merely differences between workmen and employers, but social facts which interest and disquiet the whole world.

IV.

The socialist parties organized at Paris and in the province for propagandist and electoral purposes have modified, to any considerable extent, only their general spirit and the direction of their forces. These parties are four in number:

1. The French Labor Party, called somewhat erroneously "collectivist," inspired by Karl Marx and led by M. Jules Guesde and M. Paul Lafargue.
2. The Revolutionary Socialist Labor Party, which openly declares itself communistic, and considers political action only a propagandist means. This party is led by M. Allemane.
3. The Federation of Socialist Workmen of France, which professes the same principles as the Revolutionary Socialist Labor Party, but which hopes to gain through political action certain reforms, looking toward the performance, by the state or by the commune, of all the great public services.
4. The Revolutionary Socialist Party, which has taken the name recently, and consists of groups which rally around the Central Revolutionary Committee. They are inspired by the communistic spirit, disdaining to analyze economic facts and make theoretic definitions, but are rather an extreme republican than a strictly socialistic party. They are led by M. Blanqui and M. Vaillant.

V.

These various factions fight each other vigorously, though, perhaps, not so stupidly as did the former groups at the beginning of the movement. Each considers itself orthodox and the others as schismatic. A superficial movement toward union, having its center in Parliament rather than in the parties, and called the Socialist Union, has thus far proved somewhat abortive. But in June, 1898, the Revolutionary Socialist

Labor Party nominated a commission of six members, charged to represent it in a general socialist conference. A little later the other parties took similar measures. The first general conference took place on November 20, 1898, and the following three resolutions were adopted:

"1. That there is need of substituting for the provisional representation, such as the committee of vigilance [organized the previous month], a permanent body representing all the socialist organizations which are constituted on national lines.

"2. The independent socialists are invited to organize into a national federation, to be represented on the future committee of federation of the socialist organizations.

"3. Nothing shall be modified in the organization and working of the separate socialist bodies."

In December, 1898, the permanent committee was formed upon the following principles (somewhat similar to those of the federation of the American colonies):

"1. Nothing shall be modified in the internal working of the contracting organizations which shall not first be approved by their respective delegates. . . . The delegates shall seek for a general agreement in the solution of each question, but each organization shall remain unbound by their decision.

"2. Each of the five organizations shall be represented in the central union by seven delegates regularly commissioned."

At the session January 15, 1899, the national federation of the independents was consummated and took part in the common deliberations, which were marked by much good will, tact, and courtesy. And a great international socialist congress has now been planned for 1900, to be held at Berlin.

The supreme inspiration of the socialist movement is that the proletariat—the great body of the people—has but one consciousness, one will, one set of interests, one common end, and that a new phase of social coöperation must succeed that of clashing individual interests.—ALBERT RICHARD, "La Marche de l'Esprit socialiste en France," in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, July 10, 1899.

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AIMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSUMERS' LEAGUE.

THE underlying principles of the Consumers' League are few and simple. They are partly economic and partly moral.

The first principle of the league is universality. It recognizes the fact that in a civilized community every person is a consumer. From the cradle (which may be of wood or of metal, with rockers or without them) to the grave (to which an urn may be preferred), throughout our lives we are choosing, or choice is made for us, as to the disposal of money. From the newsboy who fosters the cigarette and chewing-gum trades, and is himself fostered by our failure to give the preference to some one-armed father of a family in the purchase of our papers, to the self-conscious patrons of the Kelmscott sheets, we all make daily and hourly choice as to the bestowal of our means. As we do so, we help to decide, however unconsciously, how our fellow-men shall spend their time in making what we buy. Few of us can give much in charity; giving a tithe is, perhaps, beyond the usual custom. But whatever our gifts may be, they are less decisive for the weal or woe of our fellows than are our habitual expenditures. For a man is largely what his work makes him—an artist, an artisan, a handicraftsman, a drudge, a sweaters' victim, or, scarcely less to be pitied, a sweater. All these and many more classes of workers exist to supply the demand that is incarnate in us and our friends and fellow-citizens.

Those of us who enjoy the privilege of voting may help, once or twice in a year, to decide how the tariff, or the currency, or the local tax rate shall be adjusted to our industries. But all of us, all the time, are deciding by our expenditures what industries shall survive at all, and under what conditions. Broadly stated, it is *the* aim of the National Consumers' League to moralize this decision, to gather and make available information which may enable all to decide in the light of knowledge, and to appeal to the conscience, so that the decision when made shall be a righteous one.

The Consumers' League, then, acts upon the proposition that the consumer ultimately determines all production, since any given article must cease to be produced if all consumers ceased to purchase it, as in the case of the horsehair furniture of the early part of the century, which has now virtually ceased to be manufactured; while, on the other hand, any article, however injurious to human life and health the conditions of its production may be, or with whatsoever risk they may be attended, continues to be placed on the market so long as there is an effective demand for it; *e. g.*, nitro-glycerine, phosphorus, matches, and mine products of all kinds.

While, however, the whole body of consumers determine, in this large way and in the long run, what shall be produced, the individual consumer has, at the present time, for want of organization and technical knowledge, no adequate means of making his wishes felt, of making his demand an effective demand. Illustrations of the truth of this proposition are plentiful in the experience of everyone.

A painful type of the ineffectual consumer may be found in the colony of Italian immigrants in any one of our great cities. These support at least one store for the sale of imported macaroni, vermicelli, sausage (Bologna and other sorts), olive oil, Chianti wine, and Italian cheese and chestnuts. These articles are all excessively costly, by reason of transportation charges and the import duties involved; but the immigrants are accustomed to using them, and they prefer a less quantity of these kinds of foods rather than a greater abundance of the cheaper

and more accessible supplies by which they are surrounded. The pitiful result is that the importer buys the least quantity of the real Italian product requisite for the purpose of admixture with American adulterants. The most flagrant example of this is, perhaps, the use of Italian olive oil, of which virtually none, really pure, is placed upon the market, for sale at retail. What the Italian immigrants really get is the familiar Italian label, the well-known package with contents tasting more or less as they used to taste at home in Italy. What the actual ingredients may be they know as little as we know when we place our so-called maple syrup, or our so-called butter, or honey, on our hot cakes at a hotel in the city. The demand of the Italians in America for Italian products, although large, persistent, and maintained at a heavy sacrifice on the part of the purchasers, is not an effective demand, because the immigrants have neither the knowledge nor the organization wherewith to enforce it.

That knowledge alone, without organization, is not sufficient to create an effective demand is well illustrated by the experience of a conscientious shopper of my acquaintance in Chicago. Deeply stirred by an eloquent appeal in behalf of the sweaters' victims and their sufferings, she determined to free her own conscience by buying only goods made in factories. She began her search for such goods in the great leading department store in which she had always fitted out her boys for school. The salesman assured her that "All our goods are made in our own factory; we handle no sweatshop goods." She, being a canny person and well instructed, asked for the written assurance of that fact, signed by a member of the firm, to be sent home with the goods. They were never sent, though this was an excellent customer whom the firm was in the habit of obliging if possible. This process she repeated in several stores and outfitting establishments, until it became clear to her mind that she could not free her conscience alone and unaided. Her plight well illustrates the case of the individual consumer, enlightened but unorganized and, therefore, ineffectual.

The purchaser who is able and willing to pay for the best that the market affords is apt to think that, whatever the sorrows

of purchasers of ready-made goods, he is safe, because he gets his garments only of the merchant tailor and pays a high price for the assurance that they are made up under conditions which guard him against disease, and enable the merchant to pay the working tailor a fair price for his labor. But this customer is really no better off than the Italian colony or the well-instructed but ineffectual club woman making her search for righteously made ready-made wares. For example: When I was factory inspector of Illinois, I was one day in search of a cigarmaker who was said to have smallpox in his family, during the terrible epidemic of 1894. Quite by accident I happened upon a tailor newly moved into the suspected house, and not yet registered either with the local board of health or with my department. In this tailor's shop, which was his dwelling, there was a case of smallpox. In the same shop there was, also, a very good overcoat, such as gentlemen were paying from \$60 to \$75 for in that year. In the collar of the coat was a hang-up strap bearing the name of the leading merchant tailor of Helena, Mont. Now, that merchant tailor had had, in his plate-glass window, samples of excellent cloth, from which the customer had ordered his coat. The tailor had taken the measurements and telegraphed them, together with the sample number of the cloth, to the great wholesale house in Chicago of which he was the agent. The wholesaler had had the coat cut, and had sent it to the tailor in whose sickroom in an infectious tenement house it was subsequently found. But for the happy accident of our finding that tailor while looking for an entirely different person, the hapless customer in Helena, Mont., would surely have bought smallpox germs with his expensive garment. Essentially, the position of this purchaser did not differ materially from that of the Italian immigrants; like them he was paying a price which entitled him to get clean goods; like them he had neither technical knowledge nor organization to make his demand effective.

Besides his fatuous belief that his custom work, because it is costly, is made under clean conditions, the purchaser of costly garments usually comforts his soul with the assumption that the working tailor who makes them receives some substantial share

of the high price in the form of wages. While it is true that the Brotherhood of Tailors ordinarily commands better wages, by reason of their strong organization, than workmen in the ready-made branches, it is nevertheless true that the tailor in this case, as in scores of others known to me, was driven by extreme poverty to conceal the dreadful fact that he had smallpox in his family, through fear of losing a few days' or a few weeks' work. So the high price of his coat did not even entitle the customer in Helena, Mont., to an easy conscience on the score of wages.

It is sometimes questioned whether, in spite of the special cases set forth, and the evils which they typify, it is not true that in a general way the laws protect the purchaser, and the producer bends all his energies to meet the consumers' wishes; so that another organization in these organization-ridden times might seem to be superfluous. These are really two questions, and must be answered separately.

First, as to the producer, and his effort to meet the wishes of the consumer. It is true that every manufacturer studies the market; he is constrained, if he would succeed in his business, to calculate, infer, guess, from the action of the buyer of last year, yesterday, and today, to the action of the buyer of tomorrow and next year. The failure of an enormous percentage of manufacturers shows how difficult is this task of inference. Recurring crises show that the difficulty is sometimes an insuperable one for the whole body of manufacturers at once. Successful manufacturers approximate to the wants of large bodies of buyers; but the approximation is far from being always satisfactorily close. How few of our ready-bound books are just as we like to have them; or of our ready-made shoes, or other garments! Bakers' bread is a classical example of ready-made food intended to suit the "average" buyer, and really suiting the taste of no one. The difficulties of the manufacturer are greatly intensified by the extraordinary incompetence of the "average" purchaser to judge the desired articles on their merits. What housewife can detect, alone and unaided, the injurious chemicals in her supplies of milk, bread, meat, home

remedies? What young girl selecting silk for her adornment knows that oil-boiled taffeta is more durable than common silk at twice its price; or why it is so? And we all buy our wheels on the reputation of the manufacturer, without any knowledge of the qualities of the rubber, steel, brass, wood, and leather used in making them.

For certain great modern industries men have devised tests of the product; and warships, locomotives, railway bridges, and electrical installations can all be tried and tested before the bills are paid; but for the bulk of the product of present industry nothing effective has been devised corresponding to these tests. Especially is this true of all those branches of manufacture which were once carried on by women in the home, and have now gone out of it into shops and factories. Concerning these products purchasers must rely upon their individual skill as buyers. The old rule, *caveat emptor*, is here carried to its utmost application; and in this connection producers suffer so keenly from the lack of intelligence on the part of consumers that they are actually fitting up museums for the purpose of educating them; of which museums the new Commercial Museum in Philadelphia may be regarded as a promising type.

While, however, the most enlightened and progressive manufacturers are thus approaching their problem along the road of education, the great mass of producers have long had recourse to the more simple device of advertising. This can lay no claim to any educational quality. It is distinctly not meant to educate or instruct, but to stimulate, persuade, incite, entice, and induce the indifferent to purchase. Much of the current advertisement, of which the patent-medicine advertisement may be taken as the type, is directly aimed at the ignorance of the purchaser. Nearly all of it is aimed at the cupidity of the public; and it, therefore, offers cheapness as the one great characteristic. Now, the Consumers' League does not object to that cheapness which is achieved by the introduction of two-, four-, and ten-needle machines, driven by the dynamo, and used for sewing garments cut (144 at once) by the help of the electrical cutter. It does object to that cheapness which is attained by making children

run foot-power machines in tenement kitchens in competition with the electrical installation. It seeks, therefore, to afford information whereby the intending purchaser may test the accuracy of the producer's claim that he is aiming to meet the wishes of the public.

To the producer the league offers that which he needs more than any other one condition of success—a somewhat stable body of customers. In Great Britain, where the coöperative movement has grown slowly to gigantic proportions, the purchasers by pooling their interests have been enabled to employ expert buyers who can stipulate in advance as to conditions of manufacture as well as prices and qualities; and obtain in return for the stable demand which they represent goods produced by manufacturers aware, in advance, of the wishes of this part of their purchasing public. In this country, in the absence of such an organization, supply and demand are left to regulate themselves automatically, ruining in the process large numbers of merchants and manufacturers who guess unsuccessfully as to the wishes of the public, or fail to appeal to it by their offers addressed to its supposed cupidity and credulity, involving us all in the consumption of immense quantities of adulterated goods made in the attempt to approximate the wishes of an unenlightened and unorganized body of purchasers; and driving down below the living point the wages of the weaker portion of the employés who produce and distribute the goods.

The Consumers' League recognizes the fact that this blind guessing, inferring, deducing the wishes of the consumer from his action in the past, while now almost universal in this country, is not inevitable in consequence of any natural or social law. All factory legislation is enacted in recognition of the fact that the human relations of supply and demand are susceptible of beneficent modifications; the coöperative movement is a further witness to the same fact; the Consumers' League, latest comer in this field, aims at still another demonstration of this truth.

As to the second part of the query, whether the consumer is not substantially protected by the laws, and enlightened by the official information afforded under them, in spite of the

individual examples of the lack of power of the single purchaser already adduced, the answer is manifold. One of the most important considerations is the fact that legislation is by no means uniform throughout the states; and the righteous man in Massachusetts, living under the best labor code in this country, enforced by the most vigilant and experienced inspectors of factories, is in as great danger of buying garments made in infectious shops under the sweating system, which is in full blast, and is daily increasing in extent and in intensity in New York city, as was the Montana purchaser from the shops of Chicago. For under the constitution of the United States no one state can forbid the importation of goods made in another state, however far the standard of conditions of manufacture in that state may fall below its own. For the promotion of uniform legislation for the protection of the consumer, if for no other purpose, there seems to be room for the work of the National Consumers' League.

Nor is this all. While the manufacturers are spending millions for the purpose of enticing and persuading buyers, the nation, the states, and the cities are spending their hundreds of thousands of dollars for the purpose of affording to the public information concerning industrial conditions, food adulterations, and various other interests of the buyer. The Department of Labor at Washington, the state bureaus of labor statistics, the state inspectors of factories, the municipal boards of health all publish, annually or biennially (some of them quarterly, monthly, and weekly), information designed for the enlightenment and instruction of the public. But very little of this information has, hitherto, served the purposes of the individual purchaser. If I have read the reports of all these officers, I am not only in as great danger as before of buying glucose for sugar, acetic acid for vinegar, and paper in the soles of my shoes; I am in as great danger as ever of buying smallpox, measles, scarlet fever, infectious sore eyes, and a dozen forms of disease of the skin in my new garments. For not one of these officials publishes the list of the kitchen tailors to whom the merchant tailor gives his goods to be made up; just as not one of them

can possibly give information whereby adulterations of foods can be successfully detected in the private kitchen. There is urgent need for a private society to investigate certain specified branches of industry and list the best establishments in them, guaranteeing the product made under clean and wholesome conditions, using all the information afforded by existing agencies, and continually spurring them on to make this information more specific and practical; thus affording the individual purchaser that available information which, as we have seen, he so sorely lacks.

On the other hand, it may be largely for want of such a volunteer society that the available official information already existing has been, hitherto, largely ineffectual. In vain has the fact been printed that the most fashionable chocolates of the day are made by Italian children whose personal habits are so filthy that physicians, asked to examine them as to their physical fitness under the factory law to work, required the children to bathe, change their clothing, and have their hair cut, before proceeding to the examination. The chocolates are as popular as ever. In vain has the fact been printed that the bouillon so extensively advertised as particularly delicate and suitable for the use of invalids, aged persons, and little children is boiled in such close proximity to the fertilizer storage of the packing establishment that the factory inspectors fall ill on the day of an inspection of the premises. The bouillon continues to be served at the luncheons and dinners of the socially aspiring. In vain is the fact printed year after year that the sweaters and their victims, after working fourteen, eighteen, even twenty hours a day through their "rush" season, starve through a long vacation at their own expense; that consumption, formerly almost unknown among the Russian Jews, is now commonly known as the "tailors' disease," having become distinctly characteristic of the sweaters' victims in consequence of the inhumane conditions of their work. Official statements on all these matters, safely buried in official reports, do not reach and influence the great mass of the buyers.

Incidentally, it is true that the community is likely to enjoy the benefit of a more rigid enforcement of its ordinances and

statutes just in proportion as it coöperates through volunteer agencies with the officials who write these reports; for in the absence of such tangible evidence of the existence of enlightened and organized public opinion, the story of honest officials hounded out of office, of weak ones bribed, and of incompetents retained permanently in place is one of the black chapters of industrial history.

The National Consumers' League acts upon the proposition that, to constitute an effective demand for goods made under right conditions, there must be numbers of consumers sufficiently large to assure purchases steady and considerable enough to compensate for the expense incurred by humane employers. For this purpose the National Consumers' League has established a permanent office in New York city, and has entered upon a systematic work of organization of state leagues in addition to those of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois which were in existence before it, and themselves constitute it. The National Consumers' League undertakes for the present year to investigate a single sharply defined branch of industry, as an experiment to determine the power of the purchaser when organized for a definite purpose. To manufacturers in that branch — women's white muslin underwear — the National Consumers' League offers the use of its label and the standard on which this rests, and pledges itself to advertise widely and persistently the humane conditions existing in the factories approved by it. The standard adopted for the present embraces four requirements, viz.: that all goods must be manufactured by the manufacturer on his own premises; that all the requirements of the state factory law must be complied with; that no children under sixteen years of age shall be employed; that no overtime shall be worked. It is hoped that within a reasonable time it may be possible to include a requirement as to minimal wages; the four which have been adopted are already realized in the best factories which have been found in the branch of manufacture under consideration.

Since the exodus of manufacture from the home, the one great industrial function of women has been that of the purchaser.

Not only all the foods used in private families, but a very large proportion of the furniture and books, as well as the clothing for men, women, and children, is prepared with the direct object in view of being sold to women. It is, therefore, very natural that the first effort to educate the great body of miscellaneous purchasers concerning the power of the purchaser should have been undertaken by women, among women, on behalf of women and children. Having proved successful, within moderate limits, in that field, it is now extending among people irrespective of age and sex; and is asking the coöperation of the institutions of learning, and of learned societies.

The first effort in this country was made by two ladies, Mrs. Frederick Nathan and Mrs. Charles Russell Lowell, in New York city, in 1890. They selected two stores in which the



OFFICIAL LABEL.

treatment of the employés seemed to them more than usually humane; and, setting forth the good points of those stores as their standard, they wrote to 1,400 storekeepers on Manhattan Island inquiring whether they wished to arrange the work in their stores in conformity with the standard and have their establishments included in a proposed white list. Out of the 1,400 *two* responded favorably; and from that modest beginning has grown the present "White List" of the Consumers' League of New York city, embracing nearly forty leading stores. For the two ladies proceeded to organize their friends; to bring their growing constituency to the attention of the retail merchant; to circulate their White List, and the Standard upon which it is founded; and to educate public opinion as to the power of purchasers to determine the conditions of labor in retail stores. The present principles, object, and Standard of the Consumers' League of New York city are as follows:

The Consumers' League of the City of New York.

PRINCIPLES.

I. That the interest of the community demands that all workers should receive, not the lowest wages, but fair living wages.

II. That the responsibility for some of the worst evils from which wage-earners suffer rests with the consumers who persist in buying in the cheapest market, regardless of how cheapness is brought about.

III. That it is, therefore, the duty of consumers to find out under what conditions the articles which they purchase are produced, and to insist that these conditions shall be at least decent and consistent with a respectable existence on the part of the workers.

IV. That this duty is especially incumbent upon consumers in relation to the products of woman's work, since there is no limit beyond which the wages of women may not be pressed down, unless artificially maintained at a living rate by combinations, either of the workers themselves or of consumers.

OBJECT.

Recognizing the fact that the majority of employers are virtually helpless to improve conditions as to hours and wages, unless sustained by public opinion, by law, and by the action of consumers, the Consumers' League declares its object to be to ameliorate the conditions of the women and children employed in New York city, by helping to form a public opinion which shall lead consumers to recognize their responsibilities, and by other methods.

Standard of a Fair House.

WAGES.

A fair house is one in which equal pay is given for work of equal value,

irrespective of sex. In the departments where women only are employed, in which the minimum wages are six dollars per week for experienced adult workers, and fall in few instances below eight dollars.

In which wages are paid by the week.

In which fines, if imposed, are paid into a fund for the benefit of the employes.

In which the minimum wages of cash girls are two dollars per week, with the same conditions regarding weekly payments and fines.

HOURS.

A fair house is one in which the hours from 8 A. M. to 6 P. M. (with three-quarters of an hour for lunch) constitute the working day, and a general half-holiday is given on one day of each week during at least two summer months.

In which a vacation of not less than one week is given with pay during the summer season.

In which all overtime is compensated for.

PHYSICAL CONDITIONS.

A fair house is one in which work-, lunch-, and retiring rooms are apart from each other, and conform in all respects to the present sanitary laws.

In which the present law regarding the providing of seats for saleswomen is observed, and the use of seats permitted.

OTHER CONDITIONS.

A fair house is one in which humane and considerate behavior toward employes is the rule.

In which fidelity and length of service meet with the consideration which is their due.

In which no children under fourteen years of age are employed.

The Consumers' League of New York city, dealing exclusively with the stores on Manhattan Island, made its appeal exclusively to the conscience of the purchasers. Asking them to give the preference to the stores in the White List, it stated its purpose of encouraging humane employers to continue in their course, and of inducing others to imitate them. The success attending that appeal has encouraged the league to enter upon its more extended field of action; and, incidentally, to broaden the scope of its appeal. The National Consumers' League asks that purchasers, by insisting upon buying goods bearing its label, will discriminate in favor of those manufacturers who treat their employés humanely, so far as that is possible under the conditions of the competitive system; and that they will do so both for the sake of the employés and also for the sake of promoting that form of manufacture which is most wholesome for the whole community, in preference to conditions in which danger of spreading infection is constant and considerable. The appeal is still, as before, on behalf of the employé; but it is, also, on behalf of a far larger constituency—the whole purchasing public.

For, clearly, it is also a social duty to promote that form of manufacture which tends toward wholesome products, made under right conditions, rather than the sweatshop with its dangers to the family in which the work is done, and to the purchaser who may buy all the diseases to which reference has been made, despite the glib assurance of the salesman: "All our goods are produced in our own factory."

The present appeal of the National Consumers' League promises to be of increasing value to those employers who care to meet their employés as self-respecting people employed under reasonable conditions, and paid wages in proportion to the value of their work. Many such employers have greeted the league with cordial welcome. One proprietor of a factory, known for forty years as having most carefully selected employés, unusually intelligent, and in surroundings rarely desirable, on being visited by a representative of the National Consumers' League, stated that these were aspects of his factory in which the public had

not seemed to be interested. The proprietors of such factories sustain constant intense pressure of competition of others who have a lower standard; and they need and welcome the offered support of an organized body of purchasers. One practical demonstration of this may be found in the offer of several such employers to use the label of the Consumers' League, bearing the expense of printing the labels and attaching them to the product; another is the help given by a manufacturer of wide experience in drafting the form of contract to be used, and many various designs for the label, from among which the one now in use was selected. As the league grows in numbers and in influence, this moral and financial support to the humane employer may be expected to stimulate the spirit of emulation in others who have hitherto been guided by the desire for cheapness rather than for goodness in the arrangement of their factories. This has been noticeably the effect in New York city, the most enlightened employers having been the first to comply with the requirements of the local league, and others hesitating, some of them for years, but finally coming to the point of making the required concessions.

Recognizing that its work must be one of education and organization, the Consumers' League has sought the coöperation of the great educational institutions. The departments of economics of Harvard, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania, and Wellesley College have been actively interested in the work of the leagues of their several states. The department of sociology of the University of Chicago has made valuable contributions, both faculty and students helping with tongue and pen the discussion of the power and the duty of the consumer. The American Academy of Political and Social Science has published in its *Annals* the proceedings covering its discussion of the theoretical foundation of the work of the league. The American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Social Science Association, at their recent sessions, have discussed the subject;¹ and it will form the subject of one session of the meeting of the American Economic Association at its

¹ The substance of this paper was read at the latter meeting.

coming meeting during the Christmas holidays. The Association of Collegiate Alumnæ, at its October meeting, considered the "New Economics in the Colleges Embraced within this Association," especial importance being attached to the teaching of the theory of consumption. The General Federation of Women's Clubs, at its biennial meeting in June, 1899, gave its principal evening session to the discussion of the principles and aims of the Consumers' League. State federations of women's clubs and individual clubs are asked to take up the subject, placing it on the programs of their public meetings.

In general, the power and usefulness of the Consumers' League will depend largely upon the intelligence and active work of the local organizations, and the degree of coöperation which these succeed in enlisting on the part of the general public. At present the league points out that consumers, even when unorganized, have power to put an end to the production of any given goods by refraining from purchasing them; to promote the production of others by demanding them. When organized, even very partially, consumers can decide, within certain limits, the conditions under which the desired goods shall be produced. Consumers have, however, done none of these things in an orderly and enlightened way, except so far as coöperative buying has been practiced and the adulteration of foods limited by legislation procured through the efforts of purchasers. The power of the purchaser, which is potentially unlimited, becomes great, in practice, just in proportion as purchasers become organized and enlightened, place themselves in direct communication with the producers, inform themselves exactly concerning the conditions of production and distribution, and are able thus to enforce their own will instead of submitting to the enticement and stimulus of the unscrupulous advertising seller.

Briefly stated, by way of résumé, the aim of the National Consumers' League is to organize an effective demand for goods made under right conditions. As means to this end it endeavors:

1. To investigate existing conditions of production, and publish the results of its investigations.

2. To guarantee to the public goods found to have been made under conditions satisfactory to it, by attaching to them its label.

3. To appeal to the conscience of the purchaser as an offset to the continual appeal of advertisers to the credulity and cupidity of the public.

4. To coöperate with and encourage in every legitimate way those employers whose work is done under humane and enlightened conditions.

5. To procure further legislation for the protection of purchasers and employés.

6. To coöperate with the officials whose duty it is to investigate the conditions of production and distribution, or to enforce laws and ordinances dealing with those conditions.

7. To form organizations of purchasers for the purposes above set forth.

FLORENCE KELLEY,

Secretary National Consumers' League.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE CHURCH.¹

By GRAHAM TAYLOR, D.D.,

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OF the social function of the church the churches are conscious as never before in their modern history. This fact is due to the dawning of that social consciousness upon the race which is the presage of another new era of its progress toward the kingdom of God. This new consciousness of each other is begotten by the growing recognition of God as the Father of us all. To the proposition of universal fatherhood there is but one corollary—brotherhood—of church with church in the communion of saints; of nation with nation in the bonds of an international patriotism; of race with race in the strangely new and real race-consciousness which is thrilling the body of humanity; of craft with craft and of class with mass in the indissoluble interdependence of modern society, and of man with man the world over.

As surely as the church's mission is fundamentally more positive than negative, and ultimately more constructive than destructive, so certainly the function of the church in society is more formative than reformatory. There can be no reform without the idea of the ideal form. Reformation, therefore, must ever be subsidiary to the creative function of forming the ideal. The formative social functions of the church are three: first, the recognition of the divine ideal of human life, individual and social, for itself and all men; second, the initiation of movements and agencies for its realization in the world; third, the transmission of the Spirit's power for the social regeneration.

To recognize the divine ideal of human life in worship is the primary social function of the churches in their several communities and in all the world.

¹A discussion of "The Church and Social Reforms" at the International Council of Congregational Churches, Tremont Temple, Boston, September 23, 1899.

This ideal is not less individual for being social, nor less social for being individual, but social because individual and individual because social. For life consists in large part of its relations. "One man is no man." Religion is relationship. The Christian religion is Christ's ideal of relationship to God as Father and man as brother, progressively being realized in personal experience and in the history of the race. In trust for humanity has this ideal of the "kingdom of the Father" been committed to the churches. For themselves and for all men they recognize it in public worship. Worship is the recognition of worth-ship, of what is worth being and doing, as seen in what God is and does. Worship is, therefore, social service of the highest type and the most practical utility. Everywhere holy hands are uplifted to God without wrath or doubting they keep the flag of the kingdom of heaven floating high over earth. There everyone may know God's idea of the one man and Christ's ideal of the fellowship of all men. There where common prayer is wont to be made, where the songs of many voices blend in unison; there at the sacramental supper where is broken the one bread made of the many grains that were scattered upon the mountains, and the one wine from many berries is the communion which each shares with all and all with each; there where service is serving and work is worship, there for all time has been held aloft the highest social ideal; there, the world over, human life has more steadily and nearly approached the commonwealth of brotherhood.

If, however, this Christian standard of the life of the one and the many had always, and especially during this century, been held nearer earth than heaven; if the earthward realization of the heavenly kingdom had been boldly proclaimed as the ideal toward which the industrial, political, and social programs of men could and should be aimed, current history would be written in a different handwriting and to another purport than now appears. If, for instance, the freedom wherewith the Son makes free had been fearlessly applied to each man's economic freedom and to the toleration of every man's liberty of thought respecting the same, the philosophy of anarchism might not have had such a

great apostle as Peter Krapotkine, nor be marshaling men in all Christendom who are capable of suffering martyrdom for acts of despair to bring about the one far-off event of individual liberty. The Christian communion would have been recognized at sight as the only place in all the world where one man counts one. If, on the other hand, the spiritual equality of the kingdom of God and the absolute democracy of its all-leveling and all-lifting doctrines had been fearlessly applied as the ideal of industrial and political relationships, the great race movement for actual brotherhood might not now so largely take the form of materialistic socialism. If the churches had heeded the summons of Joseph Mazzini, that greatest prophet and martyr of modern democracy, they might have anticipated by their leadership the fateful and fearful defection from their ranks and their spirit of so large a part of the modern democratic movement. In accounting for this defection, however, and in placing the responsibility for it, one fact, almost always overlooked, should be far more strongly in evidence to extenuate the motives on both sides of that breach of apathy or alienation between the churches and the manufacturing classes. It is the fact that, when at the close of the fateful eighteenth century the factory system—that greatest unarmed revolution—had swept a peasant population, as by a cyclone, from their farms and farmhouse manufactories into the slavery of machinery and the squalid demoralization of the early factory towns, the churches were in the darkest eclipse of their faith, the suspended animation of their life, and the paralysis of their work for the world. Just when the industrial classes most needed the comforts, protection, and leadership of the common faith, they actually seemed to be most ignored and abandoned by the churches. Only here and there a lonely voice was lifted in protest or sympathy in behalf of the multitude helplessly lost in a wilderness “great and terrible.” The decadence of the churches of that period must have been nigh unto death, measured by their delay in waking to the moral and social aspects of the industrial situation and in arousing thereto the conscience of the nations, much more of their own membership. For, remember, it was more than fifty years from the time the first

protest against child labor was publicly registered in England to the enactment of any effective factory legislation. While wandering in this wilderness those more than forty years the manufacturing population was lost to the fold. While letting them wander there, as "sheep having no shepherd," the churches lost an ethical insight, a sense of identification with the masses, and a social leadership which they have by no means made up and which, after all their social progress in these later years, even yet leaves them far from abreast with the complex and increasingly critical social situation of our own day. How much more in keeping with the pace of its splendid progress might "Evangelicalism" have rounded out the present century if, in addition to its many great achievements in home lands and its still more glorious conquests in foreign fields, its churches had listened when Richard Oastler was a voice crying in that wilderness, "Prepare ye the way of the Lord!" if they had more promptly followed young Shaftesbury when by his vicariously sacrificial service he led the mediatorial way toward the redemption of modern industrialism from the curse of Cain; if the judgment of God's throne against the slaughter of the innocents which reverberated in Mrs. Browning's "Cry of the Children" had startled the Christians of both continents to united action; or, farther back, if they had carried on and out Wesley's emancipation of Christian experience and method, as he himself began to do, into the equalization of the social and economic conditions of Christendom; or, still farther back, had they developed and extended their reformation of dogma to that of the social order and had worked out the ethical corollaries of the farther-reaching propositions of their world-revolutionizing, kingdom-building faith. Wyclif did so. For he cried to the people: "Father he bade us all him call, masters we have none." The right of private judgment is democracy. Will we admit it not only, but practice it? Common salvation from common sin is equality of opportunity. Dare we not only proclaim but apply it?

But this great loss of that half century to the people and the churches should now be only the incentive toward the gain to be won by loyalty to the social ideals of the gospel of the

kingdom. For only these Christian ideals of the social order can really possess the place in the world's hope and heart which the substitutes for them can never more than occupy. But to make society Christian there must be a science of Christian society. It is the new science of the old "kingdom," the social extension of the common faith, the application of the doctrines which save the soul to the saving of society. The gospel of the kingdom is sociology with God left in it, with Christ as the center of human unity, with the new birth of the individual for the regeneration of society and the indwelling Spirit as the only power adequate to fulfill its social ideals. For this kingdom of the Son of Man the whole earth is space, the weary heart of man gives place, every nation will make room, each community will welcome its humblest herald, all else must make way.

It is the second function of the churches to initiate social movements and agencies for the realization of the Christian ideal, but not to be their executive.

One "Holy Roman Empire" is enough for Christendom to extenuate before the bar of history. The name, fame, and influence of another Constantine are more than enough for the ideals of the church to carry through the centuries. We free churchmen have not found ecclesiasticized politics to be enough of an improvement upon the genus to be tempted to repeat those colossal failures. But we are subject to the temptation of attempting the same sort of less imposing blunders. Our rank and file have so long and so largely been composed of the middle men of the economic world, and we have so long and so largely shared in the gains of their prosperity, that our churches are in danger of being regarded as institutions of the bourgeois class and the self-appointed and accepted executors of its residuary estate. The thinking elements of the producing classes long since identified these organized bodies of the followers of their greatest friend and fellow-workman with the history and the destiny of the bourgeoisie system of industry, out of which the economic world is surely and more and more swiftly passing. We from within know how far from true that thought is to the inner consciousness of the churches, and yet we should be honest and

scholarly enough to admit how strongly the appearances seem to justify such a partial judgment by those who look on critically from without and are suffering from the system while they look. We know how many productive toilers there are in the ranks of our membership, and how many of their sons are in our ministry, but yet we should be candid enough to confess with shame the frequent servility to wealth, as well as our indiscriminate abuse of its holders, the unjust discrimination shown to social caste, and the unintentioned, but none the less painful, disproportion of manual toilers in the trusteeship of our institutions and the boards of our church control. The churches can afford now, as at the beginning, and as whenever "sitting under the cross," to preach the ideal righteousness and equality of the everlasting kingdom and the eternal justice of the ever-living Lord without, on the one hand, having respect to persons or classes, and without, on the other hand, identifying their organization with schemes of social reconstruction or with economic agencies of production or distribution. That is the function of the industrial organization of the body politic, the function, though not the form, of which is to be respected as an agency equally divine within its sphere as the church is within its own.

The social ideals of the gospel have borne their best fruits in society when the churches have given the initiative toward higher conceptions of civic and national life; have supplied towns, cities, state, and nation with citizens inspired by these ideals of Christian social relationship, and with the willingness to sacrifice to realize them; and have given no suspicion of making any attempt, either formal or virtual, to usurp the functions of government. The churches should be the last to tolerate, much less to claim or secure, class legislation for their own or others' benefit, for they stand for all, if for any. Not in their corporate capacity should the churches assume the function of reformatory agencies for the enactment or enforcement of law. For, on the one hand, neither in their constituency nor in their form of organization are they adapted to or effective in such service, and, on the other hand, if they were, theirs is the higher function, and even the harder work of maintaining the standards and

generating the sacrificial spirit that makes such a strife at law unnecessary, or, if necessary, triumphant. If, therefore, the churches may not be the executive of social action, even in the effort to realize their own ideals, they may give initiative to every such effort by fulfilling their function of inspiring, educating, and unifying the people. Where other institutions of the community—the homes, the neighborhood centers for culture and social intercourse, and the municipal provisions for social needs—fail to meet and minister to the wants of the people, it is not only justifiable but obligatory upon the churches to provide substitutes for them. Thus “institutional” churches and social settlements are the ministering body of the Son of Man, incarnating the spirit of the Christ in their ministry to the physical and social, educational and civic, moral and spiritual necessities of our city centers, not only saving souls out of the wreck, but also helping to save the wreck itself. But rarely, if ever, is it necessary or advisable to turn the pulpit into a lectureship on economics and politics, or the sabbath service into a free forum for the discussion of social theories. Far more effective is it for the churches to man the social point of view, and thence faithfully and fearlessly, by word and in deed, to extend the application of the righteousness of the prophets, the gospel of the Christ, and the ethics of the apostles, from their old work of righting the one man's relation to the one God, to the new work of righting the relation of each to all and of all to each. To unify all the forces which make for righteousness and inspire them to realize the highest ideals attainable is the formative function of the churches in a community which will have far more of a reformatory effect than all the effort they could make to lead reforms that are always more effectively promoted by other agencies. For, in the language of a reformatory chaplain, “formatories are the best reformatories.”

The history of the English people began when upon the tomb of a forgotten hero might have been inscribed the words which Charles Kingsley wrote under the name of Hereward the Wake: “Here lies the first of the new English who, by the grace of God, began to drain the fens.” So, it is said, the imperial supremacy

of the English people dates from the time the nation went home from Waterloo to attend to her own housekeeping, to work for her daily bread, to care for her women and children, to build roads, shops, and schools, to cleanse houses and streets, and care for her sick. And the church which will initiate this world-work of the kingdom will begin to write a new and glorious page in the history of the commonwealth of Israel and the covenants of promise.

The third and greatest of all the social functions of the church is to supply that sacrificial service which is the only medium of the Spirit's power for the regeneration of society.

The social ideals of Christianity have all along the history of their revelation inspired the initiative of many others than men of the Spirit. Over the men of 1798 there hung like a mirage in the desolation of their desert the ideals of that kingdom which is "righteousness, peace, and joy." Had their initiative been "in the Spirit," then "liberty, equality, and fraternity" might have been the translation of those ancient terms in pentecostal tongues to the modern world, and the Revolution might have been the world's second Pentecost, the Spirit's social regeneration, the birth of the coming nation in a day. For social regeneration is the function of the Holy Spirit, the spirit of the Christ, which has never wrought the social regeneration without having the cross to work through; without having, as at Pentecost and at every social revival since, Messianic people to sacrifice themselves and bear away the sin of society and bring the kingdom in. The cross of social self-denial is the Christ-man's burden, now as ever, now in some respects more than ever. For there is an ethical tragedy at hand, such as has not tested Christendom since the Reformation, such as did not test it then at a point of such close contact with the world. It remains to be seen where the cross-bearing spirit will find the Messianic people, "the servant of Jehovah," to serve the peoples.

The crisis bringing us to a test of this cross of a social denial of self and an economic profession of Christ is coming both from without and from within. From without comes the demand for democracy, political not only, but industrial and social the more —

a demand intense, worldwide, yet most emphatic in Christendom ; a categorical imperative to the churches. But it is only the echo of the impact of the kingdom upon the world. For the gospel has at last struck the earth under the feet of the common man. It has awakened the consciousness of manhood in him, the consciousness that if he is a man he has the claim to the right to live the human life and to have the living of a man. "This dumb terror" — the dispossessed, disinherited son of the world's heaviest tasks and least requited toil — is replying to God "after the silence of the centuries," saying, "I would be the man the Lord God made and meant me to be, the man the school and the church have taught me to be ;" and the Lord God — his and ours — awaits the answer of Christendom. Will we let him be by helping him help himself? It will not answer to make reply : "We will let him alone." *Laissez-faire* was the lisping of the infancy of economic science. Civilization is repudiating it, much more Christianity. For even civilization means human interference in the cosmic struggle for existence. The "let-alone theory" of society bears the mark of Cain. Its theological definition is hell. "Joined to his idols let him alone." The Lord God awaits answer to what the Spirit says to the churches. Will we be set apart to God to take part with man? Will we "for their sakes" consecrate ourselves as Christ did for our sakes? Will we love men as he, better than self, in order that they may be able to love neighbor as self? Will we, in the Christlikeness of our industrial and commercial relations, furnish the economic terms in which the gospel must find expression, if it is to satisfy the consciences of increasing multitudes of fellow-men? Will we have the mind in us that was in Christ Jesus, who thought it not a thing to be grasped at, a prize to withhold, to be what he had been, to keep what he had, but "emptied himself" that others might be filled with the more abundant life? Will we, dare we as a body, bear that cross of economic sacrifice and social self-denial that God may ever highly exalt us, and let the church share with the Christ the "name above every name, at which every knee shall bow"? This is the church's social question. Will we reform ourselves in order to conform the world to

Christ? Will we be the world's cross-bearers that its kingdoms may become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ?

The question whether the church will be the democracy is raising the question whether the democracy will be the church. One of the keenest satirists of ecclesiasticism which current fiction has produced answers: "Nothing but a church will do. All the other schemes of democracy have come to naught for want of that. The lecture platform is no substitute for Sinai. Democracy is a religion, or nothing, with its doctrine, its forms, its ritual, its ceremonies, its government as a church — above all, its organized sacrifice of the altar, the sacrifice of self. Democracy must get rid of the natural man, of each for himself, and have a new birth into the spiritual man, the ideal self of each for all. Without religion how is man, the essentially religious animal, to face the most tremendous of all problems, social justice?"¹

From within the church there is the revolt of the Christian conscience against the prevalent ethical dualism which is resulting in a moral self-stultification of many Christians in trade; is depriving the church of the membership of conscientious men, and is a creeping paralysis over its spiritual power and social influence. The issue between "the competitive system" of industry and social order and the rudimentary ethics of Christ's golden rule and love of neighbor as one's self is absolute and mandatory. This is the soul of the social question which will not down; which cannot lose its identity in Jesuitical casuistries; which must be met by each Christian as it meets him, and by the churches when confronted by the crises of their communities. Those who live protected lives under the shelter of assured incomes can little imagine the stress and strain upon the moral sense of an increasing multitude of our brethren who are exposed to the frightful struggle for economic existence both in the ranks of capital and labor. The conscience of Christendom will not much longer allow this breach between the rule of faith and the rule of practice; will not much longer tolerate the profession of belief

¹ See RICHARD WHITEING, *No. 5 John Street* (New York: The Century Co.), pp. 309 *et al.*

in Christian altruism as the rule of practice, while life itself is maintained by conformity to the diametrically opposite principle of every man for himself. The prayer and hope for the coming of the kingdom upon the part of those who willingly submit to this dualism will not always be thought to be ingenuous. For, as one of America's best economists writes, "if the ethico-economic rule of 'every man for himself' were a recognized principle of action, the result would be a society composed, indeed, of men, but a collective brute."¹ The cross imposed from within is to decide whether we will live two lives or one; whether we will believe in the single-sight through which the whole body is full of light, or grope on in the darkness of the double-vision of the evil eye; whether we will have any religion that is not ethical or any ethics that is not religious. It is not a question whether this cross will be borne, but whether we shall wear the crown awaiting those who take it up as their cross; for ethics is surely, if slowly, establishing its sovereignty over economics. "The reformer's conscience," as another has said, "claims the right to audit the books of society, must enter politics and conquer the earth. The holy land to be redeemed is under the feet of the peasant and the laborer." It is plain enough that those who are being possessed by this social conscience and fired with the passion of a social chivalry to unite in the new crusade for the recovery of that land of promise, cannot long stop short of action. Inevitable is the social organization of the moral forces now being generated in individuals for overcoming the baneful evil of this ethical dualism with the moral monism of the kingdom of God. Orthodoxy of life will yet be as essential a test of one's Christianity as orthodoxy of belief. Heresy of heart and conscience will yet be a surer excision from the Christian body than heresy of the head. Sooner or later no one will be recognized as a Christian who does not possess faith in the ethics of Jesus as the rule of practice; who does not strenuously endeavor to do the things that he says; who will not be the beatitudes. One of the best-known exponents of economic

¹See PROFESSOR JOHN B. CLARK, *The Philosophy of Wealth* (Boston: Ginn & Co.), pp. 133, 219.

ethics in this country affirms: "The infidelity of our century, and this is the only form of infidelity to be feared, is disbelief in the golden rule of conduct. If Christianity ever comes to exert a positive influence in the direction of the affairs of men, it will be through the persistent assertion on the part of the disciples of Jesus that this rule is paramount, that it is universal in its application, and that every interest opposed to it is an un-Christian interest."¹ Whenever this note of reality has actually been struck, Christianity has exerted this positive influence over the affairs of men. Francis of Assisi no sooner began to live the single-sighted, one life than from palace and hovel the people followed him back to the fold from which they had been widely estranged and long alienated. All the church bells of Christendom have scarcely arrested the fixed attention of so many earnest minds as the simplicity and single-heartedness of Tolstoi's deep-toned consistency of life. The names of Charles Kingsley and Frederick Denison Maurice are still not without power to hush the bitterest invective against the ministry and to modify the fiercest denunciation of the church which it has been my lot to hear in the most revolutionary circles to be found among Chicago's workingmen. Whatever earthly form this righteous social order may take will be "the kingdom of the Father," and whatever organization mobilizes the moral forces that bring it in will be the church of the Son of Man.

The free churches bear the sovereign insignia of being a part of that church by the part of that kingdom they have brought into the world. They have borne their cross in the day of their visitation, and have worn the crown of ministry to the many. Their church "without a bishop" reared these states "without a king." Their missions abroad have implanted over the wide world seed-thoughts and sentiments having in them the power of an endless life, which will yet burst through all barriers and bloom in the social regeneration of the world. Their association of homes, schools, and churches for the redemption of the

¹ PROFESSOR H. C. ADAMS, address: "Christianity as a Social Force." See volume, *Religious Thought at the University of Michigan* (published 1893 by the Students' Christian Association), p. 55.

subject and abject races is reviving the unfit so as to be fit to survive. Their faith in the living God and the living people, as expressed in their fearless dependence upon a polity without ecclesiastical authority, and a creed which finds its only authoritative symbol in the current confessions of ever-present belief, is the very democracy of the kingdom. The practice of this present faith in the present God and the present people is the crowning service which the free churches can render the kingdom, the church, and the world. But the very weight of their crown is their cross. For what has been said of modern democracy is as true of it in church as in state: "It lays on the will the heaviest tax of all. . . . The sincere believer in democracy must have a dogmatic conviction that the principle of individuality shall some time have the widest possible spread. His right to be an individual himself puts him under the highest conceivable obligation to create individuality in others. He is a gentleman in a true democratic sense just in the measure that he has the art of finding himself in an ever-growing number of persons of all sorts and conditions. . . . He must carry the campaign against caste into larger issues. He must face all that is disagreeable and problematic in democracy, concealing nothing, blinking nothing away. And at the same time he must keep his will strong and tempered, so that its edge shall never turn. To meet all his social obligations heartily, to pay all his political debts joyously, never to throw a glance over his shoulder at the monastery—this is a mighty day's work."¹

To fulfill this their social function let our free churches go triumphantly hence into the century of social democracy, the dawning of which admonishes us to examine ourselves, and take heed that we take not the sacrament of the people's service unworthily.

DISCUSSION.

REV. PHILIP MOXOM, D.D.: The heart of our religion is involved in this problem. In a long experience, in which I have tried to keep myself close to the essential elements of the work of the church, no question more

¹ PROFESSOR H. S. NASH, *Genesis of the Social Conscience* (New York: Macmillan Co.), pp. 303, 304.

vital than that of today's discussion has been presented to me. It lies at the heart of our religious and theological concern. I am not a partisan, but I hear the voice of One who is saying to this age and generation: "Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?" All these problems have their roots in the cradle. The kingdom of God, if it comes at all, must come through the gateway of childhood. The principles of righteousness and justice must be planted in the child's mind before it is seven years of age, if it is to hold them all its life. An ounce of formation is worth a ton of reformation.

REV. WASHINGTON GLADDEN, D.D.: I want to put all the emphasis I can upon the magnificent address of the morning, every word of which I believe. The first and the whole question seems to me to be to find out whether we believe the gospel of Christ or not. The Sermon on the Mount is not a secondary element in the gospel. It gives us the practical application of God's fatherhood and the brotherhood of man. The fundamental question is: Do we believe that we are (not may become) the children of God? The question of our belief in that, and of our action upon our belief, is the whole question for us. If we believe it, we know what our action must be. No small part of the gospel's dynamic is in the Sermon on the Mount.

A. M. FAIRBAIRN, D.D., principal of Mansfield College, Oxford: I should not like to say that I indorse every word of Dr. Taylor's address. With its spirit I cordially agree, but from its criticism of the attitude of the churches toward the industrial classes at the introduction of the factory system I as cordially dissent. The factory system made men part of the machine, and the heavenly fire which had burned upon the altars of humble peasant homes was smothered. The church did not accept this fact with indifference. There was nothing that stood for the poor man and helped his cause through all that transition like the church, and it has worked ever since against the tendency to make men mere "hands." If the voice of religion has been silenced in the home of the workingman, who is to blame? The church did its best to hold the men, but in came the great factory, which took the men from their homes, swept them into work at daylight, swept them out again for a half hour for breakfast, kept them prisoners all through the day, with another brief dinner space, and swept them out again in the evening jaded, tired, too worn out to think of aught but sleep. The men had no time to keep their altars alight. The factory reduced the man to a part of the machine—a "hand," and nothing more. To preserve religion amid the social changes of the past has been no easy task. We must be just. We carry on by our prayers and sacrifices the labors of the past. I hold individuality to be a mighty force, but I acknowledge other forces as mighty. And we have a conscience to create in the state, as well as in the family and the community.

REV. D. L. RITCHIE, of Newcastle-on-Tyne: The evangelical churches of England have cared for the soul, but have not forgotten the body. Our

best men devote their strength and their time in working on school boards and in politics, in municipal government and Parliament. We call it an honor not to separate ourselves from politics. We go into it, not as churches, not as political parsons, but as men with great interests at stake in God's kingdom. Dr. Dale was one of the greatest publicists of England. He was the adviser of Gladstone. Dr. Charles Berry burned himself out in public service too soon for England. Our English delegates will protest against making Christianity identical with any scheme of economics. An injustice has been done the speaker of last evening. I know that he does not put the Sermon on the Mount into any secondary place at all. But he knows, and we know, that to carry out the Sermon on the Mount we need a dynamic. The only power that can realize Christ's ideals is in the person of our Redeemer, and in his cross. I do not want to make a boast, but I feel that the evangelical churches on the other side are at least a step in advance of you here in their attitude toward the social movement.

REV. ROBERT CRAIG, D.D., of Edinburgh: I have listened to the paper with greatest interest and admiration, but I have marveled that no reference has been made in the discussion to that most important point in the consideration of the social question, the drink traffic. In fighting this evil many men have illustrated concretely that spirit of sacrifice for which the paper pleaded. We must not forget the importance of the individual soul.

PROFESSOR TAYLOR: I think if you will read my paper you will see that I have forefended myself from many of the criticisms. I distinctly denied that the church should have any formal connection with particular schemes of social reform or of economic production and distribution. But it is not a question of economics or politics to say that any system of industrial or social order is untenable which attempts to incorporate such diametrically opposite ethical standards as that upon which the "competitive system" is based and the principle of neighbor-love inculcated by Christ. It is impossible that these two standards can both be fundamentally right and equally approved by the Christian conscience. You can never make them appear to be of equal authority. You can never make people believe that you really hold to the Christian principle of loving your neighbor as yourself, if you justify the practice of the competitive principle of each one for himself. In all the years of my pastoral service I have seen the fine gold of the Christian character of our Sunday-school boys become dim from their entrance upon the fratricidal strife of the competitive struggle for existence. Recognize, if we must, the competitive principle as the basis of the existing status, but do not justify it by the authority of your altruistic faith. Rather sink with the flag of Christ's ideal at high-mast than float on any bottom with it at half-mast.

Permit a word of rejoinder to Dr. Fairbairn and my English brethren. I would like to have assured them, if time had allowed, of my appreciation of

the fact that the English labor movement is a quarter of a century ahead of the American, largely, I believe, because of the friendlier attitude of their churches toward it than of ours. For I well know that the backbone and strength of the labor leadership in England have been largely drawn from the rank and file of the Nonconformist churches. But, my brethren, I am sure you cannot read the industrial history of the latter part of the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries in your own most eminent English authorities without feeling sure that the crisis of the industrial revolution came upon the churches at the most unfortunate period in their history, when they were least prepared to grapple with the appalling situation in which the manufacturing population of England found itself. I am almost willing to leave the point at issue to the arbitrament of Hodder's *Life of Lord Shaftesbury*. What was it that caused that greatest hero of the century his heartbreaks, if it was not the lack of coöperation from the churches whose sympathy and help he had a right to expect in his efforts to stop the slaughter of the innocents by the competitive industries of Christian England? The fact of the unpreparedness of the church at that period was cited, however, to account for the breach which still exists to an appalling extent between the churches and the productive manual workers in all Christendom. For over twenty years I have stood in this breach trying to help bridge it — stood for the church where it was hardest to stand. In all that time I have heard but two men speak disrespectfully of the character of Christ, but very rarely have I heard respectful reference to the churches that bear his name. This fact is stated, not extenuated. But it must be faced. There is a tremendous gulf between the churches and the mass of people in the densest populations of Christendom. The deepest breach is that in the ethical relationship of industrial life. Let me illustrate from a leaf of social-settlement life. One evening in the workingmen's economic discussion at Chicago Commons an individualist declared that he was "tired of hearing the Golden Rule preached to workingmen." "It is the dream of a Hebrew madman. It never has been true and never can be. The survival of the strongest is the law of nature. Competition is the law of trade. The biggest beast gets the biggest bone. Might is the only right. Stop not, therefore, for the weak. It is only the creeping Christ who tells you to do so." The socialist who had opened the discussion made reply: "There is, as Drummond says, a struggle for the life of others in nature as truly as the struggle for the life of self. Motherhood proves it. But I have read somewhere that this struggle is seen least in the hyena breed. That man's evolution must have been arrested at the hyena stage. But, men, to get the beast out of all of us that is in that man to a greater degree, cost the life of Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth. I am no Christian, but it makes a man's heart full to think that he had to die for a thing like that!" Brethren, it is not hard to tell toward which of these two positions the ethics of Christ's gospel most tends.

Dr. Gladden did not mean, I am sure, in emphasizing the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount to disparage the dynamic force in the person and work of Christ. When will we ever cease falsely to discriminate between ethics and religion? This breach in the ethical relationship of the industrial world cannot be bridged cheaply. Only by a vicarious incarnation of the ethics of the cross of Christ, in the flesh and blood of its members, can the church span that chasm. Do not, for Christ's sake and brother-man's, too hastily criticise the men who are standing in that breach to reconcile men to each other and to God. I believe that there is an ethical revival of religion at hand, a revival of the religion of relationship to God that will express itself in the brotherhood relationship to men. Can anyone deny that it is needed? Must not all of us admit that the evangelical movement is, for the present at least, experiencing a decided check? Is it loyal, do you think, to blink the facts? Does not loyalty to the church demand that we face the worst and do our best? Let me again repudiate any intention of being unjust to the churches of today or of the past. But, brethren, we must be honest even in religion, where, perhaps, it is hardest to keep the Golden Rule. There is more Christianity in solution than has been precipitated in conventional expression or crystallized in ecclesiastical form. Let us recognize the footfall of the Holy Spirit to be in advance of us all

CONCERNING CERTAIN WISE LIMITS TO CHARITY ORGANIZATION SOCIETY WORK.

Written from the point of view of a director of a charity organization society in a city where no general society for relief exists.

For the sake of brevity, the charity organization society or associated charities which does not give relief directly is here called C. O. S. That which does give relief from its own funds is called mixed society.

Anyone who is not ready to accept the cardinal doctrine of C. O. S. about relief, viz., that it is not the purpose of wise charity, but that it is a means to other ends, just as truly as investigation and registration are means and not ends, will not be interested in this paper.

THERE is an obvious necessity that much of the "charity" which it is our business to organize, or to associate, must, under present conditions, include a large amount of relief in kind or money. It is now generally understood that unceasing care must be exercised to insure that this necessary relief shall not do harm, instead of or as well as good, to the recipient. How best can we avoid or lessen the evils which relief may cause, while we secure all the benefits that wise and kind relief can confer? The temptation to do this by keeping the distribution of relief in our own hands is a serious one. It is easier, in theory, to keep our own agents within due bounds than those of another society. Our agents are fully occupied; it would save much time to write relief orders in our own office instead of asking other people for them. We are already criticised for too much machinery; why erect a new machine in the shape of a society for relief, instead of adding an attachment to the one existing? These questions seem pertinent, especially to business-men who know the advantage of consolidations and combines. And, it must be admitted, about half of the so-called "charity organization societies" or "associated charities" in the United States are mixed societies, and many of the mixed societies appear prosperous.

There are, however, several dangers which no mixed society

has entirely escaped, which have been fatal to several of them, and which have destroyed the strictly C. O. S. work in more.

The first and most serious of these dangers is one which also threatens a C. O. S., but it is much more formidable to the mixed society. It is that of coming to regard *relief* as an end instead of a means. Now, the consequence of taking a means for an end, in charity work as well as in all other departments of human activity, is simply that effort rests with the means, and the true end is forgotten.

The history of many a mixed society, which began with the clearest C. O. S. principles, has been that the C. O. S. work has dwindled as the relief work has grown, until after a few years the former is, in extreme instances, practically extinct. The most striking and rapid instances of this decadence known to the writer occurred in the Associated Charities of Cincinnati, under its original organization (it is doing better now); in the first Associated Charities of Washington, D. C.; and in some of the district organizations in Philadelphia. Many smaller and less prominent societies have met a similar fate, but those mentioned have been the most conspicuous sinners against light among the societies calling themselves by the titles of charity organization society or associated charities.

The history of most of the great charitable societies which were established in this country responsive to the wave of charitable emotion which began in Elberfeld (Prussia), and reached our shores about forty-five or fifty years ago, and which were variously known as societies for the improvement of the condition of the poor, provident societies, union relief societies, etc., etc., was almost exactly like that of the decadent charity organization societies which I have mentioned. Beginning with excellent principles, which in their printed documents often read like extracts from the declaration of objects and methods of a charity organization society of today, they all degenerated in a few years into mere *dole-relief* societies. Some of them became well-managed and economical relief societies, but all of them, or almost all, forgot in practice the distinctive principles with which they set out, although they

sometimes retained them in the statement of their methods usually printed on the first page of their annual report. It is true that in the last few years there have been striking examples of reform and new life in some of them which have felt the influence of the C. O. S. movement.

The way in which the declination of so many once excellent societies to a lower plane has occurred will be seen on a little consideration. In a mixed society it is a natural and almost inevitable result of circumstances and character. Agents and committees are human. They usually have more work on their hands than they can do their very best with. They feel their responsibility to do something for every case. Of course, since C. O. S. principles have been adopted, we rarely say to ourselves concerning any given case that we will give, or secure, the needed relief and then drop it, but this is what we often do. Some relief in a given case is, or appears to be, necessary. We administer the relief, usually as a strictly temporary action, and pass the case for the present, intending, at least hoping, to take it up for careful, wise, and permanent treatment later. Practically it is not thought of again until a renewed application shows a renewed need of relief. Again the temporary aid is given and the case is passed. Each time this is done the case is made a harder one for true C. O. S. work. Each time the consciences of the agent and committee are less sensitive, not only as regards this case, but all cases. After a few repetitions of this process the consciousness comes that "*this is a case for relief*," principally, if not entirely. This occurs at first with a few cases, then with many, then with a majority of those treated. The district committee, which finds its chief business to have descended from the beautiful ideal of uplifting the poor by personal devotion and service to the sordid plane of deciding whether a poor Irish or negro washerwoman is to have a 75-cent or a 50-cent grocery order this week, loses interest, and leaves the work chiefly, or solely, to the agent. The agent, usually overworked at seasons of the year, does ever hastier and poorer work, and presently finds herself the almoner of what is really a dole-relief society, salving her conscience by operating a feeble, free employment

bureau (so as to "*make work the basis of relief*"), and by chatting over a case or two with her neighbor who is almoner for a church charity fund, or with the parish priest, or occasionally securing a bed at a hospital for a sick man, or sending a child to the day nursery (so "*securing the coopération of all charitable agencies*").

Such an agent occasionally deplores that "*our friendly visitors do not take the interest they do in Boston*," and thinks probably they are a different kind of people there. Perhaps she says: "*The conditions are so different with us; we cannot do as they do in Baltimore and Newport.*" Or, if she is very able and energetic, she says: "*I don't want volunteers around me; let me do my work with the poor, but don't bother me with friendly visitors.*" The above are actual, not imaginary quotations.

The friendly visitors, few in number, wholly untrained, without leadership, when they do call at the office, chiefly do it to ask for more relief for their poor families. The directors have a great deal of trouble raising money, and are constantly annoyed because "*it costs two dollars to give away one.*" The society holds an annual meeting, at which one or two ministers, usually newcomers to the city, and perhaps new converts to the modern idea of charity, make glowing speeches, rehearsing the time-honored hopes of C. O. S. Reports are read, economy in the office force commended. No one says, "*We are only talking about these fine things, not doing them,*" and the evils of unorganized charity flourish almost as they did before the society began. The name C. O. S. is spoiled by abuse, and there is a burnt-over district left when the society dies.

This is a sad but a painfully true history of the consequences of relief-giving by a mixed society calling itself C. O. S. That it is not true of all such societies is owing to the devotion and strength of a few individuals. It is the probable history of all.

The tendency of charitable energy to expend itself in its lowest form is analogous with the same tendency in physical energy. Just as physical energy constantly tends to waste itself in the form of radiant heat, so charitable energy tends to waste itself in the form of giving things, either at our own cost or at

the cost of those from whom we collect. C. O. S. is only true to itself when it stands for a higher form of force, one that shall not be so much giving as exchanging. If we call ourselves a C. O. S., we are bound to keep up our efforts on the higher plane. No matter how slowly the results may come, we must have the courage and the patience of our convictions. We must not flatter ourselves that we have done the great and fine work we set out to do, when we have simply introduced a little system into the work of charitable relief, and saved a few dollars previously wasted.

Another danger, much more serious and more difficult to avoid in the mixed society than in C. O. S., is that of hurtful misunderstandings. Of course, to be misunderstood is inevitable. We must be prepared for that, and must be always ready to explain to and reconvert our supporters. But the worst misunderstandings arise from cases where our sayings and our doings do not agree. When we say, "*Not alms, but a friend,*" and make relief-giving our chief business; "*Lift the poor above the need of relief,*" and do little but give the relief which helps to keep them down where they are, will not people think us insincere? The constant criticism, based on misunderstanding, of the percentage cost of relief work can best be met by saying bravely: "*All you give us is for machinery; we give no alms.*" It is too much to expect that poor people who are sent to us for relief, and for whom we secure help in some way, shall ever quite understand us. But at least our own friendly visitors, members of committees, and the more thoughtful of our subscribers should comprehend what we stand for. In a mixed society more than half of such persons, in spite of all the fine theories of helpfulness printed in its annual reports, will continue to believe that charity and alms-giving are synonymous.

Again, there is the constant danger of failure to secure proper coöperation. In theory coöperation is secured by resolutions voted at meetings of committees or boards of directors. In practice it comes about by the agents and visitors working together in a friendly way about a given family in distress, and using together the records and other information gathered and

digested at the central office C. O. S. The almoner of a church charity fund will often seek coöperation with a mixed society (not through it with others) in order to turn over to it for relief some case which has long burdened the church's fund, and has probably become completely pauperized. If we do not give relief, we are spared such trials, for those who control such funds under such circumstances do not want C. O. S. investigation nor registration, and care little for any friendly visitation other than they can supply. The duty of C. O. S. is to do these things, and it expects the church to do its full share of the work of helpfulness, that is, to care for all its own members in distress, if able, and as many more cases as it can. C. O. S. is most successful in getting relief societies to coöperate with each other, and all agencies through it, when it constantly helps them by making their relief-giving function plain, and not infringing on it. It must expect the relief agencies of every kind to do the work for which they exist, and not let them think they can evade responsibility for unrelieved suffering by assuming that C. O. S. will make up for all they fail to do.

The most valuable aid in securing the coöperation of private charitable persons is lost to the mixed society. C. O. S. can call on its friends and subscribers to furnish the material assistance needed for their own cases with a better grace than the mixed society, and does not need to fear the answer: "*I subscribe that you may help these people; why do you bring them back to me?*"

The C. O. S. must secure its influence with and guidance of other societies and agencies by usefulness to them. It must carefully avoid competition with any. "*Whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.*" The price of success is demonstrated usefulness.

The above are among the more obvious reasons against a society which calls itself C. O. S. or A. C. being the disburser of relief funds from its own treasury. They do not all apply, though some of them do, to C. O. S. being a temporary custodian of funds given it for specific cases. Nor even to C. O. S. keeping a "Golden Book," although there are some difficulties

and dangers attending the latter method. Nor do they militate decidedly against a C. O. S. soliciting funds at one and the same time for itself and for a friendly relief society, which is officered entirely by volunteers and which depends on C. O. S. for investigations, etc., provided the two causes be made distinct when the solicitation is made, and thereafter on the books and in the reports of the societies.

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OLD AND NEW ASPECTS OF THE ARYAN QUESTION.¹

THIS book is a monograph of *Homo Europæus*; that is, of that variety of man which has been designated by writers in different fields by the various names of the dolichocephalic-blond, the Kymric, the Galatic, the Germanic, and the Aryan race. I prefer to designate the race ordinarily by the scientific name given to it by Linnæus. In a work devoted to the scientific study of a form of *Homo* it is desirable to use a zoölogical terminology such as is employed in describing *Felis*, *Corvus*, or *Ammonites*. Such a terminology is a means of impressing upon the reader that man is biologically akin to the animals and subject to the same biological laws. Too often man is regarded, even in serious works, as an exceptional being apart from, or even superior to, law. This is an error which must be rigidly avoided. The arbitrary in human affairs exists only in the imagination of mystics. Anthropo-sociology, and in general political science as based on the doctrine of evolution, is bound to substitute a concrete knowledge of the laws of human life in place of the metaphysical and mystic conceptions of the sociology of the philosophers.

If I employ also the term Aryan, I do so partly to avoid constant repetition of the longer designation, and partly as a concession to the reading public whose education is usually literary rather than scientific. Ammon, Wilser, Muffang, Fouillée, Closson, Ujfalvy, Ripley, and others have, indeed, employed in publications of a more or less popular character the terminology that I adopted from Linnæus, but it still needs to be explained by the terminology in more general use. I have had, then, to choose between the words: Kymric, Germanic, and Aryan. The first of these, which means literally compatriots, dates only from the Middle Ages, and has been used only in reference to some Gallic tribes. The second has never been generally accepted as

¹ Translated by CARLOS C. CLOSSON.

These pages are from the introductory chapter of the forthcoming work of DE LAPOUGE, *L'Aryen*.

a designation for the entire race in question. I prefer the term Aryan to either of the others, because it has gained considerable currency during the last twenty years, and because it has been given a general significance by the philologists, and so by the reading public.

It is, however, as is shown by the history of the word, far from being a satisfactory term.

In the sacred books of India and Persia the word *Arya* designated the parent stock of the Iranians and the Hindus. From *Arya* the philologists derived the term Aryan to indicate the linguistic group and the special civilization of the peoples of this ethnic branch. Students came to regard all the Indo-European languages as derived from a more primitive Aryan spoken in the region of Bactria, and all the Indo-European peoples as descended from the Aryan stock, which is supposed to have swarmed all over Europe and a part of Asia.

In this conception, which was the prevailing one until recent years, there is much more of error than of truth. The Indo-Iranian group was not the parent stock of the Indo-European peoples, the Indo-European peoples did not come from central Asia, and the elements of which they are composed are of various origin and without any other ties than a certain community of languages and institutions.

Under these conditions it is not exactly a happy idea to choose the name of the Aryan branch as a general designation for the languages and institutions of the Indo-European peoples. It would be equally appropriate if, in the future, when all memory of present history is lost, philologists and ethnographers should designate what we now call the Anglo-Saxons by the term Tasmanians, because of the discovery in Tasmania of some traces of Anglo-Saxon institutions or literature.

Upon this deceptive generalization has been grafted a special doctrine still more confusing. Most scholars and specialists who regard the Aryans as having originated in Europe think that the development of the Aryan language and primitive culture occurred among a dolicho-blond people, or, at least, among a people whose controlling elements were dolicho-blond. Hence

arises a new connotation for the word Aryan; having been already extended from the Iranians of the Veda to cover all the Indo-Europeans, it now becomes, instead of a vague ethnic term, the name of a race in the zoölogical sense.

I share, indeed, this view that the dominant classes among the Aryans of the Veda were dolicho-blond, and perhaps also the mass of the people were dolicho-blond. This last, however, is so uncertain that one must regard the use of the term Aryan as equivalent to dolicho-blond as a case of very possibly confusing the part with the whole. The word Aryan, however, in thus changing its meaning, has become so elastic that it is still preferable for our purposes to such terms as Galatic, Germanic, or Kymric, which refer to definite peoples, each of which was without doubt dolicho-blond, but each of which represented only a small part of that race.

With these explanations as to terms, we may turn to another preliminary matter. In a work devoted to the Aryans it would hardly do to dodge altogether the so-called "Aryan question." The "Aryan controversy" has consumed whole reams of paper and has played a considerable part in the literature of the last half of the century. The interest of this controversy is, however, now for the most part only historical; the only point still debatable is the part played by the dolicho-blond race in the evolution of the proto-Aryan civilization. Reserving my space for the results of my own researches as to *Homo Europæus*, I will here, as elsewhere where adequate monographs already cover the ground, simply refer the reader to the existing literature of the Aryan question, and, in particular, to the works of Penka, Taylor, and Salomon Reinach.¹

¹ REINACH, *L'Origine des Aryens; Histoire d'une controverse*, Paris, 1892.

This work is devoted to the Aryans in the ethnographic, not in the anthropological, sense; that is, to the discussion of the Aryan *peoples*, considered without reference to their physical *type*. It includes a nearly complete bibliography of all the previous linguistic, ethnographic, and historical works bearing upon the subject. The author, who in this book does not decide between the different views, has in a later work accepted the hypothesis of the European origin of the Aryans ("Le mirage oriental," *Anthropologie*, 1893, IV, 539-78, 699-732).

The twofold thesis of the European origin of the Aryans and of the prevalence among them of the dolicho-blond type—this last the Aryan question in the anthropological sense—has been expounded by several writers. It dates back to Bulwer

THE ARYAN CONTROVERSY.

In a work full of brilliant errors, *Lectures on the Science of Language* (1861), Max Müller asserted that there was a time when the ancestors of the Hindus, of the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slavs, the Celts, and the Germans lived under the same roof. This idea of a patriarchal family of Aryans, the ancestral stock of the various Aryan peoples, the home of their languages and institutions, gained widespread acceptance. In the early sixties it was the prevailing view. It is still to be found in some works of vulgarization, and is still taught in some institutions of learning which have become hospitals for all kinds of infirm and invalidated doctrines.

The conception was very simple, too simple to correspond with the complicated data of history and science. It supposed that, as the tribe of Aryans increased and their language developed, groups detached themselves; and so, one group crowding another, they spread over a vast area the language and institutions that prevailed among them at the period of their separation.

Lytton (*Zanoni*, 1842) and Omalius d'Hallo (Bul. Ac. de Belgique, 1848, XV, 549). It implies a different conception of the problem, and reasons thus: The Aryan being dolicho-blond, and the dolicho-blond being of European origin, the origin of the Aryan peoples must be sought in Europe. This thesis, sustained by Latham in the preface of his edition (1851) of the *Germania* of Tacitus, was, therefore, no longer a new doctrine when it was brilliantly developed by Clémence Royer at the Congress of Anthropology of 1872 and the Congress of the Anthropological Sciences at the exposition of 1878. From that time the leading exponent of this view has been Penka, the advocate of the hypothesis of the origin of the dolicho-blonds and of the Aryan civilization in Scandinavia. The principal works of Penka are: *Origines aryacæ*, Vienna, 1883; *Die Herkunft der Arier*, Vienna, 1886; "Die arische Urzeit," *Ausland*, 1890, 741-4, 764-74; "Die Entstehung der arischen Rasse," *Ausland*, 1891, 132-6, 141-5, 170-4, 191-5; "Die alten Völker der östlichen Länder Mitteleuropas," *Globus*, 1892, LXI, n. 4-5; "Die Heimat der Germanen," *Mitt. der Anthr. Gesellschaft in Wien*, 1893, XXIII, Heft 2; "Zur Paläoethnologie Mittel- und Südeuropas," *ibid.*, 1897, XXVII, 19-52.

This hypothesis of Scandinavian origin was earlier propounded by Wilser at the meeting on December 29, 1881, of the Archæological Society of Karlsruhe (*Karlsruher Zeitung*, January 22, 1882). Wilser has published a considerable number of articles upon this question, the most recent being "Stammbaum der arischen Völker," *Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift*, 1898, XIII, 361-4.

Even before Wilser's advocacy of the Scandinavian hypothesis, Latham had modified his earlier theory of the origin of the Aryans in central Europe. Still regarding the latter as the region in which the Aryan civilization developed, he came

The Iranians and the people of India were the eldest of the family, the most faithful conservators of the primitive language and institutions. The Celts, the Latins, Greeks, Germans, and Slavs represented swarms or colonies of the original stock pushing farther and farther westward. In this hypothesis Europe was conceived as a region without previous inhabitants, for the idea of the existence of prehistoric man in Europe was still regarded by scholars as a dream and by conservatives as a nightmare.

But it soon transpired that between the great linguistic divisions had existed complex affinities wholly different from what the above theory required; each of them was related in a particular way to several others, and unfortunately these relations existed between the languages of peoples now occupying neighboring regions; that is, they were correlated with the present geographical relations, and not with the order in which the colonies were supposed to have separated from the parent tribe. It was then necessary to assume that the expansion of the Aryans had occurred only after their differentiation into great tribes, Celts, Germans, Slavs, Hindus, etc., and that the respective position of these tribes in the primitive Aryan land was the same as that of the historic peoples of Europe. Thus it came to be thought that the Aryan tribes had developed in his later years—so I am informed by his friend, Dr. Beddoe—to consider the region now largely covered by the North Sea as the cradle of the Aryan race. He thus reached substantially the hypothesis advocated by the present writer.

Among the authors who have regarded central Asia as the original home of the Aryans, because they considered the true Aryans to have been brachycephalic, must be cited Ujfalvy. This author has, however, abandoned this earlier view. He now considers, and rightly so, the brachycephalics as comparatively late arrivals in central Asia. The Tadjiks, so analogous to the brachycephalics of the Alpine region that Topinard regards them as Savoyards retarded in their migration, are in reality a people transplanted into Bactria only a short time before our era, coming from the confines of Armenia. Ujfalvy, in his recent work, *Les Aryens au Nord et au Sud de l'Hindou-Kouch* (Paris, 1896), allies himself with the twofold hypothesis of the European origin of the Aryans and of the prevalence of the dolicho-blond type among them.

Taylor's *Origin of the Aryans* sustains a twofold hypothesis, first, the European origin of the Aryan languages and civilization, and, second, the prevalence among the Aryans of the brachycephalic Finnic type. This work, although full of anthropological errors, is in general the best and most recent guide in regard to the ethnographic and philological aspects of the matter.

in central Europe, and that, as their numbers increased, they had simply spread out over adjacent territory, with the exception of the Phrygians, the Armenians, the Iranians, and the people of India, who had reached their final habitats only after long migrations. In a word, it was more logical to place the original center in the region where so many Aryan nations exist with the geographical relations corresponding to the linguistic relations, rather than in the remote region of Bactria.

Meanwhile many other discoveries were made, especially in archæology, prehistoric anthropology, and philology. It was found that the different human races, in the zoölogical sense, existing in the modern population of Europe were present thousands of years before the time of the Aryans. It was found also that the Lithuanian and other languages of Europe retained forms more primitive than the Sanskrit or the Zend. Recent criticism, exceeding the truth, perhaps, in the opposite direction, restores to a comparatively recent period those works of fictitious antiquity, the sacred books of Persia and India. M. Darmesteter, in his *Le Zendavesta* (Paris, 1893), asserts of this book, reputed the most ancient in the world: "It was entirely compiled after the conquests of Alexander, between the first century before and the fourth century after our era." This is perhaps correct as regards the Zend compilation, but the compilers may have had at their disposition documents of an earlier date in Aramean or cuneiform.

Max Müller's theory has now only one serious advocate—himself. The philologists have worked out, little by little, the following conception: Instead of a patriarchal family, or even a primitive Aryan tribe, there existed a number of nomad tribes, spread out over a great territory, with languages closely related and undergoing a collective linguistic evolution toward the Aryan forms, each dialect influencing its neighbors. In this complex and ramifying mass of dialects, a process of selection eliminated the weaker and gave a broader extension to the stronger. Thus by the suppression of intermediate dialects were formed the great linguistic groups, just as, more recently, the French, Spanish, and Italian languages have been formed

by the extension through historical events of local idioms over large territories and the choking off of various less fortunate dialects which had equally sprung from the common Latin base.

With this theory, a result largely of the old wave doctrine of Smidt and others, is associated a complementary explanation of the increasing simplification of idioms. The destruction of forms is due to the development of a kind of jargon in countries where conquest superposes peoples speaking dialects too diverse for mutual comprehension, and in families where the father and the mother do not speak the same language.

It is by such arguments that the philologists have come to abandon the theory of the origin in Bactria of both the Aryan peoples and the Aryan languages and civilization.

REGION OF ORIGIN.

As I have indicated above, the philologists are today pretty well agreed to regard central Europe as the region in which has occurred the evolution of the Aryan languages and institutions. There exist, indeed, several other opinions, but some of these have been abandoned and the others have not been received with favor. Of these opinions the two most serious are those which place the origin of the Aryan culture respectively in southern Russia and in Scandinavia. The first of these views rests on the fact, generally admitted, that the early Aryans were nomad and pastoral peoples, and this manner of life naturally develops on the steppes rather than in a forested country such as central Europe. This argument, however, neglects climatic changes. It is easy to reply that just as the great Hercynian forest, highly developed at the commencement of our era, covered what were formerly steppes, so the impenetrable forests where the Gauls and Germans struggled in the historic period may very probably not have existed five or six thousand years before our era. The Scandinavian hypothesis errs by confusing two separate problems: the origin of the Aryan *civilization*, and the origin of the dolicho-blond *race* considered as the Aryan *par excellence*. We shall see that this race developed in the Scandinavian region, in the lowlands of the North Sea and the Baltic, but at the epoch

of the Aryan civilization *Homo Europæus* had spread out already into central Europe.

If we trace on a map the known lines of the migrations of the Aryan peoples, the arrows point as if they had all been shot from a bow in central Europe. The migrations toward India and Iran came from the northwest; those of the Armenians and the Phrygians from the west; the Greeks and Latins moved from the north southward, the Gauls and Germans from the northeast toward the southwest, the Scandinavians from the south northward, the Slavs from the southwest toward the northeast. The reservoir from which flowed the migrations of the historic period is then limited on the south by the Alps, the Balkans, and the Black Sea. In this region are to be found all the objects the names of which occur in all of the Aryan languages. The philologists have attached great importance to arguments of this latter sort, and the present limitation of the habitat of the beech tree—the name of which is found in all of these languages—to the region west of a line passing through Königsberg and Odessa convinces them of the occidental origin of the Aryan civilization. As intimated above in another connection, I do not place much weight on considerations of this nature. The botanical and zoölogical areas of distribution vary so much with climatic changes that it is difficult to say where were the extreme limits of distribution of the beech or of the eel seven or eight thousand years ago. I will limit myself, therefore, on this point, to a reference to the works of Penka and his predecessors. Moreover, under our conception that the Aryan civilization developed in no single tribe, but among a number of nomad peoples occupying a large area, and by no means identical or homogeneous in race or culture, it becomes unprofitable to seek for a narrower localization of the origin of that civilization.

PRIMITIVE CIVILIZATION OF THE ARYANS.

The same philological methods make it possible to frame hypotheses of a certain degree of probability in regard to the state of civilization of the Aryan peoples before their differentiation.

There are no names of common origin for the metals or for objects constructed of metal. Hence it may be concluded that the differentiation was already complete before these peoples learned the use of the principal metals. Agriculture was rudimentary, and wheat was unknown. Barley, however, appears to have been cultivated; indeed, the men of the Magdalenian period knew this cereal and have left us graphic representations of it. The principal domestic animals were dogs, sheep, and cattle, these last raised in great herds and constituting the only form of wealth. This manner of life did not allow for the existence of any dense population, but only of semi-sedentary tribes which might under certain circumstances undertake distant migrations. The soil, richer in herbage than that of Tartary, Arabia, or the *Cafir* country, did not necessitate the continual movements and changes of habitation characteristic of the Mongolian, Arab, and Zulu tribes; but, on the other hand, it did not retain the population, as does land appropriated and improved, when any strong reason impelled them to seek new homes beyond the adjacent regions.

Max Müller and Pictet have given a description of the life of the ancient Aryans, which is sufficiently accurate if one discards the romance of the myths, and if one restricts the subject to the Aryans in the proper sense, those of Ariana and of Media, the ancestors of the Persians, the Medes, and the Hindus. This branch of the Aryan family, having migrated by the way of Thrace or by the Russian steppes, Crimea and the Caucasus, had for a long time dwelt in conditions most suited for a pastoral life. Prehistoric archæology shows us, on the other hand, a greater tendency in central Europe toward agriculture. The primitive Aryan civilization, therefore, was not entirely uniform, but included various stages in the passage from a régime of the chase to that of settled agricultural life.

DOMINANT RACE AMONG THE PRIMITIVE ARYAN PEOPLES.

We take up now a subject of more direct interest, and one which does not appear to have been as yet anywhere satisfactorily treated. It will, therefore, be necessary to enter more into

detail, since there exists no literature to which I can refer the reader.

First it is necessary clearly to understand the question. Formerly, when the Aryan peoples were regarded as descended from a single family, it was permissible to ask what was the anthropological type of that family. This manner of view can no longer be tolerated when it is realized that the Aryan peoples proceeded from the evolution of earlier peoples. The unity of type possible within a single family is no longer found throughout a tribe. Probably no tribe in the world can be found entirely homogeneous, and this appears to be equally true of tribes in the past, as far as we can study them in the light of prehistoric anthropology.

In order to solve the question as formerly framed, "What was the type of the primitive Aryan?", it would be necessary that prehistoric anthropology should show us a homogeneous population in the region and epoch of the formation of the first Aryan civilization. The region was that to the north of the Seine, the Alps, the Balkans, and the western part of the Black Sea; the epoch was that of the middle and end of the period of polished stone. Now, instead of a homogeneous population, there existed a considerable number of human types, among which it is necessary to choose. The question ought, therefore, to be framed thus: *Of the races present among the Aryan peoples, which race was socially predominant, to which ought the civilization to be attributed?*

It is necessary to exclude the races represented only by the servile element, or only by savage tribes existing more or less separately from the Aryan peoples, like the Indians in the United States, or only by strangers, who may have been slaves brought from a distance, or travelers or adventurers. Among every people, in fact, and especially among peoples like the early Aryans or the Indo-Chinese of the present day, it is necessary to distinguish between the element which counts and that which does not count, between that which is influential and that which simply exists within the society without playing any active roll.

This less simple aspect of the problem is more in conformity with the real conditions, but it cannot be said that the problem in this form becomes easy of solution.

Five or six thousand years before our era, at the earliest possible epoch of the beginnings of the Aryan civilization, there existed already in central Europe and the British-Scandinavian region a confused mixture of types. Later in this work we shall study them more in detail; at this point I will simply enumerate them:

1. *Homo Europæus*.—He existed everywhere from the British Isles and the north of France to Moscow and Ladoga Lake.

2. *H. spelæus*.—The so-called race of Cro-Magnon, which appears to have come from the southwest of Europe, and which from this epoch begins to be less common in a pure state, is found in the region with which we are concerned only as an accidental element, but the neolithic burial places furnish subjects who are more or less closely related to this type. It is mentioned here mainly for the sake of completeness.

3. *H. meridionalis*.—The Mediterranean race, represented by subjects sometimes pure, sometimes mixed with the two preceding races, abounds in the Long-Barrows of Great Britain. It appears to have played a smaller rôle in central Europe, but is found in some degree in the various regions.

4. *H. contractus*.—This race, which I first distinguished in the ossuaries of the Cévennes of the copper age, is found as an important element in various parts of France. It appears to have come from the northeast, and by further study its presence would probably be recognized in the neolithic series of central Europe.

5. *Pygmy races*.—The excavations of the Schweizersbild have furnished examples of dolichocephalic pygmies with long narrow faces, who differ from *H. contractus*, and who may be regarded as a distinct race.

6. *H. hyperboreus*.—This, the characteristic race of the Laps, has been found in the dolmens and other neolithic sepulchres in Denmark, Sweden, and the north of Russia. Its presence in Belgium appears to be established by one of the skulls of Sclaigneaux and by other remains.

7. *Race of Borreby*.—Another brachycephalic race, but of tall stature and with a broad high face, has been found in several localities, notably in Denmark and the British Isles. This race appears only at the very end of the neolithic epoch. It is probably the result of a cross between *H. Europæus* and some brachycephalic race of tall stature analogous to *H. Dinaricus*. Some remains in central Europe may be assigned to this last race. These tall brachycephalics have been wrongly associated with certain mixed Mongolian races. There is nothing in common between them except the characteristics resulting from the presence of *Acrogonus* among the common ancestors of these races.

8. *Race of Furfooz*.—This race, also a mixed one, played a rôle of some importance in the western part of central Europe toward the end of the polished-stone period. It has been wrongly associated with the Finns, who appear to be mixed races of recent formation, for the different Finnic types of the present day do not appear in the sepultures before the Middle Ages. No trace of them is found in the neolithic or protohistoric tombs of Russia.

9. *H. Alpinus*.—I cite this form of half-breed of *Acrogonus* mainly for the sake of completeness, for I am not sure that it is allowable to assign it to the various neolithic skulls hitherto regarded as "Celto-Slav."

10. *Acrogonus*.—I cite also for the sake of completeness this type, whose existence is proved by the existence of mixed races which sprang therefrom, and necessarily, too, in various localities, for they inherit a part of their characteristics from the local races of each region from Galacia to Tibet.

I do not deem it necessary to include in this enumeration *H. Asiaticus*, the Chinese type, which, originating in Kashgaria, appears to have moved constantly toward the east, nor the cross between it and *Acrogonus*, the Mongol in the proper sense, so unhappily designated by Bory as *H. Scythicus*.¹

¹No one has maintained seriously the Asiatic origin of the dolichocephalic-brown race, although their affinities with the most ancient populations of the Orient are incontestable. It is the same for the dolichocephalic-blond race; those writers who

Of all these races only one is found everywhere in the neolithic sepultures—the dolichocephalic-blond, *Homo Europæus*. In certain regions this type is found alone, in forms varying somewhat, but often identical with those of the present population of the same locality. In other sections it is represented by individuals of practically pure race, and also by cross-breeds, in which the type is, however, clearly recognizable. In most localities, however, this race is found represented by only a part, perhaps one-half, of the remains in the sepultures. Among the other elements the brachycephalics become more and more numerous toward the end of the polished-stone period, and they are represented by very diverse types, the greater part of which do not correspond to any fixed race existing at the present day.

The remains that are found in the sepultures of the polished-stone period probably do not represent accurately the relative proportion of the different races in the population of the time. A careful study of the sepultures leads to the conclusion that the skulls and other bones belong almost exclusively to the chiefs or to families above the masses of the people, and these

regard it as originating in the south of Russia have not connected it by any genealogical tie with the yellow races. It is different, however, in the case of the brachycephalics who have been for a long time regarded as directly related to *H. Scythicus*, the brachycephalic Tartar of central Asia. This idea is connected at once with the theory of the Asiatic origin of the Aryans, these being regarded by certain writers as brachycephalic, and with the theory of Pruner-Bey, which associated all the primitive inhabitants of Europe, even the dolichocephalics, with the yellow races. This last theory is not wholly incorrect. *H. priscus* was certainly very closely related to the Esquimaux, and the latter have several characteristics in common with the yellow races, especially the color of the skin, to which so much importance was attached in the rudimentary stage of anthropology. The false part of Pruner-Bey's theory is the attempt to establish a tie of blood-relationship between the brachycephalics of Europe and those of Asia.

The Mongolian characteristics occasionally appearing among western people may be adequately explained by occasional crossing with isolated individuals of the Mongolian or the Chinese type who came in connection with the incursions of the Middle Ages or under various circumstances. These characteristics are of extreme tenacity, and may reappear through atavism after an interval of many generations. Often, also, the supposed resemblances are due simply to individual variation, the possible range of which is greater than often supposed.

Our ultra-brachycephalics of the regions of the Cévennes and of the eastern Alps far excel any of the Mongols in the degree of their brachycephaly. This brachycephaly is, moreover, the sole characteristic which they have in common with the

remains belong almost uniformly to *H. Europæus* or to crosses between this race and other races occupying apparently a lower position in the social scale. On the other hand, it is only rarely that these sepulchres contain individuals distinctly typical of races other than the dolichocephalic-blond. The subjects who do not belong to this race appear to be women taken from the inferior classes or from savage races living in juxtaposition to the Aryan civilization, half-breeds resulting from chance unions, and sometimes simply slaves put to death to accompany their masters in the other world. Apart from such cases of joint interment, the representatives, probably more numerous than is often supposed, of the slaves of foreign race, and of savages living on the confines of the relative civilization of the Aryans, do not appear to have practiced modes of burial capable of transmitting their bones to us. I may cite, as a typical example, *H. contractus*, the rigorously pure examples of which are all feminine.

We reach, then, the conclusion that the dominant class among the primitive Aryans was dolicho-blond. Whether that

latter, and even in this point the analogy in cephalic index is not accompanied by an analogous form of skull.

Tappeiner, who is the authority on the ultra-brachycephalics of the eastern Alps, has made a special study of this question. The conclusions of his work are categorical (*Der europäische Mensch und die Tiroler*, Meran, 1896): "Ich habe bei der anthropologischen Untersuchung der 3,400 lebenden hochbrachycephalen Tiroler *keinen einzigen* Mann gefunden, welcher die charakteristischen Merkmale der mongolischen Rasse an sich gehabt hat (p. 42). So wird auch der weitere Schluss nicht bezweifelt werden können, dass alle europäischen brachycephalen Schädel wesentlich verschieden von den mongolischen Schädeln sind, dass also die europäischen Brachycephalen keine Nachkommen der Mongolen sein können, und dass daher *eine prähistorische Einwanderung von Mongolen aus Asien ein anthropologischer Irrthum ist*" (p. 48; cf. also p. 53).

To this testimony of Tappeiner, based on his study of 3,400 living subjects and 927 skulls, I may add my own, which rests on about equally extensive studies in the Cévennes. I have not found a single subject of the Mongolian type. The reader may be referred for details to my *Matériaux pour l'Anthropologie de l'Aveyron* and *Recherches sur 127 ultra-brachycephales de 95 à 100 et plus*. I may say, further, that I have been unable to find any Mongolian types among ancient skulls of brachycephalic Europeans preserved in the museums.

The question has, moreover, of late taken a new turn. The anthropological researches in Russia, in the Caucasus, in eastern Siberia, and in Turkestan have not yet furnished a single Mongolian skull anterior to the Huns, the Turks, and the Tartars. The arrival of the yellow brachycephalics in central Asia does not appear to

predominance was at once social and numerical, or merely social, matters little. The civilization of a people is the creation of the master class, even if with the language it is shared by the slaves, the serfs, and the foreign element. Our solution of the Aryan question is, then, the identification, in the sense and in the degree indicated above, of the Aryan with *H. Europæus*.

This thesis differs at once from that of Penka, who regards the dolichocephalic-blond as having alone constituted the Aryan peoples, and from that of Mortillet and Topinard, who identify the Aryan race with the brachycephalics, attributing to these, also, the language and culture.

I regard the thesis of Penka as at fault, in that it assumes an absence—certainly very improbable—of social relations between the dolicho-blonds of the proto-Aryan epoch and the brachycephalics living with or near them. Penka and Wilser seek in

have antedated our era. It is to be added that migrations by a route north of the Caspian Sea were not exactly easy until an epoch tolerably near the historic period.

On the other hand, our brachycephalics are, in part, very closely related to those of Asia Minor, of Armenia, and of neighboring regions, as far as north Persia and the Pamir. These last, studied by Ujfalvy, are, moreover, according to their own traditions, colonists brought to Bactria by the Macedonians. These are the Galtchas in whom Topinard saw Savoyards retarded in their migration toward the west!

It is well to take this occasion to finish with another myth connected with the one we have been discussing. It is currently assumed that the yellow race is brachycephalic. This is an error which I have several times exposed, as has also my friend Ujfalvy, but it appears to have a tenacious hold upon life. The true *H. Asiaticus*, of small or medium stature, yellow skin, black hair, black oblique eyes, is dolichocephalic. It is the cross between this race and some form of *Acrogonus* that is brachycephalic. In fact, of the seven hundred millions of the yellow races not one-quarter are brachycephalic. Yellow populations whose index is as high as the average of the brachycephalics of Europe are not numerous, and those with indices above 84 are comparatively rare. They consist of only a few tribes (Manchus, 84; Usbeks, 84; Kirghiz, 85; Kalmuks, 86). Their total number is not over three million. The yellow peoples of Siberia are usually below 80 or only slightly above it. The Ladikis of Pamir measured by Ujfalvy gave an average index of 77 for thirty-six individuals. Risley found an average of 80.7 for 388 mountaineers of Darjeeling. The people of Tibet are more dolichocephalic. Hagen found averages between 80 and 86.9 for numerous series of Malays, but the Malays are in part of another race. For 15,582 Chinese he found an average index of 81.7—lower than those of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, and the Balkan peninsula.

There are, then, in China, and among the yellow race generally, relatively fewer brachycephalics than in Europe, and there, as here, the brachycephalics represent a foreign or intruding element.

vain to avoid this objection by placing the cradle of the Aryans in southern Sweden. This localization appears to be accurate only for the primitive Germans. The country would have been too small for the various Aryan peoples, who had become differentiated to a degree which presupposes a considerable geographical separation. Moreover, even in Scandinavia some brachycephalics are found in the neolithic sepultures. Lastly, it is certain that even early in the neolithic period *H. Europæus* had already a wide area of dispersion around the North Sea and the southern part of the Baltic.

THE BRACHYCEPHALIC HYPOTHESIS.

The supporters of the brachycephalics' claim to Aryan glory are somewhat numerous. Behind Mortillet and Topinard are ranged Sergi and Ripley; the ethnographic and philological division is led by Taylor; and the more practical part of the campaign appears to have been taken up by M. Drumont and his anti-Semitic guerillas.¹

This hypothesis is, however, even less sustainable than that of Penka. It is one of the forms of that oriental mirage which makes both the people and the civilization of Europe appear to its victims to rise out of the East. The conception of Mortillet and Topinard is that the brachycephalics came from Asia, swinging the hatchet of polished stone, and leading the domestic animals. They are supposed, also, to have introduced wheat and various useful plants and trees. Now, in the Portuguese *Kjökenmöddings*, in the grottos of the region of Corbières, and in other localities also, the brachycephalic appears anterior to the neolithic epoch. He has not, therefore, brought the tools of polished stone. On the other hand, the asylian deposits of the

¹ By reason of the prominence of the anti-Semitic movement and the unpleasant notoriety which it has given to the term "Aryan," it is desirable to indicate in what sense the word is used by these agitators. The anti-Semites assume the title "Aryan" for our brachycephalic masses. In point of fact, the real representative of the Aryans, the dolichocephalic-blond, has not much more liking for the anti-Semitic campaign than has the Jew himself. M. Drumont has no love for the Anglo-Saxons, and perhaps he is right, for it little matters to the brachycephalic, destined, in any case, to be controlled by some other element, what is the nasal profile of his master.

Pyrenees show us that wheat was cultivated since the fifth interglaciary period, long before the polished-stone epoch. These same deposits furnish us examples of the fruits of the walnut, the plum, the cherry, and of other trees of alleged Asiatic origin, already improved by culture. The domestic animals of the neolithic period appear to be mostly of African origin, especially the cattle. Further, the polished stone hatchet was not an Asiatic importation. It is rare in Asia, where its introduction was relatively late. Its origin is African. Its evolution can be followed in the African paleolithic deposits from the *acheuléen* form to the most perfect form of the neolithic epoch. These various importations were made rather by the Mediterraneans.

Moreover, wherever we find the brachycephalic in the neolithic burial places, he appears only as an accessory or accidental element. It can no longer be doubted that the brachycephalic skulls of the lake-dwellings of Switzerland, for example, belonged to captives taken in war, for, as we shall see when we come to consider the matter more in detail, the sepultures of the lake-dwellers prove that that population was uniformly dolichocephalic.

Finally, in Asia itself we find no trace, either in Asia Minor or in Bactria, of an ancient brachycephalic Aryan civilization. There was, indeed, a civilization, but it was not Aryan; there were, indeed, brachycephalics, but they were not Aryans.

From all this may be drawn the moral of the unfitness of the term Aryan to describe a race of men in the physical or zoölogical sense. When the discussion is in regard to the Aryan civilization, languages, religions, institutions, etc., the word, although inaccurate in so far as it confuses the part with the whole, is a convenient and necessary term. It is, therefore, permissible, when the point of view is philological or ethnographic, and in these connections it has come to have a fairly uniform significance. As regards physical type, however, the image evoked by the name Aryan differs according to the author that one reads. For Mortillet, Topinard, or Drumont, the Aryan is an avowed brachycephalic, resembling the chestnut peddler on our streets or the typical peasant of Piedmont, Auvergne, or Savoy. If the

author is Ammon, Penka, or Wilser, the image is that of the typical globe-trotter from England or the "Uncle Sam" of the Yankees—lank-bodied, dolichocephalic, leptoprosopic, usually blond, adventurous, and aggressive. In my view, both these types were represented among the Aryans, but the dominant classes among them, the builders of the Aryan civilization, were of the type of "Uncle Sam," or, to use the terminology most suitable from the anthropological point of view, were of the race *H. Europæus*.

GEORGES VACHER DE LAPOUGE.

RENNES, FRANCE.

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER VI.

REFLECTIVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

PROFESSOR BALDWIN in his *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*¹ has set forth a theory of psychic recapitulation supplementary to that which the biologists have developed. In aiming to prove that the mind of the child passes through certain definite stages corresponding to those which human society has followed, he finds in each the following three stages :

1. A primary or organic stage, corresponding to the pre-human or animal stage of physical strife and "instinctive coöperation."

2. The "spontaneous, or frank, trustful, 'free and easy,' social stage," corresponding to the "tendency to family life and the germinal beginnings of social and collective action which we see illustrated in some degree in the animal kingdom."²

3. The self-conscious or reflective stage, beginning about the sixth year and corresponding to the period of distinctively intelligent social life which began with "the discovery of the arts of tilling the soil and living, for some of his meals at least, on vegetables. [Here] the social tide sets in. The quiet of domestic union and reciprocal service comes to comfort him, and his nomadic and agricultural habits are formed. He lives longer in one place, begins to have respect for the rights of property, gives and takes with his fellows by the bargain rather than by strife, and so learns to believe, trust, and fulfill the belief and trust."³ Here also is the rise of totemism and its accompanying recognition of a clan or public interest, as distinguished from mere private interest, a distinction to be found strongly "marked in the child's social development at the very beginning of his growth into real moral personality."⁴

¹ Pp. 188 ff.

² Pp. 212-13.

³ P. 214.

⁴ P. 566.

It seems probable that the correspondences here pointed out by Professor Baldwin do actually exist, but he has not carried us forward to a more critical and fundamental distinction in the psychology both of the man and the race. This is the distinction between empirical¹ thinking in terms of concrete wholes and abstract reasoning based on analysis of essential attributes, which is, of course, a prime distinction made by psychologists. It is incumbent upon the sociologist to locate the corresponding distinction in race psychology and to unfold the social cause of the transition from the lower to the higher.

Psychologists contrast these two modes of thinking as predominantly association by contiguity and association by similarity. The one is habitual "unconscious" inference, the other is voluntary analysis with the express purpose of making new classifications of the material of experience. "Empirical thought associates phenomena in their entirety, but reasoned thought couples them by the conscious intentional use of a particular partial aspect which has been extracted from the whole."¹ A more definitely sociological psychology would place greater emphasis on the difference in the processes of the two modes of thinking. Empirical thinking is imitative, traditional, customary, habitual. If it originates anything new, it is only by adding here and there to the old and familiar what has been accidentally hit upon in mere routine experience. In this way grew up primitive products, inventions, and institutions by a "natural" evolution, a process which M. Tarde² designates as "accumulation," though not pointing out its psychic basis.

Reflective thinking, on the other hand, is skeptical, critical, introspective, individualistic, at first iconoclastic, later inventive and constructive. It seeks "essential attributes," analyzes the accepted traditions, institutions, and products of the time, in order to discover either the fundamental laws and purposes which govern their making, or those attributes which in fundamental ways enable the thinker to reclassify and reorganize the material of experience. Invention here may displace the old altogether or recombine it in unthought-of ways, and progress leaps forward

¹James.

²*Les Lois de l'Imitation*, pp. 188 ff.

by "substitution," to use the term proposed by Tarde. Thus, while empirical thinking tends only to results, learns only by experience, and makes progress only through the crude logic of *post hoc*, reflective thinking searches for underlying causes and general principles, learns by criticism, and improves upon the past by the logic of *propter hoc*.

It is not difficult to locate the emergence of the reflective form of thinking in social history. We should first notice that it is not so different in kind from empirical thinking as the psychologist's distinction would seem to indicate. The difference consists, not in the nature of the process, but in the conscious search for hidden similarities, instead of the imitative acceptance of traditions and the empirical grasp of the first observed similarities that mere contiguity offers. This the Greeks called "thinking" *per se*, and "thinking" was the original name for philosophy. It did not require a new brain capacity, but came suddenly upon the breakdown of narrow tribal and local control, and the rise of commerce and money in the place of agriculture and barter. The introduction of money itself was a process of analysis and abstraction whereby the quality, value, was extracted from commodities and given an exact measurement and a preëminence over the concrete commodities themselves. These events threw individuals upon their own resources. They were compelled to think in order to survive. Thinking began in the economic field and then expanded elsewhere. Thales was first a merchant, then a philosopher. Sudden riches were acquired, and men of low origin became more powerful than kings descended from gods. This provoked political thinking. Class contests and civil wars arose, after the rulers had been found to be without divine sanctions. Merchants and politicians, like Solon, became political philosophers, and attempted to discover the hidden laws, not only of nature, but also of society and government. These political philosophers soon got a hearing from the disorganized multitudes and their political leaders. Pericles espoused Anaxagoras with his view that reason determined the mass.¹ Traditional government was shattered and must be

¹ ERDMANN, *History of Philosophy*, p. 66.

reorganized. Reflective thinking is called upon to shape new constitutions. Revised charters of Athens follow each other in quick succession, and so often did Florence mend her constitution that Dante likened her to a sick man in bed always changing his position to escape from pain.

There are differences in detail between the emergence of reflective thinking in Greece and Italy and its emergence in a centralized absolutism. In Italy the close of the wars between the pope and the emperor had left the local governments disorganized. Pressure from above was removed. Petty tyrants with illegitimate rule seized power through their shrewdness. Rapid revolutions brought all varieties of despotism, aristocracy, and democracy. Everything was on a small scale and easily overturned.¹ In England and France, however, despotic government was centralized. In France this continued until the Revolution. In England it underwent a slow evolution, as a result of reflective thinking. Here we can test more clearly than elsewhere the theories of sovereignty.

CHAPTER VII.

SOVEREIGNTY—COERCION.

Austin's theory of sovereignty is based on the conception of a single will issuing commands to subordinates. "If a determinate human superior *not* in a habit of obedience to a like superior receive *habitual* obedience from the *bulk* of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society. The position of its other members toward that determinate superior is a state of subjection, or a state of dependence."²

This description, baldly dividing society, as it apparently does, into those who govern by sheer force and those who are forcibly subdued, has been met by attacks on all sides. With the help of these conflicting opinions we are able to analyze the elements which constitute sovereignty and to find that they are comprised in the following three concepts: coercion, order, right.

¹BURKHARDT, *The Renaissance in Italy*, pp. 57, 129 ff.

²*Jurisprudence*, p. 226.

Rousseau is sometimes held to have substituted for force as the basis of sovereignty an original voluntary agreement; but he plainly holds that, "as nature gives to man absolute power over his members, the social compact gives to the body politic absolute power over its members."¹ This absolute power, however, is always directed by the general will instead of the will of the actually historical sovereign, and this general will is the will of the existing generation and can never be bound even by the original compact. Rousseau does not eliminate coercion, he only transfers it from the monarch to the people. Herbert Spencer, abandoning the original contract and perceiving that society originates in conquest, substitutes a vast system of individual contracts, as the basis of the modern "industrial régime."² Coercion with him is primitive and transitional; it is destructive of personality, and gives way to free mutual agreement between individuals.

Spencer's view is, indeed, a just criticism upon that narrow description of sovereignty set forth by Austin. Austin's conception is truly primitive. Its type is despotism. But Spencer overlooks the two elements which, following despotism, have been incorporated in sovereignty, namely, order and right. These have not eliminated coercion, but have changed its mode. In despotic times coercion was repressive, or criminal, enforcing uniformity in beliefs and habits. Now it is mainly civil or "restitutive,"³ setting forth the term and conditions for private contracts, enforcing and refusing to enforce certain ones, a function in primitive times exercised by custom. For this reason it does not efface personality, but has relaxed its pressure from personal beliefs and desires, and by adopting and acting upon certain ideas of right has opened a wide field of free choice for the subordinate individual.

Green's contention that "will, not force, is the basis of sovereignty," differs from Rousseau's, not at all in eliminating force, but in giving a narrower interpretation to the "general

¹ *The Social Contract*, Book II, chap. 4.

² See DURKHEIM, *De la division du travail social*, p. 221.

³ Durkheim, as above.

will." There is something of ambiguity in his use of this term. In one place he speaks of it as the "impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears of a people, bound together by common interests and sympathy." This meaning corresponds with Rousseau's, and is practically equivalent to public opinion. The other meaning, which, indeed, forms the tacit basis of all his reasoning, is much narrower, and is practically only that section of public opinion which is concerned with right and wrong. This meaning will appear later, in the discussion of right.

Willoughby¹ has cleared away the confusion into which Green had cast the theory of sovereignty by his discussion of the location of sovereignty in the body politic. Sovereignty, being a political term and designating coercive power, can be exercised only when society is politically organized. Until a people become politically organized in the form of a state there is no sovereignty. "Public opinion," "general will," "the ultimate political sovereignty," and similar terms, denote only certain *conditions* of political action, but are not in themselves legal or civil in their nature.² They enter into the question of political expediency, into the forecast of results by the sovereign, and into the formation of his opinion; but it is the expression of legal will through coercive agencies that marks the location of sovereignty. "Sovereignty is exhibited whenever the will of the state is expressed. In fact, it is almost correct to say that the sovereign will is the state, that the state exists only as a supreme controlling will, and that its life is only displayed in the declaration of binding commands, the enforcement of which is left to mere executive agents."³ Now, the will of the state is seen wherever in government there is exercise of choice, or discretion. Where this shall be depends on the actual constitution of the government. In modern constitutions it exists primarily in the legislature; but the executive, who ordinarily has no will or purpose of his own and is but the instrument of the legislative will, has also limited discretion in the ordinance-power, and is to that extent sovereign. "Constitutional conventions," in so far as

¹ *The Nature of the State* (Macmillan, 1896).

² P. 287.

³ P. 302.

they have the direct power of creating constitutional law, exercise the sovereign power.¹ And the courts, whose work is mainly interpretative, do actually create law, and are to that extent sovereign. The people are not sovereign except where they directly enact the laws, as in the initiative and referendum. Popular election of officials is only an administrative and not a legislative act, and when once elected these officials are themselves sovereign in as far as sovereignty is distributed among them by the actually existing organization of government.²

The advantage of Willoughby's analysis of sovereignty is that it is based on what we have already seen to be the psychic basis of coercion, the will, as seen in the expression of mere wish or preference. Sovereignty is thus separated psychologically from the strictly executive and judicial functions of government, where the psychic basis is knowledge and skill. But it is at the same time joined to the exercise of private coercion which we have already seen to be the psychic basis of private property. Whenever mere wish or opinion is imposed upon others and is carried into effect through coercive sanctions, there we have dominion. This dominion, when exercised by private persons, is private property; when exercised by public officials, it is sovereignty.

CHAPTER VIII.

SOVEREIGNTY—ORDER.

In the preceding paragraph we have seen that the common basis of public and private dominion is coercion. This conclusion is popularly rejected, because it is deeply felt that sovereignty is free from the characteristic quality of private dominion, caprice. Says Sir Henry Maine:³ "At first sight there could be no more perfect embodiment than Runjeet Singh of sovereignty, as conceived by Austin. He was absolutely despotic. He kept the most perfect order. . . . The smallest disobedience to his commands would have been followed by death or mutilation, and this was perfectly well known to the enormous majority of his subjects. But he never made a law. The rules which regulated the

¹ P. 304.

² Pp. 305, 307.

³ *Early History of Institutions*, p. 380.

life of his subjects were derived from immemorial usages, and these rules were administered by domestic tribunals, in families or village communities. . . . Customary law is not obeyed as enacted law is obeyed. Where it obtains over small areas and in small national groups, the penal sanctions on which it depends are partly opinion, partly superstition, but to a far greater extent an instinct almost as blind and unconscious as that which produces some of the movements of our bodies. The actual constraint which is required to secure conformity with usage is inconceivably small. . . . Nevertheless in the interior of the households which together make up the village community the despotism of usage is replaced by the despotism of authority. Outside each household is immemorial custom blindly obeyed; inside is the *patria potestas* exercised by a half-civilized man over wife, child, and slave."¹

The foregoing observations of Sir Henry Maine are, indeed, valid as against the literal statement of Austin's theory. Austin, of course, had in mind the sovereignty exercised through constitutional forms in the parliamentary system of Great Britain. Maine has in mind the dominion exercised prior to constitutional government. He rightly likens the operations of custom upon the family proprietor at this stage to the operations of international law upon nations. Each despot is sovereign in his own family, but he submits to accepted customs, not because they have coercive sanctions against him, but out of mere habit. Custom is backed by religion, and together they form, not merely the "general will," or the "public opinion" of the time, as is often asserted, but the very constitution and structure of government itself. Within the framework thus provided the individual proprietors exercise their *patria potestas*. Custom is the only guaranty of order. Where it does not hold, there caprice governs. But in the constitutional form of government, upon which Austin's theory is tacitly based, order is in some way incorporated in the very exercise of coercion itself. It is not an outside custom holding despotic wills in check, but it is an inside balancing of wills holding each other in check. We are now to inquire

¹P. 393.

into the process whereby custom has disappeared as the maintainer of order, and coercion itself has become orderly.

The paternal family, we have seen, had both a political and a domestic side to its coercion. With the growth of population and chieftainship so much of the political side as was needed was separated out and organized in an overshadowing institution, the feudal hierarchy. This led to absolutism. Absolutism, we have seen, followed upon changed economic conditions. The increase of population, the complete occupation of land, the breakup of serfdom, the rise of the wage system, the mobility of population, the introduction of money, and the fluctuations of prices—all these causes conspired to overthrow entirely the rule of custom. With this bulwark of order disappearing, the power of the monarch increased. He began to extend his sovereign will into those precincts formerly controlled by custom. His lawyers now introduced the fiction that custom becomes law only because "what the sovereign allows he commands." This has become the doctrine of the analytical school of jurisprudence. "There can be no law without a judicial sanction," says Austin,¹ "and until custom has been adopted as law by courts of justice, it is always uncertain whether it will be sustained by the sanction [of force] or not."

In Austin's literal and tacit use of the word "law" as the *orderly* command of constitutional sovereignty this doctrine is, of course, true, but, then, it is also meaningless, for, by the very definition of law, custom is already excluded. In truth, the doctrine only marks the complete breakdown of custom, and the subsequent injection of order into sovereignty. Previous to this injection the king's invasion of the precincts of custom signified mainly the invasion of order by caprice. This is absolutism—the doctrine that the king's will alone is the fountain of law.

The first effort of absolutism is to reduce the feudal chiefs who are next to the monarch in power. Such was the outcome in oriental despotism, in China, India, and Russia. This is the culmination of absolutism. But in England a different result followed. The feudal nobility, deprived of their private dominion

¹ *Lectures*, p. 69.

by the king, had learned to combine together effectually and to secure for themselves a voice in shaping the sovereign will. No longer able to hold their earlier position as petty sovereigns, they could now become sovereigns over their own property only by sharing in the king's sovereignty, and securing through the House of Lords a veto on his arbitrary will. Here for the first time the state as such truly appears. A despotism is not a state. It is private property. Law is the criterion of a state, but the arbitrary, transient commands of a despot are not laws. It is the capriciousness of private property that evokes the state. Economic and competitive conditions had finally centralized the coercive sanctions in one man. On such a large scale his caprice assumed ominous import. While private despotism was distributed among numerous proprietors, its social significance could not be seen. But centered in one man it became simplified, visible, and portentous. The subject of coercion has no will of his own. He is merely the limb of another. Different kinds of masters, the willful, the humane, the weak, the vacillating, and different moods of the same master, deprive the subject of moral character. He has no security for the future, no incentive to make much of himself or his interests. In other words, he has no property of his own. The effect on the master is pride, false estimates of self, immorality, caprice. Here is the double urgency for order in social affairs. The political problem which marks the genesis of order and the state begins in the attempt of social classes which have been subordinated on the basis of the coercive sanctions to coerce in turn the monarch, in order to set boundaries to his coercion and to secure private property for themselves. Magna Charta was imposed upon an especially capricious king, in the form of an agreement binding on him and his heirs not to extend his will beyond certain limits. It set forth channels within which king, barons, and people should each henceforth execute their personal wishes, without interference from others. It was a compromise, "a treaty of peace between the king and his people in arms."¹ It was in form a series of commands purporting to issue from the free will of the king, but, from the fact

¹ TASWELL-LANGMEAD, *English Constitutional History*, p. 102.

that these commands were the expression of the joint will of the king and his barons, they are known as "positive laws" instead of mere commands. They are the will of the state as against the will of one man.

But Magna Charta must not be looked upon as more than a foreshadowing of the true state. It preceded by three hundred years the triumph of absolutism. It was mainly a compromise or "international" treaty between feudal proprietors, each sovereign in his own field. The advance of irresponsible absolutism continued to absorb the coercive sanctions of subordinate proprietors. It was not until the revolution of 1688 that subordinate classes achieved a recognized permanent right of participation in shaping the royal will. Sovereignty is a daily flow of coercion, and not the mere promise of a king to do and not to do so and so. Sovereignty, therefore, requires definite enduring constitutional organs for its daily exercise. Magna Charta did not adequately provide these. There was as yet too little common consciousness and coöperation among the barons and people. The private interests of each were not yet overshadowed by the absorbing despotism of the king. But the Bill of Rights introduced Parliament definitely into the will-shaping functions of sovereignty. It forever provided that "the pretended power of suspending of laws, of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authoritie without consent of Parlyament is illegall." Henceforth every command issued in the name of the king proceeds from the joint will of the king and Parliament, as provided in the constitution, and is a true law. Coercion is extracted from the king's private property and is made a public function, and Parliament is now admitted by the monarch into partnership in shaping the direction of this public coercion. The personal caprice of the king loses its import as a factor in sovereignty, and positive law comes to have order for its basis as well as force.

But it must not be thought that in this new form coercion has lost coerciveness. Philosophical and biological theories have tended to personify the state and to raise it above the matter-of-fact affair that it is. Hobbes says: "The common-

wealth is one person." Says Schopenhauer: "The state is the work of reason that mounts from the one-sided and personal to the collective point of view, whence it discerns the fundamental unity of man . . . [it is] the substitute for individualistic egoism of a collection or corporate egoism of all." The terms "social consciousness," "social mind," "social organism," are the present-day phrases which supplant the "universal reason," the personification, and the metaphysics of the past. Austin, no doubt, avoided entirely this personifying tendency when he divided society into masters and subjects. But Green, in developing the concept of the "general will," has given to it in the minds of his followers a strong support, and publicists of today, even with historical training, while clearly appreciating the analysis of Austin, are yet so fascinated by their theories of the unity of the sovereign that they are speaking of the state practically in metaphores. Says Willoughby: "Sovereignty belongs to the state as a person, and represents the supremacy of its will. Sovereignty is thus independent of its particular powers in the same way that the self-conscious power of volition and determination of the individual human person is distinguished from his various faculties or the aggregate of them. It is the very possession of this sovereign will that gives personality to a politically organized community. Sovereignty . . . is necessarily a unit and indivisible—unity being a necessary predicate of a supreme will."

Our criterion and analysis of these conceptions will appear in examining the arguments for and against Aristotle's classification of the forms of government. Aristotle described monarchy as the rule of one, aristocracy as the rule of the minority, and democracy as the rule of the majority. This classification has been criticised as being purely arithmetical, and containing no organic principle. "Number, without a principle of measurement or rule of distribution, is about as vague defining principle as may be imagined."² On the other hand, Schleiermacher's

¹ *The Nature of the State*, p. 195.

² JOHN DEWEY, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. IX, p. 31.

defense of this classification has been generally accepted as sound. He holds that "the numbers and proportions are used simply to indicate how far the consciousness of the state has spread through the population, and to note the degree of intensity with which that consciousness is developed; the principle is this: no part of the population in which the consciousness of the state is strongly developed can be kept out of the organization of the state, and, therefore, the number inspired with this consciousness, and participating in this organization, really does determine the organic character of the state."¹ Burgess, in making the important distinction between "state" and "government," holds that Aristotle's classification applies only to the "state," and he proposes a different classification for governments, based on administrative and structural peculiarities. This distinction is valid, and governments, being merely the machinery through which the states carry out their will, should be classified on the basis of the method of this organization. But, granting this distinction, have we really discovered anything more than a merely numerical basis of division in Aristotle's classification of states? If "state consciousness" becomes diffused among the people as mere isolated units, then a mathematical basis of classification is adequate. But if the diffusion of "state consciousness" is itself an organic function of the state, then the basis of classification must be found in the very nature and purpose of the state. That this is the case can be plainly seen from a view of the way in which "state consciousness" has actually developed. The state is the coercive institution of society. It is not an ideal entity, superimposed upon society, but is an accumulated series of compromises between social classes, each seeking to secure for itself control over the coercive elements which exist implicitly in society with the institution of private property. Every statute, legal decision, or executive ordinance newly enforced is a new differentiation and transference of coercion from its original private control to that of social organization, and every such fact is an increment in the growth of the state. Now, while this transference is

¹ BURGESS, *Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law*, Vol. I, p. 73.

being made in the progress toward monarchy, described above, there is, properly speaking, no state consciousness. The monarch is simply a private proprietor on a larger and more authoritative scale than others, and all property, such as it is, whether held by monarch or by subject, is private property. When, however, this movement is completed in absolutism, those whose private coercion has been appropriated by the king through his sheriffs, judges, and other subordinates, and who find themselves reduced to the level of their own subordinates, now begin to be drawn together in common interest against the pretensions of the king. That which draws them together is, in the first place, the possession of similar property rights or coercive privileges, upon which the king has encroached. The consciousness which animates them is a class consciousness. This is only a name for their recognition of common interests in the face of a common obstacle, and their capacity to coöperate for overcoming this obstacle. It is more than that habitual, instinctive consciousness which in primitive times blindly leads to coöperation under the personal and divine prestige of a chief. It is an outcome of reflective self-consciousness. It depends, first, on an assured means of subsistence, and the accompanying leisure for contemplation and combination. With this there must also exist certain psychic qualities, such as self-control, self-sacrifice, intellectual capacity, hopefulness, energy, integrity. These are essential factors in mutual confidence. Without them enduring combination is impossible. It is a striking fact, already noted, that these psychic qualities did not exist among the nobility of Asiatic monarchies, and consequently they were able to make no permanent resistance to the power of the despot. In other words, they were unable to combine and to secure through their constituted spokesmen a share in determining the sovereign will. But in England the nobility, aided by the smaller proprietors, possessed these qualities in sufficient degree to constitute the House of Lords, and later the House of Commons, as partners with the kings in sovereignty. "State consciousness" is thus originally class consciousness, organized at first in voluntary, private, and unofficial ways. This organization, by concentrating

the coercive factors which remain in possession of the given class, acquires power adequate to gain a share in the coercion hitherto exercised alone by the monarch. Their voluntary organization is thus incorporated in partnership with the king, and the coercive institution thus inaugurated is the germ of the state. State consciousness is simply class consciousness organized for partnership in the coercive control of society. The problem of the diffusion of state consciousness is, therefore, the problem of the basis of social classes as constituents of the state. And, since the state is the coercive institution differentiated out from the primitive homogeneous blending of all institutions, the basis of a social class is the consciousness of common dependence upon a definite mode of coercion. This brings us back to our classification of coercive sanctions.¹

We have seen that in the early emergence of private property the proprietor possessed both corporal and privative sanctions. We are now to notice that in the gradual emergence of absolutism and the state it is first the corporal sanctions that are extracted from private property and are constituted the basis of sovereignty. In other words, private vengeance, private execution of criminal justice by feudal courts, and private ownership of serfs and slaves, were displaced by the king's justice. This involved eventually the entire undermining of the characteristic coercion exercised by feudal chiefs. Population at this time was sparse. Only a small portion of the land was under cultivation or reduced to private ownership. Slavery or serfdom was the only means of coercion, and the escaped serf became an "outlaw," roaming the primeval forest a free man, envied and sung by those unable to escape. Ownership under these conditions necessarily became a hereditary aristocracy. Communities were separated. Security required that each should be undivided and controlled by a single will. This was the economic basis of primogeniture. The feudal nobility, based on this common property interest, when finally deprived of private control by absolutism, recovered it collectively through state control, by

¹ See also LORIA, *Les bases économiques de la constitution sociale* (Paris, 1893), tr. by Bouchard.

sharing sovereignty with the monarch. They then became the aristocracy, and aristocracy, as a form of the state, is government by hereditary property.

With the further increase of population and the occupation of all the land, direct coercion was no longer needed, and was followed by freedom of labor and the wages system. Coercion here is indirect, and the sanctions are privative. Not the person of the laborer, but his means of subsistence, are owned. Instead of scarcity of men there is now scarcity of land, and economic value is transferred from men to land. The privative sanctions turn upon the power of proprietors to employ, promote, and discharge the laborers. Since there is no escape to vacant land and no scope for outlaws, this control is effective. It could be met only by organization on the part of the newly freed men in the form of merchants' and manufacturers' guilds, joint-stock associations, corporations, and companies. These, gradually acquiring wealth, acquired influence in government through their lobbies, and finally were legalized and incorporated in the structure of government, thus constituting the representative system. They acquired definite partnership in the English constitution with the Reform Bill of 1832. The characteristic feature of this new property interest, based on privative sanctions, is its transferability. It began in the free cities and later spread to the country. Labor is free and mobile, changing from one employer to another, and capital must also be free in order to go where it can get the richest results from the employment of labor. Government by this form of property is capitalism or plutocracy, and plutocracy is government by transferable property. Beginning on a small scale with small proprietors, this form of property tends to concentration in pools, combines, trusts, and monopolies, just as hereditary property tends to absolutism. Thus organized and centralized it strengthens its coercive control over all subordinates, over the community, and over the sovereignty in which it has acquired partnership.

The antagonism in England between aristocracy and plutocracy has resulted in the enfranchisement of the unpropertied classes, and in protective legislation in their behalf. In the

United States, where aristocracy had no hold, this movement has been influenced more by doctrines of natural rights and by the desire to attract immigrants. These classes have also been compelled to organize in labor unions in order to acquire partnership in the control of industry, and possibly also in sovereignty. The tendency here is quite similar to that of aristocracy. The feudal chiefs, having lost their private control through absolutism, regained it collectively through partnership with the sovereign; so the unpropertied and salaried classes, having lost individual control of transferable property through the growth of great industry and monopoly, are now in various countries regaining that control by the use of their newly acquired universal suffrage and partnership in government. This is the third form of the state, democracy. The alternative to democracy is a caste system. Both are wage systems, which follow the disappearance of serfdom and the occupation of the soil; but caste is private coercion, democracy is partnership in state coercion. Following the breakup of feudalism in England, the aristocracy, having lost private control over their serfs, attempted through sovereignty to fasten the caste system upon the ex-serf in the form of sumptuary laws and statutes of laborers which were aimed to suppress the standard of living and to keep wages at a minimum. This policy, successful in India, failed in England, and the way was left open for the later development of plutocracy and democracy.

From what precedes it appears that the state cannot properly be under the exclusive control of a single person or class. Such would be the perverted forms of the state designated by Aristotle as tyranny, oligarchy, ochlocracy. The state is rather the partnership of different classes in government. This partnership is not sporadic and chanceful, but is definite, organized, intended. Here is the significance of the structure or "constitution," or "government," as distinguished from the state. The state is the coercive institution of society controlled by those classes which have acquired partnership in determining the sovereign will. Government is the particular machinery or form of organization constituted for shaping and executing the coercive

will of the state. Hence the form of government follows the introduction of subordinate classes into lasting partnership in sovereignty. These subordinate classes have been forced to combine first in voluntary associations outside the state. This provides them with coercive power adequate to force entrance into the constitution. When once admitted, they are admitted as already organized, simply by legalizing their voluntary association and incorporating it into the structure of government. The House of Lords is the legalized organization of hereditary property; the House of Commons is the legalization of the national conventions and lobbies of merchants and small land-owners representing transferable property.¹ A law to be enacted must gain the consent of king, lords, and commons, each sitting independently, and not coerced by the others. In other words, each social class has a veto on the others. This is provided in the structure of government, which is therefore all-important in the substitution of order in the place of caprice. Each class must be furnished with organs for expressing its will which are appropriate to its own character. This is more likely to be the case where these organs have been previously developed in voluntary associations. The aristocracy, being limited in numbers and wealthy, can meet as a direct primary assembly, the house of lords. The plutocracy, being widely scattered, of limited means, and relatively numerous, must act through their leading men as designated in their local guilds, corporations, and associations of freemen. Democracy, being most widely extended and of most diversified interests, is unable to act through the other forms, and therefore tends to direct legislation. Where the machinery of government is not adapted to these several classes, or where a new political power has been injected into the old machinery, there are the conditions for political corruption. The unparalleled corruption of British politics previous to the Reform Bill sprang from the mixed machinery of aristocracy and plutocracy. The corruption of today in America and France, and its recent revival in British cities, springs from universal

¹ See COMMONS, *Pro. Rep.*, pp. 14-16; HEARN, *The Government of England*, pp. 423-8.

suffrage working in the machinery of representative or plutocratic government, and is being remedied by such democratic remodeling as civil-service reform, secret ballot, corrupt-practices acts, primary-election laws, etc. The machinery of government is much more than machinery—it is the organized participation of political classes, based on property interests, in the exercise of sovereignty. It is the very source and genesis of order and right. It is the means whereby the unity of sovereignty, the “social consciousness,” the “state consciousness,” is originally established through the coöperation of the various political classes which participate therein. It, therefore, marks off the state from absolutism or despotism, where the will of one man dominates the people, restrained only by custom rather than by the legalized internal checks and balances of orderly sovereignty.

We can now see more clearly how it is that sovereignty and private property together constitute the coercion, or dominion, of society, and we can judge of the adequacy of Professor Burgess' statement¹ that “sovereignty is the absolute, unlimited, universal power over the individual subject and all associations of subjects.” Sovereignty is not original (historically), for it is derived from private dominion. It is not absolute, unlimited, and universal, because it is limited by so much of coercion as still remains in private hands. And those who retain it as private parties are the same as those who regulate it through sovereignty. Sovereignty and private property must always be in control of the same classes of individuals, since those who have the sovereignty are able wholly to dispossess the others. A prime aim of sovereignty is the protection of property. The fallacy consists in failing to distinguish between *potential* and *actual* sovereignty. Sovereignty *could* possibly encroach entirely upon private property, but it goes only as far as the actual structure of government and the partnership of propertied classes in the state has provided.² Coercion, either public or private, is

¹ *Political Science*, p. 52.

² “At any one time the state actually exercises, through its governmental organization, only those powers which it has drawn to itself by formal adoption.” There is “no capacity for legal action irrespective of state organs.” (WILLOUGHBY, pp. 194-292.)

not occasional or latent, but it is a situation, a social system; it is not an *event*, but a *flow*. It exists wherever there is will with corporal or privative sanctions. This is its essential characteristic, the will, the mere wish, the opinion, the expressed and obeyed desire of one who commands, whether this command be good or bad, wise or foolish, noble or base, right or wrong. Coercion is, therefore, solely in the field of ethics. Here we find the third factor in sovereignty, namely, right.

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[*To be continued.*]

THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS IN SOCIAL REFORM

THERE are some consequences that follow from the attempt to establish the theory of social reform among the inductive sciences that need emphasis. That to which I wish to refer is the implication of the hypothesis.

Socialism, in one form or another, lies back of the thought directing and inspiring reform. While socialistic utopias have been recognized as impotent to lead to better conditions, and opportunists have succeeded to the programists, the assumption that it will be possible to effect by constructive legislation radical changes that will lead to greater social equality is still very widely present. The success of municipal ownership, in means of transportation and various common necessities within cities, has aroused the expectation that this success can be achieved in other industries as fast as they are so organized as to become so-called natural monopolies. I think that a great deal of this confidence is inspired by the socialistic schemes of an essentially *a priori* character, rather than by a study of the conditions which these municipal concerns represent. We fail often to notice that government as an institution has essentially changed its character in so far as it has assumed these new functions. The government has become a business concern, which enters into the business world on a basis that is determined by the latter. It has assumed a certain amount of invested capital, where business risk has ceased, in the interests of its members, and has undertaken to carry on an enterprise that has already been worked out as regards its methods and technique. In a word, the municipality has become a business body operating for the benefit of those that make it up, and is therefore not different in principle from any stock company. The number of enterprises that such a body could undertake as a commercial body are, so far, necessarily small, and we have no reason to assume that in the end anything but business conditions will determine what the municipality may successfully manage. There is no reason why

the German government, as a social individual, should not buy up and manage such a business as the railroad; only so far as the business itself is concerned it must conduct it upon the principles which control the industrial world as a whole. It may introduce such reforms into it as are demanded by the public sentiment that finds expression in legislation, sooner than they will be introduced into other concerns. But it becomes at once in tendency as conservative as other great concerns, and must adapt itself to the demands of the business world of which it is a part. The government has then separate functions. On the one side, it formulates and brings to a focus public sentiment in so-called legislation, and conducts a police activity, national and international, over against classes of society and human impulses which are as yet not so socially organized as are the bulk of its members with their dominant impulses. On the other side, being an institution which is as definitely independent as other corporations within the community, it may undertake a very limited number of industrial and commercial concerns, which business evolution has carried to such a point of perfection that they lie safely within its domain.

While we recognize this possibility, we must, on the other side, recognize with equal distinctness that the functions of government, as an institution, are merging with equal rapidity into the industrial world which it is supposed to control. The whole work of legislation is not only dependent upon public sentiment, at least in democratic countries, but it is finding constantly fuller expression in other channels of publicity. The newspaper, in its various forms of journal and magazine, is effecting changes that are assumed to be those which follow governmental action. If only it becomes possible to focus public sentiment upon an issue in the delicate organism of the modern civilized community, it is as effective as if the mandate came from legislative halls, and frequently more so. This is true, not simply in the public reaction upon the justice of movements like those of great strikes and lockouts, but even in the interpretation of the methods of industrial and commercial activity. What the court does in reinterpreting laws is being done in increasing extent by simply closer

organization of the business world — an organization that depends most immediately upon growing publicity. The study of the criminal and defective classes, as an expression of the conditions of the social body in which they are found, and their treatment from this new standpoint, as well as the movement toward arbitration for the solution of international differences, all point to the passing of functions which are supposed to inhere in the government into activities that belong to the community simply through its organization apart from government as a separate institution. On the other hand, certainly one of the most important so-called governmental functions, that is characteristic of the time, is the committee work, which is but a part of the general process of gaining publicity as regards what is going on in the country and the world. This is often done, not by a legislative commission, but by the university as well as the newspaper. In attempting to forecast what is to be the result of the movement of municipal ownership, we have to consider, therefore, not only the development of the municipal corporation and the industry that it conducts, but also that of a government that is changing fully as rapidly as the industrial and commercial world.

I have adduced this as an illustration of the attitude which social reformers must assume toward their problems. It is impossible to so forecast any future condition that depends upon the evolution of society as to be able to govern our conduct by such a forecast. It is always the unexpected that happens, for we have to recognize, not only the immediate change that is to take place, but also the reaction back upon this of the whole world within which the change takes place, and no human foresight is equal to this. In the social world we must recognize the working hypothesis as the form into which all theories must be cast as completely as in the natural sciences. The highest criterion that we can present is that the hypothesis shall *work* in the complex of forces into which we introduce it. We can never set up a detailed statement of the conditions that are to be ultimately attained. What we have is a method and a control in application, not an ideal to work toward. As has been stated, this is the attitude of the scientist in the laboratory,

whether his work remains purely scientific or is applied immediately to conduct. His foresight does not go beyond the testing of his hypothesis. Given its success, he may restate his world from this standpoint and get the basis for further investigation that again always takes the form of a problem. The solution of this problem is found over again in the possibility of fitting his hypothetical proposition into the whole within which it arises. And he must recognize that this statement is only a working hypothesis at the best, *i.e.*, he knows that further investigation will show that the former statement of his world is only provisionally true, and must be false from the standpoint of a larger knowledge, as every partial truth is necessarily false over against the fuller knowledge which he will gain later. Even the axioms of Euclid are not true now in the sense of Euclid. In a word, our confidence in the results of science and the general application of intelligence to the control of the physical world is based, not upon a knowledge of the whole universe as it is, but upon a faith in its general rational character, that is perhaps best stated in the success of working hypotheses.

In social reform, or the application of intelligence to the control of social conditions, we must make a like assumption, and this assumption takes the form of belief in the essentially social character of human impulse and endeavor. We cannot make persons social by legislative enactment, but we can allow the essentially social nature of their actions to come to expression under conditions which favor this. What the form of this social organization will be depends upon conditions that lie necessarily beyond our ken. We assume that human society is governed by laws that involve its solidarity, and we seek to find these out that they may be used. In the same way the natural scientist assumes that the world is as a whole governed by laws that involve the interaction of all its forces, and that he may find these laws out, and use them for the further organization of his world, so far as he is a part of it.

There is here, however, a distinction that is of considerable importance. In the physical world we regard ourselves as standing in some degree outside the forces at work, and thus

avoid the difficulty of harmonizing the feeling of human initiative with the recognition of series which are necessarily determined. In society we are the forces that are being investigated, and if we advance beyond the mere description of the phenomena of the social world to the attempt at reform, we seem to involve the possibility of changing what at the same time we assume to be necessarily fixed. The question, stated more generally, is: What is the function of reflective consciousness in its attempt to direct conduct? The common answer is that we carry in thought the world as it should be, and fashion our conduct to bring this about. As we have already seen, if this implies a "vision given in the mount" which represents in detail what is to be, we are utterly incapable of conceiving it. And every attempt to direct conduct by a fixed idea of the world of the future must be, not only a failure, but also pernicious. A conception of a different world comes to us always as the result of some specific problem which involves readjustment of the world as it is, not to meet a detailed ideal of a perfect universe, but to obviate the present difficulty; and the test of the effort lies in the possibility of this readjustment fitting into the world as it is. Reflective consciousness does not then carry us on to the world that is to be, but puts our own thought and endeavor into the very process of evolution, and evolution within consciousness that has become reflective has the advantage over other evolution in that the form does not tend to perpetuate himself as he is, but identifies himself with the process of development. Our reflective consciousness as applied to conduct is, therefore, an identification of our effort with the problem that presents itself, and the developmental process by which it is overcome, and reaches its highest expression in the scientific statement of the problem, and the recognition and use of scientific method and control.

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THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION.

THE "able editor" is the real king in our day and generation. Carlyle made this observation in his poetic and picturesque history of the French Revolution, and if it was true then, how much more profoundly and vitally true it is today! Sociologists have not failed to recognize the tremendous influence and importance of the newspaper as an *organ* of public opinion, and some of them have gone farther and adverted to the press as the director and molder of such opinion. In spite of certain superficial inductions, the power of the press has never been so great, so decisive, so irresistible as it is now. Hide-bound and bigoted partisan newspapers have doubtless suffered considerably during the past decade, owing to the growth of political independence and the decadence of old-fashioned partisanship, which was based on tradition and habit, rather than on personal conviction and critical thought. But even the intolerant and dogmatic party organ is by no means moribund, while the press as a whole has certainly rather gained than lost authority and influence. The newspapers make and mar political fortunes. They "create" great men out of next to nothing and destroy the reputations of men truly fit for leadership. They decide questions of war and peace. They carry elections. They overawe and coerce politicians, rulers, and courts. When they are virtually unanimous nothing can withstand them.

So relatively new and so formidable a sociological factor deserves to be carefully studied. Many problems, ethical, political, and social, are presented by the newspaper phenomenon, and a few of them are to be touched upon in this paper. It is necessary to begin with some familiar and obvious propositions.

The primary and essential function of a newspaper is, of course, the publication of a tolerably complete record of the world's activities, sensations, and happenings. If it is useful to know "how the other half lives," it is evidently of far higher utility to know how humanity outside of one's own country lives

and behaves. Knowledge is a liberalizing and civilizing agency. Prejudice, international hatreds and dislikes, are chiefly the result of ignorance, provincialism, and narrowness. What travel and actual intercourse do for the few, newspapers do for the many. To be interested in the politics, economics, and miscellaneous affairs of other peoples, to follow their struggles and study their intellectual and moral traits as manifested in daily conduct, is to become gradually and unconsciously cosmopolitan, broad, human. If one touch of nature makes the world kin, what must be the effect of the daily interchange of sentiments made possible by the press, the sharing by the nations in one another's joys and sorrows! Thanks to the press, the civilized world has become "small" and organic. Nations feel themselves under a moral coercion, and a "decent regard for the opinion of mankind" prevents much wrong and injustice, and induces anxious reflection and deliberation, even in apparently irresponsible rulers. The light that beats upon thrones, cabinets, parliaments, and other institutions is fierce, indeed, in these days of publicity. The Dreyfus trial, without a parallel in history so far as the keen concern of civilization in the proceedings and outcome was concerned, was a striking illustration of the effect of the modern newspaper with its marvelous facilities for gathering and speedily spreading the news.

From the standpoint of "news"—that is, publicity and knowledge of what is going on—the sociologist would be justified in hailing the modern press as a wonderful moral factor, were it not for that curse and pestilential nuisance, the "yellow" variety of newspapers. It would be a serious error to suppose that there is a wide gulf, or at least a bold, black line, between the sensational and irresponsible paper and the careful and trustworthy one. The honest, fair, and truthful papers in the United States, for example, could easily be counted on the fingers of one man's hands. The question of "yellowness" is one of degree. Some papers are utterly reckless of principle, honor, and reason; others confine their yellow tendencies to particular spheres and subjects. Some lie constantly; others lie only at election time. Some manufacture news; others distort and misrepresent, and are

content with preventing their readers from seeing things exactly as they are. Some lie for revenue, others for party advantage and the success of the cause in which they believe. The paper that desires and secures accurate reports, that sets down nothing in malice, that suppresses nothing which is unfavorable to *its* side, and honestly publishes everything which is creditable to the *other* side, is notoriously the rare exception. Yet the business of a newspaper is to tell the news—fairly, impartially, intelligently, and accurately—not to “make” news, nor to color and falsify it.

It is evident that when mendacity, sensationalism, and recklessness reach a certain degree, the advantages of publicity and the dissemination of facts and information are overbalanced by the mischiefs and demoralizing effects produced. When we speak of the broadening and liberalizing influences of the press, we imply that truth is its watchword and inspiration. A venomous and hate-inspired press breeds internecine and international animosities, friction, fanatical hostility, and even war. In France a powerful section of the press is so vile, brutal, shameless, and inhuman that Mr. Bodley, in his admirable study of that country, congratulates Frenchmen upon the fact that multitudes of peasants and laborers never read the newspapers. Mr. Bodley is right, and we know what a blessing it would be if certain American newspapers, having hundreds of thousands of readers, found themselves deprived of their constituents. It would be rash to say of any country that it would be better off morally and intellectually without newspapers, but one can certainly conceive such a situation.

The evil is greatly aggravated by the established and fixed habit of commenting upon the news. The average paper has an editorial policy and this policy, indirectly applied and manifested in “editing” the news, is directly expressed in the interpretation and criticism of the recorded facts and incidents. To what extent the editorial habit has grown is a matter of general knowledge. The editorial “we” covers sins, absurdities, and follies without number. Nothing is more ludicrous and preposterous than the omniscience and dogmatism of the editor of a familiar type.

Does the editor or his subordinate staff ever hesitate to attack, judge, and correct anybody? Is there a question in science, religion, ethics, economies, politics, that the editor cannot discuss at an hour's notice? Authority is something totally unknown to the newspaper. The editorial "we" is above all. The editor is glad to have the support of authority, but he is not daunted or disturbed at finding recognized authority against his position. The mature opinions of scholars and experts he treats with a flippancy and contempt which the slightest degree of responsibility would render impossible. But the editor is irresponsible. The judicious and competent few may laugh at his ignorance and presumption, but the cheap applause of the many who mistake smartness for wit and loud assertion for knowledge affords abundant compensation. Controversy with an editor is a blunder. He always has the last word, and his space is unlimited. He is an adept at dust-throwing, question-begging, and confusing the issue. In private life he may be intellectually and morally insignificant, but his readers are imposed upon by the air of infallibility with which he treats all things, and the assurance with which he assails those who have the audacity to disagree with him. The average newspaper reader easily yields to iteration and bombast. He believes that which is said daily in print by the august and mysterious power behind the editorial "we." His sentiments and notions are formed for him by that power, and he is not even conscious of the fact.

If editors were well-informed, competent, and conscientious, what a magnificent opportunity theirs would be! What are all the schools and educational systems of the world beside the daily newspaper—the recorder and critic of every important act and utterance of civilized humanity? The newspaper overshadows every other educational agency. The lecture-room, the pulpit, the public meeting, the pamphlet, the book, what is their influence as compared with that of the daily press? If the editors always knew what righteousness and justice demanded, and were always ready to act upon this knowledge, our rate of progress toward a reign of equity and reason would be amazing. But when we remember that editorial comments and arguments are

so generally and so often either ignorant or dishonest, we shudder at the amount of harm and wrong, cruelty and wickedness, we owe to this teaching.

It has been suggested—by Lord Rosebery, the ex-premier of Great Britain, among others—that daily papers would be greatly improved by the abolition of the editorial page. Why should not interpretation, criticism, and comment be left to the weeklies and monthlies, whose editors and contributors have the leisure and opportunity to inform themselves upon the topics they are called upon to discuss? Superficial and hasty comment, even when well-intended, is worthless, and this would seem to point to a division of labor between the daily and the weekly press. Why not reserve comment for the latter, while giving to the former a monopoly of the news?

The suggestion is hardly a practical one. In the first place, the editors of the daily papers will never surrender so substantial a part of their power and sovereignty. Their interest is not identical with that of society at large. Their liability to error does not occasion them much anxiety. In the second place, they do not admit that weekly papers, as a rule, exhibit greater firmness and wisdom in their handling of grave, difficult, or complex questions. In the third place, the public is impatient and wants the comment served with the news—fresh, hot, and piquant. The average man is not a stickler for precision and impartiality, and in these days of rapid and intense activity he will not wait several days, and often a week, for comment upon news in which he is interested.

The notion of divorcing news from comment is unsound for another reason, already implied. It is an error to suppose that the elimination of the editorial page would remove temptation and conduce to greater responsibility and fairness. The editor who tries to make the worse appear the better reason in his interpretations, who deliberately misleads his readers, will not be disarmed by the disappearance of comment. He will achieve his object in another and easy way—by “editing” the news, by suppression, exaggeration, emphasis, depreciation, and the thousand and one tricks known to the trade. We know how

partisan papers report the speeches of political opponents, and what ideas readers are permitted to obtain regarding movements and affairs which the editor antagonizes for one reason or another. It is well to recognize, then, that the editorial page is a fixture, and the problem is how to convert it into a salutary and socially beneficial factor.

There has been some talk of the need or desirability of a "Christian daily" newspaper. That is futile. The real need is a moral, high-minded, clean, and honest newspaper press—a press that will not prostitute truth to selfish interest. There are newspapers which approximate this ideal, but they are few and far between. How is their number to be increased?

The objection to party organs or representatives of particular schools is superficial. Parties and schools of thought are inevitable, and there is no valid reason why they should not have their organs. Honest partisanship is one thing; unprincipled and bigoted and narrow-minded partisanship is quite a different thing. The independence that means absence of conviction is neither morally nor intellectually respectable. The independence which society has a right to ask is that independence which places truth above partisanship and does not hesitate to censure friends or to recognize merit in adversaries. "My party right or wrong," "My school right or wrong," are vicious watchwords. Parties are means to certain practical ends; schools are means to theoretical ends. Each of us is entitled to present the faith that is in him, and if he establishes an organ for the purpose of promulgating and defending his beliefs, he not only acts rightly, but really renders a service to humanity. Out of conflict and controversy, provided fair play is observed, the truth emerges. In free and earnest discussion theories are tested, and the foundations of accepted beliefs subjected to a rigorous examination. The fittest survive, and the result benefits all.

Were all newspapers merely organs of various parties and organizations, nothing more would be required of them than the avoidance of dishonorable methods of warfare. But newspapers are also enterprises of a commercial character. The primary object of the proprietor (and therefore of the editor) is to

make the largest possible profits. It is safe to say that nearly all the evils connected with the press flow not so much from their partisan nature as from their commercial aspect. The average newspaper is not started in order that particular principles may be properly and systematically advocated, but in order that profits may be made *by* advocating particular principles. The proprietor who goes into the business of newspaper publishing to make money must do what all men of business do—please the public and give it what it demands. Since there are many publics, there are consequently many species of newspapers. The existence and prosperity of sensational and reckless newspapers indicate the existence of an audience or constituency which revels in sensations and likes vulgar and nasty stuff. Between such newspapers and their constituencies there is a constant process of action and reaction. The newspaper degrades and corrupts taste far from refined at the outset, while this continuous descent necessitates the continuous lowering of the standard. There is a downward education as well as an upward education. Habituate readers to scandal, filth, and vulgarity, and clean journalism will seem insipid and flat to them. Indulge in vituperation, violence, and slander, and moderation and sobriety will be construed as weakness and lack of virility.

Now, it would be idle and thoughtless to ask publishers to apply philanthropic principles to newspapers. Business enterprises they must remain, and financial success must be the main consideration. But does financial success justify everything? Even in ordinary business this will not be seriously contended for. In every business there are things which honest people will not allow themselves, limits which they will not overstep. Revenue may be temporarily swelled by fraud, adulteration, and humbug, but the reputable merchant or manufacturer will consider no source of profit that is not legitimate. Similarly the reputable publisher of a newspaper, if he have principles and a high conception of the function of journalism, will sacrifice certain *increments* of revenue to the requirements of morality and truth. In other words, a certain standard must be adopted first, and circulation must depend on the size of the constituency that

is ready to follow that standard. Artists, dramatists, musicians adhere to a standard and would scorn a proposal involving the prostitution of their artistic ideals. The social influence of art—Count Tolstoi to the contrary notwithstanding—is infinitesimal as compared with that of the daily press. The greater the power and opportunity, the more solemn and grave the responsibility.

Legislation can do nothing to improve the quality of the daily press. Even the libel laws are seldom invoked and afford little protection from the deliberate assaults of malicious pens. More comprehensive laws it would puzzle the most astute jurist to frame. Just as it is impossible to draw a legal line between "shilling shockers" and yellow-covered semi-criminal fiction, on the one hand, and tales of adventure and bold exploits or of clever detective work, so is it impossible to point out where realism of the proper kind ends and indecency begins, or where legitimate controversy closes and blackguardism and truculence usurp its place. The utter failure of the California "signature" law is a pertinent illustration. This statute was passed in pursuance of a mistaken notion as to the irresponsibility of the press. It requires every statement of fact and every expression of opinion which reflects on the character or standing of any person to be signed with the name of the writer. The theory is, of course, that editorial writers and reporters and correspondents will be more careful and guarded if their names have to be appended to their several contributions. In truth, this requirement does not enhance the responsibility of the newspaper in the slightest degree. The law of every state holds the proprietor responsible for every line which appears in his paper. The proprietor is a more conspicuous person in his community than any one of his employés. The risks, legal and moral, which he is willing to incur his subordinates will hardly shrink from. The California press has undergone no change in consequence of the new statute, which is either ignored or rendered a mockery and absurdity by the farcical way in which it is observed.

The signature system, if rigidly enforced, would have one important effect: it would destroy much of the prestige of the

press and of the awful authority and mystery of the "we." Indeed, the "we" would have to be abandoned for the down-right and somewhat egoistical "I." Obscure writers and "penny-a-liners," whose qualifications for sitting in judgment upon leaders of thought and action are not obvious, would adopt a lower key and cultivate the virtue of modesty; but this effect would be temporary. In France, where signed journalism is the rule, criticism of great men by small is not less common than in the countries where anonymous journalism prevails, and the license and irresponsibility of the popular newspapers are even more extreme than in the United States; and is their demoralizing and brutalizing influence smaller? By no means.

In fine, there is no device which would enable us to lessen the tremendous power of the daily newspapers. The great majority of people depend on them for most of their information—the raw material of opinion—and for nearly all of their ideas. Iteration, assertion, emphasis, and variation are the sources of the power exercised, and of these it is impossible to get rid. They are of the essence of journalism. Honest and high-minded newspapers cannot have too much authority; for we know that when a good cause enlists the hearty support of the press, it is certain to triumph, and no one would cripple that species of journalism. The other species, unprincipled and purely commercial, will continue to inflict incalculable injury till the people learn to avoid it as they do a leper and mad brute. And here an important point must be accentuated. The sensational and semi-criminal newspapers will not be boycotted by the average man unless the moral and clean newspapers equal them in respect of completeness, comprehensiveness, liveliness, and alertness. There is much about the enterprise, audacity, and breeziness of the sensational press that makes it stimulating and attractive. The honorable press must not yield precedence in these particulars. As the London *Spectator* recently argued, journalism must be a mirror of life—of life as it is, in all its aspects. It must hold the mirror up to human nature and human activity. It should not attempt to expurgate the record as fiction is expurgated for the benefit of the young. But, on

the other hand, it need not, and ought not, to distort life and represent it worse than it is. The beautiful, healthy, heroic, noble, and good should be given a prominence commensurate with that in which we find them in real life.

It is right and socially advantageous that the members of every liberal profession should magnify their office in society. Ideals cannot be too high, provided the effort is to approach and realize them. The legal and medical and teaching professions dwell with legitimate pride upon the social utility and value of their respective services to humanity. But it will be universally conceded that the most exalted, fascinating, engrossing, and responsible profession is that of journalism when practiced in accordance with the right principles. When it is degraded into a trade, the effects are morally disastrous, and this degradation all men of light of leading, all ethical teachers, all respected and distinguished guides of the public should strive to resist. There ought to be more coöperation between these elements and the press. The worthy editors should receive more encouragement and appreciation, and the unworthy should be made to feel the scorn and indignation of the influential citizens. Editors ought to be watched and held to a strict accountability. They ought to hear from their constituency whenever they are guilty of a lapse, injustice, or blunder. "Flops," self-stultifications, and violations of fairness and decency would be far less frequent if editors knew that hundreds of denunciatory letters would pour into their offices. The fear of exposure, ridicule, and anger on the part of scores of intelligent readers would act as a deterrent. When self-contradiction, sophistry, lying, and misrepresentation are safe, because unchallenged, the editors who lack logic or conviction, or both, resort to those weapons without hesitation. They would seriously consider contemplated sins of commission or omission if a vigilant and sharp-sighted constituency were certain promptly to call them to task. Public bodies should not hesitate to adopt resolutions of censure when a newspaper has been guilty of a flagrant wrong. Even the humblest reader should be quick to resent in a "letter to the editor" any meanness or offense which outrages his moral

sense. The editor may seem "august" behind his "we," but he is human, and he is amenable to appeal and influence. He likes approbation and dislikes rebuke and criticism. He can be taught care and moderation. No single person, no matter how highly placed, is a match for the omnipotent editor, but in solidarity there is strength, and he who rightfully takes up the cudgels against an editor should be vigorously supported by all who sympathize with his protest.

Sociologists who are profoundly concerned in the formation and guidance of public opinion may evolve other means of controlling that engine and force, the daily press, in the interest of righteousness and moral progress, but the great question has been neglected so far. Yet what public man, what intelligent observer, what active citizen has not had occasion to bless—and to curse—the press for its part in modern life?

V. S. YARROS.

CHICAGO.

ALCOHOLIC HYPNOTISM.

OF all diseases which have the most numerous incidental and indirect evil effects, none perhaps is more conspicuous than alcoholism. It weakens the normal resistance of the body to most diseases. We used to hear a well-known Paris surgeon say to the students: "Gentlemen, this man has been a drinker, which complicates his chances of recovery."

But alcoholism is a still greater evil on its sociological side. The police-court platitude, "Ten dollars or thirty days," is most often pronounced upon the poor. If the unfortunate wife struggles to furnish the ten dollars, it signifies taking from herself and children their very life blood. If her husband is imprisoned, she loses his support for thirty days; this means less food and raiment, where already there may be criminal deprivation; in either dilemma the innocent mother and children almost forfeit the rights of existence.

But alcoholism also develops criminal tendencies in certain individuals, which they seem to be unconscious of. We refer to criminal acts committed in a condition of alcoholic hypnotism or somnambulism.

Somnambulism may be one of the deeper stages of hypnotism; it may be regarded as auto-hypnotism, where the subject is acting out his dreams.

Somnambulism may be defined as the condition of an individual who seems to act in a normal manner, who performs acts relatively complex, but has no knowledge of what he does, or at least does not preserve any memory of it. As everyone knows, this state is met with either under color of an accident in some sort of idiopathic condition, as natural somnambulism, or one is under the influence of hypnotism or hypnotic somnambulism.

Alcoholic somnambulism is important from the legal point of view. That alcohol, in certain quantities, can produce at least a fleeting oblivion, an eclipse of memory, is a fact demonstrated by daily experience. Everyone has heard it said, if he has not

proved it himself, that when intoxicated a man goes home, opens the door, and goes to bed—all this without the least consciousness or slightest remembrance of it. This same forgetfulness is shown in alcoholic delirium. The phenomena of *amnesia* are much more common than it is thought. Vetault gives a number of facts to show that this is the rule under the influence of profound alcoholic intoxication. When there is violent delirium or an approach to noisy alcoholic frenzy, when homicidal impulses of irresistible brutality have sway, there is, upon awaking, no remembrance of the acts. The forgetfulness is as complete as that which follows the paroxysm of epileptic fury, with which the paroxysm of alcoholic fury has numerous points of resemblance.

Francotte says he has examined several accused persons who, having acted under the influence of alcoholic delirium, affirmed that they had retained no memory of the incriminating act. Their recital, and the circumstances surrounding the deed, tended to demonstrate their sincerity.

In the case in point, the phenomena of drunkenness and the symptoms of alcoholic delirium are a proof, or at least an exterior manifestation, of psychic trouble which has given place to forgetfulness.

We give a number of cases¹ illustrative of alcoholic somnambulism. The first is a case of amnesia, whose genuineness cannot be suspected. P., twenty-eight years of age, was brought to an asylum on Wednesday in the afternoon. The police found him on Tuesday, in the morning, at a public place in the city. He had amused himself some time by playing on the doorsills of one of the houses with his watch, with pieces of money, and other small objects. In spite of all efforts to induce him to speak he did not reply to a question. He seemed to have lost completely the use of speech and hearing. He had the appearance of an idiot.

The physician called declared that the subject appeared not to hear what was said to him. It was impossible to draw from him a word; general sensibility seemed abolished.

¹ Reported by Francotte, Bulard, and Bouchet.

Neither the police nor the physician thought the affair a case of intoxication. There was nothing characteristic in his manner of walking. He was sent to the asylum. On his entrance the brother guardian did not suspect him of alcoholism. The patient could not speak or see. They thought he was blind because his pupils did not stir when a handkerchief was waved before his eyes; his look was fixed; his expression lifeless. They offered him something to eat. At first he refused without speaking or otherwise expressing anything. When they prevailed upon him to drink a cup of coffee and eat a little bread, he seemed to awake from a dream, demanding where he was.

On Thursday he was perfectly himself. He said that on Monday, having already drunk a good deal of alcohol, in the evening he entered a café in a street. There he found a friend, with whom he took several drinks. He left the café, not knowing how, and from that moment memory failed him.

Consciousness only returned Wednesday afternoon. He remembered what had happened since then and previous to that time.

It was in vain that they sought to awaken any remembrance. Memory preserved not the least vestige of any event occurring between Monday evening and Wednesday afternoon. The subject declared that for a long time he had been given to alcoholic excesses. At the beginning, especially, he had had frequent attacks of the "drink fever." He had been very drunk two hundred times, he said; but nothing like this had ever happened to him. He persisted in the belief that his companion had put something foreign into his drink. It had never made him seriously ill, nor caused any trouble. His complexion was anæmic. There was a slight trembling of the tongue and hands. He showed different signs of degeneracy: ill-formed skull, unsymmetrical ears, etc.

There was no notable point of anomaly in his mental state. One of his sisters had been in the asylum, where she died. She was insane and had nervous attacks.

Here was a state of unconsciousness, of amnesia, brought on by alcohol and lasting nearly forty-eight hours.

Certainly this case had nothing to do with somnambulism. The appearance of the subject was far from being normal. He was in a kind of stupor. But, on the other hand, he did not present the appearance of a drunken man, and he had preserved a certain motor activity.

We give below a number of examples of alcoholic somnambulism.

A certain man was accused of cheating, committed under the following circumstances: Several times, and in different localities, he entered an inn or café, ate and drank, and then went away without paying his bill, or he refused to acknowledge his account when it was presented to him. His father was a drunkard. At the age of fifteen years the son began to drink and indulge in many excesses. From the beginning, after these errors, the patient had, he himself said, troubled thoughts. He was conscious of this, but, not being incoherent in writing or speaking, no one perceived it.

Later he showed such marked mental trouble that they thought of sending him to an asylum. It was utterly impossible for him to recall what he had done for fifteen days. He remembered only that at this period of his existence he dreamed of riches, of treasures which he would discover. After still greater excesses, he told of them himself; he was tormented, disturbed, preoccupied. He imagined people followed him.

At last, one lovely day—he could not recall whether it was evening or morning—he set out for a city where he was to spend the night; then, always possessed by the thought of people following him, he took at the dock-yard a ticket for the first station on the road.

He did not stay there, but went to the country of his father, where he gave himself up to excess in drink. He could not tell how long he remained there. He stayed with a paternal aunt, who drank also. It was, so to speak, a hereditary habit in his father's family. He could not recall how he left his aunt; and from that moment memory completely failed. He could not recall what had happened, and no matter how he was pushed or

questioned, having returned to his senses, he did not vary in his statements.

As to other places where they accused him of having been and left without paying what he owed, he invariably affirmed that he had no remembrance of any such thing. "I do not deny it," said he, "since the justice says so; but I do not recollect it at all."

It was impossible for him to recall how he got to a place. He found himself in prison, and from that moment his memory was a little better.

His previous life he related quite well. Persons who had seen him during the period when the incriminating acts had taken place had noticed no sign of mental trouble. During his sojourn at the asylum there was evidence of special hallucinations of a terrifying nature, and ideas of grandeur and wealth.

According to Lentz, epileptics, after violent fits, talk in a coherent way, conducting themselves with every appearance of reason, and yet there exists at the time absolutely no inward consciousness. Their conduct is only a succession of actions entirely automatic, in which consciousness has no part, but which, as in somnambulism, still preserves some connections and seems at first the result of determinate intellectual combinations.

As an example we give H., a case of Lentz, aged twenty-three years.

The father of H. almost constantly drank; his mother was irritable and violent.

With a companion he spent the whole night going from saloon to saloon. The next day they went to the country. They met a woman seated on the roadside. He drew a knife which he had been using to clean his pipe: "Woman," he cried, "I'll kill you; save yourself, woman, or I will kill you!" The woman was saved; but at the same moment three workmen appeared at the turn of the way. Henry threw himself on them and struck them successively with the greatest rapidity. After this murder Henry was calm. He walked on, and turning to his companion said to him: "Are you going?" But upon cries

of "Murder!" and "Assassin!" he threw away his knife, ran from his pursuers, fell an instant before an obstacle, rose, entered the town, went to his home, and there in the greatest confusion undressed and went to bed.

Being awakened from a deep sleep he replied with strong protestations and violent despair.

Henry was not arrested until the next day. He manifested the greatest astonishment and complete forgetfulness of all that had transpired since he left the last alehouse.

He was condemned to ten years of solitary confinement.

In all these observations we notice the presence of somnambulistic elements: unconsciousness, amnesia—activity relatively complex joined to a normal appearance. If we closely examine the observations, we find the indication of certain anomalies of conduct and character having existed during the somnambulistic state. Doubtless the subject would reveal disorders more marked still if he could be examined closely by a competent person. Simple somnambulism itself resembles very imperfectly an individual awake and of sound mind; what characterizes it especially is immobility of countenance, fixed look, haggard and dim eyes. Similar peculiarities are found among hypnotized somnambulists and probably in all forms of somnambulism. Those who have had occasion to observe subjects in a state of hypnotic somnambulism must have been struck by the transformation which the countenance undergoes, the general surprise, at the moment of passing from the hypnotic state to a waking condition.

It is not less true that the appearance of the somnambulist is that of a man awake and conscious. But in legal medicine, the expert not being present at the moment of the crime, we must be satisfied with the deposition of witnesses usually not at all familiar with such delicate observations. It is necessary to be certain; for these normal appearances by no means exclude unconsciousness, forgetfulness, and consequent irresponsibility. A man who acts reasonably does not necessarily act rationally or consciously: he may be in a state of somnambulism.

It is not true that the effect of intoxication may always be one and the same; that the man who stands straight, walks, and performs certain acts with the appearance of reason cannot be essentially troubled in his consciousness and free will, and should be regarded as responsible for all his actions.

Forgetfulness does not necessarily imply absolute unconsciousness. Observation of facts concerning sleep demonstrate the contrary. We are conscious of having dreamed and vaguely conscious of the subject of the dream. If we fix our attention and immediately recall these memories, we can often put together the fragments of the dream. On the contrary, if upon awaking we follow our occupations, the light traces left in the memory by the subconscious activity of sleep are effaced by the conscious acts of waking. In making judgments of such cases one must take account of previous attacks of somnambulism. All incriminating circumstances should be carefully established. In questioning the witnesses the slightest signs of mental perturbation, such as expression of countenance, look, and attitude, should be noted.

HYPNOTISM AS A REMEDY FOR ALCOHOLISM.

A great many cases of alcoholism cannot be cured by any method whatsoever. The claim of certain charlatans that they succeed in curing 90 to 95 per cent. of cases of this malady shows great dishonesty on their part as well as ignorance and credulity on the part of the public. Experience with many vaunted remedies has shown that, when they effect a genuine cure and not merely a temporary improvement, the result is due to suggestion, which is largely, though indirectly, fused in all these methods of treatment. In the cases cited in Lloyd-Tuckey hypnotism was almost exclusively used. Among the chief causes of alcoholism are:

Bad health, principally when it is accompanied by insomnia and neurasthenia.

Overwork, when the patient resorts to alcohol to stimulate his failing energies.

Anxieties and cares, which he seeks to forget temporarily;

influence of environment, and bad example, and hereditary predisposition.

The cause of the difficulty must first be discovered. Attention to the general health, freedom from care, change of associates are sometimes sufficient in themselves to effect a cure. In cases where something else is necessary, hypnotic suggestion may be a moral and mental tonic.

In cases of hereditary dipsomania hypnotism is perhaps the only remedy which has any chance of success.

Of nineteen dipsomaniacs treated by methods other than hypnotic, not one was permanently cured. Of sixty-five cases in which hypnotism was used, twelve were completely cured, thirty-nine temporarily cured, or greatly benefited, and in ten cases no result whatever was obtained.

LAWS AGAINST HYPNOTISM.

The governments of several countries have placed obstacles in the way of the use of hypnotism as a curative agent. In France the practice of hypnotism and all that pertains to it is forbidden to all military physicians. In Russia it is allowed to all physicians without exceptions, on condition that two physicians assist at all the experiments. The operating physician, furthermore, must make immediate report to the medical bureau of the methods he has used, the results he has obtained, or the results he has attempted to obtain, and the names of the assisting physicians. Such restrictions are equivalent to prohibition.

Packiewicz says he is convinced that hypnotism is the most innocent therapeutical agent, and is not in the slightest degree dangerous. Twelve years of experience in hypnotism, during which time he has had more than twenty thousand sittings, have brought him to this way of thinking. The fact that the contrary opinion is current is due, he thinks, to physicians who are incompetent to practice hypnotism properly, and in bad faith preach against it. In nervous and mental diseases hypnotism is a very powerful curative agent, and no specialist ought to neglect to use it. Many competent neurologists agree with him that hypnotism in the hands of physicians is harmless. They are

Bérillon, Bernheim, Danilewski, Delbœuf, Dumontpallier, Eulenburg, Forel, Janet, de Jong, von Kraft-Ebing, Liébeault, Moebius, Moll, Morselli, Obersteiner, von Schrenk-Notzing, Tokarski, Lloyd-Tuckey, Wetterstrand, Vogt, Voisin; all these physicians use hypnotism in their practice, and have not met with any serious accidents.

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SEMINAR NOTES.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RIEMANN SURFACE.¹

WE are groping for a more perfect conception of the organic unity of the life of society. Such phrases as "the social organism" have for some time been frequent upon our lips, yet they do not carry, to the uninitiated at least, the whole significance of the light of a truth which is only beginning to dawn upon us. Attempted generalizations, where they have dealt with actual, known conditions, have been only partially successful. The vastness of the field for investigation, the complexity of the material to be dealt with, have rendered it extremely difficult to present results at once comprehensive and profound.

These facts have been realized by certain present-day philosophers whose first care it has been to elaborate and perfect a method which should be a tool worthy of the work. They have tried and tested it in many ways, and by means of it are laying the foundations of a philosophy which they believe shall be a vantage-ground to a better understanding of the nature of the structure of our social life. With the fruits of their labors our interest is here concerned. The purpose of the present endeavor is to lead to a realization of the significance of the new philosophy in one or two of its aspects. We do not ask how it has been derived, but what, in point of fact and formulæ, it is, as applied to all and every phase of life.

Instead of singling out a particular phenomenon, to trace its winding way through the tangle for a little distance, without being able to tell why it takes now this turn and now that, or to say anything about the myriads of other threads which cross and recross it—all that men have been able to do up to date—the sociologist today

¹When the figure, JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, November, 1898, p. 382, was explained to the class of which the writer of this paper was a member, Miss Hewes suggested that the thought could be more fully indicated by the symbolism of the Riemann doctrine. She was requested to elaborate the suggestion, and the paper may accordingly be read as an appendix to the chapter above cited. As its two closing paragraphs clearly indicate, it is not an attempt to give final formulation to social combinations. It tries to make the fact of the *complexity* in all social reactions more evident, and to give an approximate notion of the degree of that complexity. Miss Hewes' contribution to the subject is certainly commendable. A. W. S.

aims, from his point of view, *to think the whole human race* as a complex unity. He is striving to make more clear his perception of an entity, infinitely complex, in which he sees manifest certain causal relations, upon the further investigation of which he seeks, and believes it possible to discover, the underlying principles which operate over the whole plane of associated activity.

The forces that produce motion in social groups are the sum of the wants and desires of human beings. Let us accept the classification of them into (*a*) health, (*b*) wealth, (*c*) sociability, (*d*) knowledge, (*e*) beauty, (*f*) righteousness,¹ and signify them by the letters *a, b, c, d, e, f*. Now, these operate in varying proportion in every individual, and take different forms in different groups in various parts of the world during successive ages. But gradually, everywhere and always, the ways of gratifying them become customary and grow into corresponding social institutions. Thus, for example, it will readily be seen how from desires for wealth have grown up what were at first only conventional ways of gratification and have since become our various economic institutions, which are now obligatory ways of satisfying the wealth desire. (Of course—especially true in the example just cited—the direction is always primarily determined by the physical environment, but, considering the latter constant for the time given, we confine our attention rather to the psychic elements.) These institutions, then, must also be submitted to classification. We accept as the most comprehensive and inclusive grouping yet made De Greef's schedule of social phenomena.² They fall into seven principal groups: (*G*) economic, (*H*) genetic, (*I*) artistic, (*J*) scientific, (*K*) moral, (*L*) judicial, (*M*) political, to be designated respectively by the letters *G, H, I, J, K, L, M*.

"We have now for our problem [quoting Small] the discovery of the general laws of interrelation between the individual elements in society, represented in terms of desire by the product *abcdef*, and the institutional element, represented by *GHIJKLM* This discovery must be made by investigation of such reactions, both in selected eras, prehistoric, ancient, modern, or contemporary, and in successive civilizations, that is, it must be both static and dynamic. . . . This knowledge of the relation of individuals to institutions is a scientific desideratum;" and is to be attained only by scientific methods of investigation.

¹ See SMALL AND VINCENT, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 175.

² See DE GREEF, *Introduction à la sociologie*, Vol. I, p. 214.

Observe what is affirmed in this hypothesis. Its significance lies in the question: Does there in actual fact exist between institutions and the constituent desires of which they are the product the relation of function to variable? And what, indeed, is the nature of that relation? Recall the definition of function given by Osborne. He says: "When the value of one variable quantity so depends upon that of another that any change in the latter produces a corresponding change in the former, the former is said to be a *function* of the latter." Thus

$$x^2, \log(x^2 + 1), \sqrt{x(x+1)}, \text{ etc.,}$$

are functions of x . "A function of two or more variables is the relation existing between them such that any change in the one produces a corresponding change in the other." Thus

$$xy + yz + zx, \sqrt{\frac{x+y}{z}},$$

are functions of x, y , and z . These illustrations symbolize the functional relation of social institutions and the human desires, which is no less intimate and fundamental than are the values of x, y , and z to the value of the expression.¹

It may be that the human desires named do not embrace all the factors. (In point of fact, they do not.) There may enter in certain constants from the material environment which determine in part the form of the function and the paths of the variables (a, b, c, d, e, f) which we are trying to trace in order that we may have the means furnished us of ascertaining in any given case which of the n different values is properly assignable to any special function considered at a special point. For we find that the quantities with which we have to deal are *complex*, and our functions are *multiform*. Our analogy, then, to be understood, requires that we have in mind the method of representation of the imaginary quantities, and for convenience we may quote a paragraph from Durège:²

"A complex variable quantity, $z = x + iy$, depends upon two real variables, x and y , which are entirely independent of each other. Hence, for the geometrical representation of a complex quantity, a

¹ In order to meet objections which might be raised to the use of symbolism suggested in this interpretation, it might be well to call attention to the principle which underlies it and makes its use perfectly legitimate, namely, that the operations performed affect only the properties belonging to the symbol and not what the symbol indicates.

² See *Theory of Functions*, pp. 13-15.

range of one dimension, a straight line, will no longer suffice, but a region of two dimensions, a plane, will be required for that purpose. The manner of variation of a complex quantity can then be represented by assuming that a point p of the plane is determined by a complex value, $z = x + iy$, in such a way that its rectangular coördinates, in reference to two coördinate axes, assumed to be fixed in the plane, have the values of the real quantities x and y . In the first place, this method of representation includes that of real variables, for when once z becomes real, and therefore $y = 0$, the representing point p lies on the axis of x . Next, the coördinates of the point p can vary independently of each other, just as the variables x and y do, so that the point p can change its position in the plane in all directions. Further, one of the two quantities, x and y , can remain constant, while only the other changes its value, in which case the point p will describe a line parallel to the x - or y -axis. Finally and conversely, for every point in the plane the corresponding value of z is fully determined, since by the position of the point p its two rectangular coördinates are given, and therefore also the values of x and y .

"Instead of determining the position of the point p , representing the quantity z by rectangular coördinates x and y , we can accomplish the same by means of polar coördinates, for, by putting

$$r = \cos \phi, \text{ and } y = r \sin \phi,$$

we obtain

$$z = r (\cos \phi + i \sin \phi).$$

. . . . Hence we can also say that a complex quantity $r (\cos \phi + i \sin \phi)$ represents a straight line, of which the length is equal to r , and which forms an angle ϕ with the principal axis. . . . From the property of complex quantities, that a combination of two or more of them by means of mathematical operations always leads again to a complex quantity, it follows that, if given complex quantities be represented by points, the result of their combination is capable of being represented by a point."

It is necessary to keep well in mind throughout the discussion the correspondence we have established, the values of our functions, the institutions (G, H, I, J, K, L, M) being expressed in terms of the variable desires (a, b, c, d, e, f). We shall speak as is usual of the variable z , which may stand for any one of our variables or a combination of them forming the complex variable $z = x + iy$. Nor is the method purely artificial, since we are not comparing analogous things, but demonstrating relationships.

A complex variable may describe very different paths in passing from an initial point z_0 to another point z_1 . The question arises, "whether the curves described by the function w , starting from w_0 , which correspond to those described between z_0 and z_1 , must always end in the same point w_1 , or whether they cannot also end in different points. Now, in the first place, it is clear that, in the case of *uniform* (one-valued) functions, the final value w_1 must be independent of the path taken; for otherwise the function would be capable of assuming several values for one and the same value of z , which is not possible with uniform functions. This reason, however, does not apply in the case of *multiform* functions. Such a function has, in fact, several values for the same value of z , and hence the possibility that different paths may also lead to different points or to different values of the function."

To return to the concrete: Suppose our function w is, say, the institution of property in land. Suppose, upon examination, we find the same point reached in New England, where the institution has developed along the lines familiar in history since time past, and, again, out on the Pacific coast, where entirely at variance with their traditions (and, as experience has shown, at variance also with their welfare, and any code of justice that human ingenuity can devise) the same forms have been forced upon the unwilling and deluded Indians by the Land in Severalty bills of Mr. Dawes. Different paths have led to different values of the function, all of which we must know accurately before we may speak with authority concerning the values at given points. To use the symbols again: Let the variable z in $w = 1/z$ pass from 1-4 by different paths, and let w start with $w = +1$, corresponding to $z = 1$. Let (polar coördinates) $z = r(\cos \phi + i \sin \phi)$, then $w = 1/r(\cos \frac{1}{2} \phi + i \sin \frac{1}{2} \phi)$. Since w is to start with the value $+1$, $r = 1$, and $\phi = 0$; if z describe path from 1-4 and does not inclose the origin, then ϕ arrives at 4 with value 0, while $r = 4$. $\therefore w = 2$. If z goes once around the origin, then at 4, $\phi = 2\pi$ and $\frac{1}{2} \phi = \pi$, while again $r = 4$, hence w acquires the value -2 .

The object to be accomplished in introducing the Riemann surface is to convey graphically an idea of the kind of classification which must be made of the different social values (a problem now confronting sociologists) in order that, given any of the human institutions in forms of thought, of personal action, of expression, or of coöperation, we may be able to show corresponding to each, in meaning terms, the variable desires, both in past and present, so that the interdependence

of each and all may be made obvious, and the direction indicated in which any unknown value is to be looked for; just as the discovery of the element argon was predicted from Mendelejeff's chart by the law of the periodic functions of atomic weights.


Precisely this task (*i. e.*, the representation) was undertaken by Riemann and the solution found in his conception of the n -sheeted surface.¹

"Let $w = \sqrt[n]{z}$. To one z in the Argand diagram correspond two values of w , whereas we wish to make two points correspond to two values of w . To these two points the same complex variable z should be attached. Instead of a single z -plane we take two indefinitely thin sheets, one of which lies immediately below the other. To the one value of z correspond two places in these sheets, one vertically below the other. Every place in the upper or lower sheet has one, and only one, of the two values $\sqrt[n]{z}$ or $-\sqrt[n]{z}$ permanently attached to it. If for a given z , $\sqrt[n]{z}$ be attached to the upper sheet, then $-\sqrt[n]{z}$ must be attached to the lower sheet at the point z . When $z = 0$ or ∞ , the values of w are equal, and only one place is needed to represent them; hence we regard the sheets as hanging together at 0 and ∞ If in the Riemann representation the path start from a place in the upper sheet to which the value $\sqrt[n]{z}$ is attached, it must lead to that place in the lower sheet which lies vertically below the initial point. It follows that we must give up the idea of having only one w -value attached to each place of the two sheets, or else make a connection or bridge between the sheets over which every path which goes once around the origin must necessarily pass."²

¹For the formation, etc., see HARKNESS AND MORLEY, *Treatise on the Theory of Functions*, extracts from which are given below.

²*Directions for making model of a Riemann surface for a three-valued function:* A difficulty arises, first, because the sheets of the surface interpenetrate, and, in the second place, because frequently at branch-points several sheets, which do not lie one immediately below another, must be supposed to be connected. For the purpose of illustration it is only necessary to be able to follow certain lines in their course through the different sheets of the surface. This may be done as follows: First cut in the three sheets of paper placed one above another, which are to represent the surface, the branch-cuts, and then only at those places where a line is to pass over a branch-cut from one sheet into another join the respective sheets by pasting on strips of paper. Then we can always contrive that, when the line is to return to the first sheet, from which it started, we have the necessary space left for the fastening of the strip of paper by means of which the return passages is effected. By these attached strips union of the separate sheets into one connected surface is accomplished; and it is then no longer necessary to connect the sheets with one another at the branch-points.

The surface in which lie the paths of the different social institutions is composed of n sheets, where n may have an infinite value and (instead of $w = \sqrt[n]{z}$, as in the model) $w = \sqrt[n]{z}$. The area of each sheet is coextensive with the whole of human activity, but the value of the function is uniform (*i. e.*, has only one value corresponding to



one value of the variable) in any one sheet. It will now be necessary to follow with some care the discussion (from Durège) of the cases where either a discontinuity occurs or several function values become equal, the function changing its value in describing a closed line around a *branch-point*. For just as the mathematician applies tests for these points, so the investigator of social forces must proceed to locate the "branch-points" for society, to be able to show when we are

approaching one and ascertain the effect of a passage round, etc. Just what is meant by this will be made clearer after the mathematical exposition.

Consider the function defined by the cubic equation

$$w^3 - w + z = 0 \dots$$

"For each value of z , w has in general the three values w_1, w_2, w_3 .

But the last two of these become equal when $z = \frac{2}{\sqrt{27}}$. At this point

we have $w_2 = w_3 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{1}{3}}$. If now we assume that the variable z changes continuously, or that the point representing it describes a line, then each of the three quantities w_1, w_2, w_3 likewise changes continuously, or the three corresponding points describe three separate paths. But

when z passes through the point $z = \frac{2}{\sqrt{27}}$, both functions w_2 and w_3

assume the value $\sqrt[3]{\frac{1}{3}}$, hence the two lines w_2 and w_3 meet in the point $\sqrt[3]{\frac{1}{3}}$. At the passage through this, therefore, w_2 can go over into w_3 , and w_3 into w_2 , without interruption of continuity; indeed, it remains entirely arbitrary on which of the two lines each of the quantities w_2 or w_3 shall continue its course. In this place a branching of the lines described by the quantities w_2 and w_3 takes place, hence Riemann has called those points in the z -plane at which one value of the function can change into another, branch-points.¹

"In Fig. *A* the three w_1, w_2, w_3 are drawn for the case when z describes a straight line parallel to the y -axis and passing through the

branch-point $e = \frac{2}{\sqrt{27}}$. The w -points which correspond to the

z -points are denoted by the same letters with attached subscripts 1, 2, 3. Let us follow the path of only one of the quantities, say w_3 . This


describes the line $b_3 c_3 d_3$ and approaches the point $e_3 = e_2 = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}$, as z

approaches the point $e = \frac{2}{\sqrt{27}}$ along the line $b c d$. Should z now

pass through the point, w_3 could continue its course from $e_2 = e_3 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{1}{3}}$ on either of the two paths $e_3 f_3 g_3 h_3$ or $e_2 f_2 g_2 h_2$, on which one as well

¹ *Definition*—"A point at which either a discontinuity occurs or several function values become equal is called a branch-point when, and only when, the function changes its value in describing a closed line around this and no other similar point." For illustrations of the test applied, see Durège, p. 42.

as the other can be considered the path corresponding to the continuation $e f g h$ of z ; the way open to w_3 is, in fact, divided at $e_2 = e_3$ into two branches. When z goes from b to h through the branch-point e , then w_3 , starting from b_3 , can arrive at h_2 just as well as at h_3 ; and the same is true of w_3 starting from b_2 . In case the path of z leads *through* the branch-point, the final value of the function remains




undetermined. If, on the contrary, z describe a path from b to h which does not pass through a branch-point, the final value of the function may differ according to the nature of the path, but it is for each definite path of z *always* completely determined. A similar branching of the function takes place at those points at which w becomes infinite and therefore discontinuous. Thus, for instance, the point $z=0$ is a branch-point both for the function $w = \frac{1}{\sqrt{z}}$ and for

$w = 1/\sqrt{z}$. Further, in the function determined by the equation

$$(z-b)(w-c)^3 = z-a, \text{ or } w = z + \sqrt[3]{\frac{z-a}{z-b}},$$

in which a, b, c denote three complex constants, and therefore three points, $z=a$ is a branch-point, at which all three values of the function become equal to $w=c$. Moreover, at $z=b$ all the values of w become infinite. The three functions suffer here an interruption of continuity, and hence it can remain undetermined on which path each is to continue its course, because, when the function makes a spring, it can just as well spring over to one as to the other continuation of its

Fig. C



path. As a general rule, those points at which w becomes infinite or discontinuous are branch-points. But there are cases in which points are not branch-points, although at them values of the function are either equal or discontinuous. . . . Accordingly, the branch-points are to be looked for only among those points at which interruption of continuity occurs, or at which several values of the function become equal, but whether such points are actual branch-points must still be expressly determined.

"The preceding considerations have shown that, when a variable z , starting from an arbitrary point z_0 , describes a path to another point z_1 which leads through a branch-point of the function w , the latter

acquires different values at z_1 , according as it is allowed to proceed on one or the other of its branches. Therefore, in the case of such a path of z , the value of w is undetermined. If, on the contrary, z describe any other path not leading through a branch-point, w acquires at z_1 a definite value, and two paths, both of which lead from z_0 to z_1 , assign different values to w only when they inclose a branch-point.*

We are as yet pretty fairly baffled in dealing with many phenomena of the life of society. A good illustration, and a case as little understood as any we might choose, is that of *revolutions*, where the functional relations we have been assuming seem at first sight to have been interfered with, and wait to be reestablished before society regains its equilibrium. We have never yet been able to generalize as to the causes producing, or the changes wrought by, them. All that men have¹ been able to do in times of peril has been to put their fingers on the pulse and give each different guesses as to the direction in which the stream was coursing—little else. Yet there always occurs after such a social upheaval as the French Revolution is generally supposed to have been, in a way precisely similar to the "scattering of the functions at a branch-point," an inexplicable rearrangement of social institutions, and we find them leaving the paths beaten by custom and tradition, and taking entirely new directions. Again "discontinuity occurs." That is, there is left a gap in the path, and, seemingly, no connection remains between the old and the new. There is no need to multiply illustrations. Of the changes in civil government, in industry, in forms of religious freedom, etc., brought about in this way, history can furnish any number. But who has ever been able to predict accurately beforehand the future of any one of the institutions involved?

Now, the task of searching for these branch-points, that we may have warning when we are approaching one, is exactly what the social investigator will one day be expected to perform. But he must have furnished him correct equations of the paths followed by every single one of the human institutions in terms of the variable desires, as they exhibit themselves at any given time and place, the dependence of function upon form of desire being shown to be as close and intimate as though it could be made to appear in some such form as

$$w = 1/\sqrt{(z-a)(z-b)(z-c)(z-d) \dots}$$

where a, b, c, d, \dots are the branch-points. But remember that the fact that such correlations exist, and the possibility of man's actually

* See AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September, 1897, pp. 161-3.

formulating them in terms of mathematical precision, are two very different things, nor has the latter been here affirmed.

Today, however, the most urgent task of the sociologist is in the present, in learning to understand present conditions. The tedious, but very essential, sort of analysis indicated in this paper is the kind of work before him. Having gained some idea of the interplay of the different forces, some comprehension of the structural interdependence existing between social institutions and human desires, and the functional activity continually at play, he gains also a knowledge of the obstacles which must be removed for his further progress. Before he is able to furnish even skeleton formulæ, in which may be substituted approximate values for the meaning terms of desire, he must have a more complete, a more perfect, classification than has yet been made of the various forms of institutions and desires manifest in actual conditions, the data for which are not yet at hand.

AMY HEWES.

REVIEWS.

The Psychology of Socialism. By GUSTAVE LE BON. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899.

THOSE who are familiar with the author's earlier works, *The Psychology of Peoples* and *The Crowd*, will find little that is new in his latest effort. He belongs to the group of Frenchmen who almost despair of their national and racial civilization, and find in the individualism of the Anglo-Saxon the only healthful and promising force for the future of society. The moral of the present work is that socialism is the legitimate working out of the weakness of the Latin society and can be combated successfully only from the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon individualism. Socialism is defined through the elements which are common, according to M. Le Bon, to all theories :

All would invariably have recourse to the state to repair the injustice of destiny, and to proceed to the redistribution of wealth. Their fundamental propositions have at least the merit of extreme simplicity: confiscation by the state of capital, mines, and property, and the administration and redistribution of the public wealth by an immense army of functionaries. The state, or the community, if you will — for the collectivists now no longer use the word state — would manufacture everything, and permit no competition. The least signs of initiative, individual liberty, or competition would be suppressed. The country would be nothing else than an immense monastery subjected to strict discipline. The inheritance of property being abolished, no accumulation of fortune would be possible. (P. 28.)

Under various rubrics the author shows that all these tendencies are inherent in the Latin nature. The modern Latin is quick of intelligence, spontaneous, but weak of will; capable of sudden outbursts of energy, but incapable of long-continued expenditures toward distant goals, unless indeed he be under the guidance of some overpowering leader, under which the Latins may accomplish, as they have, the greatest achievements. He feels his weakness and constantly looks for control to the state. The state constantly increases its surveillance, until, if we may believe the author, private enterprise in industry and commerce is almost rooted out in France. Constantly increasing governmental control chokes out the individual effort which is found in England,

America, and Germany. Private corporations are almost taxed out of existence, and tend therefore to pass into the hands of the state. The whole spirit of the civilization is to multiply direction and control, for the Frenchman is inherently averse to taking responsibility. Immense complexity of business methods and multiplication of the personnel in all undertakings result, and in turn make individual management impossible, and with this, successful adaptation to new conditions, rapid and effective transaction of business, and economical procedure. The necessary failure under these circumstances forces business enterprises to look for continually increasing state aid, until the natural conclusion would be the absorption of all in the hands of the collectivity, as the railroads have already been absorbed. Thus Latin society is the natural soil out of which socialism springs, while, on the other hand, the inevitable weakness, the loosening of all the cords of energetic activity, the rooting out of all initiative and progress, which the author is convinced must result from the inauguration of any socialistic state, may be illustrated, in embryo at least, in the present French conditions. The book is a reciprocal criticism of France and socialism. The criticism of socialism is not in any sense novel, and is sufficiently indicated above. The illustration from present French conditions is interesting, but if it is possible to judge the accuracy of his generalizations of the French situation from his statement of that in America, large deductions must be made. As a picture, however, of the weak side of French character the drawing is effective and striking. As an indication of the repression of individual initiative and the control that the socialistic programist calls for, the illustration from French conditions is most instructive.

But the programists represent but one phase of socialistic theory, and one which, as M. Le Bon recognizes, is passing in Germany and has quite passed among that brilliant coterie, the Fabian Society, in England. The socialists are becoming opportunists. They are losing confidence in any delineation of the future condition of society—any “vision given in the mount”—and are coming to clearer consciousness of the force that lies behind socialism; and with this consciousness come heightened insight into many conditions of modern times and better standpoints from which to criticise such movements as the organization of labor. For example, it is socialistic thought and thinking that opens the minds of the laborers to the fact that the wage and working-day are the result of all the forces and conditions out of which the fabric of civilization springs, and cannot be the simple dictum of employers and

managers. It is socialistic thinking that has led to the appearance of the trained expert who represents the labor union in conference with the employer, and recognizes the common situation between employer and employed upon which alone any arrangement or compromise can be made. Socialistic thinking may be different in France and England, but it is the same great force and cannot be studied in the camp of the programists alone. It is coming to represent, not a theory, but a standpoint and attitude. As the author says, it is a reaction against individualism. The other phase of conduct is rising above the threshold of consciousness—the community phase. Naturally it formulated itself first in dogma, and still lives in part in dogma. But its reality lies in the essentially social character of all conduct, and the gospel, according to socialism, is the recognition that all self-seeking has and must have a social end, if it belongs inside a social organism.

What society is struggling to accomplish is to bring this social side of our conduct out so that it may, in some conscious way, become the element of control. Now, as an analysis of this great, as yet inchoate, movement M. Le Bon's book is inadequate. For to him socialism is bound up with a creed and a program, and stands or falls with these symbols of faith. It is true that Latin definiteness of conception and the Latin feeling for and dependence upon the state tend toward the program-socialism, and reciprocal analysis of the program and the Latin social consciousness is valuable and edifying. Instead of being the end, however, this is but the beginning of a movement that must be appreciated in its strong as well as its weak side to be appreciated at all. There is, perhaps, little need of emphasizing this, but there is food for reflection in the attempt at psychological analysis of the use of socialistic dogma, which prefaces the treatise. I am not at all sure that I have fully grasped M. Le Bon's theory, but I take it to be something like the following:

Our conduct springs from impulses which belong to the ancestral soul. These springs of conduct are the heritage of countless generations, which may be referred to as the few but deeply founded beliefs which underlie our civilization. But, though they take the form of beliefs in the dogma of the church and state, it would be a great mistake to assume that they are the products of ratiocination, or are in any sense subject to reason as regards our recognition of their truth or falsity. And as they represent the heritage of the past, that which has been handed down by the race, they stand for the common impulses

of men, and are, therefore, altruistic in the most profound sense. This may be seen and experienced in the crowd, whose motive, according to the author, is always unselfish, however brutal and crude the means used.

The whole process of rational intelligence consists in bringing new experiences into this inner core of our natures and interpreting them from this standpoint. This is the process of perception and that of reason as well, if I understand the author. The conclusions he draws from this are, first, that the process of perception must be always and unavoidably a deformation of the object. For it is perceived only in so far as it is forced into the group of beliefs which we have inherited from the gray past. Still we are equally unable to recognize the deformation, since our process of perception is exhausted in this act. M. Le Bon fails to explain what psychologic process it is which enables him to run down this deformation of all our known world, nor why this capacity which places him, at least in this case, quite above the deforming phase of perception should not become the heritage of all. His second conclusion is that the conscious rational process is always egoistic over against the altruism of the unconscious impulses. The egoism seems to be involved in the attempt to make the universal impulse fit the immediate exigency of the individual. What the individual is vividly conscious of is that which he must do for his own preservation and success; and yet he can grasp the situation only so far as he deforms it through interpretation by his altruistic impulses. If perception, then, consists in forcing all experiences upon the Procrustes bed of inherited impulses and beliefs, reason consists in the consciousness of the conflict between the experience in its individual demands and the altruistic impulses which still must dominate the conduct. Now, it is just here I take it that the belief—the dogma—comes in. It is a mediation between the individualistic trend of fighting for one's own existence and advantage and the race impulses that beneath the threshold of consciousness irresistibly bear the individual upon the current in which he is but a ripple. Thus the belief in a New Jerusalem would be the compromise between the demand for satisfaction of individualistic passions and life itself, and the society and family impulse that calls for complete self-abnegation. In the New Jerusalem this dualism is to be overcome. Of course it must follow from this position that reason is always egoistic, that the conception of the new Jerusalem and kindred conceptions are always selfish. They are an attempt to put the individualistic, egoistic meaning into the altruistic

race impulse. Rational belief must be always a calculation of the payment which the individual is going to get later on for acting his part as a simple member of the species. Again we would ask how it is that M. Le Bon has written a long book presenting with great wealth of argument the proper course for Frenchmen to pursue. This undertaking, which would repudiate any reward in this world or the next, is surely a rational one, and yet not an egoistic one. It rises quite above the plane of the fight between the altruistic and egoistic element, and presents rational motives for conduct which are found in a conscious and sincere love of one's country. If in this case reason is able to get down into the hidden sources of action, to put to itself the task of clarifying these from their own moral standpoint, with no reference to the egoistic demand, why may not the crowd even eventually reach this position in which the reason in its exercise is not necessarily egoistic. In a word, the very existence of the book denies the author's sophistic epistemology and hedonistic ethics. If perception were a necessary process of deforming the world, M. Le Bon could never have discovered it. And if reason is universally egoistic, while our disinterested conduct must always be, as such, unconscious and unanalyzed, the worthy purpose of this book could never have been rationally conceived or discursively carried out.

It is evident at once where socialism comes in. It is a late gospel, according to Marx, by which a bridge is laid between the race impulse and the demand for individual life and gratification. The promise of revenge upon the hated rich, the equalization of fortunes that is to bring comfort and gratification in this world, if not in the next, reconciles the crowd and the disaffected man to immediate life. It is a new religion — but a dangerous one; for its realization is laid in this world and calls for the torch, the guillotine, and the dagger. Strangely enough, the author who says truth or falsity has nothing to do with the acceptance and maintenance of religious beliefs and dogmas, is sure that no sooner has socialism been tried than the crowd will reject it. Though belief has the strange power of carrying along unreconcilable propositions as glittering truths, the socialistic dogma is sure to break down when put to the test.

Now, it is true that our perceptions are conditioned by our own natures and their past, and it is true that reason attempts to bridge the break between the more or less unconscious habit and the immediate situation which calls for its readaptation. But, so long as we are able to draw out of our natures and their past experience scientific rules for

conduct, this conditioning does not mean hopeless deformation, and as long as the reason is able to state the new rule for conduct in just as universal and social a form as the old, it is not compelled to work solely in the interest of a selfish ego.

Or, to make the statement concrete and applicable to the present instance, because we can never get outside of our experience to look at it, it does not follow that we cannot discover the method and process of that experience. No one knows what he is going to do, judged by results, for the result is too wide and far-reaching for him to estimate, but he may know that he is acting rationally. We may depend upon our interpretation of the present in terms of the past, so far as method is concerned. The engineer does not know the full value and meaning of the bridge he is building; no elevation will tell him that. But he knows *how* to build it. While we are perfectly willing to have the unexpected happen, we expect science, physical and mental, to tell us how to behave in its presence. Furthermore, we state the law, the universal, in terms of society, and its infraction, the exception, the particular, in terms of the individual. But that is only till we can either modify the law or enlarge the individual. Thus, while reason is bridging over the chasm between society and the individual, it is forming a new society or a new individual, and in either case is making a real identification. Here, also, this takes place, not by a statement of what either society or the individual is going to be, but by finding the point of identity between them, and controlling the process of reform by sacrificing nothing valuable in either. It is only the method we can be sure of, not the result.

Now, I take it that this is but an abstract way of saying that we have, in general, given up being programists and become opportunists. We do not build any more Utopias, but we do control our immediate conduct by the assurance that we have the proper point of attack, and that we are losing nothing in the process. We are getting a stronger grip on the method of social reform every year, and are becoming proportionately careless about our ability to predict the detailed result. We may compare the programist to the concocter of the old-fashioned farmer's almanac, and the opportunist to the member of the signal service who is satisfied with a meteorological method that may control immediate conduct. If I have rightly interpreted M. Le Bon, his psychology is that of the programist, and is as inadequate as the social theory.

The psychological problem is a real one. The author's position,

that consideration of the ultimate truth of beliefs has had little bearing upon their acceptance or non-acceptance, is justified by history. Belief has turned upon the criterion of their actually working. The historical verification of beliefs has never taken the place of their efficacy in arousing human emotion and stimulating to action. The fallacy lies in assuming that the power to call out action has lain solely in the reference to the past event or the future state. The power lies in the efficacy of these assumptions in rendering present action possible. The concepts of heaven and hell have served to arouse to action, not because men have directly sought the joys of the one or avoided the horrors of the other, but because they served to evaluate the meaning of lines of conduct. No one was ever bribed or frightened into righteousness, but the glories of the New Jerusalem and the terrors of the pit have enabled men to estimate the nature of the respective types of action, and have assisted in setting free impulses which would have been otherwise dormant. The efficacy of belief lay in the firm conviction that certain types of conduct were admirable and others despicable, and men accepted the dogmas which aided in vivifying and deepening these convictions. It is a further question, that we must here pass over, why men wanted to estimate their conduct as good and bad; but the tendency was there. This tendency eagerly seized upon the dogmas which aided in accomplishing this evaluation and setting free the energy that was then ready for expression. Here lies the psychological problem. A belief is accepted because it organizes our conduct and sets free energy that is otherwise inhibited. This is the so-called subjective evidence that has always borne the weight of all dogmatic institutions. On the other side, the belief lays claim to objective verification. Though it is the subjective evidence that convinces, the conviction demands acceptance of the objective occurrence, and when this is successfully attacked, the belief is for the time being undermined.

It is evident that the supposed objective reality serves a real end in the psychological mechanism. For example, the belief in the probity and worth of candidates of one's own political party and the objective reality of its platform makes political activity along many lines possible. The support of men and measures can be undertaken with vigor and enthusiasm, and all the social energy bottled up in the partisan finds free expression. Undoubtedly the consciousness of the free, uninterrupted expenditure of the energy is the real ground for the vividness of the belief, and will presumably resist any argument that may be brought against it. If, however, through overwhelming and striking

proofs, the opposite of the partisan's contentions be forced upon him, the result is the distressful inhibition of the activities that had heretofore such free expression. The objective reality of the dogmas and beliefs may be said, therefore, to represent the fixed lines of habitual reaction along which alone free expression of energy may take place. Our beliefs are, so to speak, the projection of our habits, and represent the possibility of action. Thus the social habits of the partisan may be such that he could not deliberately support the candidacy of one whom he recognized as a scoundrel. His belief in the party nominee is the projection of this habit of social reaction.

Furthermore, the beliefs may organize and unite various lines of activity which otherwise would be dissipated and severally wasted. It is in this function of the belief that we recognize the program. All the reactions against the innumerable discomforts and distresses of life are organized and directed in one channel by the detailed picture of a state of society by which all these distresses and discomforts will be avoided. The necessity of such a program will be in proportion to the lack of organization of the life of the people to whom it appeals. We find, therefore, that it is an early stage in the development of any new phase of social conduct, or else represents the very lack of organization of the people, which results from dependence upon an outside control. This type of organization is, however, more or less artificial and unreal. The various discomforts, for example, to which men are subject in poverty and distress are to be met, not by the particular reactions which each element of distress calls forth, but by a higher principle of social organization; *e. g.*, not by the immediate devouring of beefsteaks and installing of comfortable furniture, etc., but by the hard fight for higher wage and shorter time, with the corresponding increase in the meaning of life which comes with this struggle. The belief in the program means that every time the shoe of poverty pinches an accession of spasmodic energy accrues to the propaganda. This is a crude proceeding compared with organic interest in a labor union that is directed toward immediately possible achievements, with a vivid sense of the present reality of the means used and their necessary parity with the methods of the employer. Gradually the sense of community of interest between both arises, and with it growing interest in the actual struggle and a feeling of intense meaning that does not have to be projected into the future to get reality. Such an interest in the immediate struggle, with the prospect of attainable results, organizes conduct far more effectually than the detailed mental picture

that comes in answer to the different stimuli to complaint. There is the same specific weakness in the program that inheres in the day-dream as a motive for action. In the nature of the case the interest in the immediate process tends to take the place of the devotion to the program. Nor is this a phenomenon that is confined to socialism. In Christianity there is a constant transfer of attention from the dogma to the interest in immediate practical effort toward the amelioration of suffering and wrong.

The psychological inefficiency of the programist lies in the necessity of continually diverting the attention from the task in hand to the mental picture of the program-state. There result divided attention and great waste of force. In the nature of the case the opportunists must become a stronger, better organized force because their interest is centered constantly upon immediate problems. They are not forced to draw their power from a distance, nor does their organization of interests represent detached activities. From the psychological standpoint it is safe to prophesy the conquest of the opportunist over the programist, wherever they come into conflict.

GEORGE H. MEAD.

Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology. By G. TARDE. Translated from the French by Howard C. Warren, Assistant Professor of Experimental Psychology in Princeton University. With a Preface by James Mark Baldwin. The Macmillan Co. Pp. xi + 213. \$1.25.

THE original of this little book was noticed at length in this JOURNAL for November, 1898. The translation is excellent. While we recognize a logic in M. Tarde's own arguments that makes for conclusions different from those which he draws, it would be a great mistake to undervalue his services at the present stage of sociological thinking. If all his books could be presented to English readers in an equally genial version, the prevailing awe of M. Tarde's opinions would more promptly give place to perception of their provisional and partial validity.

A. W. S.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Popular Education and Public Morality.—Is American public opinion right that people grow better as they know more? Are our modern systems of education really making better citizens? Horace Mann said: "Knowledge and skill have but helped the man to be a more deadly enemy to his race, if he is wanting in right motives."

Statistics indicate a rapid increase of crime in recent years. The Guarantee Company of North America affirms that during the calendar year 1894 the aggregate of embezzlements, committed largely by educated men, was six million dollars more than during the previous year, making a total of more than \$130,000,000 stolen in eleven years past. The United States census reports show a steady increase in the prison population in the last fifty years in proportion to the whole population, while illiteracy has decreased, and general education has been diffused. In Germany it seems crime has increased 28 per cent. between 1882 and 1892, while the increase in juvenile crime was 50 per cent. The increase in population during the same period was only 12 per cent., and there was a coincident increase in popular education. In France, in the poorest and most illiterate rural districts, the moral condition of the people is the best in the nation. Was Cardinal Antonelli's view a fair and disinterested one when he said, "Give the people bread and the catechism; it is enough for them"? The consumption of liquors in France, usually of poor quality, has sextupled within the last thirty years, while education has been compulsory during nearly the same time.

What is the interpretation of these statistics? In the first place, they show that the popular ideas of what constitutes right and wrong, and the administration of justice, have become more intense and discriminating than formerly; man has in recent years rapidly grown in self-consciousness, freedom, leisure, and in the number of his social contacts. We punish today hundreds of offenses which to our fathers were no offenses at all, or which their criminal legislation did not reach. Of such a character is alcoholic intoxication. Again, in the rapid breaking up of the old habits of social life which we have been undergoing, much individual demoralization and social discord has been the inevitable result. Modern science may have unsettled many a man's moral and even religious convictions for a time, yet it has vastly expanded his conceptions, and his grip on the world, which must eventually result in a deeper moral and religious consciousness. Hence the condition of those people whose morality is based on blissful ignorance is not so high and desirable, after all.

Not less culture, but more and better culture is our need. This should be not conceived as merely intellectual culture, but all-around culture. It should aim to train conscience, will, hand, and intellect in the formation of habits of *good conduct*. Strictly religious education must, at present at least, be left to the church and the home in particular. But the school should be permeated through and through with truly moral feeling and motives. The common public school, remodeled and generously enlarged and reinvigorated on this principle, must be our chief dependence for a sturdy, moral, and efficient citizenship.—CHARLES W. WENDTE, "Popular Education and Public Morality," in the *New World*, September, 1899.

Industrial Organization.—The time has gone by when it is necessary to argue as to the right to exist of large aggregations of capital for the purpose of industrial development. They have been found the only effective instruments for accomplishing the colossal public works demanded by the age. Every great movement in the world's history has been opposed owing to mistakes in its organization and progress.

And the great combinations of wealth have their mistakes. Periods of alternate "prosperity" and "hard times" recur. In periods of prosperity such as we are now having, the danger point is regularly reached when, owing to unexpectedly favorable

statements of profits, an undue advance in the quotations of existing securities takes place, new capitalization is created, and business-men rush into overproduction without duly increasing their reserves. What should be preached is the gospel of steadiness, and the new corporations are large enough and controllable enough to make for steadiness in a way that would have been impossible under the old conditions.

In organizing a large corporation it is essential that the individuality and goodwill of the successful concerns involved shall be maintained, and so centralized in an interest in the common result as to bring the standard of all up to that of the best.

The chief advantages of large combinations of capital are as follows: Raw material bought in large quantities is secured at a lower price; the specialization of manufacture on a large scale in separate plants permits the fullest utilization of special machinery and processes, thus decreasing cost; the standard of quality is raised and fixed; the number of styles is reduced, and the best standards are adopted; those plants which are best equipped and most advantageously situated are run continuously and in preference to those less favored; in case of local strikes or fires the work goes on elsewhere, thus preventing serious loss; there is no multiplication of the means of distribution; a better force of salesmen takes the place of a larger number; and the same is true of branch stores; terms and conditions of sale become more uniform, and credits through comparison are more safely granted; the aggregate of stocks granted is greatly reduced, thus saving interest, insurance, storage, and shop-wear; greater skill in management accrues to the benefit of the whole instead of a part; and large advantages are realized from comparative accounting and comparative administration; the grand result is a much lower market price, which accrues to the benefit of the consumers, both at home and abroad, and brings within reach, at the cheaper price, classes and qualities of goods which would otherwise be unobtainable by them.

Other advantages of a larger social and political nature result. The trend toward centralization of manufacture brings a wider distribution of the profits. In "hard times" each concern in the combination obtains its fair share of the reduced volume of business at fair prices, thus preventing the failures among jobbers, manufacturers, and suppliers of raw materials. Again, national standing is promoted for the country having the larger well-managed combinations. Only such organizations can provide and operate the highly developed special machinery by which the markets of the world are controlled; and the standard of living of the workmen can be sustained only by this means.—CHARLES R. FLINT, "Industrial Organization," in *Cassier's Magazine*, September, 1899.

Democracy in New Zealand.—To realize fully the character of the political situation in New Zealand, say in 1891, one would have to picture to himself a house of commons in which the recognized leaders of both our present parties had either not attempted to obtain seats, or, having attempted, had failed in obtaining them; and in which the administration of affairs was handed over to a cabinet consisting of men whose shibboleths and whose ideals were those of Moses Tillet and Keir Hardie. If we conceive such a cabinet, with an obedient and even enthusiastic majority at their back, we have some conception of the sort of cabinets that ruled in New Zealand in the parliaments of 1891 and 1894. The question, then, how it was that so little came of it all is surely one that at least presents an interesting study in the psychology of nations. On the one hand, the fact seems to indicate that, in English-speaking communities, property and the established order of things have less to fear from even the most complete triumph of a popular party than we are ordinarily inclined to anticipate. On the other hand, to those who entertain unbounded expectations as to the power of the state to remedy human ills, and to effect such revolutions in human affairs as would be involved in the nationalization of the land, or in doing away with or in modifying in any important respect the competitive and capitalistic systems, its lesson appears to be that, when all visible opposition has been conquered, the battle, instead of being won, has hardly commenced. When the task of transmuting theories into practical measures is once set about, it seems that impalpable, but, at the same time, insuperable obstacles present themselves, and, in one way or another, further progress in the collectivist direction comes to a standstill, rather from the lack of inherent motive power than owing to any opposition with which the champions of socialism can do battle.

A striking instance of the contrast between anticipation and event, between proposals and performance, is to be found in the history of the New Zealand government's dealings with the land question, on which more than on any other Australasian politics have always hinged.

In 1894 the expropriation proposals got the length of being put into the shape of a government bill that was laid before the house of representatives. As a bill it would have been drastic enough for a Ledru Rollin or a Louis Blanc.

As the government had a following of about fifty in a house of about seventy, the outlook was serious. It soon appeared, however, that in running the gauntlet of the house itself—government supporters though the great majority were—the bill had an ordeal to pass that was by no means child's play.

One amendment after another had to be accepted by the minister in charge, until it had been transformed into something comparatively innocuous. In the first place, an amendment had been accepted to the effect that, if any part of an estate were taken, the whole, at the owner's option, must be taken also. In the second place, instead of the minister being in a position to buy at his own price, an assessment board, so constituted as to be independent of political influence, was appointed, by which, in the last event, the price would be determined. In the practical working of the act, the opponents of the government have had occasion to criticise them rather for having used it to purchase the properties of their friends and allies at fancy prices than for having used it to terrorize capital or to harass political antagonists. So much for the expropriation aspect of the land-nationalization scheme.

In what we think of as state socialism there appear to be two distinct principles involved; and, curiously enough, we find them here operating in direct antagonism to each other. On the one hand, there is the principle of subordinating the interests of the individual to the interests of the community; on the other hand, there is the principle of doing away with the existing system of competitive rewards, and of remunerating the individual in accordance with his needs, rather than in accordance with his capacity. In regard to the first—the subordination of individual to state interests—the history of New Zealand politics goes to indicate that, in the Anglo-Saxon world at any rate, a victorious democracy, instead of being likely to push it to undesirable lengths, is much more likely unduly to ignore it. The other socialist principle, on the contrary—that of remuneration in accordance with needs—seems to be highly effective, for a time at any rate, in molding the policy of such a victorious democracy. In New Zealand its operation was conspicuous in connection with both the land and the labor question. In regard to both, however, limitations and difficulties soon began to make themselves manifest.

It seems, indeed, that always when the state adopts the principle of making concessions to one person or class of persons which, in the nature of things, it is impossible to make to all, the issue is, and must be, political corruption in one form or another. There lies the great difficulty and danger that besets the practical application of the principle of payment in accordance with capacity; and it forms a difficulty and a danger that, I think, have not been sufficiently adverted to. As regards the new labor policy, its tendency to give rise to political corruption was at least as conspicuous as was that of the new land policy. The salient features of the new system were that, in the construction of a road or a railway, instead of a few large contracts being let, a large number of small ones were—a change that might or might not be desirable according to circumstances—and that, further, these contracts, instead of being let to the lowest tenderer, as was usual, terms were accepted which were intended to afford a fair living wage to the group of, perhaps, ten or a dozen workmen who took the job.

The practice of sending up the unemployed from the cities to the forest districts was certainly speedily discontinued, and such road work as there was to be given fell into the hands of the settlers themselves and their sons. The original conception of the policy was thus practically abandoned. It was initiated with the aim of raising the whole level of wages in New Zealand. It was only found possible to make it endurable by taking the existing level as something that was fixed *ab extra*, and over which the government had no control, and by accommodating to it, as their standard, the terms of the employment which they were in a position to give.—WILLIAM WAR-RAND CARLILE, "Democracy in New Zealand," in *Economic Review*, July, 1899.

Old-Age Pensions.—Except in Denmark, which has a population of only about one-half that of London, schemes for providing old-age pensions are not working well; and the laboring classes, for whose benefit the proposals have been made, are having their faith in legislative methods much weakened by the fact. In Germany old-age pension laws have taken the form of compulsory insurance, and make the employers, as well as the workmen, liable for disablements.

Many schemes have recently been brought forward in England to solve the problem, notably that of Mr. Booth, which amounted in fact to "poor relief," and reduced itself logically to the principle that people shall eat, not because they have worked, but because they happen to have been born. But none of these measures have passed.

The cause of the failures is that "we have tried to encourage thrift by pouring into it that poison which destroys thrift." "All attempts by the state to relieve poverty by supplementing inadequate incomes must fail," declared the poor-law commission of 1834; "the only hope for the future must be looked for from the *improvement of earning power in the laboring classes*, and their own greater love of independence and sense of responsibility." This must be the guiding principle in any sound legislation on the subject.

The first thing to be done is to ascertain the nature and extent of the distress to be dealt with. Statistics show that old-age indigence is less now in England than formerly, and is steadily decreasing; while friendly societies, coöperative institutions, and the like are already measurably successful in dealing with the problems of providing for superannuates.

Secondly, we must ask as to the proper scope of the scheme. A national scheme promises to equalize burdens on the different parts of the country; but would be likely to be extravagant, through the relaxation of the vigilance and economy of private or local interest; and immoral through affording candidates for political power the means of bidding for votes.

Thirdly, we need to take stock of the instruments at hand for solving the problem without calling in state action. (1) Every corporation can be made an insurance society, and many of them are being so adapted by large employers. This promotes the continuous service and efficiency of the employés. (2) The labor societies, under the stimulus of the democratic motive to independence and equality of rights, are promoting self-help on the part of their members by old-age benefits. (3) The friendly societies are, upon the authority of the chief registrar of England, becoming safe depositories. (4) The accumulations in the national debt office, resulting from the people's savings, might be used, as similar funds are being used in some countries, to assist in the multiplication of workmen's dwellings. (5) The poor law itself ought to be revised.

Thus the taxing of employment to make some reparation for its wear and tear; the utmost development of self-help and thrift; the reorganization of charity; and a thorough reform of the poor laws—those appear to be the methods by which we ought to proceed.—HENRY W. WOLFF, "Old Age Pensions," in *Economic Review*, July 15, 1899.

The Relation of Ethics to Sociology.—It is for the true good of any department of knowledge or inquiry to understand as thoroughly as may be its relation to other sciences and studies, to see clearly what elements of its reasonings it has taken from them, and what in its turn it may claim to give them; and the value of this insight becomes greater in proportion as the growth of human knowledge, the steady extension of the range of human inquiry, brings with it a continually more urgent need for a clear and rational division of intellectual labor. If, therefore, the relation of ethics to sociology is truly one of subordination, it is important that students of ethics should fully recognize this truth and render due obedience to the superior authority. In order to examine closely the relations between these two studies we ought to be able to bring the general character and outline of each in turn clearly before us. In the narrow sense ethics may be designated an inquiry into the principles and methods of determining what is right and wrong in human action, the content of the moral law, and the proper object of rational choice and avoidance. This inquiry may be combined with the scientific study of the actual relations of men, regarded as members

of society, as they have been, are, and will be. Sociology, as conceived by Comte and Spencer, may be briefly characterized as an attempt to make the study of human history scientific by applying to it conceptions derived from biology, with such modifications as their new application requires. Granting the substantial correctness of these definitions, and assuming that sociology has attained as much consensus, as to principles, methods, and conclusions, and as much continuity of development as the physical sciences dealing with organic life, and as much power of prevision as Comte hoped for it, we must suppose that the forecast of social consequences furnished by sociology so developed must rightfully exercise a fundamentally important effect on the practical application of general ethical principles or maxims, and the deduction of subordinate rules of conduct from these. But to the further claim that sociology must not merely modify the practical application of ethical principles, but must also determine these, the reply must be made: This is impossible, since sociology, even when dealing with ethical principles, is only concerned with what is, has been, and will be judged, and not with whether it is, has been, and will be *truly* judged—which determination is the specific problem of ethics. If it be urged that the aim of sociology is not merely to ascertain, but also to explain, the variations and changes in social morality, and that this explanation must lie in reducing to general laws the diversity of moral opinions prevalent in various ages and countries, and that these general laws must either coincide or clash with ethical principles, we need only to point out in reply that these sociological laws must be so general as to include and explain erroneous moral judgments as well as true moral judgments, and that they cannot, therefore, coincide with ethical principles. Again, it may be asserted that the end of social relationships, as determined by sociology, is the preservation of the social organism, and that the ethical philosopher must accept this and make it also the ethical end; and that by so doing he subordinates ethics to sociology. Several replies are possible here. First, ethics would not so become a branch of sociology, exactly speaking, but rather an art based on the science. Again, this identification of the sociological and the ethical ends is one to which the moralist cannot be driven by the sociologist as such. For the argument that, if the ethical philosopher declines to accept the preservation of the social organism as the ethical end, he places himself in opposition to the process of nature, is only forcible if we introduce a theological significance into our notion of nature, attributing to it design and authority; and this introduction of theology carries the sociologist beyond the limits of his special science. But, more fundamentally yet, it must be urged that neither of these hypotheses is more than partially true. It is not life simply, but good or desirable life, that is the ethical end; and the determination of the content of this notion "good" is a task in the discharge of which ethics can gain no help from sociology. Nor is the view that morality has been developed under the influence of the struggle for existence among social organisms, as a part of the complex adaptation of such organisms to the conditions of their struggling existence, a probable conjecture as regards more than the earlier stages of its development in prehistoric times. We cannot say of the most signal contributions to the progress of morality that they are always decisively preservative of the particular nation by which they are made. Finally it must be urged that there is need that the mutual influence and interpenetration of ideas between ethics and sociology be carefully watched and criticised in order not to become a source of confusion at the present critical period. To give an illustration: "A man," it is said, "finds himself a member of a society in certain relations to other human beings. He is son, brother, husband and father, neighbor, citizen. These relations are all facts, and his duties lie in fulfilling the claims that are essential parts of these relations." Now, no doubt these various social relations do demand from the individual a certain recognition. But to maintain that it is an absolute duty to fulfill all such claims is hardly possible. They are vague, varying, and conflicting; they are sometimes unreasonable; in short, they do not form a harmonious system, and the study of them as facts does not give a criterion of their validity and a means of eliminating conflict. In considering which of the demands made upon us by our fellow-men have to be satisfied and which repudiated, and, when two conflict, which is to be postponed, we require a system of principles of right conduct which the study of social facts as such cannot alone give, but which it is the business of ethics to give.—H. SIDGWICK, in *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1899.

The Legal Aspect of Trusts.—There is little difference between the decisions before and after the passage of anti-trust acts. Judicial interpretation has interpolated necessary words of limitation or construction, just as if the words "unjustifiable," "unreasonable," "partaking of conspiracy," "prejudicial to the public interest," etc., had been written into the statutes themselves.

The supreme court of the United States, for the time being, and because it alone can speak finally on this subject, must, until popular sentiment has been awakened to better appreciation of the needs of the freedom of commercial relations, be the refuge for persecuted capital and persecuted ability. Not all corporations need this protection; not all corporations are entitled to it. Some corporations may be organized, not in the interest of trade and commerce, but in the interest of the restraint of trade and commerce. Such corporations may become public enemies; but the great class of corporations of which we are speaking, though brought into being by motives of profit among those interested and having for their object larger returns through labor-saving devices and selected ability, are not to be frowned upon or their evil influence guessed about or assumed by the courts. If one corporation offends, let it receive the punishment. Let others be unmolested.

While the courts have protected individuals and corporations in the enjoyment of their rights, they have not failed to give appropriate definitions of what are omissions by the individual or the corporation of their obligations to the community, or to make it quite clear what corporations are and what are not entitled to the benefit of these decisions.

Men or corporations may not conspire to fix the value or limit the output of a necessary of life; corporations may not enter into copartnership with one another; they must not create or seek to create monopolies; they must not be formed for that purpose; they must not injure the trade of another by unjust methods; competition must stop at all illegal methods of rivalry, and competition must not mean conspiracy. — JOSEPH S. AUERBACH, "The Legal Aspect of Trusts," in *The North American Review*, September, 1899.

Anarchistic Crimes.—Through all the transformations of morality we can invariably detect a common fund of feelings that constitute the elementary moral sense of peoples that have reached the human or social plane, the indispensable soil for the complex and highest developments of virtue. These feelings, the exceptional absence of which characterizes the born criminal, and the exceptional violation of which constitutes crime in its primitive and typical form, may be said to be identical with the minimum of "pity" and "probity" presupposed by horror of bloodshed and by repugnance of theft. Without the existence of such a minimum of "pity" and "probity" in the average man, murder and theft, the most violent assertions of individual activity, would spread unchecked to the point of destroying the possibility of collective life. The so-called "political crime" is nothing but a variety of crime in its typical form of murder and theft, having as its impulsive suggestion a political thought or scheme of social reform. This latter is not the crime, but the impulse to crime, finding its way into murder and theft through the action of degenerative causes — collective or individual — which destroys the normal equilibrium of the moral type of man. Political crime, when involving murder or theft, differs from what is called common crime only in its motive. There is crime whenever there is perpetrated, for whatever purpose, an offense, in the form of murder or theft, against either of the two fundamental forms of the ethical sense.

In anarchistic crimes the political theory of anarchism is the initial suggestion to crime. Anarchism aims at the suppression of every form of "external" authority, the complete and direct abolition of classes and of political, economic, and social inequalities, through the wholesale destruction of the present framework of society — the demolition by all available means of existing social institutions. Between anarchistic dreams and insane delusions the boundary is almost imperceptible. This explains why anarchism is a sort of refuge for all intellectual déclassés: it is a drain collecting the irreducible residuum of unassimilated minds, the waste product of social culture. The insistence of anarchism on the necessity of absolute freedom in the present condition of the great masses of the people is the cause of the transformation of the theory itself into a tremendous agency of criminality. The necessity of

destroying every vestige of authority attracts all social outcasts—the dissatisfied people who, not having succeeded in life, are filled with envy and bitterness—and all those on the border of crime, who find in militant anarchism a wide field for the assertion of their destructive impulses. In anarchism we find a confluence of two currents of social degeneration: intelligence which has proved incapable of social progress and is, therefore, forced into the regions of utopia; and character which has failed to yield to the exigencies of social adaptation and is, therefore, forced into the field of rebellion and violence. Thus it happens that the doctrines of anarchism are scattered among a body of desperate criminals. The unavoidable drift of the anarchistic theory to become a channel for criminal instincts is proved by the fact that it has largely spread over the Romance countries, more profoundly contaminating those who show the highest rate of illiteracy and criminality. The coincidence of the diffusion of anarchism, a high percentage of illiteracy, and a heavy rate of criminality, goes to show that anarchism cannot find favorable conditions of development where the social fiber is sound, where the criminal or anti-social tendencies are not strong enough to furnish a large body of people ready to accept its destructive formulas. The anarchist is an abnormal man, and must be suppressed or rendered impotent for doing evil. Whenever the two typical forms of crime—murder and theft—appear, the fact that they are essentially anti-social acts, incompatible with collective life, calls for prompt repression in the name of social defense.—GUSTAVO TOSTI, in *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1899.

Socialism and Trade Unions.—Socialism is absolutely without the pale of the natural organization of working forces, which goes on developing by the cooperation of liberty of association and liberty of work. Trade unions were created in England at a time when there was no question of socialism, and it was the political economists and the statesmen of the school of "self-help" who freed them from the laws prohibiting coalitions and associations. It was the same in France, where the socialists never thought of abolishing the laws against coalitions at the very time when their ablest chief was prominent in the government. To the liberal propaganda of the liberal political economists is due the reform accomplished under the Ollivier ministry, and later on the law in respect to syndicates which the leaders of socialism considered a mere bait. For a long time the socialists attributed no weight to the trade-union movement, and when the movement acquired a serious importance they only took part in it to turn it aside from the path of self-help. This has been called a division into old unionists and new unionists. The new unionists are no longer willing to have funds for life insurance, accident insurance, etc.; they want more legislation, more inspection, more taxation; but they do not want self-help, they want the state to help them. Experience will force them back into the paths of the older unions; the state cannot help them unless they help themselves.—G. DE MOLINARI, "La Guerre civile du capital et du travail," in *Journal des Économistes*.

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CONDUCTED BY C. H. HASTINGS.

NEW BOOKS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS REVIEWED.

Explanation. *Titles not starred* represent new publications announced in the standard publishers' lists since the last issue of the bibliography. A *star prefixed* to a title indicates that it was taken from a review of the work in the periodical cited after the title. It may or may not be a new announcement. The *arithmetical signs* following the citation to a review indicate the tenor of the review: X, uncertain; +, favorable; -, unfavorable; +-, favorable, but with reservations; -+, unfavorable, but with commendation; ++, very favorable; --, very unfavorable; +-+, very favorable, but with reservations; -+-, very unfavorable, but with commendation. Absence of any sign indicates that review has not been read. The *publication date* when not given is understood to be the current year. *Prices quoted* are usually for volumes bound in cloth in the case of American and English books, in paper in the case of all others. *New editions, translations, and new periodicals* are bracketed.

Abbreviations. See at end of Bibliography.

NEW BOOKS.

1. Anthropology, Ethnology.

- Bastian, A. Zur heutigen Sachlage der Ethnologie in nationaler u. sozialer Bedeutung. B., D. Reimer. 56 pp. 8vo. M. 1.
Dachsel, Paul. Eight years among the Malays. Milwaukee, Wis., C. N. Caspar Co. 121 pp. 8vo. \$3.50.
Groome, F. H. Gipsy folk tales. N. Y., New Amsterdam Bk. Co. 212 pp. 8vo. \$4.
Keane, A. H. Man past and present. N. Y., Macmillan Co. 584 pp. 8vo. \$3. (Cambridge geographical series.)
Ripley, W. Z. Races of Europe: a sociological study (Lowell Institute lectures), accompanied by a supplementary bibliography of the anthropology & ethnology of Europe, published by the Public Library of the City of Boston. N. Y., D. Appleton & Co. 2 v. pors., map. 8vo. \$6.
Schrader, O. Prehistoric antiquities of the Aryan peoples: a manual of comparative philology & the earliest culture, tr. by F. V. Jerome from 2d rev. German ed. . . . N. Y., Scribner's Sons. 486 pp. 8vo. \$6.75.

2. Biology, Evolution, Science.

- Hutton, F. W. Darwinism & Lamarckism, old & new: four lectures. N. Y., G. P. Putnam's Sons. 226 pp. 12mo. \$1.

3. Charities.

- Boire, André. Du vagabondage (thèse). P., Chevalier-Marescq & Cie. 127 pp. 8vo.
Bougand, Emile. History of St. Vincent de Paul from 2d French ed. by Rev. Jos. Brady. N. Y., Longmans, Green & Co. 2 v. pors. 8vo. \$6.
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Ducuron-Fucot, René. De la répression de la mendicité (thèse). Toulouse, Marqués & Cie. 183 pp. 8vo.
Du Puy, Hubert. Vagabondage et mendicité. Commentaire critique de la législation en vigueur et des conditions de l'assistance. P., libr. Larose. 178 pp. 8vo. f. 3.50.

- Fay, E. A. Marriages of the deaf in America: an inquiry concerning the results of marriages of the deaf in America. Wash., Volta Bureau. 527 pp. 8vo. \$5.
Für Feste u. Freunde der inneren Mission . . . Gesammelt v. M. Hennig. 21-30. Heft. B., Buchh. des Ostdeut. Jünglingsbundes. 2 M. o. r. (3. Bd. kplt. M. 1.50.)
Gesch. d. inneren Mission in Thüringen. Eisleben, Verlag Thüring. evan. Sonntagsblattes. 594 pp. 8vo. M. 6.
London—County Council. Endowed charities. Reports made to the Charity Commissioners at an inquiry in Lambeth Parish into endowments, etc., with reports of the Commissioners concerning charities, 1818 to 1837. L., Eyre & Spottiswoode. 1s. 6d.
Mangini, Alfr. I monti di pietà e loro riforme. Macerata, tip. A. Tamburrini. 40 pp. 16mo.
Poor-law conferences held in the year 1898-99. Proceedings, papers read, discussion, report of central committee. L., P. S. King. 690 pp. 8vo. 12s.
Quaas, Edm. Geschichte der inneren Mission im Herzogt. Sachsen-Altenburg. Altenburg, Th. Körner in Komm. 159 pp. 8vo. M. 3.

4. Cities.

- Claretie, J. La vie à Paris (1898). P., libr. Fasquelle. 500 pp., 18mo. f. 3.50.
Cook, F. A. Medieval towns: the story of Rouen. N. Y., Macmillan Co. 409 pp. il. 16mo. \$2.
Dresden—Verwaltungsbericht des Rathes der königl. Haupt- u. Residenzstadt Dresden f. d. J. 1897. Dresden, Zahn & Jaensch in Komm. 366 n. 64 pp., 4to. M. 3.
Eaton, D. B. Government of municipalities. L., Macmillan Co. 8vo. 17s.
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Headlam, Cecil. Medieval towns: the story of Nuremberg. N. Y., Macmillan Co. 303 pp. 16mo. \$1.50.
Heidelberg—Chronik der Stadt Heidelberg f. d. J. 1897. 5. Jahrg. Bearb. v. Aug. Thorbecke. Heidelberg, J. Horning. 114 pp. 8vo. M. o. 80.

- Hollander, J. H. Financial history of Baltimore, Md. Balt., Johns Hopkins Press. 397 pp. 8vo. \$2.
- Michie, T. J., ed. Municipal corporation cases, annot. . . . all cases decided by the courts of last resort in the U. S. V. 1. Charlottesville, Va., G. R. B. Michie & Co. 796 pp. 8vo. \$5.
- Moore, E. C. S. Sanitary engineering: a practical treatise on the collection, removal & final disposal of sewage & the design & construction of works of drainage & sewerage. N. Y., D. Van Nostrand. 621 pp. 8vo. \$10.
- Odgers, W. B. Local government. L., Macmillan Co. 294 pp. 8vo. 3s. 6d. (English Citizen.)
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- Sexby, J. J. Municipal parks, gardens & open spaces of London, their history & associations. N. Y., C. Scribner's Sons. 646 pp. il. 8vo. \$8.40.
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- Wagner & Schäfer. Das Baurecht der Stadt Mainz. Mainz, H. Quasthoff. 338 pp. 8vo. M. 4.
- Weber, A. F. Growth of cities in the 19th century: a study in statistics. N. Y., Macmillan Co. 495 pp. 8vo. \$4. (Columbia University studies in history, etc.)

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| A. | Arena. | JHS. | Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science. |
| AA. | Americano Anthropologist. | JPE. | Journal of Political Economy. |
| AAC. | Archives d'anthropologie criminelle. | JNS. | Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik. |
| AAE. | Archivo per l'antropologia e la etnologia. | LC. | Literarisches Centralblatt. |
| AAP. | Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. | LG. | Labor Gazette. |
| AC. | L'Association catholique. | LoQR. | London Quarterly Review. |
| ACQ. | American Catholic Quarterly Review. | LQR. | Law Quarterly Review. |
| AEL. | Annals d'Ecole libre des sciences politiques. | MHM. | Mansfield House Magazine. |
| AGP. | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. | MIM. | Monatsschrift für innere Mission. |
| AHR. | American Historical Review. | MA. | Municipal Affairs. |
| AIS. | Annals de l'Institut de science sociale. | NA. | Nova antologia. |
| AJP. | American Journal of Psychology. | NAR. | North American Review. |
| AJS. | American Journal of Sociology. | NC. | Nineteenth Century. |
| AJT. | American Journal of Theology. | NS. | Natural Science. |
| ALR. | American Law Register. | NT. | New Time. |
| ALRV. | American Law Review. | NW. | New World. |
| AMP. | Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Séances. | NZ. | Neue Zeit. |
| AOR. | Archiv für öffentliches Recht. | PhR. | Philosophical Review. |
| ASA. | American Statistical Association, Publications. | PSM. | Popular Science Monthly. |
| ASAr. | Allgemeine statistisches Archiv. | PSQ. | Political Science Quarterly. |
| ASG. | Archive für sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik. | PSR. | Psychological Review. |
| ASP. | Archiv für systematische Philosophie. | QJE. | Quarterly Journal of Economics. |
| BDL. | Bulletin of the Department of Labor. | QR. | Quarterly Review. |
| BG. | Blätter für Gefängniskunde. | RBP. | Rivista beneficenza publica. |
| BML. | Banker's Magazine, London. | RCS. | Revue de christianisme sociale. |
| BMN. | Banker's Magazine, New York. | RDC. | Rivista di discipline carcerarie. |
| BOT. | Bulletin de l'Office du Travail. | RDI. | Revue de droit internationale. |
| BS. | Bibliotheca Sacra. | RDM. | Revue des deux mondes. |
| BSt. | Bulletin de statistique et de legislation comparée. | REA. | Revue mensuelle de l'Ecole d'anthropologie de Paris. |
| BUI. | Bulletin de l'Union internationale de droit pénale. | Réfs. | Réforme sociale. |
| C. | Cosmopolis. | ReS. | Revue socialiste. |
| ChOR. | Charity Organisation Review. | RH. | Revue historique. |
| ChR. | Charities Review. | RHD. | Revue d'histoire diplomatique. |
| CoR. | Contemporary Review. | RIF. | Rivista italiana di filosofia. |
| DL. | Deutsche Literaturzeitung. | RIS. | Revue internationale de sociologie. |
| DR. | Deutsche Revue. | RiSS. | Rivista italiana di sociologia. |
| DRu. | Deutsche Rundschau. | RiSS. | Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali. |
| DS. | Devenir social. | RMM. | Revue metaphysique et de morale. |
| DZG. | Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. | RP. | Revue philanthropique. |
| EcJ. | Economic Journal. | RPe. | Revue pénitentiaire. |
| EcR. | Economic Review. | RPh. | Revue philosophique. |
| EdR. | Educational Review. | RPP. | Revue politique et parlementaire. |
| EHR. | English Historical Review. | RRL. | Review of Reviews, London. |
| EM. | Engineering Magazine. | RRN. | Review of Reviews, New York. |
| F. | Forum. | RSC. | Revue sociale catholique. |
| FR. | Fortnightly Review. | RSI. | Revisita storica italiana. |
| GEC. | Giornale degli economisti. | RSP. | Revue sociale et politique. |
| GM. | Gunter's Magazine. | RT. | Revue du travail. |
| HLR. | Harvard Law Review. | S. | Sanitarian. |
| HN. | Humanité nouvelle. | SR. | School Review. |
| HR. | Hygienische Rundschau. | SS. | Science sociale. |
| HZ. | Historische Zeitschrift. | VWP. | Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. |
| IAE. | Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie. | VR. | Yale Review. |
| IJE. | International Journal of Ethics. | ZE. | Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. |
| JAI. | Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. | ZGS. | Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften. |
| JCB. | Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association. | ZPK. | Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. |
| JEc. | Journal des économistes. | ZPO. | Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht. |
| JFI. | Journal of the Franklin Institute. | ZPP. | Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. |
| JGV. | Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft. | ZS. | Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft. |
| | | ZVR. | Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. |
| | | ZVS. | Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung. |

[The titles of articles selected from periodicals not in this list will be followed by name of periodical in full.]

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THE RECENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY.

It is a fact which cannot have escaped the observation of foreigners that there is today in Germany very little enthusiasm for a vigorous and thorough social reform; that the laborers' struggle for emancipation encounters today in Germany more opposition than formerly. At the beginning of this decade we Germans enjoyed a season in which it seemed as though all the cultured people of the nation, the Kaiser at their head, were about to offer their aid to elevate the laboring classes. In the year 1889 the Kaiser gave a personal audience to a deputation of striking miners, and he warned the masters that they ought to put their hands in their pockets. Six months later he sent the celebrated communication to his minister of commerce, with the demand upon the state to satisfy the just complaints and wishes of the laboring classes. How far the Kaiser was at that time inclined to meet the wishes of the laborers may be seen from the two following utterances: (1) "It is one of the tasks of the sovereign power to regulate the time, the duration, and the character of labor in such a way that maintenance of the health, the demands of morality, and the economic needs of the laborers and their title to legal equality will be provided for." In this way account was taken of the wishes of the laborers for introduction of a law for a maximum labor day, and, more than

all, promise was made that there should be no plans in the future for special legislation against laborers.¹ (2) "To guard the peace between employers and employés, legal provisions should be adopted with reference to the forms in which the laborers should be authorized to take part in regulation of affairs of common concern, through representatives who enjoy their confidence, and also with reference to their consideration of their interest in transactions with the employers and with the organs of my government."

Herewith is the right promised to the laborers of coöperation with the employers in closing labor contracts, and particularly through the use of representatives "who enjoy their confidence;" that is, who have been chosen by the laborers themselves. The right of the labor organizations to take part in settling the terms of the labor contract is here unequivocally expressed. Accordingly the Kaiser at that time placed himself on the side of the laborer with reference to the two chief demands, namely, for protective laws and for freedom of combination.

Following the above-mentioned imperial rescript to the minister of commerce, there was a circular letter of the ecclesiastical authorities of Prussia to the clergy. The church council (*Oberkirchenrat*) of Berlin called upon its pastors to address themselves to the study of the labor question, to attend meetings of the people, and to oppose themselves to "the godless and faithless Social Democracy;" and, furthermore, to call into existence associations of laborers on an evangelical basis. In the same year (1890) the Evangelical Social Congress was established by theologians and professors of national economy. This organization undertook the task "of making fruitful the forces of faith and love dormant in evangelical Christian society, to the end that social evils might be remedied." In a word, there prevailed in the widest circles the warmest enthusiasm for helping the laborers, for supporting them in their struggles against suffering and oppression, for satisfying their demands for worthy life and just

¹ On October 1, 1890, the socialist law expired, which during the twelve years previous had placed the Social Democracy, and therewith the labor organizations, under special legislation.

treatment, and for rescue of them by these means from the arms of the Social Democracy. At that time the German Social Democracy was certainly very unfriendly to religion, and was also very cool in its feelings of patriotism.

But this spring of a fine and large social reform was not long to endure. The law for protection of labor which the government proposed in the Reichstag in 1890-91 was far from meeting the expectations which the imperial decree had properly raised, and the friends of social reform were unable to amend the law so as to incorporate more inclusive terms. Nevertheless, this law is the sole actual outcome of that period of enthusiasm and agitation. With the year 1892 the reaction in the temper of the governing classes began to be evident. From the Kaiser himself no word of encouragement and stimulus in the field of social politics was any longer heard. On the contrary, the great capitalists acquired more and more influence with him. He made their thoughts and views more and more his own. His addresses in public were more and more in their favor. The church also withdrew with the Kaiser from the social undertakings upon which it had entered. The decree of the church authorities of the year 1890 was recalled five years later. Clergymen who were socially disposed, who took an interest in the labor movement, were punished or disciplined, or at least constantly watched and nagged. The Evangelical Social Congress was more and more avoided by church officials, and many of the clergy. Indeed, in 1896 permission was refused in Leipzig for the congress to use a church for a commemorative religious service. In a word, the number of those who stood fast in the earlier temper and still wished to help the laboring class grew continually smaller, and their influence became weaker. They were more and more pushed into an attitude of defense; they could not obtain new laws for the laborers; they were obliged rather to bend all their energy to defense of the old laws, dating from earlier and better times, against new attacks. The general right of suffrage for the Reichstag—this chief weapon in the political struggle of the laborers—presently became more and more an object of dislike and of more or less open attack in the

ranks of the great middle-class parties (the Conservatives and a portion of the National Liberals). The law governing association and assemblage, which already affronts all liberal demands—how we envy the English and the Americans when we hear of the personal liberties that obtain in their states!—this law was to be made still more restrictive in the several states of the empire, and the program was actually carried out in Saxony, although not in Prussia. In this series of assaults upon the labor movement, which were undertaken partly by the governments and partly by the above-named great parties, belongs now also the proposed law which at the present moment almost alone occupies the attention of social politics in Germany; namely, the law for the protection of the conditions of factory labor, as it is officially termed by the imperial government; the "House of Correction Law" (*Zuchthausgesetz*), as it is called with propriety by the laborers who are most affected by it. I must speak somewhat at length of this law, its antecedents, and its significance, because in this connection the present status and future prospects of social reform in Germany are most evident.

Among the great employers it had been for some time perceived as an unwelcome fact that during the last decade there had been a very considerable development of the labor organizations in Germany. Our labor movement, to be sure, lags behind that in America and in England, but compared with the condition between 1880 and 1884 it has already become a decided power. It is easy to understand that corresponding with this growth there was on the side of the employers increasing impatience and opposition toward the organizations. In many trades there was a considerable degree of harmony, to be sure, between the employers and the laborers. In the printing trades, for example, a three-years' tariff was accepted by the great printers' organizations, and this agreement covered the rates of wages and the hours of labor for all Germany. In other trades there were movements toward similar tariffs arranged in common between employers and labor organizations. But the great masses of the employers stand today still upon the old position, namely, that they will not concede to the labor organizations

any right to coöperate in determining the conditions of labor. They want "to remain master of the house," as the ever-returning watchword has it. In every demand for wages they see only "wild greed," "rebellion," or "lawlessness." These classes of employers control, through their organizations, the larger part of the industry. The most reputable and financially responsible newspapers are their organs. Almost the whole body of functionaries, almost all the police officials, and almost every judge is on their side, because all these come from the same social stratum and are recruited from the same sources. Moreover (and this is of capital importance), they have won the ear of the monarch for their conceptions. The chief spokesman of this capitalistic tendency, the iron magnate Freiherr von Stumm-Halberg (formerly simply Herr Stumm!), is among the most intimate friends of the Kaiser, or at least he was until recently. The great "cannon king" Krupp, of Essen, is also a person who is in favor at the court. Besides these many others might be mentioned. It is to be added that the leading representatives of the old nobility and of the great landed proprietors in this instance naturally go entirely with the great industrial organizers. To a certain extent they have in their blood the conception that it is the destiny of the lower classes of the people to obey (*Order zu parieren*, as the traditional German phrase has it!), and that it is, therefore, their duty to accommodate themselves contentedly to their appointed lot. These conservative feudal circles constitute the daily environment of the monarch. Wilhelm II. would be more than a man if he were not gradually influenced by the tone of his surroundings.

To all this must be added another influence which incited him to abandon the reformatory ideals of his early years. He had believed that if he partially met the demands of the laborers they would throng about his throne with thanks and enthusiasm; they would cease to follow the international and democratic aims of the Social Democracy, and would be converted to patriotism and fidelity to the crown. In this hope he was deeply disappointed, or rather in his sanguine enthusiasm he had believed that success would instantly follow his endeavors. That, however,

was an impossibility. The Social Democracy had struck too firm roots in the laboring classes, and the unpatriotic international and anti-monarchical thoughts were by the twelve-years special law to which the Social Democracy was subject from 1878 to 1890 too deeply provoked by the government itself for all to be suddenly changed at a single stroke. It would, to be sure, have been within the power of imperial statesmanship to win the laborers for a national and monarchical policy, if for a decade the policy of the spring of 1890 had been continued; but inasmuch as the Kaiser wanted to pick the fruits at the same moment in which he planted the tree, bitter disappointment was the necessary result.

In this situation the above-indicated influences of the squires and the capitalists must have fallen upon fruitful soil. The Kaiser, who thought he had been repulsed by the laborers, was obliged to take refuge with these other strata, because he cannot govern at all without a party upon which he can depend. Accordingly he adopted more and more the views of the capitalists. He also began to see in every struggle for wages merely an exhibition of the republican spirit, or of discontent and illegality. Moreover, to him every labor organization was only an association of Social Democratic agitators and whips (*Hetzer*), who were trying to bring about the overthrow of the state and of society. After his lively fashion, he gave more and more frequent expression to this feeling in speeches, table-talks, and other utterances. At the same time the Social Democracy did its utmost, through its unwise and improper attitude, especially at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the empire, to sharpen the existing opposition.

Accordingly, after several other attempts to head off the political or industrial labor movement, the most recent proposal was made, namely, the so-called "House of Correction Law." This unique name is sufficiently explained by the history of the proposal.

In the summer of 1897 the Kaiser visited the famous institutions of the well-known Pastor von Bodelschwingh near Bielefeld. In this neighborhood an uprising of the masons had

occurred just before. Bodelschwingh had been seriously affected by it. A hall which he needed for the reception of the Kaiser could be made ready only with great difficulty and with considerable use of "voluntaries."¹ Allusion was made to the subject during the visit of the monarch, and the latter got the idea that the members of the labor organizations were merely the restless, lazy, dissatisfied sort of people, while the voluntaries, that is, the unorganized laborers who in the case of a strike took the vacated places, were the portion of the labor class that especially deserved encouragement.² This was the occasion of the Kaiser's speech in Bielefeld, in which he called upon the people to support his program, which he indicated as follows: "Protection of the national labor of all productive classes, encouragement of a healthy middle class, ruthless suppression of all revolution, and the severest punishment to anyone who has the audacity to hinder a fellow-man in the performance of free labor whenever the latter wishes to labor." Herewith was the new struggle against the labor organizations opened. In itself the proposition with reference to the "severest punishment for hindering a fellow-man from free labor" could be turned against the employers who by black list or boycott excluded the leaders of the labor movement from all possibility of getting work in the future. But the whole context in which the sentence stands, the interpretation that it received by the official newspapers, and the further steps of the administration, clearly showed that the sentence was directed solely against the laborers who in case of a disturbance would attempt to restrain others from labor, and to add them to the number of strikers. The "good" elements of the laboring class, the "contented," "uncritical," "peaceful" people, who are not to be incited to commotion—the "voluntaries," as they were called from this time—were to be protected against the agitation of the labor organizations. It was supposed

¹ The term *Arbeitswillige* has been rendered as above in this paper. The plain English of it is, of course, "scab."

² During the past summer Pastor von Bodelschwingh sent a letter to the editor of *Hilfe*, Pfarrer Naumann, in which he himself makes the above explanation, at the same time declaring that he is an opponent of the "House of Correction Scheme."

that in taking their part the best means were employed for putting the brakes upon the organizations.

In the following winter the government issued a secret circular to all the administrative officers of the state and the police authorities, with the inquiry whether during the labor difficulties there were not so many excesses and crimes against those laborers who did not care to take part in the movement that it was wise to offer increased protection to the "voluntaries" through additional penalties for "misuse of the right of combination." Through some as yet unexplained source this circular, which was expressly designated "confidential," came into the hands of the editors of the central organ of the Social Democratic party, *Vorwärts*. It was immediately published in this paper, and it was made a subject of discussion in the Reichstag. The government made the following explanation: "If there is any country in which such combinations of laborers are less necessary than elsewhere, that country is Germany. In a country where there is direct universal suffrage the interests of the laborers will always find lively and efficient support through the weight of the fact that they constitute the great mass of the voters. Consequently such a representation of the laborers as exists in the labor organizations is among us nowhere near so necessary as in other countries with other modes of election."

From this it is manifest that the tendency of the circular, and of the law for which it was to prepare the way, was hostile to organizations of laborers in general, although in form it was only directed toward provisions for the "voluntaries." From this time people knew what to expect, although for six months the government gave no further signs of its intentions in the matter.

On September 6, 1898, the Kaiser made another speech at the small town of Oeynhausen, in Westphalia, and like a thunderbolt from a clear sky it illuminated the whole situation. He said: "The protection of German labor, protection of those who want to work, was promised by me during the last year in the town of Bielefeld. The bill is near its completion,

and will be presented to the representatives of the people in the course of this year. It provides that every man, whosoever he may be and whatever his name, who attempts to hinder a German laborer willing to work from prosecuting his labor, or who incites him to strike, shall be committed to the house of correction [*Zuchthaus*]. I promised this punishment at that time, and I hope that the German people will stand by me, in the person of their representatives, in protecting, so far as is possible, our national labor in this manner. Right and law must and shall be protected, and so far as lies in my power I shall see to it that they are maintained."

Like a bursting shell this speech struck into the circles of the laboring people and their allies. Nothing good had been expected; suppression of the organizations had been anticipated; but no one had suspected that men were to be liable to the house of correction for hindering others from labor, or simply for inciting to a strike. The house of correction is the severest penalty after capital punishment that our criminal law knows. Perjurors, counterfeiters, murderers, and other infamous criminals are sentenced to the house of correction; and now this punishment was to be visited upon that laborer who urged his comrades to common resistance, in order to coöperate in improving their own and their children's condition in life. A tremendous excitement took possession of the whole labor population and all the liberal parties. The name "House of Correction Scheme" was given to the proposed law before its contents were fairly known. The National Socialists and the Social Democrats adopted in their conventions energetic resolutions against the law, the former with very tactful allusions to the social expressions of the Kaiser, who was now opposing the labor movement, who, however, eight years before had announced himself with great positiveness as in favor of the labor organizations. The latter party expressed themselves with very plain emphasis of their anti-monarchical tendency in general. The evangelical and Catholic labor organizations joined in these protests. Among the capitalists, on the other hand, this speech was celebrated with enthusiasm, as the word of salvation for which they had long

waited. What is worst of all is that German courts were found which, even before the proposed law was known, proceeded as though it had already become law, and condemned striking laborers who had offended against others to four and eight, and even ten years in the house of correction.

Nevertheless it was nearly nine months before the bill, which on September 6 was said to have been near completion, actually saw the light of day. With commendable tact the government succeeded in keeping it completely secret during all stages of its preparation. It came as a total surprise to the Reichstag on the morning of June 1 of this year. At the same time there appeared, as is customary, a statement of the reasons for the bill, and a few days later a memorial, which pictured excesses connected with strikes, and attempted thereby to gain votes for the law. Three weeks later the first reading of the bill occurred in the Reichstag. In spite of the decisive defeat which the government suffered on this occasion, it held fast to the bill, and the ultimate decision will not be reached until November next (1899), when the Reichstag reassembles.

The bill proposed to the Reichstag has for its purpose the protection of the freedom of the "voluntaries." All persons who belong to no organization, who want to live in peace with their employers, who are satisfied with their wages, and have accustomed themselves to live within their wages—all these are to be protected against being compelled by the members of an organization to join in their wage conflicts. The argument in favor of the bill assumes that these "voluntaries" are peaceable, orderly, and especially desirable elements in the state, and that it is an important and urgent task of the sovereign power to protect the identical interests of these classes and the state. It overlooks, however, the fact that these voluntaries consist of very diverse elements. In part they are elderly people with large families, who would prefer to work along quietly on moderate wages rather than to scrimp themselves and their families for a time in the hope of better income. In addition to these there are also people of very doubtful character, loafers and tramps, who seize the opportunity to quickly earn a few

marks and then to disappear ; or agricultural laborers who have just come into town, and who regard the lowest wages paid in town as a tremendous run of luck in comparison with the earnings of agricultural labor. Besides these there are foreign laborers from countries very low in civilization, with limited needs, as, for instance, those from Russian Poland, Galicia, and to a certain extent also from Italy. The immigration from these countries into Germany is just now immense. It is very far from being true that all these are "elements of especial value to the state." Of course, all these ought to be protected against mal-administration or insult, just like the other citizens. The general protection of person and of property, the foundation of every civilized state, should be secured to them. But beyond that they deserve no further protection. Other social classes have an abundance of social and economic means of constraint which are highly disagreeable for those upon whom they are exercised, and which cannot be legally forbidden. Such means of constraint must be conceded to the labor organizations also, so that they may attain their ends.

If the "voluntaries" are to be protected against such attempts at constraint by means in excess of general criminal law, every attempt of this sort must necessarily have the character of special legislation, and of assault upon the labor organizations. The "voluntaries" are the lowest strata of the labor element, who are either mentally or industrially too weak to push demands. If they are to be the ones who in the establishment of the conditions of labor are to be consulted in the first instance, these conditions of labor will always remain upon the plane that is most unfavorable to the laborers. Whoever protects and strengthens these elements thereby holds the whole labor population fast upon this lowest plane. He ties the hands of those who attempt in organizations to work themselves up a trifle higher. Hence the "protection of the voluntaries" is the battle-cry of all those who oppose the advancement of the laborers. Whoever, on the contrary, is of the opinion that this advancement of the laborers is for themselves, for the state and nation, for the historical development of mankind in general,

an important and desirable end, will under no circumstances approve "protection of the voluntaries" beyond the proper scope of general criminal law.

We have thus in general expressed our judgment of the bill. It would be very desirable to go farther and by more precise legal and economic criticism of special provisions to justify and elaborate this general judgment. That would, however, far exceed the capacity of the space at our present disposal, and would not perhaps have the same interest for foreigners which it has for us who are in the thick of the fray. It therefore remains merely to explain the spirit of the bill in certain cardinal points, and to confirm what has already been said by a few examples.

Technically the proposed law is offered as an amendment to sec. 153 of the industrial laws of the empire. This section makes it a punishable offense to attempt by means of physical constraint, threats, insults, or ban (*Verrufserklärung*) to induce others to take part in agreements for the purpose of getting better wages and labor conditions, or to prevent others from withdrawing from such agreements. Accordingly, if a laborer does not employ one of these four means, if he merely explains to his working associates the situation, he is not liable, according to the law as it now stands; and if he employs those illegal means, unless he is at the same time guilty of a crime which according to general criminal law is liable to a severer penalty, he can at most only be subjected to three months' imprisonment.

This paragraph itself, however, contains a special law for striking laborers, inasmuch as it punishes more severely crimes which laborers commit during a strike than the same crimes committed by other people. This appears most clearly in the case of the "ban." This is otherwise not punishable. Every union can expel one of its members, and at the same time prohibit the others from further intercourse with him, without any further attention to the matter on the part of others. Every association of traders can agree to deliver no more goods to a given merchant (among the booksellers, for example, there is a ring which maintains itself only by such ban). Every officer who is guilty of conduct unbecoming the honor of his class may

be expelled with infamy from his official rank. In a word, in all classes and strata of society use may be made of the ban as a perfectly permissible weapon in social or economic life. Only when a laborer employs it as a means of assistance in his struggle for wages does it suddenly become a crime that must be punished with imprisonment. Again, threats are not liable to legal penalty in the case of an action permissible in itself. Only threats in instigation of crime are punishable with imprisonment up to six months. In this law, however, all threats employed in a strike for the purpose of inducing another to take part are made punishable. The case is not very different with offenses against honor. This condition of the special law was considerably strengthened by the new statute. In two directions it goes beyond the existing provisions of the law; it proposes first, to raise the limit of penalty, and, second, to extend the area of punishable offenses. Instead of imprisonment up to three months, these offenses in future, according to this law, shall be punishable with imprisonment up to a year, or, if extenuating circumstances are present, with a fine to the limit of a thousand marks. The maximum penalty is accordingly increased fourfold. Of house of correction, to be sure, to which the Kaiser alluded in the speech referred to, there is little said in the law. In only one passage is this word found, as we shall see below. In this respect we might, indeed, in the first moment, be agreeably disappointed, since we read only of imprisonment up to one year. If we, however, reflect what sort of people they are who will be affected by this law, the one year of imprisonment will appear to be an enormous punishment.

One is much more astonished, however, at discovering how extraordinarily the circle of punishable offenses is extended by the proposed law. Hitherto, as we have said, offenses of the kind mentioned are only punishable beyond the provisions of general criminal law in case they are committed for the direct purpose of instigating another to participation in agreements to strike, or in attempts to restrain from breaking such agreements. Even in such cases the extension of the law is with the limitation that the agreement to strike is made "for the purpose of

gaining more favorable conditions of wages and of employment." Accordingly, if a strike is not an aggressive strike, but a defensive one, if the strikers purpose merely to ward off a threatened or already announced cut, it would at least be uncertain whether they would then be liable under this sec. 153 of the industrial laws. Now, however, every agreement that has in view a coöperation to influence the conditions of labor or of wages (sec. 1) is liable to the increased penalty. In the future, therefore, no allowance is to be made for the difference between aggressive and defensive strikes. Moreover, not merely constraint to bring about participation in given actual agreements to strike, but likewise constraint for the purpose of inducing laborers to join organizations, is now placed among criminal actions. Sec. 1 has the express provision, "to participation in organizations or agreements which have in view an influence upon the conditions of labor or wages." This, of course, strikes all industrial organizations of laborers whatsoever, whether they are at the moment engaged in a strike or not. Still further, under the present sec. 153 of the industrial laws only those deeds of violence are included which are committed for the express purpose of forcing another to participation in a strike. According to the new bill, however, every threatening or insulting action which springs from failure to take part in a strike becomes liable to the increased penalties (sec. 6). That is, in case the strike is long past, if the threat or denunciation can no longer have the effect of illegal constraint, even then it may be punished with a year's imprisonment.

Finally we must enumerate in this series of extensions of the number of punishable actions a provision which has attracted more attention than all the rest, namely, the prohibition of strikers' patrols. The idea of threat is extended by this law, beyond its customary and natural sense, to cover the "systematic watching of employers, employés, places of employment, roads, streets, squares, railroad stations, water-ways, harbors, or other places of business." Thus the laborers are made impotent to carry through a strike with success. How can they maintain an oversight of the condition of the strike, of the

number of the voluntaries, the number of shops in which work is going on, and of those in which labor has ceased, etc., if they are not permitted to inform themselves by watching the places of employment? How are they to instruct their comrades who come from a distance, without knowing that in the place in question a strike is in progress, if they are not permitted to meet them at stations and elsewhere and to talk with them? The employer has the right to insert advertisements in papers published at a distance, to send his overseers or other representatives, and to do whatever else seems to him possible to collect laborers from other places; but the laborer is to be deprived of the one means which he now has of winning these new arrivals over to his side. The employers may use the telephone, the mails, social intercourse of every sort, to keep themselves informed about the condition of the strike. The laborer, who has practically none of these quiet and uncontrollable means at his disposal, is to be deprived of the sole means of information which he possesses. In this provision, consequently, the spirit is most evident which has dictated the bill.

It is easily understood, to be sure, that nothing is so disagreeable to the employer as success on the part of the laborers in preventing accessions of labor in case of a strike. Such success compels the employer to treat with them for terms of peace. It is, however, not so easily understood and not so natural—it rather creates the impression of gross partisanship—if the law-giver, who ought to maintain an unprejudiced attitude toward both parties, places himself, with his authority, entirely on the side of the capitalist, and actually forbids the laborer to use the best campaign equipment which he possesses. Already must we accuse most of the police authorities and most of the courts in Germany of having abandoned the non-partisanship which they ought to maintain as representatives of the sovereign power. In the case of the great dock strike in Hamburg in 1896 and 1897 the strikers were forbidden to approach the harbor, while under ordinary circumstances it is open without restriction to everybody. During a strike of masons in Leipzig (summer of 1897) entrance to railroad stations and the promenades of the

city was forbidden to the strikers by a police manifesto. (Our police have, or at least they assume in such matters, competence of which in the free West there can be no conception.) Similar occurrences have taken place elsewhere during minor strikes. In case this was not possible, the strikers' patrols were summarily arrested, and accused of serious disorder (*groben Unfugs*). It should be said that we have in our criminal statutes the beautiful provision (sec. 360, 11) that a fine up to 150 marks, or arrest, shall be the penalty in case one "in an improper way makes a disturbing noise or is guilty of serious disorder." This means, of course, in case anybody at night sings in the streets and breaks windows, puts out street lights, tears down or changes signs, paints statues red, or does anything of like nature that might be suggested by transient folly or youthful recklessness; the sort of thing, in other words, that we have all been more or less guilty of in our student days. There can be no question from the whole connection of the passage, and from the customary use of language, that only such offenses are meant by the words "serious disorder." Now, however, this expression is coming to be interpreted by our courts in a constantly wider sense. One may commit "serious disorder" by an article in the newspaper which rouses somebody's anger; by a speech which somebody interprets as offensive to himself; and also by standing as a sentinel upon the street near a workshop or at a railroad station and thereby becoming an inconvenience to employers. Under this serious-disorder paragraph hundreds of laborers have been punished with arrest in recent years. But this punishment is not sufficient to satisfy the employing classes. Not with arrest, but with house of correction, that is, with the ignominious punishment of the vulgar criminal, should it be punished, if anyone in future in the case of a strike acts as a sentinel or induces another to do so. Yet it is by no means beyond all doubt that actually patrolling as a sentinel can properly be included under the phrase "serious disorder." With very notable frankness the employers' association of Hamburg, one of the most arbitrary capitalistic organizations in the country, declared recently in a public manifesto that it would be better to forbid strikers'

patrols directly, rather than to reach them through a very questionable interpretation as "serious disorder."

In this section about strikers' patrols there is very plain manifestation of what is to be expected when the government and the representatives of the capitalistic party reiterate that the right of combination and the right to strike is not to be curtailed by this bill. So far as technical legal form is concerned, that is correct. In sec. 4, clause 3, this right is expressly recognized as belonging to the laborers and employers. Yet, as a matter of fact, the effective exercise of the right of coalition is made impossible to the laborers. What sense is there in entering upon a movement to affect wages if the persons engaged have no means of permanently controlling and supervising an agitation? The formal legal right to strike is still present; but if this bill should pass it is merely a tantalization instead of something with which the laborers can actually accomplish a purpose.

But this paragraph is far from being the only one which contains destruction of the right of coalition. The general prohibition of the ban has, as a matter of fact, the same effect. A labor organization cannot develop itself if it has not the right to communicate the names of the voluntaries to the affiliated organizations in other places. They must be permitted to make out and circulate lists in which all those are catalogued who at the given time have not obeyed the command of the organization, in order that in the future these people may be known and properly reckoned with from the start. Every person, however, who sends such a list may, according to the new law (sec. 6), be punished with imprisonment up to one year. It makes, however, a very peculiar impression when we read in the justification of the law that so-called black lists, that is, catalogues of all the laborers who have taken part in a strike, are to remain within the rights of the employers in the future. If a manufacturer writes to another, "In my factory today such and such workmen struck; I beg you not to employ these people," that is just as much a ban as if a labor organization transmits a list of the voluntaries. And if an employer locks out a number of people on account of disorderly tendencies, and begs other employers

not to give them work, that is again precisely as much of a ban as if laborers agree not to work for a given employer any longer. The anomaly is that such a ban is now as before to be permitted to the employer, while it is forbidden to the laborer. Herein lies not merely a destruction of the right of coalition, but at the same time a violation of the principle that all citizens shall be equal before the law. The law is thus a special law against striking laborers. It places things under penalty when they are done by striking laborers which remain free from penalty if done by other men.

Furthermore, in sec. 3 of the bill a penalty of imprisonment for not less than three months is provided for anyone who makes it his business to carry on transactions of the before-mentioned sort. The expression "business" (*Geschäft*) is up to date not to be found in our criminal law. The meaning undoubtedly is that no one shall make an occupation of these transactions and obtain an income from them. As the justification and the memorial show, this remarkable paragraph is directed against the officers of labor organizations. It will accordingly hardly be possible for the majority of secretaries of unions or editors of the trade papers to avoid "defamation of character," "ban," or "threats," within the sense of this law, even if they restrain themselves entirely from insults and abuses in the ordinary sense of the word. And if imprisonment for several months threatens them in every case, not many men will be found willing to enter such positions. That is, of course, precisely the intention. Efficient and intelligent men are to be prevented from undertaking the leadership of the labor movement. The employers are to remain in a position to appoint well-trained men, yes as a rule men highly cultivated as economists, to be the managers of their associations. But the corresponding positions in the labor organizations are to be made so dangerous that no one will offer himself for them who can find any other employment. Again, therefore, an effective use of their right of coalition is made impossible to the laborers, for how can they, without expert leadership, even approximately forecast the prospects of a strike? Here again it is manifest that the

new bill violates the legal equality of all citizens, which is, of course, the basis of every civilized state, and it destroys the use of the right of coalition, although that right remains to the laborer in form.

Let this suffice for criticism of the provisions of the law in detail. I fear that what has already been said will seem to foreigners too much of a good thing. Let me briefly mention only one more paragraph, at least, and that is the one which contains the phrase "house of correction," which had been expected since Oeynhausen. In sec. 8, clause 2, of the bill the case is supposed in which, in consequence of a strike, "danger to the security of the realm, or of one of the federal states, has arisen, or a common danger to life or property has been produced." In this case the four crimes which are concerned (bodily constraint, threat, defamation of character, or ban) are made liable to house of correction up to three years; in the case of the promoters, up to five years. It seems at first glance unthinkable that such a condition of things could ever become a reality. It is so far-fetched and so fearfully complicated that it seems ridiculous to draw up a special law for such a case. Surely, the author of this bill would not have given himself this thankless labor—for that he tortured himself a long while before he at last hit upon this form of words is only too evident—if unfortunately the phrase "house of correction" had not dropped from the lips of the Kaiser in Oeynhausen; but this penalty had been suggested, and, for better or for worse, it must at least somewhere appear. Since the paragraph is there, its effect may be immeasurable. Where could there be a strike which some court or other would not interpret as threatening the common right of property? The right of organization of laborers on railroads and in the postal service, in mines, harbors, canals, gas- and water-works, etc., is certainly very seriously threatened.

Up to date it is only the proposal of the law which lies before us in the "House of Correction Scheme." It is, of course, not to be expected that it will become law in precisely its present form. At its first reading in the Reichstag it roused

too much opposition. There is, however, still too much ground to fear that at least a portion of it may become law, for by no means all who oppose this law are opposed to its fundamental idea, namely, increased protection for the voluntaries.

At the first reading of the bill in the Reichstag (end of June, 1899) the number of those who opposed the bill with eloquent speeches was splendid. Not merely the Social Democrats formed the opposition. Nothing else was to be expected from them. Indeed, the point of the law was aimed directly at them. Their fifty-seven votes do not amount to much, however, in a house of 397 members. But in this case there were associated with them the small groups of middle-class liberals, who have in Parliament, to be sure, less significance than in the press, and, further and more important, the two large groups of the Center and of the National Liberals; that is, the party of the Catholics, which alone has over a hundred seats in the Parliament, and the moderate liberal middle party, which consists chiefly of officials, professors, and representatives of large industries. No one had expected so vigorous opposition to the scheme, particularly from this latter party, the National Liberals, as their spokesman, the lawyer Bassermann, a south German, actually manifested. What he said corresponded throughout to the traditions of the time when the National Liberals were actually a liberal party. It appeared, however, very soon that the spokesman of the party was without the support of an important fraction of the party. When it came to vote, a portion broke away from him and voted for reference to a commission—that is, for acceptance of the essential part of the scheme. Moreover, in the press of the great capitalists there arose an angry storm against this apostate. He was charged with accepting the most dangerous demands of the revolutionary movement, with flirting with the Social Democracy, and with destroying the vital energies of German industry. This made a considerable impression upon a part of the National Liberals. It seems to grow plainer that the number of those who will stand fast is growing smaller. The proposal has already appeared in influential National Liberal sheets to exclude Bassermann and his friends from the party. Accordingly, an

equally energetic opposition by the National Liberals is not to be counted on at the second reading.

No more can full confidence be given to the party of the Ultramontanes, the so-called Center. This party has announced for the second reading a series of amendments which are primarily to give legal assurance of the right of organization in general. This is so far in the interest of labor. But the announcement followed that, after the right of organization is perfected, there must be discussion of laws against misuse of this right. This means that this party, which is so strong—indeed, at the present moment the most influential in Parliament—under the given circumstances will throw its influence for a “protection of the voluntaries” in excess of the provisions of general criminal law. Every such preferment of the voluntaries, however, would be a blow to the organized laborers.

Outside of Parliament opinion about the law is also very much divided. The capitalistic press greeted it, of course, with joy. The economic journals, however, and the scholars who published in them, have with one accord disapproved it. The Evangelical Social Congress has not yet had an opportunity to pass upon it. Its session occurred just a week before the appearance of the bill. Judging from the spirit which prevailed there, this body also would doubtless have unanimously disapproved the scheme. At the session of the *Verein für Socialpolitik*, one of the largest organizations of scholars, officials, and certain business-men, the chairman, Professor Schmoller, sometime Rector of the University of Berlin, expressed disapproval in very vigorous terms. Most indefatigable, however, of all the professors in opposition to the scheme had been the Munich economist Brentano. He, indeed, is the first scientific defender of the labor organizations in Germany. For twenty-nine years he has been tireless in the work of convincing scholars and politicians of the usefulness of labor organizations. In this case he was the first to open the discussion. Even before the publication of the law he annihilated the theoretical basis upon which the bill claims to rest, in a pamphlet entitled “The Protection of the Voluntaries.” Subsequently

he elaborated his views in a pamphlet entitled "Reaction or Reform." Last of all he made an address at the convention of the National Socialists, which appeared in all the newspapers and roused the liveliest approval on the one side and equally energetic disapproval on the other. By means of all these utterances he and his colleagues have at least accomplished this one thing, namely, that the majority of the educated, in so far as they are independent of the capitalistic interests, and also a large number of influential employers, are at present among the opponents of the law.

It is, of course, not possible to say at this moment whether anything, and if so how much, of the scheme will be enacted. Before these pages reach the eye of the reader the daily press will have scattered information on this point.¹ At present, however, we may affirm: First, whether this scheme becomes law or not, the introduction of the bill in Parliament has exerted an inexpressibly embittering and exciting influence on the laboring classes. The sin that has thus been committed will not be atoned for by many years of effort. For a long time to come the laborers will have no more confidence in a government which can introduce such a bill and give it the encouragement of its name. The monarchical sentiment, which for a long time has not been especially strong, has suffered a tremendous blow from this law and the speeches which preceded it. It is significant of this state of things that even a man like the well-known Pastor Göhre, who as late as the May number of this journal reported upon the National Socialist party, of which he was a member, has left the party on account of the imperial speech at Oeynhau-sen, and, as we hear, is about to join the Social Democrats.

Second: On the other hand, this bill has unintentionally had good effect. Among the educated citizens of the middle class the demand for social reform has been manifested during the last summer more strongly than for years before. It grows more

¹[We are indebted to Mr. A. M. Simons, editor of *The Workers' Call*, for accounts from *Vorwärts* of the defeat of the bill and the subsequent passage of a bill legalizing workmen's coalitions. The suggestion above (p. 453) makes it questionable, in the absence of further details, whether this latter item is wholly to the advantage of the laborers.—ED.]

and more evident that people are growing tired of the prevailing influence of Freiherr von Stumm and his friends. People want more freedom and credit for the development of the laboring class. It is not impossible that even the Kaiser, accommodating himself to this changed sentiment, will gradually come again into the current of the first year of this decade. Many symptoms indicate that the "House of Correction Scheme" is the preliminary or final conclusion of the policy of suppression of the laborers. On the other hand, in opposition to this law the various parties among the laborers have drawn closer to each other. Formerly the Social Democratic, the Catholic, the Evangelical, and the Free-Thinking (the so-called Hirsch-Dunkers) labor organizations fought each other in the most lively fashion. Against this law, however, they have protested shoulder to shoulder. This is also an unexpected result of the "House of Correction Scheme."

In conclusion we must say, as one of the most eminent jurists, Geheimrat Sohm, of Leipzig, expressed it at the National Socialistic party convention in Göttingen, in October: "Whether this scheme or any part of it becomes law or not, right it will never be, for right has its roots in the convictions of the whole community, especially in the conviction of those who are affected by it."

DR. PHIL. MAX MAURENBRECHER.

BERLIN.

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH AND SOCIAL UNITY.¹

TO MANY men the faith in an abiding social peace grows hardly more than a dream and a wish. Progress, so far as social solidarity is concerned, seems leading for the moment to a *cul-de-sac* walled in by contradictions of its own making. Human life has passed from savagery, where that man was safest who was most alone, to the present chaos of relationships. Never was the division of labor so minute and coöperation so imperative. Never was power more synonymous with dependence. 'Never was a theoretical democracy more in evidence. And yet from the evolution the social universe has not yet emerged. The division of labor has not grown coöperative; democracy was never more in need of guidance; social classes were never more sensitive to each other's prerogatives; the interests of the individual are not yet always those of society; education has not yet taught our children the art of living together as men; the church has not yet brought about the kingdom of God. To offset this disintegrating force, to what shall we look? Economic coöperation, the brute forces of army or police, foreign war, and socialism have had their champions, and to a greater or less degree each has been tried in actual life. Yet, so far as we can judge, the question still awaits an answer, and it must continue to wait

¹ The substance of this paper was given as an address at St. George's Church, New York, November 26, 1899, and I cannot help adding a few facts concerning the work so nobly conceived and administered by its rector, W. S. Rainsford, D.D. St. George's Church is on the East Side of New York, in a neighborhood once aristocratic, but at present almost entirely consisting of boarding-houses and tenements. From *St. George's Year Book* for 1899 it appears that 7,521 persons were on the books of the church, *only 537 of whom (including domestic servants) lived in private houses*; 5,034 lived in tenements. The church maintains, besides a flourishing Men's Club, a Boy's Battalion, various societies for girls and women, a kitchen-garden class, a cottage by the seaside, a sewing school, a trade school for boys, a free library, a gymnasium, a Sunday school of 2,331 members, an employment society, a relief department, a periodical club, as well as an unusual number of strictly parish organizations. The church has an endowment, and in every way is demonstrating the possibilities of a proper conception of the social functions of a church and the use of rational methods in Christian work.

until a basis be found in some fundamental human relationship so independent of the accidents of life as to be capable of appealing to all men everywhere and inciting them to greater efforts for themselves and a more spontaneous recognition of the rights of others.

It is not at all certain that any single basis of this sort will ever be found. Life is so complicated that perhaps social unity is as visionary as the fountain of life. But one thing stands true: whatever power there may lie in other aspects of human life, even a partial social unity will be but a dream to the man who shuts his eyes to religion and God. Despite one's own doubts and the apathy of organized Christianity in social reform, wherever there is to be a bundle of lives in which the humblest man and woman shall be physically and morally safe there must also be the all-embracing life of God. And in occidental society, at least, this means that the Christian church has a distinct office and duty to perform in bringing in greater social unity.

I.

One's faith in the truth of this sweeping statement rests upon two facts: first, religion has to do with powers and instincts that are not acquired, but are elemental and common to all men; and, second, a genuine Christianity makes men incapable of isolated life.

1. Religion is the expression of an elemental, common, and therefore unifying factor of human life.

To unite men, emphasis must be laid upon interests that are not mere accidents or accomplishments, but common to all. The habits of the man of wealth, his very necessities, are so far removed from the habits, and even the luxuries, of the man of poverty as to constitute a genuine, and almost insuperable, wall of separation. To insist that unity can be made possible for a people by teaching them to obey the laws governing the time for dinner and the proper style of clothes and the literature one should read, is ridiculous. No people has ever become permanently unified on the basis of customs or civilization. Customs and civilization are the results of a deeper something

in life. Nor is social unity to be found even in a devotion to art. Music, painting, sculpture, and other forms of an essentially æsthetic life have never succeeded in building up a united society. Greece with its arts was more divided than even Judea with its refusal to make to itself a graven image. The æsthetic life is a product, not a source, of social conditions. When the Romans first conquered Greece, they thought they should have a knowledge of Greek music; but a Greek orchestra only bored the conquerors, until a centurion divided the musicians into two bands and ordered them, as they played, to advance toward each other as if in battle. When once this was done, the Romans broke forth in loud applause. War they knew; music they could appreciate only as it simulated war. Perhaps men have grown less frank in the expression of their opinions, but, inestimably valuable as is art in all its forms, social millennia will never spring from symphony concerts and art exhibitions. Culture is too much a matter of the individual, too much an acquisition. The great elemental things in life are, and always have been and always must be, the basis of united social action. Within the physical sphere, for example, there is the passion for food. A nation rises or dies as one man if starvation be upon it. There is the passion for fighting—inherited from a savage past, it is true, but something which, as almost nothing else, links men together with unbreakable bonds. A little higher is the elemental desire to acquire property. From the days of Tyre and Sidon this desire has broken across geographical wastes and bound people of different races together. There is hardly a stronger bond of union than that of commercial interest, and commerce rises superior even to the brutal elemental passion for war, and demands that there shall be arbitration where formerly men rushed headlong into battle.

But hunger and fighting and the desire for property are not the only elements of human life. Besides them and above them there are such things as faith, a trust in some power outside oneself, the instinct to pray, the belief that in some way the world is not the result of a toss-up of chance, and that, once made by a God, it has not been abandoned by its Creator.

Religious instincts are as elemental as the lust for blood. They are not something learned, and so added to life. Religion is life—or, perhaps better, is one way of living. This was one of the messages of Jesus: to be religious is to live with God as well as with men. If one life is natural, so is the other, and if religion is one way of living, it can be a bond of lives in so far as it calls into action original and essentially human elements. Ignoring all questions as to the relations of his ancestors with his tribal god, the savage in the Pacific islands today kneels at the altar of the God whose first messengers he devoured. The man of culture bows before God, hesitating perhaps to assent to any sharply articulated theology, yet wishing to let his faith find expression in deeds, if not in words. The philosopher, who more than any other man appreciates the difficulties which lie inherent in theistic belief, still sees in religion a philosophy of the whole of things, and cannot believe in anything less than a general unity lying back of all sensible variety. The root of all this belief in each class of men is undoubtedly the same, whatever may be the variety in its expression. Were religion the luxury of the rich or a necessity of the poor, it would be far otherwise, for somewhere the instinct would disappear with creed, and awe with knowledge. But as the call to war leads men away from the accidents of life, the differences of business and culture and station, and binds millionaire and pauper, clubman and cowboy, into a regiment, so Christianity, if only it is true to religion, can call men from business and daily routine and join them into the indivisible kingdom of God. In the broadest sense of the word, it is faith that makes social life possible. To make men trust God better is to make them more ready to trust men better. To make them resemble God in universality of interest is to make them more companionable, more eager to do good, less eager to succeed through oppression, less isolated and self-centered, more intent upon performing duties than upon demanding rights. If men are God's sons, then must they be each other's brothers.

2. But such a statement as this leads us directly to the position of Christianity. It is fundamentally a religion, but on its social side gains its great centripetal force by the fraternal

instincts which it engenders among its followers. There has probably been in the history of social agitation no more dynamic thought than the Christian teaching as to the divine paternity and the consequent human brotherhood. Epictetus with other Stoics, it is true, recognized it, but even he could not make it dynamic. Christianity itself for hundreds of years failed equally. But just as the heart of the strict Calvinist rebelled at his logic when it came to the fate of children who died in infancy, so in the same proportion as the interest in Christianity has swung from metaphysics to its real content has the recognition of a common humanity and a universal obligation of the more privileged to the less privileged found expression in the thought of humanity's sonship to God. It is true that in support of this doctrine men have often been exegetically at fault. Jesus himself does not seem to use the parental analogy to express the universal relationships of God, but that which we mean by the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man lies in the very heart of his teaching, and no man can be said to have found the center of Christianity who does not find his life regulated and inspired by the thought for which, whether accurately or inaccurately, the words stand today.

But, further, the individual Christian, if he approach the ideal of Jesus and Paul, is being made into a man who *cannot* live an isolated life. According to the conception of Jesus, to be religious is not to depend upon external authority, to limit one's thinking, to perform certain duties, to practice protracted deprivation, and to narrow one's interests and life. On the contrary, in his own words, it is to have life and have it more abundantly. Whatever help there may be in religious rules and regulations he recognized, but, according to his conception, to live religiously was to live helpfully with men because one was living trustfully with God. The divine life in man makes altruism instinctive. The Christian dynamic is a faith that finds expression in love. The Christian virtues are not those of the hermit, but of the man who lives among his fellows—love, joy, peace, endurance, meekness, self-control, trustworthiness. Not one of these is the outgrowth of education or

of degradation, of peculiarly good or peculiarly bad environment. All of them alike are the expression of elemental religious impulses shared by all men and obtaining reinforcement and energy from a God who dwells with all men. This is another of the legacies of Jesus: a selfish man cannot be religious. As John asks: How dare one say he loves God, whom he has not seen, when he fails to love his brother, whom he has seen? He must first violate his Christian nature who seeks his own things rather than the things of others. The real impulse, the greater inclination of Christian life, is outward. The better Christian a man is, the less aristocratic and the more fraternal he is.

And so it is inevitable that as a community is composed of men whose lives are filled with the spirit of Jesus it will be bound close together. If one may paraphrase the noble saying of the church father, society, like man, is by nature Christian; in so far as it is un-Christian it is unnatural and dangerous. An irreligious aristocracy gave France the miseries of the old régime; an irreligious proletariat gave France the reign of terror; an irreligious middle class gave France the massacre of the communists; an irreligious press is giving her travesties of justice in the name of honor.

But religion primarily is not an affair of a community, but of the individuals of a community. And if it be, as one can say without cant, that many of society's ills today spring from irreligion, to cure them one must work upon the individual life as well as the social environment. Regenerate men are the only material out of which to construct a regenerate society. Panaceas may look more fascinating, are almost sure to be more dramatic, than the unheralded production of Christian character. It is always easy to leave a Christ bound for Calvary for the untested but magnificent promises of a Christ in the wilderness. But there is no surer way toward the New Jerusalem than the road of service to one's fellows made possible and heroic by an overpowering belief, as instinctive as it is magnificent, in the presence of right motives in human hearts, and a consequent unborn but developing providential order in human society. To make men Christians is to make society unified.

II.

It is at this point that we see the social office of the Christian church as an embodiment of religion. It is concerned in awakening in men instincts which are common to the race, and in inducing them to grow into the likeness of its founder, Jesus. If it fulfills this office, it is as essential to social unity as is the school or the legislature. But its method must be its own. Unlike government, it furnishes not the external force for social unity, but must stimulate and educate the social instincts in the individual life by appealing to the moral and religious nature. If it neglects this office, it fails of performing its proper functions and will be outgrown—a danger which, if not imminent, is at least, to judge from certain phases of modern sociological literature, not unexpected by some serious thinkers.

Thus the nature of its social office determines the ends by which the church must work. It is not to take the place of the school, or of government, or of institutions of popular amusement. Its work, to say the very least, must be coördinate with that of these others, but, if it would be a source of union rather than of disintegration, it must deal with those elements of human nature that find expression in religion.

1. It must appeal to and stand for life, not philosophy.

Christianity has always been marked by the two tendencies so indispensable for every evolutionary process. On the one hand, it has been a cause of disintegration in that it has stimulated men to originality and therefore difference in thought. On the other hand, it has tended toward unity within the region of common religious life. The most casual knowledge of the evolution of the Christian centuries corroborates these statements. On the one hand are the wars of the theologians, and on the other that beautiful unity of Christian spirit which makes it possible for Christians of all shades of belief to use the hymns and litanies of those with whose teachings they differ. Sometimes the Christian church has attempted to make the disintegrating tendency integrate, to bring unity into thought by the appeal to authority. Practically the earliest reference to the rise of an autocratic bishop

patristic literature has preserved for us is in connection with the preservation of correctness in doctrine. Indeed, the great structure of the Roman church and the growth of the New Testament canon are the results of the attempt made by earnest men and women in the early Christian centuries to bring men into orthodoxy. Protestantism, although originating in a revolt against coerced uniformity, and often overemphasizing Christian individualism, has itself, within the limits of separate denominations, too often attempted likewise the impossible task of accomplishing universal, authoritative orthodoxy. The result of all these efforts to reverse the natural workings of Christian forces has ultimately been failure. No reform can run long against nature. Heresy, like the church, has sprung from the blood of its martyrs. But coercion, though it still exists, is becoming an anachronism. We are getting to understand — though in some quarters very slowly — that a man who differs from us in opinion is not of necessity a bad and blasphemous man. In the same proportion as each denomination recognizes that its work is not to force men to pronounce accurately some shibboleth, but to create God-fearing, man-loving, honest lives, does it come to insist upon such teachings as are born of universal Christian experience rather than of disproportionate emphasis upon the interpretation of the Scripture. By endeavoring to give men more abundant life rather than a more voluminous theology the church will far more than now contribute toward denominational unity, and also toward a magnificent Christian unity that will not only embrace theological opponents, but bind together social classes as well. But for the church to attempt to save society by philosophy made over into a theology is desperate foolishness. Theology, invaluable, indispensable as it is, always has been and always will be a disintegrating force. To simplify theology is to help unify society. With all the stern realities of uncoördinated social life pressing in upon Christian people, it is suicidal to waste time discussing iota subscripts and the calculus of religion. The way of the church to social efficiency does not lie through heresy trials. If it would make toward unity, its appeal must be to life; and, so far as social

significance goes, the church that does not make this appeal is dead while it lives.

And what is true of religious philosophy is just as true of any other. Church members may hold different opinions as to socialism, monarchy, trusts, prohibition, evolution, and a thousand other things, but a church as a social institution is concerned with none of them. It must educate its members in the principles governing Christian conduct; it must teach them to do right at any cost; it must bring them into vital relationship with God, that their lives may get something of the divine expansion; and then it must trust them to act freely as their own intelligence and judgment dictate. As matters are today, with moral and religious teaching barred from the schools, with the state rightly but unfortunately held to be unconcerned with religion, with colleges and universities increasingly emphasizing learning and method rather than moral discipline, this educative, coördinating work of the Christian church is imperative. It alone can devote itself to that side of the elemental humanity which religion represents. If it fails in its duty here, not only will individual lives grow poorer because imperfectly developed, but the whole structure of society will suffer. The most skeptical and most irreligious of statesmen have recognized the truth of this statement, and however much they may have judged their own lives superior to the need of the religious motive, they have been anxious to maintain the church as an institution for the masses.

But the church is something more than a *deus ex machina*, and preaching is something more than a terrifying of the masses into social order and decency by an appeal to their fear of bogies. Religion, I venture to repeat, is a constituent element in human life, and, if developed along the lines indicated by a real Christianity, produces men who will constitute the better environment for which all sociologists plead. I do not mean merely that these persons will be active in seeing that reforms come to pass. Christian people are thus active despite the apathy of certain of their number and the laments of certain men whose zeal has made them as unfair as pessimistic.

Besides such assistance rendered by Christian people, each individual church has a definite social task to perform. It is an institution of its neighborhood, and as the world with Christ in it is a different thing from the world with Christ out of it, so a community, a ward, a neighborhood possessing a genuine church is better than it could possibly be without such a church. Social environment and public opinion are only other names for men and women. As men and women grow purer and more generous, and their virtues get socialized in some institution, social environment and public opinion must improve. It is here that the local church becomes of social importance. I not only is producing Christian people, but, if it is properly performing its duty, it is coördinating, socializing their influence.

But it must work out from life. It cannot socialize theological opinion. That is an affair of each individual soul. And if the church has to do with life, then it must be ready to coördinate all the aspects of life. There is a Christianity outside the church; there are customs and institutions made necessary by the course of social development; there are other virtues than the ecclesiastical. All these must be preserved, not destroyed. Jesus gave much of his teaching at dinners. Shall the ideal of the church be asceticism, which is but another word for social disintegration? Paul preached as he worked at his trade. Shall the Christian be taught that life can be split into religion and business? Jesus had pity upon the hungry. Shall a church neglect the poor in its region—or in any region? This does not make it necessary or desirable for a church to identify itself with any special political reform. That is not the function of a church, but of a state. Let the church cease to be a theological lectureship, and, without puzzling men with strange theologies and stranger class sympathies, train them in the experience of Christian living, and under the guidance of God they will be able as individual citizens to devise wise means by which social institutions and economic conditions and political machinery shall so embody the Christian spirit as shall make a Christian society less a matter of rhetoric, and Christian living easier for all classes.

This is not to say that the unity which thus the church is to assist in producing will be absolute uniformity. Absolute similarity in work and character is impossible so long as society does not return to primitive savagery. Christianity and Christian fellowship are not identical with an immediate abolition of social classes. In the present stage of human development it is a part of human nature for men and women of similar instincts and occupations to segregate. Only the anarchist plans to destroy social organization, and even he expects that after it has been thoroughly disintegrated its individuals will recombine in other and, as he believes, better groups. An army is a unity, but its very unity is a matter of organization. The spirit of Christianity is not that of individualism gone mad. What it will accomplish will be, not the destruction of social organization, but a social unity in which inevitable economic and even social differentiation will be complemented by oneness in spirit. Economic classes may remain, but social hatreds must disappear. Utopian as this may seem to a society in which competition has not yet succumbed to solidarity of interest and the spirit of Christian fellowship, the time must come when in some way or other, either with or without revolution, wealth and poverty, learning and ignorance, as well as all other accidental differences, will cease to divide men and prevent the growth of human fraternity. What society under such conditions will then resemble no man can prophesy. Perhaps these differences themselves may have been largely abolished, although it is not clear that the ideal will be reached by any socialistic program. But, however or whenever attained, it will be seen that Christianity has had the largest rôle in its accomplishment. Social unity is a fellowship in life, not in opinion or vocation, and nowhere do human lives so readily, so finally, enter into fellowship as before the altar of a God who has been revealed as Father by a Son of Man.

2. And this brings us to the heart of the whole matter, as far as the church is concerned. God is the correlative of religion. One cannot develop, or even appeal to, the religious instincts of man sanely or healthfully except by showing how they may

find satisfaction in his God. To attempt to satisfy a religious longing by a phrase or by a philosophy or by high-class amusements is to give men a stone when they have asked for bread. The church is something more than one among many social institutions. It is society's priest—that which mediates God to a race that can but does not worship. If religion is to play any part in the accomplishment of social unity, God must be treated seriously, and men must be bound together by being bound to him.

Religious thought has lately been marked by an insistence upon the immanence of God in nature; whereas he was once thought of as transcendent, and to be brought over into nature only through some bold anthropomorphism, we are now getting glimpses of a God who is always with us, whose will does not push the planets in their courses, but who is in some true sense force itself. It is hard to believe that such a philosophy any more than any other exhausts reality, and it is not yet demonstrable that God and matter are the same substance. But this new thought of God satisfies the religious wants, and the unimaginable stretch of space seems less fearful as one thinks that God is present wherever his will acts.

But for some of us, men and women are more important than the stars. Dare we think that God is as much in humanity as in heavenly space? If the thunder is still his voice, can that voice also be heard in the succession of empires, the rise of social classes, the whole sweep of social evolution? Or is God only a convenient name for the social mind, and is the materialism which in physical science is passing from atheism to agnosticism to be intrenched in sociology?

All the logic of the schools cannot prevent a theist from believing that if God be in nature he must also be in humanity; that whatever he be in one part of his universe, that he must be in another; that he who keeps the universe from tumbling into chaos is also watching over every Zion and keeping every Israel.

Nor can such a God care only for politics and war. Shall he be a God of armies and not a God of labor unions and corporations? Shall he be a God of battle and not a God of strikes?

And if no such distinction is possible, then the man who prayed for victory in war may pray for fraternity in peace, and the church that insists upon religion as a social bond must also preach a God whose presence gives efficacy to every effort toward the silencing of social discontent, who is himself the inspiration of all social as well as individual effort. Social reform needs reinforcement at just this point. It is not enough to clean up the slums, to build schoolhouses with playgrounds, to appoint boards of arbitration. All these and countless other reforms, provided only they are not reforms against nature, are necessary and invaluable. But what promise is there in them of a completed social evolution? In addition to reform, men need to feel that there is something more powerful making for social peace than even regenerate men in a new environment. That something is a God. Only he must be no fate that sits and grins at human misery, but one who is the guardian of widows and orphans, who knows our human needs, and who can so work upon the hearts of men that they shall turn from injustice to justice and from selfishness to love.

I know the response likely to be made to this. It is a return to the faith of childhood, and that for men is very difficult. It is easy to see God in the calculable, impersonal course of sun and comet, but it is tragically hard to see him in the economic world in which one struggles. One may even be indifferent as to whether God really works in the law of gravitation; but what if he be said to work in Gresham's law or the iron law of wages? It is easier, then, to fall back on social psychology and leave God to the theologian.

But, none the less, there are the facts of social evolution, and, despite its own questions, the church must take up its Master's work, and, while it teaches men to be kind and helpful, it must also insist that they can believe in a God that still loves and reigns; who in the last analysis is the basis of social law—the One who will give men the kingdom.

Times change, but man and God and faith survive. With many a David mad to wrest from some unwilling Nabal the

wealth he holds to be his by equity, if not by law; with many a Nabal clinging to privilege and monopoly he is too blind to see are another's quite as much as his own; out from our storm-and-stress period, we, too, believe that humanity is something more than selfishness and that life is more than meat. But we need to be taught that religion is social as well as individualistic; that from the union of lives alone there can result safety and peace; and that the bundle into which lives are to be bound must be the life of God. Only the church that sets before itself this social service is working in the spirit of its Master; it alone really appreciates its responsibility in converting society into the kingdom of God.

SHAILER MATHEWS.


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE MODEL PUBLIC BATH AT BROOKLINE.

THE new public bath of Brookline, Mass., is a noteworthy and unique institution. It bears the distinction of being the first municipal, all-the-year-round bathing establishment in the United States having swimming facilities as well as cleanliness baths. It is a model institution, for it embodies in its construction and management many suggestive features for other cities and towns looking to the same wise provision for the people. Brookline has shown what an inland town can do to offset the disadvantages of having no water frontage. It has proved that a public bath can be erected which will be patronized by every class. It has further demonstrated the feasibility of making the art of swimming more generally acquired, and it has established the fact that by a small fee a public bath can be made almost, if not entirely, self-supporting.

The proposition to establish a public bath was first presented at a town meeting in 1895, when a committee of three was authorized to proceed in the matter. This committee was composed of Dr. H. Lincoln Chase, agent of the board of health; Mr. James B. Hand, formerly connected with the same board, and Miss Martha Edgerly, of the board of trustees of the poor. The best points in all baths, home and foreign, were utilized by the architect, Mr. F. Joseph Untersee, of Brookline, the finished structure costing \$40,000, exclusive of the land.

The bath is centrally located near the railroad station and close to the finely equipped new high school. It faces the principal public playground. The handsome building is in T-shape, with 86 feet front and a depth of 129 feet, its materials being water-struck brick and limestone. The head-house has a handsome main entrance in the center, and contains a vestibule, hall, and waiting-room, with office for attendants, the last being supplied with cupboards for bathing suits and towels. On the left, as one enters, is the room for private bathing, fitted up with three tubs and six Gegenström showers, with room for more.



THE NEW PUBLIC BATH AT BROOKLINE, MASS.

The size of each rain-bath is 4×4 , with a dressing alcove of the same dimensions. On the right is the swimming-school room, 28×26 , containing a swimming tank, 10×24 , which varies in depth from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 feet. This room has also a rain-bath and six double dressing-rooms. The rain-baths are all of the Gegenström pattern, which permits the bather to regulate the temperature of the water to suit himself.

Doors at either side of the superintendent's office admit to the main part of the building, which contains the natatorium and spectators' gallery. The apartment is 48 feet wide, 99 feet long, and 32 feet high to the apex of the vaulted ceiling. This splendid hall is finely lighted by arched and gable windows on the three sides, and a large skylight, 15×52 . The flooring is all of artificial stone. The tank is 80×26 and has an average of $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet of water. A heavy brass guard-rail is placed at the edge of the tank, having marble cuspidors at regular intervals. Steps of Tennessee marble lead into the water at the four corners.

A very suggestive feature consists in having 42 dressing-rooms around the tank, with passageways, 3 feet 6 inches, on either side. This special arrangement (to be found only in the best and most recently equipped bathing establishments of the continent) has many advantages. Among them are the convenience of keeping clean the inner passageway around the tank, the better ventilation of the dressing-rooms, and better order among the bathers. The inner passageway next the tank is used only by patrons in swimming costumes, and the outer for entrance and exit. In the center south end of the hall are three rain-baths, and two additional ones are located at each side of the north end, all being provided with foot-baths. These are used for the preliminary cleansing bath, which is required before the bather is allowed to go into the swimming tank.

The large swimming tank, like the small instruction tank, is lined with white glazed brick on the sides, but the floors are covered with light adamantine mosaic, as bricks would be too slippery. This lining is visible through the perfect transparency

of the water, making a remarkably dainty bath. One may venture to say that the construction of these swimming tanks could not be improved.

A very important feature of the Brookline bath is the heating of the water and the floors, to which considerable thought and ingenuity has been applied. The disadvantages of other swimming baths inhere in the fact that the water is generally of varying temperature because of the natural tendency of warmer water to rise to the surface. Ordinary methods of steam injection were out of the question because of the noise and the danger from the pipes. By the system devised, the water in the tanks, taken from the public water supply, is constantly changing; yet the standard temperature, from 75 to 80° F., is easily maintained. A four-inch supply pipe from the city main was brought in from the street and around the side of the tank to the farther end, where water is admitted at the bottom. Five Y-branches in the supply pipe (into each of which a steam condenser with a valve was screwed) regulate the temperature of the water flowing into the tank. Entering at slow velocity, the warm water is expected to spread and rise to the surface as it passes down to the opposite end. When the tank is full, water is drawn from the bath at the street end and at the bottom by a No. 5 pulso-meter, thus thoroughly mixing the stratum that would otherwise remain on the surface; steam is then forced around the supply pipe, the street connection being closed, and the temperature of the tank is equably maintained. Impurities, if present, are constantly swept from the surface of the water by a superficial current from a large copper gargoyle (a dolphin carrying the infant Neptune) at one end of the tank. Steam-pipes passing under the main hall keep warm the stone floors of the dressing-rooms and corridors.

Two horizontal tubular boilers in the front basement furnish the steam to heat the entire building. The spectators' gallery (also used as a running track) is reached by a stairway from the entrance hall, which also conducts the visitor to the handsome club-rooms lately fitted up in the second story of the head-house.

The building also contains a steam laundry for suits and towels, toilet-rooms, and every modern convenience, including a hair-drying room for women.

In the management of the institution those in charge have found, in two years' experience, that the fee system not only promotes self-respect, but also decorum and good order, and helps to make the bath self-supporting. The bathing charge, which includes provision of suit, soap, and towel, ranges from 5 cents during the day to 10, 15, and 25 cents in the evening. The fee for non-residents is 25 and 50 cents. About 46,000 baths were taken last year, at a net cost to the town for maintenance of \$3,000, which will be greatly reduced this year. About 12,000 baths were free, for on two days in the week no charge is made. Most of the time the use of the natatorium is free to school children. It is an interesting fact that, though swimming instruction is not absolutely compulsory, it is now a part of the regular school curriculum in Brookline, and the expense, \$500, is defrayed from the school funds. Three experienced teachers of swimming are employed by the town, who use the Prussian method of pole and belt. During the past year 6,130 swimming baths, with or without instruction, were taken by pupils of the Brookline public schools. A large number of these were taught to swim, and it is expected that eventually most of the school children will learn to swim sufficiently well to save their own lives if in danger, and possibly those of others. The impulse given to the noble art of swimming extends beyond the immediate vicinity. A considerable number of Wellesley college girls and of students from the Boston Normal School of Gymnastics patronize the Brookline natatorium. Two flourishing clubs, the Brookline Swimming Club and the Brookline High-School Swimming Association, are the immediate outcome of the building of the bath.

The rules and regulations issued by the management appear to be the embodiment of hygienic science and common-sense. Bathing suits of material without nap and of fast colors only are permitted. Persons who are in the least indisposed are denied the use of the bath. Every bather is given five minutes for a warm shower-bath with soap before entering the swimming tank.

The maximum time for a swim is thirty minutes. Spitting into the water is forbidden, as is also the use of tobacco in the building. Bathers are given wise instructions as to health. They are directed to keep moving in the water, to dress and undress promptly, and after bathing to take a brisk walk in the open air.

Taken all together, the Brookline institution, as a combined recreative and cleanliness bath, is defending the sound sentiment engraved over its door: "The health of the people is the beginning of happiness."

J. A. STEWART.

BOSTON, MASS.

SOCIAL CONTROL. XIV.

EDUCATION.

THE hackneyed metaphors, "potter's clay," "wax tablet," "bent twig," "tender osier," and other images used for childhood are so many ways of emphasizing its high suggestibility. The mark of the young mind is an absence of fixed habits, of stubborn volitions, of persistent ways of acting. The staunch personality that can plow through counter-suggestions as tremorless as an iron-clad in a flight of arrows we look for only in the adult. The child gradually builds it as a worm builds its worm-cast—out of material taken in from without. And this original dependence on surroundings holds true alike of martyr and of milksop, of moral hero and of weakling. They differ only in their power to form fixed habits. "The ethical life itself, the boy's, the girl's conscience is born in the stress of the conflicts of suggestion, born right out of his imitative hesitations."¹ Not long ago it was the fashion to magnify heredity and belittle surroundings. But the close study of infancy has shown that much we charged to blood is really due to example. The close mental and moral resemblances to parents are largely the result of imitation. "Heredity does not stop with birth; it is then only beginning."² "Under limitations of heredity" the child "*makes up his personality . . .* by imitation out of the 'copy' set in the actions, temper, emotions, of the persons who build around him the social inclosure of his childhood."³ He "reflects the whole system of influences coming to stir his sensibilities. And just in as far as his sensibilities are stirred, he imitates, and forms habits of imitating; and habits?—they are character!"⁴

Now, this early suggestibility, which has become so huge and pregnant a fact to the psychology of today, has always been more or less clearly apprehended by thinkers. For upon this

¹ J. M. BALDWIN, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, p. 360.

² *Ibid.*, p. 361.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 358.

and this only rests the time-honored policy of founding social order on a system of education.

Most, though not quite all, of the moral possibilities that lie in education are bound up in some way or other with the power of suggestion. There is, first of all, the training received in school or on playground from mingling with other children on a footing of equality. "All the ways of men," says Goldsmith, "are practiced in a public school in miniature." In this microcosm the too obstreperous ego gets a wholesome dressing down. There is formed a habit of moderating one's claims, of respecting others' rights, and of hitting upon those moral solutions known as "justice," which is most precious for the larger society of the adult. Closely related to this is the training to self-control and the habit of obedience to an external law which are given by a good school discipline. Another gain lies in the partial substitution of the teacher for the parent as the model upon which the child forms itself. Copy the child will, and the advantage of giving him his teacher instead of his father to imitate is that the former is a picked person, while the latter is not. Childhood is, in fact, the heyday of personal influence. The position of the teacher gives him prestige, and the lad will take from him suggestions that the adult will accept only from rare and splendid personalities. The committing of education to superior persons lessens our dependence on magnetic men. It is a way of economizing Savonarola or Wesley or Phillips Brooks.

We must allow an effect to the continual impact of precept. Whether as the master's exhortation, as oft-quoted injunction, as memorized text, or as schoolroom motto, a persistent suggestion as to conduct, provided it really strike the attention and be brought home by illustration and instance, ought to count for something. The mere droning or dinning of maxims is perhaps vain, but that which is really *taught* certainly tends to *sink in*. The present contempt for such direct methods of impressing the will is an accident, due to the fact that the reigning skepticism usually cuts for the man the bands in which precept has bound the child. Let us not forget that the immemorial device of stationary societies to preserve their ancient order has been to

make certain traditional wisdom the sole subject of study. The mere learning by rote of *Analects*, or *Vedas*, or *Koran*, or *Thorah* has been for thousands of years not unjustly deemed of great effect in molding character and fixing habits of thought.

Again, education can give that direction to a child's likes and dislikes, enthusiasms and scorns, which will lead to the adoption of a desired ideal. The born teacher is able to kindle zeal at the right flame and "fix the generous purpose in the breast." In poetry, song, religion, national history, legend, fable, and fairy tale are imbedded seizing characters which draw down love or hate according to the way in which they are presented. In the soul of the pupil the subtle and innocent Jesuitry of the school-master is thus able to weld feelings to ideas in ways which that pupil will never discover later on.

Finally, it is possible to fix in the plastic child mind principles upon which, later, may be built a huge structure of practical consequence. For thus out of sight in the impressions of childhood lie the foundations of many a man's theory of conduct and philosophy of life. Undoubtedly when reason is fully active the man revises his beliefs, tearing down the hastily run up structures of youth and building anew. But, while dislodging stone after stone that has been laid in the mortar of bad logic, he rarely disturbs the deep concrete foundation that, clinging to the bedrock of his mind with the grip of early suggestion, seems to be a part of his very self. Building on some early moral or intellectual prejudice such as the divine government, the harmony of public and private interests, the coincidence of virtue and happiness, the sacredness of law, the dignity of magistrates, society is able to get the individual on its side almost for nothing. It is this planting of seed ideas Callicles had in mind when he says (Plato's *Gorgias*): "We take the best and strongest from their youth upward and tame them like young lions—charming them with the sound of the voice and saying to them that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honorable and just."

Thus and thus can education help in "breaking in" the colt to the harness. But education is far from being always and

everywhere a moral instrument. True, it does not follow the preferences of the child: it is always *provided*. But if it is provided by the parent, it will reflect the parent's desire to fit his child for *practical* life, to equip him for success in the struggle for existence. If education is provided by a sect, it will reflect the zeal of the sect to fit for *eternal* life, to equip the soul for salvation. Finally, if it is provided by society, it will reflect the desire of society to fit for *social* life. While these distinctions are real enough, the purposes may blend somewhat. The parent comes to prize good character as a means to getting on, while the state finds that one way to lessen law-breaking is to equip its children to earn a living. Moreover, the parent may be held responsible for the education he provides, as when he is commanded: "Thou shalt teach them [your children] the words of the law, speaking of them when thou sittest in thine house and when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down and when thou risest up. And thou shalt write them upon the doorposts of thine house and upon thy gates" (Deut. 11: 18-20). Or the sect may, as in the case of Magi, Brahmins, or Churchmen, become virtually a social organ. If we regard as undoubted engine of social control only that school education which is provided gratuitously for all children by some great social organ, then this engine has not always been set in motion. There are, indeed, several factors which condition the appearance of a free public education.

Stage of social development is one. When society is still patriarchal and the commonwealth reposes on families, education remains the appanage of the parent. Heads of families being the authors and mainstays of social order, moral education may, as in old Israel, Homeric Greece, early Rome, Persia, and China, be readily committed to their care. When, as in military Sparta, social existence is staked on the fidelity and prowess of the individual man, the state thrusts the parent to one side and imposes a discipline of its own. There seems, too, to be an inverse relation between force and education, between direct and indirect methods of control. Rome, strong in lictors and legions, ignored education. The Jews, backward in political organization

or dispersed among alien races, must needs impose the yoke of their law by school and synagogue rather than by scourge and prison.

A third factor is the intelligence and self-consciousness of society. The schooling of the young is a long-headed device to promote order, and does not get adopted till the group becomes aware of its task and its resources. At first it is the rare thinker who sees anything in it, and his arguments do not always prevail. Down to the Reformation only the Greek philosophers and the Jewish rabbis had set forth the possibilities of education in respect to social order. Men trust the policeman and the priest sooner than the pedagogue. To collect little plastic lumps of human dough from private households and shape them on the social kneading-board exhibits a faith in the power of suggestion which few peoples ever attain to. And so it happens that now, when the rôle of the priest in the social economy seems drawing to an end, the rôle of the schoolmaster appears to have just begun. The technique of belief and religion has been understood for thousands of years; but the technique of education is the discovery of yesterday—or, better yet, tomorrow.

The aims that have dominated the historical systems of education have not been dictated solely by society's instinct of self-preservation, but reflect other paramount social needs as well.

The informing purpose of the earlier types of education—Egypt, India, China, Israel—was the shaping of human pulp in a rigid traditional mold. The means of reconciling order with progress were not then understood or discussed. In existing institutions it was not possible to part the essential from the accidental. The only fabric that men could conceive of was the existing one, and hence social stability seemed bound up with conservatism. Immovable these civilizations were certainly not, but their slow secular drift had little to do with conscious change. Education, therefore, consisted in so hypnotizing the young with the ancient lore that free exercise of the mind on religious, ethical, or political matters should be impossible. They were to be stung and paralyzed with tradition, thrown into a mental catalepsy by exclusive contact with sacred books and

classics edited, interpreted, and, perhaps, even doctored by a priestly caste. To make men torpid and peaceable by making them resigned, to get them to accept the social system as they accept the order of nature, to clothe law and religion with such prestige that the individual, unable to see over them or around them, bows the head submissively — such were the aims of early education.

In Greece conflicting tendencies were at work. In Sparta the state was a great educational institution, and warrior-citizens were deliberately turned out according to pattern. "At seven years Spartan children," says Plutarch, "were enrolled in certain companies and classes, where they all lived under the same order and discipline, doing their exercises and taking their play together. Of these he who showed the most conduct and courage was made captain. They had their eyes always upon him, obeyed his orders, and underwent patiently whatever punishment he inflicted; so that the whole course of their education was one continued exercise of a ready and perfect obedience."¹

In Athens there was no state system, and the child was educated primarily for himself. The profound and just reflections of the philosophers on the rôle that early suggestion might play in the control apparatus of society² never gave direction to Athenian education. But while social order had little help from the school, Athens gave birth to noble ideals of personal development, which have been the guiding stars of liberal minds ever since. Rome throughout her history showed a strange apathy in respect to education. The fact that the wholesome, character-forming home training of the child did not give way to schools until Roman power had become consolidated suggests that Rome put her trust in physical force rather than in ideas.

The Christian church, rapt by mystical visions, gave, at first, little heed to anything but soul-saving. When, later, much the same blood coursed in the veins of the church and the world, she settled down into a useful, though somewhat unmanageable, social organ engaged in the establishing of order with tools of

¹ PLUTARCH'S *Lycurgus*.

² PLATO, *Laws*, VI, § 766; *Protagoras*, p. 147.

a peculiar edge and a strange temper. During the Middle Ages state and church roughly divided the work of control, the one monopolizing the direct, the other the indirect means. The contrast of coercion and influence was symbolized in the maxim that the state has to do with the body, the church with the soul.

Under this arrangement the education of the young fell to the church. The clergy were granted a legal monopoly, and no lay teaching was allowed. But this was, after all, only a slender strand in the work of the church. Armed with other-world terrors she grappled boldly with the adult mind, and chose to preach rather than to teach. It mattered little that, at best, the poor were instructed in the catechism and the rudiments of religion. If not by schools, then by her worship and ceremonial, the church managed to indoctrinate with her beliefs. The delicate art of creating in the child, by means of skillful suggestions, a lasting bias for the good, and a rooted prejudice in favor of righteousness, remained for later thinkers to discover.

The fate of higher education in the Middle Ages shows how loth is society to treat even the teaching of adults as a private affair. The early aggregations of masters and scholars at Paris and Oxford and Bologna came near to affording an open market for instruction. But the free dealing of the buyers and sellers of teaching was soon meddled with, and, by hook or crook, a regulative finger was laid on the windpipe of learning. By bulls, charters, or "licenses to teach," the old university which had originated independently alike of the civil and the papal authority was brought under the central organs of control. Moreover, the university itself became a close corporation, fitted in due time by its timid sense of responsibility and its conservative temper to become a pillar of order.

With the Reformation the elementary schools received a prodigious impulse. From the advent of the reformers dates primary instruction in Scotland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Protestant Germany. The schools were necessary to Protestantism, for they stiffened private judgment against the authority of tradition. The appeal to the Bible as interpreted by the individual

conscience was a barren mockery unless the people knew how to read.

The same century saw the rise of a secondary education, based on the Greek and Latin classics. Perfected by the Jesuits and imitated by the rest of the world, this classical training, which reigned until this century and has only slowly been dislodged from its seats, is a most interesting device of control over the middle and ruling classes. For a pyramidal society putting a severe strain on obedience the safest and best education is one that wears away the energy of youth in mental gymnastics, directs the glance toward the past, cultivates the memory rather than the reason, gives polish rather than power, encourages acquiescence rather than inquiry, and teaches to versify rather than to think. It is natural that teachers in meeting such requirements should construct a system that favors the humanities rather than the sciences, literature and language rather than history, and the forms of literature rather than the substance.

The great democratic upheavals changed again the aim of education. The old preoccupation with the other life disappeared before the political purpose. Thinkers flaming with generous wrath at the parasitism of the upper orders demanded enlightenment as a means of arming the people against their despoilers. "No people in a state of civilization," said Jefferson, "can stay ignorant and free." Schools alone render the people "the safe, as they are the only legitimate, guardians of their liberty." This origin in revolt gave the public education of France and America that almost exclusively intellectual cast which it still retains. While latterly this political motive is dying away, the successful working of democratic government is making ever greater demands upon the intelligence of the common man, and the disposition to educate for citizenship at the public expense is ever more marked.¹

¹ "So long as the direction of man's institutional life was in the hands of one or the few, the need for a wide diffusion of political intelligence was not strongly felt. The divine right of kings found its correlative in the diabolical ignorance of the masses. There was no educational ideal, resting upon a social and political necessity, that was broad enough to include the whole people. But the rapid widening of

But the newer policy in this matter has not been shaped wholly by self-interest. Humanitarian sentiment is certainly a factor in the perfecting of schools, and socialism comes in at the end of the century to push on what democracy started. Contending in the social mind with the motives of utility is the generous ideal of an education at the public expense aiming at a free and harmonious personal development for all. For this old Greek vision is, in a way, the only solution of the difficulty of our time. The old societies dreaded change. So they sought to run each generation into conventional molds, and were worried if any traces of individuality still remained. Our western societies, on the other hand, have embraced the idea of progress and made it a part of their tradition. In the faith that the present will be surpassed they would prepare their youth to initiate, or at least welcome, progress. Hence they have thrown away their rigid molds. For them, as for the Athenians, there remains no satisfying ideal of education save the fullest development, in body and spirit, of every child within the state.

Nevertheless, we should go very far wrong to suppose that the systematic employment of instruction for the purposes of control has, in any wise, been neglected in modern educational policies. Amid the stress of new aims—political, civic, ideal—the strictly practical object of promoting morality and order by means of teaching has not been thrust aside or forgotten. The avowal that free education is an economical system of police sounds rather brutal in this smooth-spoken age. It shocks the public and chills teachers. But now and then the cat is let out of the bag. Swift declared that “all nations have agreed in the necessity of a strict education which consisted in the observance of moral duties.” Burke regarded a religious education as “the cheap defense of nations.” Napoleon said frankly: “It is

the basis of sovereignty has changed all that. No deeper conviction pervades the people of the United States and of France, who are the most aggressive exponents of democracy, than that the preservation of liberty under the law, and of the institutions that are our precious possession and proud heritage, depends upon the intelligence of the whole people. It is on this unshakable foundation that the argument for public education at public expense really rests.”—N. M. BUTLER, *The Meaning of Education*, pp. 108-9.

impossible, indeed, to remain long in the present state of things, since everyone may now set up a shop for education, as he would a shop for broadcloth."¹ "I feel called upon to organize a system of education for the new generation, such that both political and moral opinions may be duly regulated thereby."² "It seems to me that the special and the private schools ought all to be united, and brought under the cognizance of the education corps, which body ought to be so constituted as to have under its eye every child from the age of nine years."³ And this "corps" was to be "an order, not of Jesuits whose head resides at Rome, but of Jesuits whose sole ambition shall be to make themselves useful, and who shall have no interest separated from that of the public."⁴ Webster, in his Plymouth oration, said: "By general instruction we seek as far as possible to purify the whole atmosphere, to keep good sentiments uppermost, and to turn the strong current of feeling and opinion, as well as the censures of the law and the denunciations of religion, against immorality and crime." Elsewhere he terms the public schools "a wise and liberal system of police, by which property and the peace of society are secured." In Macaulay's view, "whoever has a right to hang has a right to educate." "The gross ignorance of the common people is a principal cause of danger to our persons and property. Therefore it is the duty of the government to take care that the common people shall not be grossly ignorant." "By some means government must protect persons and property. If you take away education, what means do you leave? . . . You leave guns and bayonets, stocks and whipping-posts, treadmills, solitary cells, penal colonies, gibbets."⁵

There are some to whom the spectacle of the modern secular state carefully and deliberately disengaging its vital interests from the ancient body of beliefs, to which they have so long been attached,⁶ recalls the reckless song in Faust, "*Ich habe*

¹ PELET, *Napoleon in Council*, p. 206.

² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

⁵ Speech on Education, April 18, 1847.

⁶ See PEARSON, *National Life and Character*, chap. iv.

mein' Sache auf nichts gestellt." But, in truth, these Cassandras see only a part of what is going on. The ebb of religion is only half a fact, the other half is the high tide of education. While the priest is leaving the civil service the schoolmaster is coming in. As the state shakes itself loose from the church it reaches out for the school. Step by step with disestablishment of religion proceeds the establishment of education; so that today the moneys, public or private, set apart for schools and universities far surpass the mediæval endowments of abbeys and sees.

Meanwhile we are in the era of educational monstrosities born of the unnatural union of church and school. In the countries where the state has founded the elementary school every conceivable compromise between the old and the new can be found. We find religious instruction given as part of the regular curriculum; given during school hours, but by an outsider; given outside of school hours, but within the school building; given apart from the school, but paid for with school funds. In quantity likewise there is every gradation. We find religious instruction *ad libitum*; instruction in stated subjects, such as Bible, catechism, and sacred history; instruction solely in the Bible; no formal instruction, but simply religious exercises; no exercise save the reading of the Bible without comment. We find state-aided church schools, elementary public schools with compulsory religious instruction, religious instruction save at special request, religious instruction only at special request. What are these but so many stages in the emergence of the chick from the shell? The fact that there are all these stations on the road to emancipation, and the fact that the school, having reached one station, never goes back to an earlier one, are of profound significance. They reveal, underneath the medley of systems, an almost world-wide drift from religion toward education as the method of indirect social restraint.

This is not all. In most cases the teaching in the common school has been given an intellectual bias, not because anybody demanded it, but because the sects, in their mutual jealousy, have gradually canceled out of public education nearly every atom of religious instruction. That this has come more by

accident than by design does not help the fact that the school has thereby lost much of the character-forming power that originally gave it a claim on society. It has become less an instrument of social control than an aid to individual success. Not that intellectual education is without a moral value.

By giving men a clearer view of their true interests it contributes largely to the proper regulation of life; by opening a wide range of new and healthy interests it diverts them from much vice; by increasing their capacity for fighting the battle of life it takes away many temptations, though it undoubtedly creates and strengthens some; and it seldom fails to implant in the character serious elements of discipline and self-control.¹

But this is not enough. Something more massive is needed as a breakwater against vice and crime and that moral decay which is worse than either. In India, Japan, France, Italy, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, and Australia there are complaints that the school is not doing all it might do. In view of the decay of faith and the inexorable eviction of religious teaching from the school the cry goes up for a secular civic and moral education that shall effectively minister to peace and order.

Just what shape this new education will take no one can say. Some things, however, are certain. It will not be merely one more branch of study like ethics or civics. It will not be an intellectual system with bad metaphysics instead of theology as its corner-stone. It will not consist in the droning of moral abstractions. It will begin early. It will give great scope to the personal influence of the teacher. It will be realistic, and its starting-point will be the facts of personal and social life. It will form moral prepossessions rather than intellectual prejudices. It will strive "to store up moral power in good habits." It will seek not so much to fix certain principles by authority as to directly suggest actions and feelings and modes of viewing conduct.

In this attempt there will be, at first, much to call forth laughter—or tears. Only few teachers have the gift of personal influence; the rest must learn with awkwardness and stumbling. In time character-forming will be understood and taught to the teaching

¹ LECKY, *Democracy and Liberty*, Vol. II, p. 63.

craft. Still it may always have in it something of the fine art—something beyond the reach of ordinary persons. For a while the results on the young will not compare favorably with those of the old religious education. But it took the Jesuits a long time to perfect an education in the interests of the church; so let us not begrudge the time to perfect an education in the interests of society.

And let those who rebel at this prospect be reminded that the only alternative is to go back to state churches and church schools. A state educational machine with its semi-military organization of little children, its overriding of individual bent and preference, its appeals to head instead of heart, its rational morality, its colorless and jejune text-books, its official cult of ethical and civic principles, its cold-blooded fostering of patriotism, is far from attractive. But its unloveliest features seem comely, compared with the harsh and forbidding traits of a state church.

The near coalescence of physical and spiritual forces in the modern state may well inspire certain misgivings. When we note the enormous resources and high centralization of a first-class educational system; when we consider that it takes forcible possession of the child for half the time during its best years, and submits the creature to a uniform curriculum, devised more and more with reference to its own aims and less and less with reference to the wishes of the parent; when we consider that the democratic control of this formidable engine affords no guarantee that it will not be used for empire over minds, we may well be apprehensive of future developments. The chief security for spiritual freedom under this educating modern state seems to lie in the vigor of other spiritual associations lying over against the state to check it and redress the balance. The "free church in the free state," the press, the organization of science, the republic of letters, the voluntary cultural associations—these forbid the undue ascendancy of the control organization of society.

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THE RACE-PRESERVATION DOGMA.

AMONG the many dogmas with which the philosophy of social life abounds, one of the most deeply rooted in the minds of men in general, and of philosophers in particular, is the dogma of the preservation of the species. It is usually taken for granted, as an axiomatic truth, that the perpetuation of the race is the supreme object of all organic existence, and that it must be, or "ought to be," the ultimate standard by which human actions, when ethically considered, are to be measured, and ethical theories judged. Thus, Mr. Spencer, in order to justify his ethico-political doctrines, sets out with the "hypothetical postulate" that "the preservation of a particular species is a *desideratum*." From this postulate he concludes that, although the preservation of the species is subservient to that of its various individuals, yet the preservation of particular individuals must be subordinated to the preservation of all individuals, that is, of the species; and he speaks of the "ethical" and "quasi-ethical" (human and sub-human) "obligations" of the individuals to conform to the consequences derived from that postulate, and of the "justification" of "sacrifices, partial or complete," of some of the individuals for the maintenance and prosperity of the species.¹

Statements of this kind are open to the objection that they are likely to lead, through their indefiniteness, into very gross errors, when due attention is not paid, on the one hand, to the proper meaning of the words employed, and, on the other hand, to the difference between the real facts of nature, considered as concrete phenomena, and our formulation of them by means of conceptual terms. To this must be added that the introduction of the terminology of traditional ethics into the province of natural science is both illogical and dangerous. The personification, or objectification, of the concept "race" often makes us reason as if the race, or the species, were really something

¹ SPENCER, *Justice*, chap. i, § 4.

different from its constituent individual members; whence arises our habit of dwelling at great length, and with much satisfaction, on the frequent antagonisms between the welfare of the individual and the welfare of the race, without pausing to reflect why one group of individuals should be called the race rather than another, or why the preservation of one group should be more "justifiable" than the preservation of another group; or whether, when both groups are threatened in their very existence, there can really be any antagonism between their interests, in so far as their interests relate to the bare fact of the preservation of the groups in question.

Instead of constantly speaking, as we do, of the antagonism between "the race" and "the individual," it would be more proper to describe all cases of conflict as occurring between the interests of one or more individuals and the interests of the other individuals, it being obvious that neither side can be taken as the exclusive representative of the race at large. Nor is there, that I can see, any "ethical justification," founded on the "hypothetical postulate" (that the preservation of the race is a *desideratum*), for sacrificing the interests of one group to those of the other; for, whichever of the two may be destroyed, if this destruction does not involve the destruction of the other, the latter will remain as *the race*, and therefore the race will be preserved; while, if the destruction of one of the contending groups implies the destruction of the other, the case is evidently not one of conflict of interests, but, on the contrary, one of identity of interests; so that, on this supposition, it cannot be said that one group is sacrificed for the benefit of the other, but succumbs in the pursuance of its own interests. And where the more powerful portion of the race compels the other portion to sacrifice its interests without the interests of the weaker portion being otherwise threatened, the case is barely one of force and wholesale selfishness; and, whether the action be "ethically justifiable" or not, the justification can certainly not rest on the race-preservation postulate.

As a matter of fact, the much-spoken-of "rights of the community" are, when all rhetorical adornments have been trimmed

off, an unmistakable recognition of the truth that, in actual life, the inferior have to submit to the dictates of the superior, simply because the superior are the stronger. When my house is pulled down against my consent, that a railway may be built, I am coerced, by actual or possible force, to sacrifice my well-being and prosperity, as I understand them, to the well-being and prosperity of *others* (not of *the race*), as they understand them; and if anyone wish to "justify" the sacrifice, he must do so by holding that will and might make right, or else he must reject the legitimacy of the action in question. The theory that the race is to be preserved and improved is obviously inapplicable here, as in every other case; for I, together with others who find themselves in the same circumstances in which I am placed, may ask my opponents why they should be considered as the exclusive representatives of the race, or, rather, as being themselves the race, and why their prosperity, and not ours, should be identified with the prosperity of the race; and, whatever answers may be given to these questions, the answers cannot, without reasoning in a circle, be based on the "ultimate postulate" of the preservation of the race. This postulate, therefore, cannot be accepted as *sufficiently ultimate* to make it the foundation of morality, whether private or public. Should it be said to me that the well-being and preservation of the species refers to its continued existence in the future, and that the happiness of present generations is to be partly sacrificed to the happiness and existence of future generations, I can rejoin by asking whether this proposition is to be taken as an *a priori* truth or as an experiential fact. In the former case I shall again ask, Why? and in the latter case I shall say that experience does not seem to teach anything of the kind. I am not aware of any general line of conduct that men follow for the *exclusive* benefit of future generations. It is, of course, unreasonable to ask for proof of a proposition that is expressly presented as a postulate; but a postulate cannot be accepted unless it agrees with all the facts of experience and the deductions of reason, and these requirements are not fulfilled by the race-preservation postulate.

In reality, the preservation of the species is the natural result of the actions of individuals—it is the preservation of the individuals themselves, in their efforts, be it noticed, to preserve themselves, not the race. It is evident enough that if the individual be preserved the species will be preserved; that the individual endeavors to preserve himself, and is aware of this effort and its aim; that he neither thinks, nor is there any reason why he should think, of the future prosperity and development of the race; and that in all his actions no springs can be discerned that do not relate to present welfare. I do not see why the tendency to preserve the race, rather than the individual's tendency to preserve himself, should be given as an ultimate postulate. And the latter tendency is not only a postulate, but an experiential truth: the individual desires to live and be prosperous, and he lives and is prosperous; and from this the preservation and prosperity of the race naturally follow. That every individual must conform to the requirements of other individuals, no one will dispute; but this conformity is a means to his own happiness, which is the final end of all his actions. And we may go farther and say that the preservation of the individual is not yet the ultimate term of reduction; for deeper still we find the feelings of pleasure and pain, upon which the preservation of the individual, as well as of the race, depends, and in which all prosperity consists. Pleasure and pain, as is well known, are the only ultimate facts of hedonism; and a hedonism that admits other ultimate facts, or "postulates," appears to me to be inconsistent.

We must now approach the subject from a more delicate point of view. I refer to those phenomena bearing directly on the perpetuation of the race, especially the function of reproduction and the rearing of offspring. It is customary to speak of an "instinct" of self-preservation and an "instinct" of race-preservation; and, as the latter is often identified with sexual appetite, a few remarks on this subject may not be out of place.

By an *instinct* seems to be meant a conscious, but not cognizing or purposive, adaptation of an animal's acts to its environment, or the animal's capability of thus acting; the conscious element

being either a sensation or a perception, from which the subsequent acts follow as reflex actions. One of the characteristics of instinctive acts is that they pass from the automatic sphere to the volitional sphere, and conversely: the stimulus that in instinctive acts affects the organism through sensation or perception only, produces in volitional acts a series of mental phenomena—sensation, perception, memory, imagination—which finally culminate in the determination of the will and the voluntary and purposive performance of those acts. It is to be remarked that, owing to a mode of expression, due in part to our analogical manner of conceiving things and events, and in part to a survival of the old teleological methods and theories, we usually speak of instincts as being subservient to special ends or purposes; and when the instinctive act becomes an intelligent act, these special ends or purposes come to be recognized as the direct objects of volition: they become the motives of the will. The so-called instinct of self-preservation, for instance, includes all those acts, such as the gratification of hunger and the shunning of dangerous enemies, the effect of which is the maintenance of life. These acts are, in the higher animal world at least, prompted by special feelings; but in many cases the individual is not conscious or aware of the results of complying with those promptings; whereas in more advanced organisms, as in man, the effects of the compliance become clearly perceived, and, by being represented in consciousness, become in their turn prompting stimuli, whether the original prompting feeling be present or not. A child or an animal which, through pathological derangements, has lost its appetite will starve to death; but a man, who foresees the effects of his present actions, will take food, even if he does not feel hungry, in order to preserve himself. This intelligent compliance with rational promptings, with the express intention of attaining an end that in the lower animals is instinctively or unknowingly attained, may, for convenience, be called a rationalized instinct. Note that in this case the object of the action is in fact what is expressed in language—namely, *self-preservation*; it is this end the individual has distinctly in view, and it is at this end that he aims. In

other words, self-preservation, plainly apprehended as such, becomes a powerful spring of action, and may therefore with propriety be taken into account in all investigations regarding the conduct of man.

But are we justified in affirming as much of the "instinct of race-preservation"? Leaving aside, for the present, the lower animal world, I shall consider the matter from a purely anthropological point of view, and, so as to deal with it more properly, divide it into two different orders of facts: the instinct of sexual intercourse and the instinct of race-preservation proper.

As to the first of these two instincts (which might be more properly called an appetite), it seems sufficiently obvious to me that we are using inaccurate and misleading language when we identify it with the instinct of race-preservation in general; and the confusion becomes more apparent when we ascend from the lower animals to man—from instinct proper to rationalized instinct. We saw that a rationalized instinct—that is, one that has changed from a reflex into an actually or possibly purposive mode of acting—is characterized by a perception or a representation of its end, and an intention to attain that end; and that instinctive acts, prompted at first by mere feelings, are afterward performed under the guidance of reason, whether the prompting feelings be present or absent. But does man, in his sexual intercourse, actually propose to himself as an end the production of new individuals? Does he, when the sexual appetite, or the more refined sentiment of love, is absent, devote himself, influenced only by a representation of the result, to the reproduction of his kind, or make any efforts for the exclusive purpose of attaining that end? Without mentioning those very common cases of promiscuous intercourse, from which naturally there results no multiplication, nor those also very common cases in which married couples purposely avoid the birth of offspring, nor still those in which children are exposed or otherwise got rid of, experience seems to declare that the union of two individuals of different sexes rarely, if ever (I speak now of civilized man), results from their desire or express intention of having offspring. Where nature is allowed to follow her course, that

is, where mercenary motives do not intervene, a man joins himself to a woman in marriage for the woman's sake, and for that only: it is his passion for her that prompts him; if he makes any calculations, it is to possess her, live with her, and be happy with her; his motives are most decidedly egoistic, or, if there are any altruistic motives, they do not extend beyond the woman he has selected; the preservation of the race he does not think of, or, at the most, he thinks of it as incidental, not as an essential motive determining him to unite himself to that or any other female. And as much, of course, may be said of the woman. They may, no doubt, in some cases desire to have offspring; they may be greatly disappointed if they have it not; but the having of offspring is not the end of their union; nor would they think of uniting themselves in the absence of those mutually attractive feelings known as love. In the present state of society there seems, then, no warrant for speaking of a rationalized instinct of reproduction, in the sense that we speak of a rationalized instinct of self-preservation; and we may say that, while self-preservation is a spring of action, reproduction is not.

With respect to the preservation or rearing of offspring, it must be admitted that of this we may with propriety say that, in the case of man, it is a rationalized instinct. For, leaving out some abnormal exceptions, it is a general fact that all actions performed by parents for the benefit of their offspring are purposely performed by man, with a perfect knowledge of their effects, and a decided intention to achieve those effects. We nurse our children, clothe them, look after their health and comfort, educate them, and often make sacrifices for them, merely for their sake, and because their well-being and their progress in life are by themselves sources of very intense pleasures to us. As with the instinct of self-preservation, which, by becoming intelligent, has become conscious of its object and is guided by its object, so with the instinct of offspring-preservation: its object is represented in consciousness, and acts as a very powerful stimulus. And, inasmuch as upon this instinct the perpetuation of the race depends, we might perhaps call it a race-preserving instinct, were it not for the danger of extending the expression

beyond the limits within which it must be restricted. For this reason I should prefer to call it the offspring-preserving or offspring-preservation instinct.

But notice that this instinct, although very powerful, is not always stronger than, nor equal to, the instinct of self-preservation; and if the species is preserved, it is not because the self-preserving instinct is subordinated to the offspring-preserving instinct, where the two conflict, but because, as a general rule, they do *not* materially conflict. In case of actual and serious antagonism, the offspring-preservation instinct is almost invariably overruled by the instinct of self-preservation. It is well known that among savages, where the means of subsistence are scarce, and where nomadic habits in a rough and sterile country make children a burden to the mother, infanticide has been of very frequent occurrence; and of some tribes it is affirmed that not one of their women could be found who had not destroyed at least one of her children, while others had killed four or five, and even as many as ten.¹ Among the ancient Arabs, who had to contend with frequent and devastating famines, the practice of female infanticide was prevalent; it was considered more worthy of praise than of blame, and had to be repeatedly condemned by Mohammed.² In the ancient European world infanticide and the exposure of children were exceedingly common. By the primitive Roman law infanticide was condemned only in the case of male children and of the eldest female; and although the law of the empire declared the practice to be a criminal offense, yet it was not considered identical with homicide, being punished simply by exile; while the exposure and sale of children, far from being condemned as crimes, were carefully regulated by the Christian emperors.³ In countries, as China, that are afflicted with over-population children are constantly destroyed or exposed; and even in the most highly civilized societies the exposure of infants is not rare. In all

¹ DARWIN, *Descent of Man*, chap. xx.

² CH. LETOURNEAU, *Evolution of Marriage and of the Family* (Scribner's Sons, 1891), chap. v, sec. 3, pp. 82, 83.

³ See LECKY, *European Morals* (D. Appleton, 1889), Vol. II, chap. iv, pp. 26 ff

these cases we see the self-preserving instinct asserting itself in opposition to the offspring-preserving instinct.

It may be said that in such instances as the foregoing the natural instincts have been perverted. But this expression is only a metaphor; there is no perversion in nature. Nor is it the exception, but the rule, that under the pressure of extreme want all so-called moral sensibilities are either entirely destroyed or subordinated to the more imperative feelings of self-preservation and self-love. In the frequent famines and scarcities to which savages are exposed they do not scruple to devour their own offspring or other of their fellow-beings. A fishing or a hunting party, if the undertaking prove a failure, will sacrifice some of its own members, who are eagerly eaten by the fortunate survivors; a father will gladly feed on his child, or, in time of war, desert him, or sell him for a hatchet or a knife.¹ The love of liberty, which in civilized communities seems to be so deeply rooted, is likewise killed (where it exists, for among some savages it is entirely absent) by the unsparing hand of misery, not only in the barbarous state, but even in more advanced communities. Many African negroes have been seen begging to be taken as slaves to save them from starvation, and in China the case is stated as very common of men selling their children, their wives, and themselves for the necessities of life.² In the Middle Ages the small proprietors surrendered their liberty in exchange for the protection of powerful vassals; in times of famine the poor sold themselves into slavery for the means of subsistence, and, according to the testimony of contemporary historians, "mothers ate their children, and children their parents; and human flesh was sold, with some pretense of concealment, in the markets."³

I have referred to these well-known cases, which might be multiplied almost to infinity, because, for the very reason that they are *extreme*, they disclose to us the true *ultimate* springs of human actions, of which we constantly lose sight, owing to the

¹ See MALTHUS, *Essay on Population*, Bk. I, chap. iv.

² *Ibid.*, Bk. I, chaps. viii, xii.

³ HALLAM, *Middle Ages*, chap. ii, pt. ii, note 15.

increasing complexity of our mutual relations, and the correspondingly increasing complexity of the motives by which conduct is regulated. That the preservation and welfare of the individual are in general the main object of his actions seems to be demonstrable *a posteriori*; that he *is* sacrificed by others for their interests is also an actual fact, caused by the selfsame egoistic motives; but that he *ought to* sacrifice himself for the interests of "the race," or that others have "a right" to sacrifice him for their benefit, is more than sound reasoning would warrant. He may, and he usually does, identify his well-being with the well-being of others, and find pleasure in sacrificing himself for their sake; but so long as his pleasure is not so conditioned, the imposition on him of burdens that he is unwilling to bear can have but one "justification"—force.

In dealing with matters of this kind it is exceedingly difficult to trace the line of demarcation between the somewhat arbitrary divisions of instinct and reason; and we are liable to mistake for altruistic sentiments and race-preserving instincts what are in reality egoistic endeavors at self-gratification, and calculated schemes prompted by the desire for self-preservation and individual welfare. As the comparative study of social phenomena seems at first sight to bring into great prominence the "instinct" of reproduction, and to warrant some very common interpretations of the laws of nature in this respect, it becomes necessary to glance at some of the facts, and determine to what extent the usual conclusions are justifiable.

"Desire for offspring," says Mr. E. Westermarck in his excellent work on marriage, "is universal in mankind. Abortion, indeed, is practiced now and then, and infanticide frequently takes place among many savage peoples; but these facts do not disprove the general rule."¹ That desire is attested by the observed customs of many uncivilized peoples, no less than by the laws and histories of old and modern communities.

¹EDWARD WESTERMARCK, *History of Human Marriage* (London and New York, 1891), chap. xvi, p. 376. It is to be noticed that in this passage the author wisely refers to "the *desire* for offspring," which is a more intelligible and expressive phrase than "the *instinct* of race-preservation."

A consequence of this is that in the lower races woman comes to be valued "not only as a wife, but as a mother." Fecundity, more than beauty, is what is required of a desirable wife. Among many inferior groups it is the custom not to marry a girl before she has had children, and, in some cases, before she has been *tried* by the prospective husband. Prolific-ness entitles a woman to general esteem and respect (at least where these feelings are not unknown); sterility is considered so disgraceful, and the charge thereof so humiliating, that Livingstone mentions, as not rare occurrences, cases of suicide occasioned by this serious accusation; and in many uncivilized and half-civilized communities a woman's barrenness is deemed a most legitimate cause for repudiation or divorce.¹

While it is true that these facts seem to establish the wide extent of the "desire for offspring," it is equally true that this desire cannot *always* be identified with a race-preservation, or offspring-preservation, instinct. Among savages (as Mr. Westermarck very properly observes), although instinct may play a part in the phenomena just described, the main motive is to be found in the utility derived by parents from their children. "They [children] are easily supported when young, and, in times of want, they may be left to die, or be sold. When a few years old, the sons become able to hunt, fish, and paddle, and later on they are their father's companions in war. The daughters help their mother to provide food, and, when grown up, they are lucrative objects of trade."² These remarks, which to an unphilosophical mind may appear as a shocking and repulsive picture of human nature, seem to be borne out by the cold testimony of facts. In savage life a wife is both a slave and a slave-making machine, and her value is estimated in proportion both to her fecundity and her personal ability. Of some American Indians Bancroft says that they "make capacity for

¹ WESTERMARCK, *op. cit.*, chap. xvi, pp. 376-9, and chap. xxi, pp. 488-9, where numerous illustrations of the "desire for offspring" are given.

² WESTERMARCK, *op. cit.*, chap. xvi, p. 380. It is stated by Bruce that in Dixan, one of the frontier towns of Abyssinia, the only trade was that of selling children. Five hundred were annually exported to Arabia, and in times of scarcity four times that number.

work the standard of female excellence;" and the great value attached to a woman's prolificness I have already mentioned. This double standard is, indeed, what might be anticipated from mere considerations of utility, for, "in the state of nature, next to a man's wives, the real servant, the only one to be counted upon, is the child."¹ When children become burdensome, they are often sold, destroyed, or exposed, and parental affection does not always extend beyond the limits of selfish calculation. A fact worthy of notice is that infanticide is generally practiced on female children, rather than on male; although where want is extreme both males and females are indiscriminately sacrificed. As an illustration of the high value attached to the possession of sons I may refer to the authorized custom, prevalent among the men of some savage tribes, of repudiating their wives on the failure of the latter to give birth to male children, and of taking wife after wife until a boy is born to them.²

In civilized communities, if it is true that the love of offspring is often very great and in some sense disinterested, the "desire for offspring" has decreased very considerably; and it were blindness or stubbornness to deny that this decrease has been mainly due to an antagonism between the individual's welfare and the sacrifices entailed by parenthood. Children are no longer so useful tools as they were in primitive times, nor can they be converted into productive merchandise. They are, indeed, "a great comfort;" but this comfort is burdensome, and many prefer other comforts that may be enjoyed at less expense and without the sacrifice of personal independence, especially as civilization has created both new wants and new pleasures. And, as the intercourse of the sexes is not generally restricted to marriage, both men and women find happiness outside the pale of domestic life. The result is that *many* dispense with marriage, and, even of those who marry, *many* abstain from having and rearing offspring. Here again the race-preservation postulate comes in conflict with the actual facts of experience.

¹ WESTERMARCK, *op. cit.*, chap. xvi, p. 381; chap. xxi, p. 490.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xxi, pp. 488-9.

I have refrained from referring to the processes and actions by which the perpetuation of the species is effected in the lower animal world (although it may be said that no phenomenon of either individual or social life can be adequately studied without having due regard to the laws of life at large), for the reason that, in proportion as we descend in the scale of organisms, the details of the same general fact become more and more different from those observed in higher types; whence arises the necessity of many qualifications and distinctions. It is the overlooking of these qualifications and distinctions that often leads us into illogical conclusions and unwarranted generalizations. Not having much space at my command, I shall offer only a few remarks on this important subject.

In the lowest types of organization reproduction takes place by fission and segmentation, the result of the process being the disappearance of the parent, or, rather, the conversion of the parent organism into the offspring. A little higher in the scale the substance of the parent is consumed in the formation of eggs, the body of the parent being finally reduced to a lifeless shell wherein the eggs are preserved and protected. Many of the lower creatures live just long enough to have offspring, and die as soon as they have fulfilled this "duty." In cases of this kind it is emphatically said that the individual "is sacrificed in producing" other individuals;¹ and the corollary naturally derived from this law of "sacrifice" is that the "interests" of the individual are subordinated to the "interests" of the race. Mr. Spencer, however, after reviewing the conditions of reproduction from the lowest to the highest types, concludes:

In proportion as organisms become higher in their structures and powers, they are individually less sacrificed to the maintenance of the species; and the implication is that in the highest type of man the sacrifice is reduced to a minimum.²

Although the truth is here recognized that the welfare of the individual has gradually come to be of as much importance as

¹ SPENCER, *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, § 275.

² *Ibid.*, §§ 275, 277.

the welfare of "the race," and that "the race" has become subordinate to the individual (a truth further borne out by the fact that in the higher types the continuance of the life of the parent is indispensable to the life of the offspring), yet it is maintained that the "law of sacrifice" still holds, although reduced to "a minimum." Here that psychic factor is disregarded by which, metaphorically speaking, we can, and do, oppose the laws of nature, and through which (still speaking metaphorically) the preservation of the race, ceasing to be necessary, has become contingent. As this neglecting of an important fact affords a striking exemplification of the danger of generalizing the laws of life without having due regard to the changes wrought by the processes of evolution, I shall consider the subject a little more closely.

In passing from sub-human life to human life, we pass from the so-called instinct to intelligence. Since, from the naturalistic point of view, mental states are the concomitants of physiological processes, all of which may ultimately be identified with reflex actions, we may perhaps say that intelligence is simply a teleological instinct, inasmuch as it is, in a certain sense, an instinct conscious of its object, and whose promptings are due to a representation of that object. This aptitude of prevision introduces a very wide difference between the actions of the higher animals, especially of man, and the actions of the lower animals; and a corresponding difference must be introduced in all scientific conclusions as to animal conduct, especially human conduct. Thus, because lower animals live until "nature" destroys them independently of their will (for such cases of suicide as that of scorpions seem to be disputed), it is not to be concluded that such is the law of all life, and that man cannot possess the desire for suicide, or that he is violating the laws of life when he takes away his own; nor is it logical to conclude that life "is to be" preserved at all events. Similarly, from the fact that in the lower animal world the species is preserved, sometimes at the expense of individuals, we are not justified in concluding that species-preservation is a universal law, that it is the "obligation" of every man to attend to the preservation of

the species, nor, in short, that the species "is to be" preserved at all. It must be remembered that the process of evolution itself shows us that instincts, feelings, ideas, no less than organs, begin, grow, change, and die, and that, in this perpetual flux, we often find an order of facts gradually transforming itself into what seems to be its entire opposite. Nor must it be forgotten that there is a law of dissolution as well as a law of evolution; and who can foresee what causes will accelerate the human race in its downward motion of retrogression?

The biological doctrine of Mr. Spencer, as presented in some passages of his *Sociology*, and more at length in his *Principles of Biology*—the doctrine, namely, that fecundity decreases as organization develops—does not seem sufficient to account for a very notorious fact—the growing decrease of the birth-rate in civilized countries. Some writers, wishing to refute the theories of Malthus, have maintained that the purely biological law is in itself a check on the increase of population; that statistics prove very conclusively that the decline of fecundity is a biological consequence of civilization, and that there is in the race an "organic tendency" to keep its numbers within the means of subsistence.¹ This, however, is not a complete interpretation of the real phenomena exhibited by society, as it leaves out of consideration the most potent factor—the psychic factor operating in the form of selfishness. We are not to suppose that the growing "infecundity" is real barrenness, or physiological impotence, or that this physiological deficiency increases with civilization to such an extent as to be the only explanation, or an adequate explanation, of the reduction in the birth-rate. Mr. Nitti himself, after his defense of the Spencerian theory, ends with surprising inconsistency by saying: "In general, however, we must agree with Bertillon that 'the French birth-rate is reduced

¹ See F. NITTI, *Population and the Social System* (London and New York, 1894), pp. 171-4, 94-5 (an interesting book, but very poorly translated). He mentions the well-known fact that in France the number of births per marriage was 4.24 in 1800-1805, 4.08 in 1816-20, 3.26 in 1836-40, 2.96 in 1886-9, and gives many other data. Statistics for longer periods may be found in Mulhall's *Dictionary of Statistics* (London, 1892), s. v. "Births," from which it appears that, in general, the birth-rate of civilized countries has been decreasing during the century.

by the voluntary sterility of the families.'"¹ "Agrarian inquiry in France," he says in another place, "has established that proprietors, and chiefly small proprietors, have an aversion to fecundity, and a tendency to accept Malthusian practices; while, on the other hand, only the working classes, or those who are without property, remain devoted to the social duty of having children." And this practice is not confined to the French rich, but is "a universal phenomenon," caused by the fear people have of falling from the higher to the lower classes, and of having their comforts and social advantages diminished.²

Nor do I need to appeal to any high authorities or statistical data (which are usually most grievously abused and misinterpreted) to establish the reality of facts that are open to the observation of everyone: that marriages are diminishing; that the family relations are becoming looser; that (against the advice of Malthus) parents *do* limit the number of their offspring; and, what is still more significant, that not only the *desire for* offspring diminishes with civilization, but the *love of* offspring as well.³ These are not remote social phenomena, but common events and conditions capable of being verified by the most superficial observation of civilized life; and they are phenomena of a psycho-economic nature, not to be confounded with purely biological phenomena.

From the foregoing exposition it may be judged how far, and under what limitations, the preservation of the race, even considered in its most vital points, can be accepted as a spring of action and a law of human nature; while the legitimacy of erecting it into a supreme standard of justice and morality does not seem to be warranted by the actual facts of society.

¹ NITTI, *Population and the Social System*, pp. 153 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 142-3. It is curious to notice how often Malthus' opponents make use of the very Malthusian principles and facts that they endeavor to refute or disavow.

³ Both among the Romans and the ancient Germans the mother who refused to suckle her children and placed them in the hands of nurses was considered shameless and low (LECKY, *Europ. Mor.*, Vol. II, chap. v, pp. 300, 340). "A century ago," says Nitti (*op. cit.*, p. 127), "even among the richer classes, a mother who gave her children to be nursed by another was a mere solitary exception. . . . Now there is not a mother of the middle class who, being able to do so, does not voluntarily renounce the duties of maternity."

Taking the expression "the race" in the sense of "others," or "the rest of humanity," it may be stated that, in general, the race is a matter of supreme indifference to the individual, whose affections are confined within a circle of small radius, when compared with the entire field of human life; and, in the great majority of cases, the race is the individual's greatest enemy. Indeed, it is the antagonism between the individual and the race that constitutes the fierce struggle for existence, and to which are due almost all the sufferings and miseries of our species, as of other species. We are not justified in judging human affairs through the spectroscope of sentimentalism, which leaves out the powerful actinic rays of "animal passion." The sentimentalist and other theorists are usually not soldiers in the field, and their exceptional views and feelings are not faithful representations of man's nature. The majority of human beings are perpetually struggling with other human beings—that is, with the race at large—and it is in the essence of the human constitution that whoever is prevented by others from earning a comfortable living and leading a happy life should wish for the diminution, rather than the increase or prosperity, of his competitors. It is the *race* that compels the laboring man to work for a miserable salary, to live on unwholesome food and in unhealthful quarters, supporting a numerous family for whom he is unable to provide the most urgent necessities of life; it is the *race* that throws him out of employment, lands him on the road to vice and crime, and leads him to the penitentiary or to the gallows; it is the *race* that discourages the young girl, and, withdrawing the bread from her mouth, offers to her lips the poison of prostitution; it is the *race* that causes and fosters all the miseries, the unutterable suffering, and the degraded condition of nine-tenths of its very individuals. Why, then, insist on the supposed truth that the preservation of the race is, or *ought* to be, a *desideratum*? And are we appealing either to reason or to feeling when we say that such and such sacrifices should be made for the preservation of the race at large?

In what precedes I have aimed at presenting some features of life as they offer themselves to impartial observation, without

intending either to praise or condemn them ; and at deriving from them the only corollaries warranted by logic. I have enunciated what I conceive to be facts of nature, and in nature I am unable to find anything either blamable or praiseworthy. Those who believe in the independent personality and absolute freedom of the human ego will, of course, think otherwise. But in that system of philosophy that regards man as but a *part* of the one continuous whole there are no independent personalities ; every fact, physical or mental, comes, when considered in time, from eternity ; when in space, from infinity : nor does it come alone and by itself ; it is only a little foam on the crest of the wave, which rises, sparkles, sinks, and is no more.

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THE SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD.

THE primary purpose of this paper is to describe, not what the writer thinks sociology ought to be, but what it actually is, up to date. The secondary purpose, to be taken up in a later section of the paper, is to point out certain lines of development which sociological theory must inevitably follow.

By way of anticipation it may be said at once that the definition or description of sociology to be used in a subsequent paper is: *Sociology is the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association.*¹

It goes without saying that this description of sociology is not a definition of the preserve that can be claimed by any academic department of sociology. As will be pointed out before the close of this paper, we shall remain unable to see, not to say solve, the problems of association, so long as we remain unable to realize that our academic divisions of labor upon the problems are measures of convenience, which become inconvenient whenever they obscure the actual correlations of common subject-matter.

Innumerable definitions or descriptions of sociology are in vogue. Each represents the opinion of a person or of a school, in opposition to some other view of what sociology is or ought to be. No one of these views can as yet command the assent of all the sociologists. No one of them can prove that it has the adherence of a majority or of the most weighty sociologists. There is one fact, however, which crops out in the writings of all the different sorts of sociologists, namely: they are all trying to reach judgments of a higher degree of generality than the subject-matter of any single branch of social science is competent to authorize. It makes no difference how narrowly a given

¹ This conception has been ably treated by MR. R. G. KIMBLE, in a paper entitled "Contributions to the Comparative Study of Association," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, March, 1899.

sociologist defines his discipline for himself; he sooner or later begins to betray his tacit conception of his mission by propounding judgments that leap over his own boundary. Their validity depends upon knowledge that belongs, in the first place, to each of the more special divisions of social science. It follows that, in spite of all disagreements about territory, sociology is in practice, as a matter of fact, an attempt to organize and generalize all available knowledge about the influences that pervade human associations. The men who make the most restricted definitions of sociology often indulge in the most absolute generalizations in the name of sociology, and they seem to take themselves quite seriously while they are thus placing the poverty of their logic upon exhibition.

The impulse to generalize social laws of higher orders than those to be derived from the traditional social sciences may be audacious. It may look to results which are beyond the reach of human reason. The ambition to develop a system of generalizations which will interpret the influences that form human society may be foredoomed to disappointment. The fact remains that the sociologists are in the midst of an adventure which means nothing less than discovery of the limits of human power to trace the workings of human association in all times and under all circumstances. As was said above, this turns out to be true about equally, though in different ways, of those who seek wisdom through a sociology defined as the science of an abstracted section of social facts, and of those who boldly describe sociology as a comprehensive science or philosophy.

To get our bearings, therefore, in today's sociology, it is necessary to survey the course of thought by which we have arrived at our present attitude toward the problems of society. We must review the forms under which the pioneers in sociology have presented the problems to themselves. These early attempts are instructive, not because they have contributed directly to the solution of sociological or social problems, but because they have led to more exact statement of the problems.

Judged by results, sociology up to date has comparatively little to say for itself. Before we are through we shall argue

that the chief significance of the sociologists is in their instinct of the oneness of all knowledge about men. If names were consistently used, sociology would not be understood to mean a phase of social science. It would be the comprehensive term for all search into the facts of human association, somewhat as biology no longer means any special phase of the science of life, but the whole body of investigation into vegetable and animal phenomena. We are obliged to use the term "sociology," however, to designate that standpoint from which a better survey of human association is becoming possible, which at present seems, to those social scientists who do not occupy it, entirely isolated from their interests. The best that has been done so far by sociology in the narrower sense, except incidentally in certain of its concrete divisions, is to demonstrate the lack of method in analyzing social relationships, and in searching for the secrets of social cause and effect. The history of sociology is a record of an apparently aimless hunt for something which the hunters did not know how to describe or define. In the last half-century a few students of society have been filled with vague discontent because of haunting dissatisfaction with the sort of insight into social truth which the traditional studies furnished. These students have beaten the air, sometimes only to raise more dust, but sometimes also with the result of chasing away some of the lingering clouds. On the whole, the history of sociology consists mainly of attempts to plan a kind of study which will yield more intimate knowledge of society than the traditional social sciences have reached. As yet there is very little to show by way of conclusion from these quests. The fortunes of these attempts are nevertheless a precious legacy to the present generation. They are, first of all, object-lessons in how not to do it. In the second place, they are indirect and fragmentary indications of how to state the problems of society and how to proceed in solving them. The history of sociological method is thus the most effective discipline in methodology, if we are wise enough to gather up its teachings.

In accordance with the foregoing, we may join with Tarde in finding the progenitors of our sociologists long before the

name was invented. Tarde implies belief that the old philosophers and theologians were actually the pioneers in the fields of study which have at last reached such intensive cultivation that the class of investigators known as sociologists had to be differentiated.¹ He speaks of the "change promising better results" which is observable from the time when "such specialists in sociology" as the philologists, the philosophers of religion, and especially the economists began to perform the more modest task of identifying minute facts and of formulating their laws.

There has been a gradual recognition of interlacings among human relationships, and this perception has been calling for larger coördinations of research, and closer organization of results, than older students of society felt to be necessary. We have consequently arrived at conceptions of the relations of knowledge about society which constitute a totally new setting for all particular facts. This anticipated organon of knowledge about society is sociology. In order to get the most intimate view of sociology, both as it is and as it must be, it is worth while to make a rapid survey of certain typical attempts to formulate sociological problems and methods. We may do this most conveniently for our present purpose by reference to Barth's *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*.²

Barth's thesis is that there is no sociology except the philosophy of history. The theorem is not true, but it contains truth. The philosophy of history attempted to formulate the laws of social sequences. Sociology almost universally attempts to formulate, not merely laws of sequence, but also laws of past and present correlation. Many sociologists declare that the most important division of sociology is beyond both these groups, in laws of social aims and of the available means of attaining them. Even if we were reduced to a conception of sociology which identifies its subject-matter with that of the philosophy of history, it would be easy to show that sociology is perfecting a method which distinguishes it from the philosophy of history

¹ *Les Lois sociales*, p. 26.

² Vol. I (Leipzig, 1897). Cf. review, *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, March 1898.

somewhat as astronomy from astrology, or chemistry from alchemy. This is by no means to deny essential similarity of purpose, to a certain extent at least, between the earlier and the later attempts to discover social laws. "Sociology is accordingly the natural successor, heir, and assign of the worthy but ineffective philosophy of history."¹

It is needless to ask how early men directed their attention to the actions of men, and tried to see those actions in their connections with each other, and then tried to recount the facts in their supposed relations. There came a time, at all events—let us say, for convenience, with Herodotus and Thucydides—when this attention to actions of men in the large was conscious and deliberate. It had taken the place and rank of a dignified intellectual pursuit. It called itself history. It undertook to tell both what men had done and why they had done it. This, in general, is precisely what sociology tries to do today. History is, therefore, sociology in the yolk. We shall understand sociology best not by dogmatizing about the sort of thing which it would please us to designate by that name. The name has come to stand for something which is asserting itself, whether we like it or not. We shall form a more intelligent view of sociology if we follow the trunk line of its evolution from men's earliest naïve attempts to see human actions together. This is what history has been from the beginning. It is what sociology is now. Sociology exists today because a few men have discovered that, if we are to see human actions in their most essential relations, a more complicated machinery of research and organization is necessary than historiography controls.

The disrepute into which the philosophy of history has fallen is not due to disbelief that there has been method in human experience. When a modern critical historian speaks with contempt of the philosophy of history, he refers either to some of the obsolete methods of reaching historical judgments, or to some other man's philosophy of history. He is surely not contemptuous himself, nor willing that others should be, toward his own philosophy of history. He always has one, if he is anything

¹ *Journal of Political Economy*, March, 1895, p. 173.

more than a rag-picker from the garbage-heaps of the past. But the more we study the philosophies of history that are no longer in vogue,¹ the more are we impressed by a few common-places concerning them; for instance:

First: People have attempted to make a very little knowledge go a long way in coining generalities about society. History has proved to be like the Bible: it may be made to teach anything, if we take it in sufficiently minute fragments.

Second: People have tried to create the general truths of history out of philosophical presuppositions, instead of building them up by collection and generalization of facts. That is, they have trusted to dogmatism and deduction instead of attempting induction.

Third: People have had very crude conceptions of the complexity of the things to which their assumed historical principles were supposed to apply. They have not been able to analyze the subject-matter so as really to see the elements involved.

Fourth: Hence the foregone conclusion of demand, sooner or later, for a method which shall be an improvement upon that of the philosophy of history.

At the same time, critical study of the philosophers of history is a most valuable propædæutic for sociology. Every sociological system that is trying to push itself into favor today has its prototype among these more archaic systems, and not a few recent sociological schemes may be disposed of by the same process that rules these philosophies of history out of court.

On the other hand, each of these abortive philosophies of history has contributed its quota toward comprehension of the conditions of social problems, and together they have indirectly promoted the adoption of adequate sociological methods. This fact may be indicated more in detail if we adopt for illustration Barth's seven-fold division of the philosophy of history, instead of discussing a score or more of familiar theorems of alleged central principles in history. We find that each of these views attempted to bring into focus something that is actually present

¹ *Vide* FLINT, *Philosophy of History*. The first edition is more useful for a general survey than the incomplete second edition.

in human affairs. It may not be the something alleged. It surely is not present in the proportions alleged. It is a real something, however, and the final science of society must know it and place it.

For instance, Barth distinguishes first "The Individualistic View of History." There are still historians who hold that the actions of great individuals are the only proper content of history. There is no universal or general current which from the beginning of society carries the hero along with the rest of mankind. On the contrary, according to this view, each hero digs the course of his own current. This may have relations with the similar life-courses of other great men, but it by no means forms part of a great common current. The individualists think of the great personalities as free, as creators out of nothing, as first links of a new chain of events, which are so independent of the past that they are capable of beginning a new life in opposition to the endeavors of the past.

It is evident that so far as this view prevails there is no possibility of science. Science is knowledge of things in their correlation. If they have no correlation, there is no material for science. If there are no recurrences, no uniformities in societary events, there is no possibility of the rudiments of all science. There can be no descriptive classification.

In order to appreciate the problem with which we are now dealing, it may be an advantage to state it in concrete form, thus: The things that we want most to know about society are not things of the past, but of the present and the future. We turn back to the past because it is once for all before our eyes. It is a reality. We hope it will reveal some guidance for present and future. We want to know how men should act if they would make the most of life. We want to know what influences are at work, and how they work, in affecting social conditions. To that end we inquire into great historical movements, for example the transfer of power in the Italian peninsula from the old Roman element to the barbarian element. We call it the fall of Rome. We name other similar movements: the breaking up of the Carolingian monarchy into European feudalism; or the consolidation

of feudalism into the new monarchies; or the overthrow of the aristocracies and the enfranchisement of the democracies in the early part of the present century. From such great movements we ought to learn something about what would be involved in a social change of equal magnitude today; as, for instance, a solution of the labor problem which would give wage-earners a more direct and decisive influence in the economic order.

Suppose we are asking how such a change in modern industrial society is to be brought about, and we go to history for the answer. We find a class of interpreters of history ringing the changes on this one theme, namely: "Great social changes are the product of individual factors alone." Now, this answer is not as simple as it sounds. One man means by it that a few great, perhaps almost superhuman, men—Solon, Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon, Bismarck—have been the mainsprings of social movement, and the rest of the human herd have been inert masses moved by them. Others mean that social movements are simply the slow accretions of volume or force by addition of one human individual to another—the drop added to drop that wears the rock away, or the atom added to atom in one scale which at last overbalances the huge mass in the opposite scale. The individualistic view would say to the wage-earners of our present generation who want their class to become the dominant type in the state: "To bring about the industrial revolution that you want, either 'labor' must incarnate itself in a giant or hero, who will perform some modern labors of Hercules and make the world over; or the mere multiplication of the numbers of the wage-earners, regardless of combinations or changes of their ideas, or the coöperation of other classes, or the limitations of the constructive capacity of the operative class, will in time effect the desired social transformation, or it is impossible altogether."

This view of social forces makes individuals alone—whether the few great and forceful ones or the multitude of average ones—the sole factors in social complications.

Now, there is a sense in which this must be true. Society is made up of individuals, just as matter is supposed to be made

up of atoms; but no theory of atoms alone will account beforehand for the behavior of the particular atoms that make hydrogen or oxygen or sulphur or phosphorus. Nor will any theory of the atom alone account for what happens when one pair of substances enter into a reaction, and the unlike results when another pair of substances react upon each other. The case is similar with the actions of individuals. All social facts are combinations of individual facts. Yet the influences at work in these combinations are not accounted for by any *a priori* conception of individuals which we can reach. For instance, a hundred socialistic German students are mustered into the imperial army and are sworn to defend the Kaiser and the flag. So long as they wear the uniform they are imperialists, not socialists. Now, there is something besides the sum of those individualities which is at work in giving them a character when they are combined that is different from the sum of their characters as isolated individuals. In this case the flag and the uniform may symbolize the added something. At all events it would be a very shallow and unpenetrating account that would find in the company merely one hundred detached and self-sufficient individuals.

It may be said that the individualistic view of history marks a sort of extreme swing of the pendulum from the fatalistic, mass notion of human affairs that prevailed before men were conscious of their own personal agency, before they had fairly differentiated themselves from their surroundings. It may be said that the task of finding out the facts about influences in society is virtually the task of finding the qualifications which must be thought of when we regard human fortunes as events of which individuals are the elements. It may be said that the individualistic view gives us a primary term in the social equation, and that our further work is to find out the value of the other terms which affect the value of the individual term. These propositions are no doubt approximately correct. The individualistic conception of human affairs is not utterly false. It is a rough, uncritical, inexact exaggeration of a perception which must be reduced to more precise and proportionate formulation. Today's sociology is still struggling with this preposterous initial

fact of the individual. He is the only possible social unit, and he is no longer a thinkable possibility. He is the only real presence, and he is never present. Whether we are near to resolution of the paradox or not, there is hardly more visible consensus about the relation of the individual to the whole than at any earlier period. Indeed, the minds of more people than ever before seem to be puzzled by the seeming antinomy between the individual and the whole.

In this play between unscientific, uncritical, wholesale assumptions about society, students have been brought to face a specific problem, namely: Given individual elements in society, given also a certain coherence of society by virtue of which influences stronger than those of any individual persist, or at least influences persist with more than the personal energy of any individual, what are the specific modifying and differentiating factors which procure social motion, progress, development? Accordingly the historians, independent of the sociologists, have struck out in a new direction in the present half-century. The older historians told of the fortunes of persons, of states, of humanity. The newer history, however, becomes more specific and realistic. Both in theory and in practice it considers nations as the vehicles of culture. It traces the development of their internal conditions. It compares them with each other. It tries to fix upon what is typical in each, and by that course to arrive at the history of humanity.

Even in conservative Germany perceptions of scientific demands which have arisen in the course of arriving at such historical views have produced sociologists. They are not recognized in many of the universities, but they are working under various titles—philosophers, historians, economists, etc. They are searching for the most general truths about human associations, and about the forces that are working in them. In other words, the friction between the individualistic view of history and opposing views has been one of several distinct producers of inductive inquiry into real conditions. When the different inductive inquiries so provoked have become aware of each other, they have been seen to constitute a new line of approach to

social reality, and they have together received the name "sociology."

A similar form of conclusion must follow due consideration of each attempt to account for the historical movements of society. Barth's second title is "The Anthro-Geo-graphical View of History." Having shown in the foregoing paragraphs how a single one-sided view of past events has helped to form our methods of thinking, and to make scientific demands more precise and adequate, we need not consider other one-sided views at equal length. The outcome in each case is essentially the same. Each one-sided view has drawn attention to an actual factor in the problem of society. The sociologists are now stating the problem in terms of all these factors so far discovered. The form of the sociological inquiry is not the old form of the historians: "Is the secret of human life this or that?" The sociological form of inquiry is: "Given observed forms of influence in human affairs, how much of each detected form of influence is present in a given social movement, and in what measure does it work?" The several one-sided views have thus been merged into a many-sided inquiry.¹

We should notice, in passing, that a similar practical result is produced upon individuals by the study of the social sciences. Whether a given student gets a system of social doctrine satisfactory to himself or not, he emerges from the study of the social sciences, as at present organized, with a perception that the world of people is the arena of many interactive influences. In his judgments, either of past times or of current events, the student of the social sciences, from the sociological point of view, is forearmed against the narrowness that presupposes the prevalence of a single force rather than the interplay of many forces. The outlook that sociology makes familiar brings into the field of view the whole number of modifying influences that have been discovered among men. The sociologist, studying the present condition of China or Turkey or Japan or the Philippines

¹ *Vide* CHAMBERLIN, "The Method of the Multiple Working Hypothesis," *Journal of Geology*, November, 1897. This article is a veritable sermon in stones, which the sociologists would do well to consider. *Mutatis mutandis* it may be taken bodily as a lesson in sociological methodology.

or Spain or Germany or France or Russia or the United States, does not imagine that he has before him a simple case of economics or politics or ethics. He sees the resultant of numerous physical and spiritual antecedents, varied in each case by special combinations, and constituting in each case a peculiar organization of primary and secondary factors, the force of which has to be determined in each instance for itself.

Thus the development of thought about society has had the double result, on the one hand, of enlarging and clarifying technical social science, and, on the other hand, of forming the molds in which practical judgments of the world's present social problems must be cast.

All the one-sided views of history are, in the first place, exaggerations of ideas which may be detected very early, at least in germs or suggestions. Barth observes that something of this anthropo-geographical conception of history is to be found in Hippocrates, Herodotus, Thucydides, etc. Coming to more recent times, the idea was so prominent in Herder that many readers have hastily reduced his theory of history to terms of this notion alone. Ritter, professor in the university and military school at Berlin (1779-1859), systematically expanded the idea. His geographical studies have become the basis for school work in the subject in Germany, and his influence may be traced throughout the world. His ambition was to make geography an interpreter of history. His purpose may be described as a wish to develop a dynamic geography. Yet it would be unfair to treat him as blind to all other influences affecting society. He distinctly recognized a certain *diminuendo* movement in history, so far as the influence of physical environment is concerned. The view to which Ritter gave such prominence has been exploited with less balance by Buckle¹ and Draper.² The essential thought which Ritter did so much to justify impressed President Gilman of Johns Hopkins University while he was still at Yale. He might have developed a sociology on the basis of geography, if he had not turned to administrative tasks. Professor Geddes, of

¹ *History of Civilization in England.*

² *Intellectual Development of Europe.*

Edinburgh, is the most energetic expounder of this idea in the English-speaking world. Not the most prominent geographer but the most scholarly exponent of this particular anthropogeographical idea on the continent today is Ratzel, of Leipzig (*Anthropo-Geographie*). Ratzel, again, is to be classed with Herder and Ritter in placing his peculiar perception in balance with coöperating forces. He aims to show the ways in which humanity depends upon the spatial relations of the earth. While the analysis of influences from the environment, as carried out by Ratzel, is full of instruction, and while it opens up still uncultivated fields of research, it is still comparatively free from the fault of historical one-sidedness. Not so with men who have taken up this clue to history without the corrective which Ratzel expresses in the words: "Not nature, but mind, produces culture." For instance, Mougeolle⁴ declares: "Thus the environment alone can truly explain the chief events of history, and furnish the solution of its most general problems."

As in the case of the individualistic conception of history, so with this exaggerated estimate of the part that nature has played in the formation of human society. Doubtless the social problem has waited longer than it ought for adequate formulation, because many men have too implicitly and literally believed with Plato that "ideas make the world." Such men have told the story of history as though it were a ghost-dance on a floor of clouds. They have tried to explain how spirits with indiscernible bodies have brought about the visible results. They would not admit that the facts of human association have been the work of flesh-and-blood men with their feet on the ground. How much of the soil and the sunshine and the wind and snow and rain has lodged itself in men's works and ways remains to be determined. At all events we have been taught by the contradictions of extremists that history in the future will neither be turned over entirely to the weather bureau, nor will it be exclusively the affair of the introspective rhapsodist. Human fortunes are not diluted climatology. They are not visualized spirituality, in any sense at least which we can comprehend. They are the

⁴ *Le Problème de l'Histoire*, Paris, 1886.

resultant of physical and spiritual forces, reacting upon each other in the most complex combinations which we know. They will not be summed up in any simple equation of a single term. The views of history which exaggerate a coöperating factor into an exclusive factor, and assume that a constant influence is a monopoly of influence, are gradually forcing us to study new terms in the social problem. Each partial view of the influences that have made and remade men and associations gives us a distinct factor about which correlated search by the different kinds of sociologists must find means of answering the general question: "In what cases does this factor work; with what tendencies does it work; with what ratio of force does it work?" In other words, the sociological scheme which appropriates the lessons of previous failure to penetrate the social mystery will have a use for all accessible knowledge about the time, place, direction, and intensity of the purely topographical and climatological factors among social influences; but for the same reason it will have an appropriate place also for all the other influences that may be discovered.

Barth's third title is "The Ethnological View of History." It is not easy to draw a sharp line of division between this view and the second, just noticed. Of the two, the view now to be considered seems to have more prominence in today's social science. It appears less extravagant, less open to the suspicion of being crass materialism and mechanicalism, and therefore less taxing to the credulity. It is easier to see, or to imagine that we see, how the Teutons and the Romans could coalesce in a third something which turns out to be the Carolingian empire, than to see how the dust of one peninsula, stirred by one set of breezes, made Spartans, while the dust of another peninsula, vexed by other breezes, made Etruscans. The traditional belief that blood tells prepares a welcome in our minds for the stock-breeder's theory of history. It is supposed to have such backing in the findings of biology that the people who get the view fairly into their minds are strongly tempted to trust in its all-sufficiency, and to abandon further search for historical explanations. Indeed, the ethnologists and the orthodox economists are the closest

competitors for the distinction of making a very narrow abstraction stretch to the utmost extension as a total explanation. The prestige of the ethnological view rests, however, upon very precarious support. Whether genetic laws large enough to explain any single historical movement have been demonstrated within the field of ethnology proper is open to serious question. Much that passes for severe ethnological science is merely ingenious speculation. Even if it is proved that races have been the vehicles of influences which have affected different societies in different ways, it remains to be proved that the racial element was cause rather than effect of this influence, or of some other which was a more important cause. Moreover, many of the theorems of racial influence are theses in psychics rather than in physiology or zoölogy. They are dogmas in folk-psychology, not data or results of ethnology at all.

In this connection the most prominent ethnologists have failed to clarify their ideas. Such men as Topinard in France and Tylor in England and Brinton in this country have performed some grotesque straddles by defining ethnology as a physical science and then including in it every manifestation of man's complex nature. They have seemed to be uncertain, and they have surely left their readers uncertain, whether they were discovering physical traits, and then showing how these lend themselves to industrial and cultural development; or whether they were starting with mental developments and were reasoning back to differences of physical traits sufficient to account for the phenomena. In other words, the most eminent ethnologists have not yet shown themselves such patient investigators of the facts within their own field that their conclusions have had a very profound effect upon laymen, especially those who are experts in other branches of physical science. This is likely to grow less and less true since more carefully trained scholars are entering the ethnological field. The work of many of these, however, tends to the opposite extreme of mere description and classification of details, from which no general truth of large dimensions emerges. Hence the recent differentiation of the folk-psychologists. They are really only ethnologists of a new type

They are less first-hand discoverers of ethnological fact, and more interpreters of the material that collectors and classifiers place at their disposal. The two types together realize a division of labor that is bound to make ethnology a powerful ally of the other search-sciences in revealing the social mystery.

We need not deny that blood tells, but we should not be prematurely certain that we can hear what it tells, or that we can distinguish the voice of the particular blood that speaks. Whatever truth is to be found out along this line is apparently farther from present demonstration than the truths about the transmission of physical traits in general. It will doubtless be long before we shall be able to distinguish between proof in this field and fiction under a thin mask of illustration. Even if we were disposed to assume *a priori* that the whole truth lies in this direction, we should be phenomenally credulous to believe that the truth is already in sight sufficient to make a science of society to be remotely compared in precision with either of the physical sciences. The one prominent result thus far of attempts to fit the ethnological assumption to interpretation of the social mystery has been to impress judicial investigators with the non-correspondence between the hypothesis and the evidence chiefly relied on for proof. Instead of making toward the conclusion that blood corpuscles in one race so differ from the blood corpuscles of another race that civilizations are contrasted with each other in consequence, the evidence makes for the conclusion that ideas weigh more than differences in animal tissue in determining what the traits of associated life shall be. This is the reason why ethnology is finding its most promising developments today in the line of ethnic or folk-psychology, which is only a cross-section of mass-psychology. Each is a chapter of social psychology in general.

The problems of the relation of the animal organism to the spiritual nature of man seem at present to be in progress toward solution, if anywhere, in the psychological laboratories. People who deal with human phenomena in bulk are not likely to solve these problems, whatever they call themselves. They can merely deal with aspects of human facts which leave these fundamental

questions unexplored. Whatever may be the form which our conclusions may one day take about the influence of the body upon the mind, our interpretation of human events must have respect to this by-product of ethnological theory, namely, the observation that different ethnic and tribal groups somehow come to be the vehicles of a tradition which, so far as effects appear, might as well be part and parcel of their physical structure. Their bodies and their tradition of thought and feeling constantly function together. The colored and the white elements in the United States, for example, are not made up of individuals of absolutely identical force in the social equation. A group of colored men and a group of white men, who had passed through schools of the same grade in the same city, would not be social forces of identical quality and equal energy, for the reason that they somehow carry along unlike traditions from unlike conditions in the past. We may see these differences in men, and we should see them as they manifest themselves in racial peculiarities. On the other hand, we should not assume that these racial manifestations present to us irreducible factors of human force. That would be like a theory of chemistry which assumes that vapor and water and ice are three irreducible elements.

The final solution of the social mystery will have an answer to the question: "What is the value of the racial factor in the social equation?" Meanwhile, neither physiology nor zoölogy nor ethnology nor history lends sanction to the superficial assumption that the social equation is an affair of only one set of variables, namely, the racial characteristics of peoples. When we have in mind the ethnic factor in the social problem, it is necessary to render the sociological question in this form: "What is the formula of the racial factor in its combinations with all the other factors in the social equation?"

Barth's fourth title is "The Culture-History View." The very idea of "culture," as the term is used among German scholars, has hardly entered distinctly into American calculations. In order to indicate the viewpoint which is occupied by the interpreters to whom the title of this paragraph applies, it is

necessary to define words in a way not yet adopted as a rule in English usage.

What, then, is "culture" (*Kultus*) in the German sense? To be sure, the Germans themselves are not wholly consistent in their use of the term, but it has a technical sense which it is necessary to define. In the first place, "culture" is a condition or achievement possessed by *society*. It is not individual. Our phrase "a cultured person" does not employ the term in the German sense. For that, German usage has another word, "*gebildet*," and the peculiar possession of the "*gebildeter Mann*" is not "culture" but "*Bildung*." If we should accept the German term "culture" in its technical sense, we should have no better equivalent for "*Bildung*," etc., than "education" and "educated," which convey too much of the association of school discipline to render the German conception in its entire scope. At all events, whatever names we adopt, there is such social possession, different from the individual state, which consists of adaptation in thought and action to the conditions of life.

Again, the Germans distinguish between "culture" and "civilization." Thus "civilization is the ennobling, the increased control of the elementary *human* impulses by society. Culture, on the other hand, is the control of *nature* by science and art." That is, civilization is one side of what we call politics; culture is our whole body of technical equipment, in the way of knowledge, process, and skill for subduing and employing natural resources.

Now there are very positive theories based on human technology as the one determining factor, and even the efficient cause, of all social development. These views are indicated when Barth speaks of the "culture-history idea." The theorem is that men's ways of dealing with nature have been the cause of their spiritual life, and of their social and political conditions. Here belong at first glance all the numerous writers who have divided the history of the race into periods, according to the kind of tools or implements that men have used. It may be that the apparent importance of the method is not real enough to make their view quite as one-sided in this respect as the classification

would indicate, but the symptoms should be regarded as danger signals. For instance, when Dubois-Reymond divides historic times into three periods—namely (1) that of the building arts, bronze-casting, and stone-cutting; (2) that of the three inventions of the compass, gunpowder, and printing; (3) that of machinery moved by steam—he implies the one-sided culture view that men's inventions are the sole causes of their social condition. We might well ask of this view, as men at last asked of their mythologies: "If Atlas holds up the skies, who holds up Atlas?" If inventions cause social conditions, what causes inventions? Dubois-Reymond finds the cause of the fall of Rome in the fact that the Romans did not advance beyond the second of these three stages. He does not say whether the barbarians conquered Rome because they, too, had not advanced beyond the second stage! Of the culture-history view it is sufficient to say, with Barth: "The naturalists, technologists, and ethnologists accordingly start off on a false scent, if they try to make out that increase in the amount of 'culture possessed' is the main-spring of human progress. In this case, as before, we find that all historical events, both progressive and retrogressive, are phenomena of volition. The will is not moved, however, by endeavors after culture alone; but before and besides these endeavors are all sorts of other forces. Progress of culture is accordingly only one element, and not the only one. In many periods it constitutes, indeed, only a feeble factor in the historical movement." (P. 261.)

We reach similar conclusions in turn about the "political," the "ideological," and the "economic" conceptions of history. Upon this last view a single paragraph may be cited from Barth: "But economics thus undertakes much more than it can accomplish. Economics is rather in peculiar need of close connection with the history of the other branches of social life. In other words, economics needs sociology. Isolated from sociology, economics cannot even adequately determine fundamental conceptions. Thus Wagner¹ asks the question: 'Is the limitation of the economic motive, that is the effort to get a

¹ *Grundl.*, 3. Aufl., I, pp. 9-12.

maximum return for a minimum effort, desirable in itself, or attainable if desirable?' The answer will, without question, depend upon the assumed purpose of social life. Economics alone is incompetent to define this purpose. It is the affair of a comparative historical science like sociology, which works in conjunction with philosophy, that is, with the science of the highest theoretical and practical questions of humanity. In his politics, that is, in his theoretical and at the same time practical sociology, Aristotle claimed that happy life is the proper purpose of the state, which to him was identical with society. His notion of happy life was more fully defined in his *Ethics*. His whole politics and economics would have been different if his ethics had been different. So each modern system of economics takes form according to its assumed idea of the purpose of social life, that is, according to the sociology, and, in the final resort, the philosophy, from which it takes its departure. The isolation of economics has had as a consequence, so far as conceptions of history are concerned, only confusion."

Without resorting to further illustration from the philosophy of history, we may repeat that these snap-judgments about social laws, with all the dogmatism reinforced by them, have been so many rule-of-thumb attempts to do the thing which the sociologists want to do more scientifically. They want to formulate precise problems. They want to bring valid methods of inquiry to bear upon the problems. They want to derive knowledge that will be profitable in all things civic.

At the same time it has to be confessed that, as was hinted above, most of the sociology up to date has repeated in its way the same methodological errors which the philosophy of history committed. Yet, although the sociologists have not been forearmed individually as they might have been with lessons taught by the mistakes of the philosophers of history, sociology is gradually assimilating those lessons. Moreover, sociology is profiting by the provincialisms of the pioneer sociologists. It is learning to find the element of truth in the clues upon which different men have attempted to build sociology. These premature schemes have accordingly served their purpose toward perfecting a

method which in its turn will ultimately organize a body of knowledge.

The account which Barth gives of "the sociologies" fails to get this latter fact into focus. The titles which he gives to the groups into which he divides the sociologists really beg very important questions. As in the case of the philosophers of history, use of Barth's groupings, however, will serve to bring out the necessary facts about gradual perceptions of what sociological problems involve. This continued reference to Barth is incidentally for the purpose of correcting a radical error in his exposition. It prevents comment upon some very important writers, but the main point at present is to show that Barth misconceives the facts when he schedules a series of "sociologies." Superficially, he is correct; but closer inspection shows that, consciously or unconsciously, the sociologists have been working upon one sociology. Exaggeration of some single factor in association, or of some single feature in method, does not constitute a special sociology. It contributes, directly or indirectly, positively or negatively, to the development of the one general sociology.

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[*To be continued.*]

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF WOMEN CRIMINALS.

I.

ONE of the charges most frequently brought against sociology is that it consists only of theories, and these often of doubtful practicability. It is said its basis of fact is not sufficient to warrant its claim to the distinction of being a science. If this is the light in which it is often regarded, how can it be made more accurate, more scientific? This was the problem which at the outset confronted this investigation in criminal sociology. In this, perhaps, more than in any of the other branches, the way has been paved for scientific observation. Anthropometry and the metric system have already been brought to its aid, trained specialists have made the observations, and much statistical work has been done in relation to the social phenomena.

For the purpose of ascertaining the value and applicability of these anthropometric measurements to the female criminal in this country, and for the purpose of securing additional light upon the problem, an investigation was conducted by the writer during the summer, which consisted in visiting five institutions — the reform school at Geneva, penitentiary at Joliet, workhouse at Cincinnati, Ohio State Penitentiary at Columbus, and the workhouse and penitentiary at Blackwell's Island, New York city. At these institutions a laboratory was arranged in which the measurements and tests were made. Free access was had to the records of the institutions and to the prisoners, and every facility was afforded for an exhaustive study. The results presented in the following pages are gleaned from sixty-one criminals measured, these being compared with the measurements of fifty-five students. These results are divisible into three categories: the anthropometric and psychological, taken in the laboratory, and the sociological, which was secured by observing and interrogating large numbers of prisoners, by an examination of the records, by

conversations with officers, and by visits to the districts from which these inmates come. The results are best presented by observing these divisions.

Most of the investigation among criminals has been upon the anatomy, the functioning in society, the mental, moral, and emotional nature being neglected. The criminal has been regarded as a result, as a finished product, rather than as an individual in a state of evolution, as an organism responding and reacting to various stimuli. America has had but few students in the scientific study of the criminal, and thus the results of Lombroso, Ferri, Tarnowsky, and other European investigators have been largely accepted, and have had a much wider application than even their authors intended. What are some of these results, and are they applicable to American criminals?

Lombroso represents the work best, and is its originator. His investigations have been very minute and cover a broad field. He has examined the skulls, making a large number of measurements, and carefully noting anomalies; he has studied the brains of criminals, and also the anatomy, using anthropometry for a large number of measurements. Cephalic and facial anomalies, expression, weight, height, etc., have also been noted. Some meager observations in touch, sight, hearing, and taste have also been made. From these observations are formulated the theories which are so well known—such as the classification of born and occasional criminals, explanation of crime on the grounds of heredity and atavism, theory that the criminal is a degenerate and presents numerous defects and anomalies. Were man's structure all, with these conclusions no fault could be found; but there remain the mental and emotional impulses, the tremendous forces of social and economic environment, to be reckoned with; for man's life is but the response of the former to the latter.

In the hope of ascertaining if these facts were true for American female offenders, a series of twenty measurements was selected. It was hoped these would be comparable with Lombroso's results. America does not offer the facility for studying the skulls and brains of deceased criminals, so the measurements are limited to the anatomical. The series consisted of twenty

measurements, which included the following: weight, height, sitting height, strength of chest, hand grasp, cephalic index, distance between arches, between orbits, corners of eyes, crown to chin, nasal index, length of ears, of hands, of middle fingers, of thumbs, width and thickness of mouth, height of forehead, anterior and posterior diameters. Viewed from the standpoint of Lombroso's theory of atavism, all of these measurements have a bearing upon the relation of heredity and environment to crime. Emphasizing the former, Lombroso believes that the criminal possesses more degenerate characteristics and stigmata than do other classes.

Before comparing the specific measurements, there are some general statements of fundamental importance which should be made regarding Lombroso's work.

The number of normals measured is so small that his deductions as to differences between normals and criminals must be accepted judiciously. The number of criminals given is 1,033; of normals, 225, who were taken from hospitals; 30 not in hospitals were measured.

His measurements have been so largely anthropometrical; the psychological and environmental side, including training, has been so largely neglected, that his conclusive statements regarding born and occasional criminals, and his dogmatisms about heredity and atavism, must be accepted with some hesitancy.

His tendency to work out theories of degeneracy upon such doubtful material as historic documents of 1492, and discuss physiognomy from pictures he admits are not authentic,¹ must render him liable to the charge of partiality for this theory.

His generalizations from a few cases have tended to mislead. Thus, his descriptions of typical murderers and of criminal expressions cannot be duplicated into a general rule, and are to be found without the prison walls as well as within them.

Turning now to my series of measurements, what are the results?

The following measurements I have not compared with his results: height, cephalic index, facial measurements, length of

¹ "Was Columbus Morally Irresponsible?" *Forum*, June, 1899.

hands, feet, fingers, thumbs, and ears. After working for a time among the various nationalities which the prisons here present, I found that nationality was so influential, that so much depended upon race, climate, soil, nutrition, etc., of the various countries, that these results must be compared with those of normals of the same race and conditions. This seems to demonstrate clearly that we cannot accept the statements that criminals are more brachycephalic than normals, when one has measured only Italians or Russians, and that this is an ethnic characteristic. It is just here that Lombroso's results are untrustworthy when applied to various races and countries. Where one is dealing with structure, and this is dependent upon climate, soil, atmosphere, food, geographical location, etc., data must be confined to the race from which they are gleaned, and not be extended to characterize all criminals, merely because they are such.

With reference to weight, Lombroso says prostitutes are often heavier. He says: "This greater weight among prostitutes is confirmed by the notorious fact of the obesity of those who grow old in their vile trade, and who become positive monsters of adipose tissue."¹ My observations show the average weight of the student to be 124 pounds; of the prostitute, 120 pounds; the maximum weight for any prostitute was 160. From a careful observation of some 400 women in the Blackwell's Island workhouse I was unable to verify his statement, as these women were not heavier than were those observable upon New York streets. He makes no note of the fact that there is a tendency toward obesity with increasing age, or that nutrition, sanitary conditions, labor, etc., influence this among both normals and criminals.

With reference to age, Lombroso states that prostitutes are long-lived.² This fact is not applicable to Americans. Dr. Sanger, once resident physician at Blackwell's Island, has studied the subject thoroughly in America, and says: "In Paris 6¾ per cent. survive courtesan life for fourteen years; in New York, only 2¾ per cent.; in Paris, 17½ per cent. survive the life for ten

¹ LOMBROSO, *Female Offender*, p. 50.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 127-9.

years, while in New York the percentage is $3\frac{3}{4}$."¹ He ascribes this great difference in longevity to the different social customs and economic necessities.

With regard to strength, Lombroso says there is no proof of extraordinary muscular force, which I found true. The student's tests with the dynamometer showed a stronger hand grasp than did those for the criminals. He finds, however, a greater percentage of left-handedness. My number was small.

From observations of the women measured, and of those resident in the workhouses, I am able to refer to other statements of Lombroso's.

He asserts that prostitutes possess, more frequently than normals, enormous lower jaws, projecting cheekbones, projecting ears, virile and Mongolian physiognomy, prehensile feet, masculine voices and handwriting. I am unable to verify these, and think that, especially in the first-named, racial influences again operate. I found faces with hard expressions, and voices harsh and cynical, but they did not possess the peculiar masculine quality, and I do not believe that harshness, cynicism, coarseness make them masculine. The handwriting, by reason of the difficulty with which many of them write, and the attention they give to mechanical construction, tends to make the letters larger and more uneven, but I should not characterize it as masculine.

Lombroso also states that the pilosity among prostitutes is more excessive, and there are more receding foreheads than among normals. Again I am unable to concur in this statement.

When the classes from which these people come, who are not criminal, but who have the same cultural and educational acquirements, are observed, it is difficult to determine any marked differences.

Mantegazza, another European investigator, who has given especial attention to physiognomy, says: "Women criminals are almost always homely, if not repulsive; many are masculine; have a large, ill-shaped mouth; small eyes; large, pointed nose, distant from the mouth; ears extended and irregularly planted."

¹SANGER, *History of Prostitution*, p. 485.

When describing such characteristics as homeliness and repulsiveness in the lowest classes, the effect of clothing, cleanliness, etc., must be considered, as deficiency in these particulars renders even a normal individual unattractive.

The other measurements, not referred to in detail, are those which I have devised for other results than a comparison with Lombroso's.

We now turn to a consideration of the psychological tests. These included tests for memory, color-blindness and color preference, qualities, sensibility of the skin, taste and smell, hearing, sight, fatigue, pain, precision, respiration, and association of ideas. So far as the writer is aware, this is the first attempt to secure a series of such measurements from female delinquents, and to compare the results with those from a different educational and social stratum of society. The series used was designed for the purpose of testing the five senses, the capacity for perception, coördination, and adjustment. The series was necessarily more incomplete than the writer desired. This was due to the complexity and bulk of psychological apparatus, much of which must be excluded in fitting up a portable laboratory, and to the fact that with the delinquent classes everything must be as simple as possible, so as not to arouse too great a suspicion and antagonism.

The purposes of this investigation I conceive to be three :

1. If crime is the result of the way in which the individual *functions* in society, and he adjusts himself by means of his senses, perceptive and coördinating faculties, what differences exist in these between the criminal and the normal individual who adjusts himself better? Are there defects? If so, to what are they due?

2. Can psychology aid in the knotty problem of the influence of heredity and environment in producing crime? Will psychology reveal the defects, and will the environment, which includes the cultural and educational influences, account for their existence?

3. The closer union of psychology and sociology, thus rendering the latter more worthy of a scientific standing

Sociology needs some system of exact measurement to render its theories trustworthy and its concepts of practical value.

The method used in obtaining the results herein presented was to arrange the laboratory in some quiet place within the institution. With the coöperation of the matrons, such inmates were tested as were desirable and obtainable. The confidence and consent of the subject had to be secured, for they were extremely suspicious and superstitious of any investigation, especially where instruments were used. The measurements could not be made compulsory in any case. In the presentation of the details I shall give the test, its method, result, and comparative value, so far as I have been able to ascertain it. Where it has been possible to assign any reasons for existing facts, and where they have grown out of the investigation, I have appended them.

The first test given was that for memory. This consisted in reading a series of ten numerals. The first series contained four figures each, as 2835; the second, five, as 27914; the other, six; etc.; each series increasing in length. Immediately after the reading of each the subject was required to write them down as she thought they were read. This was continued until the point was reached where she committed three errors, transposed, substituted, or omitted a figure. This point indicated her ability for memorizing. When this was secured, the same test was repeated, only letters, as *x v h r, v l p x s*, were substituted for the figures. The letters were given for the purpose of preventing any advantage to those who had had special training in numerals, as mathematicians and bookkeepers.

The results show that the students possess much better memories. Where the memories of the criminals approximated to those of the students, I found them to possess superior educations. The courtesans had the most defective memories, the thieves and murderers being several grades higher. The reasons suggesting themselves for these differences were: the difficulty and hesitancy, due to defective education and lack of practice, with which the delinquents formed their numerals and letters. This withdrew the attention from the memorizing,

the consciousness of the mechanical work distracting them. Their concentration, by reason of defective mental training, was weaker than that of the student. They soon grew restless and found the task irksome. Even their desire to excel did not always prove strong enough to keep the mind from digressing. They were easily irritated and were exceedingly sensitive over their supposed errors. The greater defect among courtesans may be due to their greater ignorance, and habits which impair clearness of the mental faculties.

In the test for color-blindness, which is made with a series of wools, similar to that in use by railways in their examinations, I found no cases of color-blindness, though both criminals and students made errors in the assignment of doubtful shades of the blues and greens. In connection with this test I attempted to ascertain if it is true, as has been so often stated, that courtesans prefer and wear gaudy colors. I asked them to name the color they preferred for gowns and trimmings. The result shows the following selections: blue, 23; pink, 8; red, 5; yellow, 5; lavender, 3; black, purple, and green, 2 each. Observing the clothing of the women as they were brought into the workhouses, I found no one color markedly predominant. Courtesans belonging to the lowest classes often have little choice in the selection of colors, for this is frequently determined by other factors. Frequently they wear cast-off clothing; bright colors appeal more to the sensuous nature, and as these courtesans are almost always solicitors for patronage, they use them to attract attention; bright fabrics are cheaper than duller shades—these are economic reasons. Colors are often chosen because associates wear them, or because they are the custom in their environment—these are among the social reasons. Thus, these factors must be considered in an attempt at explanation. Preference and the colors worn are not necessarily the same.

Of suggestive interest rather than of definite psychological value was the test of qualities. The following list was given the subject, and she was instructed to choose from it the five which appealed to her most, which she would desire for herself or friends, care being taken to explain the exact meaning of

each where it was not understood: principle, honor, truth, justice, right, fellowship, sincerity, ambition, courage, purity, nobility, strength, sympathy, love, friendship, virtue. The results were: honor, 32; principle, 30; truth and purity, each 21; love, 18; justice and ambition, each 17; virtue, 15; nobility, 13; strength, 12; sympathy, 11; friendship, courage, fellowship, each 10; sincerity and right, 9 each. It will be noted that the stronger, more masculine qualities are more frequently chosen. Thus honor, principle, truth, justice were selected more frequently than love, sincerity, friendship, purity. I found that they used two methods of selection: the first, choosing what they desired for themselves; the second, what they desired for others, especially if through others they had fared badly. Thus principle, justice, truth often occurred because they felt their prosecutors and judge had not treated them fairly. Friendship is far down in the list, for they know few unselfish ones, and its mention often elicits a sneer; sympathy they appreciate, but it is often crowded out by the fierceness of the competitive struggle; sincerity they think does not pay, because it is not current coin within their community.

The sensibility of the skin was taken upon the forearm with an *æsthesiometer*. The method consists in pressing the two points of the instrument upon the skin. The points are adjustable and at the beginning are placed 30^{mm} apart. Ten impressions are made, the subject stating each time if she feels two impressions or one. If the judgments are accurate, the points are moved nearer together and ten tests made. This is repeated until the point is found where only one point can be felt. Then the experiment is repeated, only instead of starting with the points wide apart they are close together, and are gradually widened until two pressures are discernible. The subject's eyes are closed during the experiment.

The tests demonstrated that the sensibility is greater with the students. For the right and left forearms the average was 16^{mm}. For the criminals the average was, right, 24^{mm}; left, 21^{mm}. The lowest sensibility reached by a student was 26^{mm}, the highest 6^{mm}; among criminals the lowest was 42^{mm}, the highest 16^{mm}.

The averages for the reform-school girls more nearly approximated those of the students; those of the courtesans were farthest removed.

The reasons for this greater insensibility may be found in the nature of the occupation, nutrition, care of the body, habits tending to render the sensibilities less acute. Important also was their defective concentration. The greatest care had to be used to secure constant attention. Poor concentration tends to render the results inaccurate. Whether age is a factor I am unable to determine. Often the muscles were soft and the skin flabby, and a much greater pressure was required in order to secure a definite sensation.

The tests for taste and smell were next given. For taste solutions of salt, bitter, sweet, and sour were used, one drop of each being placed upon the end and sides of the tongue with a small brush. For smell four solutions each of camphor, bay rum, and cloves were given; each solution was of a different strength. The differences between delinquents and students were more marked in these than in any other tests. Instead of proving one of the current theories, that the criminal is allied to the savage, and is more dependent upon physical senses than upon his intellect, and thus has these more acutely developed, I found them to disprove it. In taste the delinquents were only about two-thirds as accurate as the students, in smell only about one-half.

The following reasons suggested themselves:

The eating of snuff, excessive use of alcohol and tobacco, destroy a fine sensibility to taste. The prostitutes use these to a greater extent than do the criminals, and their sensibility is much more obtuse. The coarse, strong foods used must tend to render fine discriminations impossible. Bad sanitary conditions and unsavory odors in the districts from which most of them come must affect the sense of smell, as do also such diseases, as catarrh, which are often allowed to exist unheeded. In the test for smell the power of association has a marked influence. Camphor, cloves, and bay rum were more familiar to the student. Sometimes the criminal would designate camphor as good for a

headache when she could not recall the name, or cloves for toothache. Without these associations they would not have recognized the odor. Definite associations make the results more favorable.

The test for hearing was the familiar one taken with a watch. One ear was closed with cotton, and the subject, with her eyes closed, was required to state when she heard the watch and when she did not. The watch was first held close to the ear, and gradually moved outward, until the judgment became inaccurate. Then the watch was started from a point where it could not be heard, and moved forward until the judgments were accurate. By this method numerous defects were found. For fifty-seven subjects I found the distance for the right was 4.7 feet; left, 5.4 feet. In twelve cases there were marked defects in both ears, or great discrepancies between the two.

In some cases I could ascertain no reasons; in others I found such causes as catarrhal and scrofulous diseases. Many defects were explained by the subject upon the ground of injuries, and, judging from the condition in which many of the women arrived at the workhouses, I am inclined to accept this as an explanation.

A fatigue test was taken for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of physical endurance and the amount of will-power. The subject was required to rest her hand upon the table so her index finger rested upon the pendulum of a pair of weighing scales suspended from a standard. At a signal she was required to pull the pendulum down as far as possible, and hold it steady for thirty seconds. The rate of decrease from the maximum pull to the minimum pull was taken as the indication of fatigue. The results show the students to have an inferior pull, but more endurance. The energy of the delinquent seemed to come in a burst, and was followed by a rapid decrease. The students showed greater conserving power. The maximum pull for the delinquents sometimes exceeded twelve pounds, while that of the students did not exceed ten. Average rate of decrease for the delinquents was 2.4 pounds; students, 1.6 pounds.

For ascertaining defects in eyesight, reading different sizes of type at a distance of four feet was used. The subject began

with the large sizes, and passed to the smaller sizes until she failed to read clearly and correctly. One eye was tested at a time. Twenty-four showed a marked difference between the two eyes. The difference between delinquents and students was found in both strength and acuteness. The former tire more readily, and the average shows that they failed at a size twice as large as that upon which the students failed.

This may be due in part to the following reasons: The delinquents were older than the students. On the other hand, however, the physician at the reform school states that of the girls received there about two-thirds have defective vision. The students have read more and assist themselves more readily by association of words and phrases. The hesitancy with which the delinquents read and pronounce tends to render their perception of words less accurate. The irregularity of habits and excessive use of the eyes during night hours, often under glaring lights, must tend to weaken them, as does also the use of strong stimulants.

The tests for pain were made upon the temporal muscle with an instrument which registers the amount of pressure required to produce a just discernible painful sensation. When the subject feels the sensation of pain, she indicates it, the pressure is stopped, and the reading taken. Three tests were made upon each temporal muscle, and the average used. For the students the amount required was: right, 2,018 grams; left, 1,922; reform school: right, 2,159; left, 2,105; delinquents: right 3,243; left, 3,159. My results confirm the statement that the left side is more sensitive than the right.

Dr. MacDonald has advanced the theory that luxuries and refinements tend to increase this sensitiveness. As these are incident to higher cultural and educational standards, they would support the hypothesis herein presented. One peculiarity of criminals is noteworthy: while they have an extreme *fear* of pain, they *endure* it without complaint when it is actually applied.

A test for securing the coördination of eye and hand was next given. A blank containing a number of small circles, as arranged on a target, was placed upon the wall. The subject

was seated in front of it and was required to strike as near the center as possible, ten times in regular, rapid succession. A pencil was used, and was sent forward and back from the shoulder. The nearness to the center of the pencil dots indicated the degree of accuracy. In this also the students were more accurate. Any neurotic conditions were clearly shown by this test.

The longest and most difficult test for the subject to comprehend was that of association of ideas. It consisted in giving the subject a word, as "house" or "tree," and having her write her associations with the word. One minute was the time allowed for each word. She wrote down only one word for each idea, thus securing more associations within the time allowed. After the word was given she had the privilege of writing down anything that came to her, whether it was connected with the word or not. While the associations were still fresh, they were analyzed, the subject telling that of which she thought in each instance. The tests made in this way are divisible into four groups: one series, consisting of the words "rainbow" (visual), "thunder" (auditory), "pain" (tactual), "sour" (gustatory), "ammonia" (olfactory), was given for the purpose of determining to what extent each memory prevailed. Thus, if "rainbow" was given and was followed by the names of colors, the visual still persisted; but if rain were heard, or they felt afraid, the visual was lost. So throughout the series. The second consisted in giving more abstract words, these being "mind," "habit," "value," "marriage," "religion." The words were also selected with a view to bring out the mental and moral attitude, and social influences. Thus, under "habits" they frequently enumerated all evil ones; under "value" could be clearly seen that for which they cared most; under "marriage" came out some most interesting facts—much relating to their personal history and what they believed. In these two associations the subject was allowed to think as she chose; in the third the association was constrained, her attention being confined to the subject named; the words used were: "Name all the causes of fire that you can;" "Give the names of all the birds you know." In the fourth was given a repetition of the first, only instead of giving a word representing

a picture, a sound, a taste, etc., the direct stimulus was given and the subject asked to write her association. Instead of saying "rainbow," a color was shown; for "thunder," a whistle was blown; for "pain," a pinprick was given; for "taste," a drop of quinine solution; for "smell," extract of ammonia was given. This test was for the purpose of ascertaining if the memory stimulated persisted longer upon direct stimulation.

Important among the many facts obtained from this test is that of the rate. The rate of association of the students was much greater. The number varied with the word given, for some suggested more vivid associations. Taking the first series as illustrative, the rate per minute was: students: "rainbow," 10.7; "thunder," 10.1; "pain," 10.1; "ammonia," 10.4; "sour," 12; criminals: "rainbow," 5.2; "thunder," 5.2; "pain," 5.4; "sour," 4.6; "ammonia," 4.8. These differences in rate appeared throughout the series. The courtesans here again showed the lowest rate.

This difference in rate is due to the fact that criminals' minds do not operate as rapidly; they have a smaller fund of general knowledge from which to draw associations, and they discriminate more in what they write down. The difficulty with which they write the words delays them in recording their associations.

The route of association is also interesting. There were three or four possible ones. In the first the association always went back to the word given, that is, all other ideas were related to "rainbow," for instance. In the second, one idea would grow out of another. Thus "rainbow" would suggest "blue," "blue" the color of a ribbon, "ribbon" on the subject's hat, etc., the idea of "rainbow" being entirely lost. The third was where these two were combined. The fourth was a word-association; thus: "lemon" would suggest "lemonade," or "sweet" would suggest "sour" or "bitter." The students showed a greater tendency toward the second. This was true, I think, because they often reproduced whole scenes or events, while the criminals adhered more closely to descriptions or enumerations of the subject given. Word-associations were rather more frequent among the delinquents.

The varying associations for the same word brought out by the two classes were most interesting. Noticeable, too, was the fatigue which the test produced in the criminal classes. The students were almost always fresh, while near the close the delinquents grew tired, restless, and irritable. This was true, notwithstanding their interest, which was well held by this experiment.

The last, and perhaps most interesting, test was that made with the kymograph, an instrument designed to register the respiration curve upon smoked paper. The instrument consists of a base containing a clockwork, a standard, and a drum, around which is rolled the smoked paper. The drum is revolved slowly by the clockwork. Resting lightly against the smoked paper is a pointer. A respirator is fastened upon the chest of the subject, and this is connected with the pointer by means of a rubber tubing. When the subject inspires and expires, the air is forced down and back the tube, the pointer making a curved line upon the paper as the drum revolves. Every change in the amplitude and the rate of the breathing is thus graphically portrayed.

The test was given for the purpose of determining the amount of emotional reaction to stimuli, as shown by the changes in breathing. Five curves were taken upon each sheet. In the first one the subject was asked to sit quietly and think of whatever she desired, except of the experiment. This gave a fairly regular curve. Where there were any marked depressions or elevations I stopped the kymograph and asked for the corresponding thought, which was rarely denied. Near the close of this curve a stimulus for surprise was given. The room was quiet, the subject thinking, when suddenly a block was dropped, or a hammer struck. The change in the width, height, and regularity of the curve showed the amount of reaction. These changes are made by the subjects breathing more quickly or slowly, by catching or holding the breath. The second curve was designed to secure as nearly as is possible the normal curve. For this the subject was asked to read a newspaper clipping. It had no beginning or end, and was selected to hold the attention, but

not to excite undue interest. The mind being off of the self and the experiment, the curve was usually even. Near the close of this the stimulus for pain was given. For this was used a sharp pinprick in the back of the neck. The change here was usually a sharp rise or fall, and the return to the normal curve was more quickly made than in surprise. The next curve was the reading-aloud curve. This was given for the purpose of noting the difference between the various methods of reading. Note was taken of the rapidity, monotony, attention to pauses, etc. This test also served to relieve any tension still existing in the subject. The fourth curve was related to the effect of interest. In the first half the subject was required to read the ordinary crop report found in the daily paper; in the second half she was given a graphic account of the rebellion of two criminals in prison. The former was dull to her, the latter interesting. The changes here were not so marked, partly, I believe, because the crop report was too dull, and her attention wandered to more interesting things. In the last curve the subject was allowed to think of whatever she chose, until I suggested the train of a stimulus thought. I gave first one for joy, suggesting that she think of being released. This almost never failed, the curves being deeper and wider. The second was for disgrace, and for this I used the fact of her being in such an institution and its effect upon relatives and friends. This did not secure so marked a response as did the first, but here I secured three genuine crying curves. Such curves as these, as well as those for laughter, sighing, etc., must come unexpectedly and voluntarily, and cannot be secured for the asking. The last was that for fear. For this I used a simple device. Placing a plethysmograph near the temple, I said I intended applying an electric current; that if they would not move or speak the pain would be slight. The fear of electricity is very great, and this never failed. My great difficulty was in keeping them quiet, so excessive was this fear. Two marked changes were observable: either the curve became almost a straight line, as when they held their breath, or it became ragged and of varying amplitude, as when they became nervous through fear.

These results I have not yet compared, so I am unable to say in what they differ from those of the students.

All of the psychological tests show a marked difference between the immoral women, who are those generally found in workhouses, and the women who commit felonies, who are those generally found in the penitentiaries. If the results from the technically criminal class were considered separately from those of the workhouse class, the average would be higher. The prostitute mentally and physically is more defective than the criminal. Where the differences between the two classes have been great I have separated them, giving the average for each, or calling attention to the fact of the difference.

I have here presented, as briefly as possible, the experiments, methods, and results. There remains now the presentation of the results of the sociological investigation, and the correlation of the two—the application of the one to the other, and the relation to social phenomena.

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[*To be continued.*]

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER IX.

SOVEREIGNTY—RIGHT.

BESIDES reducing coercion to order, sovereignty also squares it with right. In so far as we have considered order alone, we have defined it merely in mechanical terms, as the balancing of force against force; as the extension of rule over wide areas. But social force is the expression of human will. Will is the outcome of beliefs and desires. We must now ask: What part have ideas and beliefs in sovereignty? We shall find that order itself is possible only on condition of a common belief animating separate classes and all classes.

First, the partnership of different social classes in determining the sovereign will is possible only for those classes which have developed the capacity and power of coöperation. Such capacity is based, in the last analysis, on a belief in the moral perfection of the unseen powers that rule the world. Such a conviction alone can sustain that optimism by which hopeful, united action persists. Whether this take the form of belief in a divine ruler, or in the rule of reason and nature, it is the inspiring confidence of the believer that he is working in harmony with a power mightier than all human opposition. It is the perception of a rational aim in the work he is doing, instead of the dictates of caprice, that enlists the will and energy of the worker. The alternative is suicide or slavery. If life were conceived as mere task-work, the mere carrying of bricks back and forth from one point to another, then only hunger or the lash could hold the toiler to his work. A society or a class convinced at heart of such pessimism would perish or be enslaved. For this reason religious revivals have usually preceded, in English history, the political uprisings of new social classes.

On the other hand, the ruling classes themselves must have accepted in general the same beliefs of moral perfection, else

they could not understand the claims of the aspiring class and would be unable to make those concessions implied in partnership. They would submit to sheer coercion in the form of imperialism or tyranny, but would not enter into that arrangement of mutual veto which characterizes the true state with its constitutional form of government.

Belief in moral perfection is the belief in right and wrong. The morally right is that which squares with the perfect rule of the universe. When this belief sinks in the heart, it leads to a certain judgment of self. This is a consciousness conditioned on personal freedom, either of one's own perfection or of one's guilt; of one's harmony or disharmony with the rule of right. In the empiric stage guilt is disobedience to ceremony or custom; in the reflective stage it is the consciousness of a sinful purpose. This consciousness of self is at the same time a judgment of similar perfection or guilt in others conditioned on the recognition of like freedom of choice and action in them. But this of itself does not lead to a recognition of the right of others to be free. There is needed in addition a belief in the moral worth of others; the conviction that they as well as one's self ought to be free to express self-perfection or self-guilt. The Brahman believes in freedom only for the higher caste. The lower are to have little or no choices of their own, but are to serve the higher. The moral worth of others, considered as an effective motive for self, is ultimately a religious conviction of the equality of others. This is the narrower meaning of the "general will" which Green really has in mind in his contention, referred to in chap. 7, that will, not force, is the basis of sovereignty. The general will, he says, is "not the momentary spring of any and every spontaneous action, but a constant principle, operating in all men qualified for any form of society, however frequently overborne by passing impulses, in virtue of which each seeks to give reality to the conception of a well-being which he necessarily regards as common to himself with others."¹ "The state or sovereign presupposes rights, and is an institution for their

¹ *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 217.

maintenance."¹ "It is the interest of men in a common good, the desire on the part of each, which he thinks of others as sharing, for a good which he conceives to be equally good for them, that transforms mere 'potentia' into what may fitly be called *jus*, *i. e.*, a power claiming recognition as exercised or capable of being exercised for the common good."²

There is an ambiguity in the word "right," of which the foregoing quotations from Green give evidence. There are three uses of the term, which may be designated, respectively, moral right, popular right, and legal right. That which has been described above as flowing from the belief in moral perfection is moral right. It is right in the "adjective" sense, and is contrasted with wrong. Popular right and legal right, however, have nothing directly to do with right and wrong. They are the "substantive" uses of the term, and denote a social relation based on coercion. Holland defines a right as "one man's capacity of influencing the acts of another, by means, not of his own strength, but of the opinion or the force of society." He designates these respectively as "moral" right and "legal" right, but the term "moral" right is here ill-chosen. "Popular right" is preferable. The distinctions between these three uses of the term will appear clearly if we ask for the standard by which "moral" right is to be measured. When we ask, Is a given deed or social relation right, or is it wrong? we do not have reference to the standard set up by law or by public opinion. A legal right and a popular right may both be wrong. These are social relations, and may or may not be right. Neither do we refer to the social and legal rights of "normal" as distinguished from "pathological" societies, a criterion proposed by Durkheim.³ Individuals will differ in their opinions as to what is normal and what is pathological. Again, the standard cannot be "universal reason," for universal reason, so far as known, revealed, and workable, is only the reason of individual human beings, and these will differ. The standard of moral right must be subjective and

¹ GREEN, p. 143.

² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³ *De la division du travail social*, p. 34.

not objective. But it cannot be the individual opinion of any and all persons, for then the standard set up by criminals, cranks, and degenerates would be of equal value with that set up by others, a position practically held by the sophists. The true criterion of right and wrong must, therefore, be the personal belief of each normal person who makes a conscientious effort to know the right. This effort consists partly in seeking social confirmation. "In order to know the law of God you must interrogate not only your *own* conscience, but also the conscience and consent of humanity."¹ It also consists partly in criticising and improving upon the existing standards of humanity. In this way do the beliefs regarding right change with every individual and every race and generation. But they are purely subjective and personal, and can be changed, not by arguing or by legislation, but by conversion. The heart, the subconscious self, the moral character, the religious faith, the passions and desires, are their foundation, and only as these change do men's beliefs of right change.

Beliefs in right, as they spread through society by propaganda and conversion, lead to action. This action is the united action of those believing alike. Its social consequences are the new coercive relations which it imposes upon those who do not accept the belief. These are "popular rights." Subjective right here becomes objective. "Adjective" right becomes "substantive." It becomes a social relation. Austin says that "a so-called law set by general opinion" is "not a law in the proper signification of the term," but that it is closely analogous to a law proper, and differs only in the fact that the law in the one case is established and obedience is exacted by an uncertain and indeterminate body of persons, and in the other case by a certain and determinate body.² These analogous and indeterminate "laws" are the basis of popular rights. As soon, however, as popular rights begin to find expression through the determinate, constituted authorities of the state, whether judges, legislators, executives, constitutional conventions, or referenda,

¹ MAZZINI, *The Duties of Man*.

² AUSTIN, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, Lecture V.

they become "legal rights." Here the coercive element has been definitely extracted from the inchoate mingling of coercion and persuasion characteristic of popular rights, and has been given a clear and definite statement, on which the people can depend. The state thereby further emerges and differentiates from the other institutions of society, and the added powers in the hands of its certain and determinate agents constitute positive law and legal rights.

The confusion in meaning of moral right, on the one hand, and popular and legal right, on the other, is based on the deep conviction or feeling that legal rights should be backed by moral right. This conviction is expressed in the terms "divine rights" and "natural rights." Properly speaking, these terms do not apply to substantive rights. They do not indicate primarily a social relation, but an opinion as to what *would* be a *right* social relation, *i. e.*, a *right right*. They belong to moral right and not to substantive rights. They are simply a dogmatic way of asserting that one's own opinion of what ought to be a legal right is above question. It is to be noted that these terms do not appear until society has entered the reflective stage. In the empiric stage social relations are determined by religion and custom. These are above inquiry and criticism. They are not thought of as either right or wrong, but as commanded by the gods. But in the reflective stage, with its tyrants, tribunes, and absolute monarchs, whose personal wills emerge as sanctioning or even overruling custom, and whose commands become laws in the Austinian sense, then appeal must be made to the consciences of those who are called upon to obey. This was done first under the claim of the "divine right" of kings, then the "natural right" of kings, and finally, with the rise of transferable property, the doctrine of natural right was appropriated by the capitalist class in their demand for equal privileges with king and lords. Throughout all these controversies the terms "divine" and "natural" right signified merely that those who laid claim to the coercive power of the newly emerging state in the assertion of legal rights were morally justified in the action they took. It was their only way of appealing to the powerful

convictions of moral and social perfection lying deep in the subconscious minds of all.¹

I have said above that moral right exists only in the mind. It is subjective. But so dependent is the mind on its social condition that the belief in moral right can arise only as the individual feels himself to be free. Freedom is ability to choose and act as one wishes. There is neither right nor wrong where necessity rules — only success or failure. Free will is illusory if it does not end in free action, and free action is impossible where society has not yet overcome the high physical facts of necessity. There are three kinds of necessity. First, climatic, that which is above and beyond the control of man. The seasons, the winds, the zones, the ocean currents, the isothermal areas, establish conditions of necessity which man has but meagerly overcome, and in contest with which his freedom is only an illusory and empty option between life and death. Second, material necessity; that which man gradually overcomes through science, invention, and art. The material products which men consume and use and enjoy are but the raw material of nature worked over by human thought and labor. They are simply the products and services of others. Material freedom is the control over a wide range of these products. The savage is not free, because he has but few social products to choose from. The civilized man is free because he can choose all the way from Bibles, paintings, schools, homes, to whisky, roulette, and prostitutes. In doing so, as we have seen, he simply commands and controls the services of others. This the economists call wealth. It is material freedom. The savage is first a slave to nature, and is freed from nature by enslaving his fellow-men. Slavery is originally neither right nor wrong — it is necessary. Third, competitive necessity; that which marks the struggle for life and is overcome by organization, monopoly, and government. When the British soldiers were imprisoned in the Black Hole with only a six-inch window for air, their susceptibilities to love, justice, mutual help, which stimulated their marches and

¹ See also FIGGIS, *The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings* (Cambridge University Press, 1896).

battles, were utterly crushed in the death of the weaker and the survival of the stronger. When a thousand workmen compete for five hundred jobs, it is to the credit of human nature and the police if they do not cut each other's throats. When capitalists bankrupt their rivals, it is only the recluse, the agitator, the prophet, who whispers or shouts "injustice." The man in the struggle sees only necessity. It is vain to speak of freedom or of right and wrong, where the choice is limited to life and death, to success and failure. The first obligation in war is victory, and that is the reason why "war is hell." But when victory is won, when competition ends in monopoly, when organization and subordination take the place of struggle, then the victor is free; then he can listen to the still small voice of right.

It is the growth of monopoly and centralization in each social institution which has in the end subordinated necessity to freedom, and has paved the way not only for higher convictions of moral right, but also for the incorporation of these convictions in the form of legal rights. The freedom, which thus emerges within each institution is "institutional freedom," corresponding to the factor of organization, just as material freedom corresponds to the material basis of each institution. Institutional freedom is private property; and the ethical phase of property is the judgment of the right or wrong concerning choices which proprietors are free to make. This is personal ethics, which has a twofold character. It may refer to the effect of the free choices on the character and destiny of self, or on the character and welfare of others. But in either case the ethical judgment is unwarranted unless the person is secure in that control over the wide range of services of others which we understand by property. Now, competition is not property, but struggle for property. Its criterion is not the right nor the wrong, but the successful. Property is a requisite for survival, but it is not mere ownership. It is also the organization, subordination, discipline, efficiency, of the human agents combined under the management of the proprietor. And until monopoly is reached this organization is never so secure that it can dispense with the equipment for fight. There is always another organization, as

well or a little better disciplined, ready to overwhelm it and capture its territory and subsistence. If this be true, then it is only in the lulls of competition or in the completed and victorious monopoly that the ethical appeal can be made. This is doubly true of that customary period which culminated in absolutism, where survival of the fittest necessitated the survival of the strongest and largest organization. It is also true in the reflective period, where, although doctrines of moral right were enlisted in the strife for participation in sovereignty, yet these doctrines lodged in the mass of the people rather as a stimulus to strife than a devotion to right. But when struggle ended in centralization, when strife ended in sovereign partnership, then the claims of ethics could be heard and obeyed. The psychic basis of this fact is the same as that which we have found in private property, namely, that coercion is the means for executing the mere wish or opinion of the proprietor. It compels obedience, and therefore need not rely upon knowledge, skill, or tact. The character of the commands imposed are simply the outward expression of the moral character of him who commands. The same is true of the state's commands. They express the moral character of those who participate in sovereignty. But this partnership must first be compulsorily acquired and guaranteed in the very constitution of the state. In this process all other qualities are mere instruments of might. Force can be met only with force. But when acquired, then the moral character of the sovereign can show itself, whether he be a mere sensualist and demander of pleasure, or a conscientious dispenser of justice and right in the use of his coercive power. It is the beliefs of the sovereign concerning right which shape his sovereign will. The ethical appeal to him is in effect an appeal to use his property in such a way as to promote the highest good of self and of others, *i. e.*, to command the services of others rightly instead of wrongly.

But, unfortunately, the human will unchecked is capricious, self-seeking, oppressive. During the period of competition it is checked by its own weakness. In the period of absolutism only the personal character of the chance ruler determines the ethical

character of the entire institution. What is true of the state is true of the other social institutions, whether governmental or subordinate; each one becomes an organization with a will of its own, enforced through the subordination of its members. The capacity of the human will, its range of free choice, is deepened and widened when competition has disappeared in monopoly. It becomes an institutional will, which is the will of the headman of the institution.

The problem of the reflective organization of society, following the breakdown of custom and the disappearance of competition, is how to check the capricious use of power by this headman in each institution, and to induce him continually to exalt justice above caprice. This is the problem of order and right.

We thus have the three constituents of sovereignty—coercion, order, right. Coercion originates as private property. The struggle for existence causes this to survive in the form of monopoly and centralization. Order emerges as a constituent of sovereignty in place of caprice only when sovereignty has extended over wide areas and when subordinate classes have earned the veto power in determining the sovereign will. Right takes its place as the moral aim of sovereignty when freedom has displaced material and competitive necessity; when the struggle for property has ended in the monopoly of property. We are now to examine in detail the subordinate or persuasive institutions of society with respect to the growth of organization, the extraction of coercion, and the injection of right.

JOHN R. COMMONS.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY.

[*To be continued.*]

REVIEWS.

Naturalism and Agnosticism. (The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-8.)
By JAMES WARD, Sc.D., Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic in the University of Cambridge. 2 vols. The Macmillan Co.

IN these days the teleological and sociological conceptions are having their innings in the interpretation of experience; and their last and one of their strongest is to be found in Professor Ward's lectures. The first statement of the preface is: "These lectures do not form a systematic treatise. They only attempt to discuss in a popular way certain assumptions of 'modern science' which have led to a widespread, but more or less tacit, rejection of idealistic views of the world." The preface says also: "I take it for granted that till an idealistic (*i. e.*, spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labor." While such statements tend to place the writer somewhat in the attitude of an apologist, and perhaps help to account for what will appear to some an undue polemical spirit in certain passages, they do not, of course, affect the inherent weight of the argument. The limits of this notice will permit mention of only a few central points—especially of those more likely to be of some interest to readers of this JOURNAL.

Vol. I is occupied with a detailed account of the difficulties encountered in the attempt to state experience in terms of matter and motion. The conclusion is that the "mechanical theory" is valuable as a descriptive formula of one aspect of experience only—the quantitative one; but utterly inadequate for a description of experience as a whole, since all experience cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. Perhaps the best parts of this volume are the discussions of the conceptions of matter—motion, space, time, mass, energy, and force—rather than the long cross—sometimes very cross—examinations of Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer.

In Vol. II, after a thoroughgoing criticism of psycho-physical parallelism as an attempt to escape the difficulties of the mechanical

theory, the "previous question" is put in asking how this dualism of the physical and the psychical, which goes to pieces so readily under criticism, ever came about, and what is the significance of its conceptions. The finding is that this dualism does not originate in the individual's perceptual experience of an "external world," but that it is of essentially social origin. "The researches of anthropologists warrant us in assuming that when human intercourse begins there is no dualism."¹ Dualism comes about in this wise: When L, M, and N look at one object, *e. g.*, the sun, each has his own individual object. "How do they come to know that the actual object of each is the same individual object for all?" The answer is through some common reaction. All point or reach or in some manner react in the same way. This common reaction is at the same time inter-communication, and advances from gesture through exclamation to systematic language. Through this common reaction and inter-communication it is found that there is a common or "transsubjective" object independent of L, M, and N severally. Here, according to Mr. Ward, occurs the first step leading to dualism. Finding the transsubjective object independent of L, M, and N *severally*, it is concluded that it is independent of them *collectively*. To this fallacy is added another, which the author calls the fallacy of "introjection," and which occurs as follows:

Of my fellow common thought and language lead me to assume, not merely that his experience is distinct from mine, but that it is *in* him in the form of sensations, perceptions, and other internal states. . . . Thus, while my environment is an external world for me, his experience is for me an internal world in him. And since I apply this conception to all my fellows and it is applied by all my fellow-men to me, I naturally apply it also to myself. Thus, instead of construing others' experience exactly and precisely on the lines of our own — the duality of subject and object — we are induced to misconstrue our own experience on the lines of a false but highly plausible assumption as to others' experience, which actually contradicts our own. With this contradiction and the fallacy of naïve realism just referred to dualism is essentially complete.²

Coming to the more distinctively constructive part of the lectures, Mr. Ward finds that the fundamental characteristic of experience is its subject-object form. This character is frankly accepted as given.

If this duality in unity of subject and object be indeed the fundamental fact of experience present alike in cognition, in feeling, and in volition, then,

¹ Vol. II, p. 165.

² Vol. II, p. 172.

so far at any rate, there can be nothing to explain. The demand for explanation may be taken as evidence that we have misconceived the facts.¹

This disposition of the subject-object relation would seem scarcely to be expected from one who insists, as Mr. Ward does throughout both volumes, that the categorizing of experience is essentially a teleological affair. A little farther on, in treating the subject-object relation in individual experience, the object is found to be of a conative rather than of a cognitive nature.

Regarding experience in this wise as life, self-conservation, self-realization, and taking conation, not cognition, as its central feature, we must conclude that it is not that "content" of objects which the subject cannot alter, that gives them their place in its experience, but their worth, positive or negative, their goodness or badness, as ends or means to life.²

Were this conative nature of the object pursued farther, perhaps the subject-object character of experience would not appear quite so gratuitous. In other words, it seems there is not sufficient justification given for regarding the subject-object character of experience as on an entirely different plane from the psychical-physical. The latter is regarded as a differentiation *within* experience—as conceptions evolved in the development of experience as means to its further progress. In the treatment of the subject-object nature of experience, therefore, it appears that the author's teleology is not quite thorough-going. The same appears true of the individual-universal relation. It, too, appears to be given, and to be a differentiation *of* rather than *within* experience.

Noting this latter distinction a little more in detail, we find it is a further differentiation of experience in its subject-object form. Thus giving in the last analysis of experience four terms—the subject and object of individual experience, and the subject and object of universal experience—Mr. Ward discusses the relation of the two subjects to each other and of the two objects to each other, and finds there is perfect continuity between them. But along with this finding he appears also to hold that the universal form of experience has developed *out of* the individual. Thus³ we find:

To refute the dualism of ordinary scientific thought, then, it is necessary to show that the generalized or universal experience with which it is immediately concerned has grown out of, depends upon, and is really but an extension of our primary *individual*, concrete experience.⁴

¹ Vol. II, p. 129.

³ Vol. II, p. 153.

² Vol. II, p. 184.

⁴ Italics mine.

Were it proposed to show that the individual *and* universal develop *together*, as a polar differentiation, out of a "primary, concrete experience," it would certainly be more nearly in line with what one is led to expect up to this point in the lectures. On their face this and other similar passages look like the old isolated individualism of Hobbes. To be sure, farther on we find this: "Once again I say the subject of universal experience is not numerically distinct from the subject of individual experience;" and many affirmations of their "organic unity" are to be found. But this "oneness" and "organic unity" appears to exist *after* the universal has developed out of the individual, the individual having been prior to and apparently independent of the universal. No better refutation of such a conception of the individual as this involves could be found than many passages from the lectures themselves. But this only makes the discrepancy the more puzzling.

There appears to be plenty of room, too, for the development of further questions concerning the relation of "the four terms of experience;" *e. g.*, the relation of the universal subject to the individual object, and of the individual subjects to each other and as an "aggregate" to the universal subject. To say nothing of such questions as the relation of the universal subject to "sentience," etc. Such questions, however, reveal the merit rather than a demerit of the lectures. Everywhere they bristle with suggestions. Indeed, frequently the lecturer himself is drawn aside by "suggestions," often enough and far enough to endanger the unity of the lecture. The whole line of discussion running through both volumes, showing the necessity for a closer union between the natural and the philosophical sciences, by pointing out in detail how each breaks down going it alone, is both timely and masterly. Throughout the lectures the influence of Lotze is apparent, and is freely acknowledged. On the whole, Mr. Ward's lectures are likely to be regarded as the most important philosophical contribution since Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. And, owing to its more popular style, its larger use of scientific and sociological material, and its confessed theological interest, it is certain to have a much wider circle of readers than did Mr. Bradley's book.

ADDISON W. MOORE.

Tropical Colonization. By Alleyne Ireland. The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. xii + 282.

MR. IRELAND has lived a number of years in tropical countries, and has made a close study of institutions. His collection of books and

material is large, and, of course, is supplemented by his own personal observation. For these reasons anything which he writes ought to be of value, especially as there is so much loose and inaccurate discussion on these subjects in the newspaper and periodical press.

The volume on *Tropical Colonization* he justly calls an "Introduction to the Study of the Subject." The author does not attempt an exhaustive study of any field of colonization or of any phase of it. He makes history merely incidental, and devotes a half-dozen chapters to a descriptive treatment of political and economic conditions which characterize European colonies in general. A final chapter contains some comments on the problems which confront the United States in the East and West Indies.

The treatment of "Trade and the Flag" is a somewhat careful analysis of facts relating to British and French commerce in particular. The conclusion is that trade does not necessarily follow the flag, but that possession of a given territory protects trade as against adverse possession by a nation with a restrictive commercial system.

Three chapters are assigned to the labor question in the tropics. This question comes next in importance after the establishment of social order, and on its wise solution, after all, depends the success or failure of European tropical control. The same labor maxims which may be commonplace in temperate regions by no means apply to the tropics. The conditions are fundamentally different, and one who would do more than merely follow precedents will resolutely seek entirely new methods. Mr. Ireland's discussion of the Dutch policy in Java is very fair. The results of that policy were certainly extraordinary, and are an interesting commentary on some theories of land-tenure.

A very useful working bibliography closes the book. In its thirty-three pages are enumerated enough of the innumerable works on European colonies for the ordinary reader's purposes. Of course, the scholar must go much farther.

Mr. Ireland has made a good beginning. It is to be hoped that he will follow it up. Colonization is one of the greatest facts of modern history—one of the most potent forces of modern life. In order to understand what is going on under our eyes the world throughout, we need a vast deal of study in lines quite unfamiliar to the most of our people. Gladstone and Louis Philippe and Bismarck are names which have a meaning to most of us. How many have a clear idea of the significance of Van den Bosch and Kaufmann and Sir Henry Parkes,

for instance? There is in the achievements of European colonization a great field for students of history and of existing social conditions — a field which we in this country have as yet hardly touched.

HARRY PRATT JUDSON.

Les Idées égalitaires. Étude sociologique. Par C. BOUGLÉ, Maître de conférences à la Faculté des lettres de l'Université de Montpellier. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 249. Fr. 3.75.

THE most striking thing about this monograph is the evidence which it affords that the sociological seed sown by Simmel is beginning to bear fruit. The author frankly credits to Durkheim and Simmel the chief impulses of his work. The monograph is a notable contribution to sociological analysis, but the point of view and the method are not those of Simmel, though it is difficult to point out in a word why they are not. The title is not one that Simmel would have chosen for a study of the "form" of "equality." As M. Bouglé distinctly indicates in his introduction, societary facts and our valuations of them belong in separate categories. Simmel's demand for a science of social forms is not a demand for criticism of our ideas about social forms. Sooner or later each calls for the other, but they are not identical. Bouglé has not performed the initial work of demonstrating the form of equality in Simmel's sense. He has not answered the question: What are the marks by which we recognize the form of "equality" in human association? Instead of that he discusses in the first three chapters: (1) the definition of ideas about equality; (2) the reality of ideas about equality; and (3) anthropological, ideological, and sociological explanations of the ideas. In the second part of the monograph he inquires into the relation between the existence of these ideas and the populousness, quality, complexity, and integration of the associations in which they occur. All this is valuable, and it will help many students to approach the antecedent problem, but it does not go back to the point of departure indicated by Simmel.

It is worthy of notice that M. Bouglé recognizes the force of arguments making for both a broad and a limited content for the name "sociology." He proposes to use the term *lato sensu* for a synthesis of the particular social sciences, and *stricto sensu* for "the science of the forms of association" (Simmel), which will itself be one of the particular

social sciences. Although the study before us does not go quite to the root of the matter, it is in the spirit of the less dogmatic and the more analytic and scientific method that will presently prevail in sociology.

A. W. S.

Bibliographie des Socialismus und Communismus. Von JOSEF STAMMHAMMER. Band II. Nachträge und Ergänzungen bis Ende des Jahres 1898. Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1900. Pp. iv + 403.

THIS volume is a supplement to an earlier one published in 1893. Vol. I gave a very full bibliography of socialism and communism as treated in books, pamphlets, magazines, and socialistic papers down to the close of the year 1891. Vol. II supplements the earlier one and completes the bibliography to the close of the year 1898. Although the list of titles cited in 1893 seemed quite exhaustive, almost one-half of those appearing in the new volume are of contributions bearing a date prior to 1891. Most of these are of pamphlets which could have been discovered only by the most careful research.

Both volumes give evidence of having been carefully prepared, and give only those titles taken from authoritative sources, or of works known to and examined by the author. The subject-indexes are good, so that the bibliography should prove of value to students of any phase of the subjects covered.

H. A. MILLIS.

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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

Economics in Russia.—The economic writers who have the greatest influence on their readers, and are in the foreground of journalism and economic science, may be divided into three schools, representing three different economic theories: (1) the school of the followers of Marx; (2) the national school, the so-called Narodnichestvo; (3) the individualist school. The continual discussions and polemics for the last eight or nine years have had for their pivot the economic teaching of Marx, as embodied in his three volumes *Das Kapital*. The Russian Marxists have done much in explaining and popularizing the theory of Marx concerning surplus value and the economical basis of history, and have done more than either of the other two for the organization of labor and for the so-called "class war." Besides the workmen, the Marxian theory is taken up eagerly even by some of the "capitalist classes," who justify their eagerness "to detach the workers from the means of production" by the historic necessity of industrial development in Russia, and claim to be the real creators of progress through the greater increase of capitalistic industry. According to M. Peter Struve, Russia is moving on the lines which were traced out by Marx; that is, that the great industry, on capitalistic basis, is supplanting the small industry, and that the divorce of the immediate producers from the means of production is growing apace; and this growth of capitalism is a happy omen for Russian progress and the only way of her salvation. But, as the chief industry in Russia is agriculture, and the only means of production which is still owned by the laboring population is the land, it follows that, according to Struve, there is no other way for Russian salvation than in the expropriation of the peasants from their land. This question, whether the economic policy of Russia shall be directed toward the annihilation of the small peasant proprietorship in order to encourage the growth of capitalism, or whether she shall, on the contrary, seek to maintain and develop peasant proprietorship, especially in its communal form, is the problem which forms the crucial point which separates both schools of socialism in Russia. M. Struve and his followers think that Russia has become already a capitalistic state on the model of the nations of western Europe.

This the economists of the *Russian nationalist school*, the so-called Narodniki, do not admit. According to them there is no necessity for Russia to follow in the steps of European capitalistic society, and to wait for the golden age when the capitalistic integument will burst asunder, as there is in Russia already the elementary form of collectivism in the village commune. In accepting Marx' theory of surplus value, and in making labor the chief, and even the only, basis for the distribution of wealth, the Narodniki, however, reject his theory of the economical, materialistic basis of society. According to them, man is everything and matter nothing. They believe that society can shape its destinies, arrange the modes of production and distribution of wealth according to its wishes, quite independently of the technical and commercial evolution. M. Mikhailovsky has introduced into economics his sociological standpoint, which makes man the chief factor of progress. According to him the living individuality, with all its thoughts and feelings, becomes an independent historical factor. This individuality, and not some mystic power, gives aims to history, and directs toward them the events through all the hindrances which arise from the unconscious natural forces and historic conditions.

M. Mikhailovsky does not deny that historic conditions play the greater part in economic evolution, but he does not admit their insuperability. The individual is quite independent, and the greater his intellectuality, the more powerful does he become in shaping the destinies of his own life and the life of his country. Russia, therefore, which is yet almost an economic *tabula rasa*, can easily start in any direction she likes.

Of the same opinion is M. Uzhakov, a very well-known publicist. M. Danielson says: "We have a historic heritage in the commune which, under the pressure of capitalism and the accompanying forms of production, cannot secure to its members

means of existence. Therefore, under existing circumstances, it is bound to perish. But the communal form of land-owning is a most important basis on which to build the future social industry. What we have to do is to graft on the commune scientific agriculture and great industry, and to transform it so that it may become a fit instrument for the organization of large industry, and for giving her, instead of a capitalistic, a social form. Capitalism destroys patriarchal production, which was based on production for the use of the producer, but in destroying it does not make it sufficiently social to satisfy the needs of the whole community."

The principal idea of M. Vorontzov concerning the evolution of Russian society as a result of economic forms is that the bourgeoisie is destined to play a rôle only of second rank; the factory hands have no chance for a considerable increase, and therefore the only possible social stratum of our future, as in our past, will be the peasantry.

The Narodniki, therefore, recommend the fostering of cottage industry, communal agriculture, and coöperative workshops; politically they are the greatest enemies of bureaucracy and officialdom.

Thus both these schools of collectivists, the Marxians and Narodniki, may be said to represent two camps, one of which makes villagedom—the peasantry—the only savior, economic and social, and the other thinks the factory, the town, the thing which has to come, which must come, and which one has to strive for, if one wishes for the coming of the future collectivist society.

Generally speaking, there is no individualistic economic school in Russia at all. The difference is only in the degree of collectivism admissible in society and concerning the economic policy which Russia should aim at—whether it should be "great commerce," "great landlordism," small industry, or peasant proprietorship, coöperative or commercial joint-stock banks, etc.

M. Slonimsky, an out-and-out anti-Marxian, criticises the theory of surplus value. For a theory of labor as a value standard there ought to be first an explanation of the way to measure and to define labor itself; it is impossible to translate art work into the language of simple work, because you cannot mix quality with quantity. As a refutation of the theory of Marx, which ascribes the whole value of the commodities to human labor, Slonimsky pointedly brings out the following contradiction: "Capital," says he, "looks for the surplus value of labor, and at the same time does its best to supersede it by machinery; it lives and grows only by working through living human labor, and at the same time tries to replace it by machinery; it exploits the workers, yet can do without any exploitation; it draws its net income from the unpaid surplus value, yet systematically diminishes the number of men with surplus labor and surplus value."—S. RAPOPORT, "Economics in Russia," in *Economic Review*, October, 1899.

The Policy of the Tin-Plate Combination.—1. *Relation to the tin-plate plants of the combination.*—At the present time a number of the plants have been closed down. Among these are some of the largest and best-equipped mills in the country. The company now owns every tin-plate plant in the United States making a product for the general trade. Just how long these establishments are to remain closed it is impossible to say, but undoubtedly the company is trying to find out to just what extent it is necessary to operate the different plants to supply the demand. If it is discovered that all, or nearly all, are necessary, two lines of policy are open to the directors: first, to operate all the mills owned by the company; second, to close the more poorly equipped and badly situated mills and to increase the producing power of the better plants.

2. *Dividends.*—It is continually asserted that the American Tin-Plate Co. will be able to pay dividends from the start, not only on the preferred stock, but on the common stock as well. This dividend, it is said, will be declared on April 1 to at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The company has been in existence only since December, 1898, and although large orders have undoubtedly been given to the company, the prices of tin plate have not advanced sufficiently to pay the increased cost of steel and tin in production. There is, of course, the temptation constantly before such a concern to pay dividends out of capital stock in order to push up the quotation of common stock. But the whole attitude of the company seems to be that of a legitimate manufacturing enterprise, rather than a speculative movement. The company is not likely to force the payment of dividends before it earns them.

3. In relation to the trade a radical change has been instituted. The company has laid down the principle that it will not have any dealings with brokers in tin plate. The idea upon which this policy is based is that with but one producing company of tin plate there is no need of a broker. The company makes no quotation except on request, and in car-load lots. The territory is divided into two districts: the eastern with headquarters at New York, and the western with headquarters at Chicago. Two men have been appointed as general agents over these divisions. The sales part of the business will be independent of the other parts, the management of the mills having no jurisdiction over the general agents. Business involving less than a car load is turned over to the jobber nearest to the customer.

4. *Machinery firms.*—Arrangements have been made with nearly every firm in the land engaged in manufacturing machinery for tin plate to sell their entire product to the American Tin-Plate Co. The new company expects to forestall promoters who expect to build plants and force the combination to buy them at a fancy price by arranging with the equipment firms to take their entire output. It is said that an agreement has been made between the two parties for five years, ending January 1, 1904. Just what and how much this product is to be is determined by the tin-plate company, and the managing committee distributes the machinery secured under this agreement among the different plants as it sees fit. The prices paid for machinery are lower than if equipments were bought in the open market. There will also be an attempt made to get the machinery firms to specialize, so that each will be a producer of a certain kind of machinery. It will thus be all but impossible to start a new mill to produce such machinery. If, however, there is any special demand because of the attitude of the company, it may be assumed that machine companies in other lines will enter the field as makers of tin-plate equipment. The whole arrangement, nevertheless, is indicative of the shrewd, and not-to-be-detested, attitude of this new combination.

5. *Various economies.*—The directors and promoters have absolutely refused to give enormous salaries. The compensation will be fair, but not high. The number of officers will also be cut down to the smallest number possible. The company in quoting prices f.o.b. from New York and Chicago, and shipping to the purchaser from the nearest mill, will be in a position to save some very considerable amounts in the course of a year on freight rates. Whether it will secure any concessions from the railroads in freight rates is not known. Until the rate between Pittsburgh and Chicago is very considerably reduced, the company will have to face the English competition on the Pacific coast. The company is too new to show how much of a saving may be effected by the new management. Probably greater uniformity and closer attention to cutting and waste will produce some economies.

6. The question of wages is one of the difficult things with which the new company has to deal. The tendency is in the direction of a considerable increase in wages in all the steel industries. The advance in the selling price of tin plate has stimulated the officers of the Amalgamated Association to ask for a higher scale of wages. "The company is, therefore, encountering high prices in raw material (steel and pig tin) and in wages." It is questionable whether the economies spoken of above will any more than make up for these extra expenses. The economic strength of the company will enable it to meet these difficulties without any great trouble.

The tin-plate combination is an arbitrary, but natural, attempt to raise the price of that product.

The industry stands in two dangers: first, of possibly placing prices so high that it will be impossible to maintain them, leading to a virtual revolt on the part of consumers; and, second, the political movement culminating in the possible withdrawal of the tariff. If the consumers of tin become dissatisfied with the attitude of the company in the matter of prices, the political movement may be reinforced by their opposition to the combination.—FRANK L. MCVEY, "The Tin-Plate Combination," in *Yale Review*, August, 1899.

Productive Coöperation in France.—I. *The origin of productive coöperation in France.*—The observation has become almost a commonplace that England is primarily the land of consumers' coöperation, Germany of credit coöperation, and France of productive coöperation. The saying that France is the birthplace of productive coöperation is founded on the facts that that form of coöperation is the only

one which has developed spontaneously in France; that it inspired with a new gospel such men as John Stuart Mill and the Christian socialists in England; and that it has resulted in some of the most justly celebrated enterprises in the world, such as the *Famillistère de Guise*, the *Maison Leclaire*, and, in certain respects, even the *Magasin du Bon Marché*. Coöperative production in France, however, has had a checkered history, owing to political setbacks. The principle of the first society, founded in 1833, was to forego any division of profits among members, and devote profits in a lump sum to the creation of an inalienable and perpetual social capital. But the revolution of 1848 really marks the rise of the coöperative movement in France. Over two hundred societies were formed almost simultaneously with the movement for the political sovereignty of the people. Napoleon's *coup d'état* (in 1851) and the opening of the imperial régime, with the suppression of the right of association and of reunion, influenced decisively the failure of the majority of these societies. A second time the movement revived in 1863-6, most of the organizations being based upon institutions of credit which should make the necessary advances of capital. This second effort was cut short by the war of 1870, the insurrection of the commune, and the dispersion of the socialists which followed. Once more, during the last fifteen years, the work of reorganization has been taken up. Within the last two years sixty societies have been founded, and 1900 will probably see three hundred in the field.

II. *The specific types of French productive coöperation* are: the self-supporting, the corporate, the semi-patronal, the "integral," and the agricultural. (1) *In the self-supporting workshops* all members of the association must be at the same time shareholders and workmen, *i. e.*, all the capital must (theoretically) be furnished by laborers employed by the association. This rule has not been strictly adhered to, some of the societies becoming close corporations of wealthy employers, with associate candidates for membership. (2) *The corporate associations*, organized to give employment to all workmen in a given trade, and gradually to supplant all employers in that trade (virtually the program of Louis Blanc), have come to serve rather, with a few conspicuous exceptions (*Ouvriers Fabricants de Voitures*, *La Verrerie Ouvrière*, etc.), as workshops for the unemployed. (3) *The semi-patronal associations* owe their initiative to some philanthropic employer, who, beginning with the introduction into his factory of profit-sharing, has gradually transformed this profit-sharing into a copartnership, and has finally himself retired, transferring the ownership of his factory to his employés, under such regulations as he has himself drawn up. The manager or managers are elected generally for life, with a share of the profits. Of this type are the three celebrated enterprises mentioned first, the latter, the *Magasin du Bon Marché*, transacting business to the amount of 180,000,000 francs annually. (4) The *Association Intégrale* (so called), of recent date, is characterized by its method of employing outside capital, not only in the form of loans, but in the form of *capital associé* (by *actions*, and not by *obligations*). This type of association is denounced as traitorous by all coöperators loyal to the old ideal of self-supporting and self-governing coöperation.

III. *The relations of productive associations with distributive associations* in France are very much out of joint. There is a tendency at present, however, to adjust these relations on the plan often successfully practiced in England, whereby the distributive societies receive a share in the profits and in turn furnish a market for the productive societies.

IV. *The privileges accorded associations of producers* are chiefly of four kinds: (1) *state aid* of from 140,000 to 150,000 francs annually to be distributed in small sums as subsidies; (2) *privileges in undertaking public works*. These are (a) preference over individual employers in the award of contracts where the terms offered are equal; (b) the right to dispense with the formalities of a public adjudication, and to contract privately with the state for awards of small importance; (c) exemption from the necessity of furnishing security according to the usual practice, when, however, the contract involves less than 50,000 francs; and (d) the special right to be paid as the work is done, every fifteen days. This last provision, the most precious of all for associations of producers, is scarcely ever punctually observed. Other privileges are: (3) the *Rampal Foundation* of 1,400,000 francs for loans by the city of Paris to associations of workingmen; (4) the *Coöperative Associations' Bank*, established in 1893, and loaning 2,000,000 francs annually to some fifty associations.

V. *Achieved results and prospective future*.—Though associations of producers are

still too few to have exerted any great influence upon the general condition of the labor class, they are not chiefly to be judged by a mere money standard. The workmen themselves do not judge them thus. What they have sought above all else is independence and security; and these boons on the whole they have gained, the latter by permanence of employment and old-age pensions. These associations, as industrial experiments, possess a scientific interest of the highest importance, since they are vigorous and often successful efforts to achieve a working solution of the problem of the division of profits between capitalist and employé by making the two one, and to vindicate the right of self-control on the part of the workman.—CHARLES GIDE, "Productive Coöperation in France," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1899.

The Socialist Ideal.—Socialism is the principle and method of democracy applied to the social and economic sphere. It is *the subordination of the materials of civilization to the common weal*. It is not only a superior method of business, but also, and because of that fact, a superior idea of morality. A moral idea is not any arbitrary notion *about* life, such as may exist in this or that man's consciousness, but a working plan of life which has the capacity actually to organize life as a whole. This test socialism challenges. We need, therefore, in considering socialist programs, to ask what the ideal presuppositions behind them are which give life and force to them.

1. Socialism is nothing if not an ideal. This is not an unscientific opposition to *laissez-faire*. The very existence of an economic *problem* is itself a witness to the fact that growth in man's life is increasingly the result of conscious and deliberate action. If no man can escape the tendencies of his age, he can at least be their intelligent servant, and not their slave.

2. The ideal of socialism would be nothing if it were not a moral ideal; *i. e.*, it must be just to an idea of human life as a whole, or it tends to become partial and ineffective. Individualism and socialism, regarded as *exclusive* principles of social life, are futile and meaningless abstractions. They are limited by and relative to the conception of social welfare as a whole. Socialists have been peculiarly liable to "the fallacy of the abstract ideal." Socialism is more than a mere collection of miscellaneous programs. These are but the body of socialism without the soul; the life-giving, impelling spirit is the democratic idea. And this is necessary, for if ideas without machinery are helpless, machinery without ideas is purposeless.

3. The ethical ideal must be a social ideal; *i. e.*, an ideal of human relationships. Morality not only has no reference, but has no existence, apart from veritable human relationships. And in trying to understand and control these relationships we must not be sidetracked by abstractions. Competition and coöperation are two such delusive abstractions. They are complementary aspects of all association. A coöperation that does not call out individual competition in its service is self-defeating; and a competition that does not develop efficiency in furthering the aids of coöperation is also self-defeating, and has no social value. This, then, is the fundamental postulate of socialism: that society is organic; that its unity consists, not in any aggregation of individual units seeking private ends, but in a common good or purpose, in which all members share, both as givers and receivers. On this formal basis socialism lays its fundamental axiom: that the only logical and consistent basis of social organization is a basis of labor or work. A community is socialistic in so far as it is organized on a basis of labor in such a way that there is no place in it for those who would live on the work of others. There must be a community of duties with rights proportioned on them. Socialism is thus a moral idea in the strict sense, because it is based on the only complete idea of human association. The whole drift of socialism is "so to organize life as to make its responsibilities much more definite and direct, and a good deal less easy to escape."

4. Thus the economic ideal of socialism is a direct deduction from its ethical and social ideal—the idea of a common life. Socialism, *as a movement*, is the attempt to give visibility and actuality to this idea. It is a protest against an unsubstantial idealism or spiritualism. If an economic order cannot be realized except in and through a moral order, a moral order cannot be realized except in and through an economic order. It is thus for the recognition of the social question, as distinguished from partial social questions, that socialism stands. And this social question is the problem of putting an

end to the exploitation of man by man, and of substituting for it the exploitation of nature by man in association with man. The problem is how to raise the estate of man organically, and all together. The junction of the socialistic with the democratic idea gives to the modern solution its point and character. Equality of opportunity, equality of consideration, equality of freedom are the watchwords of democracy and of socialism alike. Socialism, however, contends that democracy remains an illusion so long as a large section of society is dependent on, or controlled by, another. Servitude is felt in proportion as the workman has no interest in his work except his wages; for this means that he is used directly for another's ends, and only incidentally for his own. Socialism arises from the perception that our economic arrangements are in contradiction with our social and political theories; and it aims to adjust the discrepancy by making the members of the community less and less dependent for their means of life upon the private ownership of the implements of industry. The movements for the "minimum wage," "coöperative stores," "collective ownership," "state control," etc., are all embodiments, necessarily more or less crude at first, of this one ideal of democracy in industry.

5. Not a little of the theory and practice of socialists, then, whether of the chair or of the street, requires a certain readjustment of view. No one social program is a panacea. Far from it; the multitude of half-considered programs and mere clamors for reform make the confusion worse confounded. What is wanted is a positive analysis of our industrial organization as it actually works. For all of us—either as consumer (fundamentally), or as employer, or as workman—are ignorantly affecting the social structure at every moment. Socialism must welcome all research and all earnest democratic endeavors within its ranks; for, based on the above ideas, it is just the one creed that cannot afford to be sectarian or exclusive.—SIDNEY BALL, "The Socialist Ideal," in *Economic Review*, October 16, 1899.

Selection of Elements of Social Organism.—Investigation of the successive stages of the social development of a given people reveals the existence of certain fundamental characteristics which persist from stage to stage, and which may be conceived as together constituting the *ethnic character*. A constant struggle, resulting from their nature, goes on among the factors of this ethnic character, and upon the issue of this struggle at a given time depends the nature of the social organism at that time and the probable value of any change it may be proposed to make in that organism; for it may be safely assumed that the evolution of the social organism proceeds in conformity to that of the ethnic character, and that the question as to whether this or that particular development of the social organism will be beneficial or otherwise depends solely upon whether it is such as will harmonize with the ethnic character of its day. Thus the primary struggle among the factors of the ethnic character gives rise to a secondary struggle among the different forms of the social organism, and the result of the primary struggle is all-significant for the result of the secondary struggle. A reform not in harmony with the ethnic character of its time must be, from the standpoint of that character, bad; it will be either utopian or revolutionary; it will either fail utterly to affect the social life of its time in an enduring manner, or else it will affect it in a manner harmful both to the existing social life and to the new social life by which it is hoped to supplant the old. The lines of social heredity may not be broken with impunity. The new must have regard to the character of the old—must be, in great degree, but the vehicle of the old. The institutions of a given time are not fortuitously created; they exist as survivals from a long period of struggle; they exist because they are the most fitting up to their time; they can be replaced only by others which will be still further adapted to the genius of the ethnic character; and this adaptation can come only through further struggle. Progress is not controlled by human will; it is primarily determined by the struggle, *inter se*, of the factors of the ethnic character. A secondary struggle then ensues by which is determined which one of many possible developments of the social organism is best adapted to this ethnic character. Thus survival through selective struggle becomes the law of progress in the social life.—N. MIHAESCO, "The Selection of the Elements of the Social Organism," in *Revue internationale de sociologie*, August-September, 1899.

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January — for November-December.

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Explanation. *Titles not starred* represent new publications announced in the standard publishers' lists since the last issue of the bibliography. A *star* prefixed to a title indicates that it was taken from a review of the work in the periodical cited after the title. It may or may not be a new announcement. The *arithmetical signs* following the citation to a review indicate the tenor of the review: ×, uncertain; +, favorable; —, unfavorable; +—, favorable, but with reservations; —+, unfavorable, but with commendation; ++, very favorable; ——, very unfavorable; ++—, very favorable, but with reservations; ——+, very unfavorable, but with commendation. Absence of any sign indicates that review has not been read. The *publication date* when not given is understood to be the current year. *Prices quoted* are usually for volumes bound in cloth in the case of American and English books, in paper in the case of all others. *New editions, translations, and new periodicals* are bracketed.

Abbreviations. See at end of Bibliography.

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A.	Arena.	JHS.	Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
AA.	American Anthropologist.	JPE.	Journal of Political Economy.
AAC.	Archives d'anthropologie criminelle.	JNS.	Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik.
AAE.	Archivo per l'antropologia e la etnologia.	LC.	Literarisches Centralblatt.
AAP.	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.	LG.	Labor Gazette.
AC.	L'Association catholique.	LoQR.	London Quarterly Review.
ACQ.	American Catholic Quarterly Review.	LQR.	Law Quarterly Review.
AEL.	Annals d'Ecole libre des sciences politiques.	MHM.	Mansfield House Magazine.
AGP.	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.	MIM.	Monatsschrift für innere Mission.
AHR.	American Historical Review.	MA.	Municipal Affairs.
AIS.	Annals de l'Institut de science sociale.	NA.	Nuova antologia.
AJP.	American Journal of Psychology.	NAR.	North American Review.
AJS.	American Journal of Sociology.	NC.	Nineteenth Century.
ATT.	American Journal of Theology.	NS.	Natural Science.
ALR.	American Law Register.	NT.	New Time.
ALRV.	Americao Law Review.	NW.	New World.
AMP.	Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Séances.	NZ.	Neue Zeit.
AOR.	Archiv für öffentliches Recht.	PhR.	Philosophical Review.
ASA.	American Statistical Association, Publications.	PSM.	Popular Science Monthly.
ASAr.	Allgemeine statistisches Archiv.	PSQ.	Political Science Quarterly.
ASG.	Archive für sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.	PSR.	Psychological Review.
ASP.	Archiv für systematische Philosophie.	QJE.	Quarterly Journal of Economics.
BDL.	Bulletin de the Department of Labor.	QR.	Quarterly Review.
BG.	Blätter für Gefängniskunde.	RBP.	Rivista beneficenza publica.
BML.	Banker's Magazine, London.	RCS.	Revue de christianisme sociale.
BMN.	Banker's Magazine, New York.	RDC.	Rivista di discipline carcerarie.
BOT.	Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.	RDI.	Revue de droit internationale.
BS.	Bibliotheca Sacra.	RDM.	Revue des deux mondes.
BSt.	Bulletin de statistique et de legislation comparée.	REA.	Revue mensuelle de l'Ecole d'anthropologie de Paris.
BUI.	Bulletin de l'Union internationale de droit penale.	RéfS.	Réforme sociale.
C.	Cosmopolis.	ReS.	Revue socialiste.
ChOR.	Charity Organisation Review.	RH.	Revue historique.
ChR.	Charities Review.	RHD.	Revue d'histoire diplomatique.
CoR.	Contemporary Review.	RIF.	Rivista italiana di filosofia.
DL.	Deutsche Literaturzeitung.	RIS.	Revue internationale de sociologie.
DR.	Deutsche Revue.	RiS.	Rivista italia na di sociologia.
DRu.	Deutsche Rundschau.	RISS.	Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali.
DS.	Devenir social.	RMM.	Revue metaphysique et de morale.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.	RP.	Revue philanthropique.
EcJ.	Economic Journal.	RPe.	Revue pénitentiaire.
EcR.	Economic Review.	RPh.	Revue philosophique.
EdR.	Educational Review.	RPP.	Revue politique et parlementaire.
EHR.	English Historical Review.	RRL.	Review of Reviews, London.
EM.	Engineering Magazine.	RKN.	Review of Reviews, New York.
F.	Forum.	RSC.	Revue sociale catholique.
FR.	Fortnightly Review.	RSI.	Revisita storica italiana.
GEC.	Giornale degli economisti.	RSP.	Revue sociale et politique.
GM.	Guntton's Magazine.	RT.	Revue du travail.
HLR.	Harvard Law Review.	S.	Sanitarian.
HN.	Humanité nouvelle.	SR.	School Review.
HR.	Hygienische Rundschau.	SS.	Science sociale.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift.	VWP.	Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
IAE.	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.	YR.	Vale Review.
IJE.	International Journal of Ethics.	ZE.	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
JAI.	Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.	ZGS.	Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaften.
JCB.	Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association.	ZPK.	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
JEC.	Journal des économistes.	ZPO.	Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht.
JFI.	Journal of the Franklin Institute.	ZPP.	Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
JGV.	Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.	ZS.	Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft.
		ZVR.	Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
		ZVS.	Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.

[The titles of articles selected from periodicals not in this list will be followed by name of periodical in full.]

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A CHAPTER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE.¹

THE fact of economic exchange confers upon the value of things something super-individual. It detaches them from dissolution in the mere subjectivity of the agents, and causes them to determine each other reciprocally, since each exerts its economic function in the other. The practically effective value is conferred upon the object, not merely by its own desirability, but by the desirability of another object. Not merely the relationship to the receptive subjects characterizes this value, but also the fact that it arrives at this relationship only at the price of a sacrifice; while from the opposite point of view this sacrifice appears as a good to be enjoyed, and the object in question, on the contrary, as a sacrifice. Hence the objects acquire a reciprocity of counterweight, which makes value appear in a quite special manner as an objective quality indwelling in themselves. While the object itself is the thing in controversy—which means that the sacrifice which it represents is being determined—its significance for both contracting parties appears much more as something outside of these latter and self-existent than if the individual thought of it only in its relation to himself. We shall see later how also isolated industry, by placing the workman over against the demands of

¹A fragment from a volume entitled *The Philosophy of Money* to be published this year by Duncker & Humblot, Leipzig. Translated for this JOURNAL from the author's manuscript.

nature, imposes upon him the like necessity of sacrifice for gaining of the object, so that in this case also the like relationship, with the one exception that only a single party has been changed, may endow the object with the same independent qualities, yet with their significance dependent upon its own objective conditions. Desire and the feeling of the agent stand, to be sure, as the motor energy behind all this, but from this in and of itself this value form could not proceed. It rather comes only from the reciprocal counterbalancing of the objects.

To be sure, in order that equivalence and exchange of values may emerge, some material to which value can attach must be at the basis. For industry as such the fact that these materials are equivalent to each other and exchangeable is the turning-point. It guides the stream of appraisal through the form of exchange, at the same time creating a middle realm between desires, in which all human movement has its source, and the satisfaction of enjoyment in which it culminates. The specific character of economic activity as a special form of commerce exists, if we may venture the paradox, not so much in the fact that it exchanges *values* as that it *exchanges* values. To be sure, the significance which things gain in and with exchange rests never isolated by the side of their subjective-immediate significance, that is, the one originally decisive of the relationship. It is rather the case that the two belong together, as form and content connote each other. But the objective procedure makes an abstraction, so to speak, from the fact that values constitute its material, and derives its peculiar character from the equality of the same—somewhat as geometry finds its tasks only in connection with the magnitude-relations of things, without bringing into its consideration the substances in connection with which alone these relationships actually have existence. That thus not only reflection upon industry, but industry itself, consists, so to speak, in a real abstraction from the surrounding actuality of the appraising processes is not so wonderful as it at first appears when we once make clear to ourselves how extensively human practice, cognition included, reckons with abstractions. The energies, relationships, qualities of things—to which in so far

our own proper essence also belongs—constitute objectively a unified interrelationship, which is divided into a multiplicity of independent series or motives only after the interposition of our interests, and in order to be manipulated by us. Accordingly, each science investigates phenomena which possess an exclusive unity, and clean-cut lines of division from the problems of other sciences, only from the point of view which the special science proposes as its own. Reality, on the other hand, has no regard to these boundary lines, but every section of the world presents a conglomeration of tasks for the most numerous sciences. Likewise our practice dissects from the external or internal complexity of things one-sided series. Notice, for example, into how many systems a forest is divided. These in turn become objects of special interest to a hunter, a proprietor, a poet, a painter, a civic official, a botanist, and a tourist. The forest is objectively always the same. It is a real, indivisible unity of all the determinations and relationships out of which the interested parties select each a certain group, and make it into a picture of the forest. The same is the case with the great systems of interest of which a civilization is composed. We distinguish, for instance, interests and relationships as the ethical, the egoistic, the economic, the domestic, etc. The reciprocal weaving together of these constitutes actual life. Certain of these, however, dissociated from this concrete reality, constitute the content of the civic structure. The state is an abstraction of energies and reciprocal actions which, in the concrete, exist only within a unity that is not separable into its parts. Again, in like manner, pedagogy abstracts from the web of cosmic contents into the totality of which the pupil is subsequently to enter certain ones, and forms them into a world which is completely abstract, in comparison with reality. In this world the pupil is to live. To what extent all art runs a division line of its own through the conditions of things, in addition to those that are traced out in the real structure of the objective world, needs no elaboration. In opposition to that naturalism which wanted to lead art away from the selective abstraction, and to open to it the whole breadth and unity of reality, in which all elements have equally rights, in so

far as they are actual—precisely in opposition to this has criticism shown the complete impracticability of the tendency; and that even the extremest purpose, to be satisfied in art only with undifferentiated completeness of the object, must at last end in an abstraction. It will merely be the product of another selective principle. Accordingly, this is one of the formulas in which we may express the relation of man to the world, viz., from the unity and the interpenetration of things in which each bears the other and all have equal rights our practice not less than our theory constantly abstracts isolated elements, and forms them into unities relatively complete in themselves. Except in quite general feelings, we have no relationship to the totality of being. Only when in obedience to the necessities of our thought and action we derive perpetual abstractions from phenomena, and endow these with the relative independence of a merely subjective coherence to which the continuity of the world-movement as objective gives no room, do we reach a relationship to the world that is definite in its details. Indeed, we may adopt a scale of values for our culture systems, according to the degree in which they combine the demands of our singular purposes with the possibility of passing over without a gap from each abstraction which they present to the other, so that a subsequent combination is possible which approximates that objective coherence and unity. Accordingly, the economic system of the world is assuredly founded upon an abstraction, that is, upon the relation of reciprocity and exchange, the balance between sacrifice and gain; while in the actual process in which this takes place it is inseparably amalgamated with its foundations and its results, the desires and the satisfactions. But this form of existence does not distinguish it from the other territories into which, for the purposes of our interests, we subdivide the totality of phenomena.

The objectivity of economic value which we assume as defining the scope of economics, and which is thought as the independent characteristic of the same in distinction from its subjective vehicles and consequences, consists in its being true of many, or rather all, subjects. The decisive factor is its extension in principle beyond the individual. The fact that for one

object another must be given shows that not merely for me, but also for itself, that is, also for another person, the object is of some value. The appraisal takes place in the form of economic value.

The exchange of objects, moreover, in which this objectivization, and therewith the specific character of economic activity, realizes itself belongs, from the standpoint of each of the contracting parties, in the quite general category of gain and loss, purpose and means. If any object over which we have control is to help us to the possession or enjoyment of another, it is generally under the condition that we forego the enjoyment of its own peculiar worth. As a rule the purpose consumes either the substance or the force of the means, so that the value of the same constitutes the price which must be paid for the value of the purpose. Only within certain spiritual interests is that not the case as a rule. The mind has been properly compared to a fire, in which countless candles may be lighted without loss of its own peculiar intensity. For example, intellectual products sometimes (not always) retain for purposes of instruction their own worth, which does not lose any of its independent energy and significance by functioning as means to the pedagogical end. In the case of causal series in external nature, however, the relationship is usually different. Here must the object, if on the one hand it is conceived immediately as valuable, and on the other hand as means to the attainment of another value, be sacrificed as a value in itself, in order to perform its office as means. This procedure rules all values the enjoyment of which is connected with a conscious action on our part. What we call exchange is obviously nothing but a special case of this typical form in human life. We must regard this, however, not merely as a placing of exchange in the universal category of creation of value; but, conversely, this latter as an exchange in the wider sense of the word. This possibility, which has so many consequences for the theory of value, will become clear by the discussion of the doctrine that all economic value consists in exchange value.

To this theory the objection has been made that even the quite isolated economic man—he who neither sells nor buys—must estimate his products and means of production according to their value, if expenditures and results are to stand in proper relation to each other. This objection, however, is not so striking as it appears, for all consideration whether a definite product is worth enough to justify a definite expenditure of labor or other goods is, for the economic agent, precisely the same as the appraisal which takes place in connection with exchange. In confronting the concept “exchange” there is frequently the confusion of ideas which consists in speaking of a relationship as though it were something apart from the elements between which it plays. It means, however, only a condition or a change within each of these elements, but nothing that is between them in the sense of a spatial object that can be distinguished in space between two other objects. When we compose the two acts or changes of condition which in reality take place into the notion “exchange,” the conception is attractive that something has happened in addition to or beyond that which took place in each of the contracting parties. Considered with reference to its immediate content, exchange is nothing but the twofold repetition of the fact that an actor now has something which he previously did not have, and on the other hand does not have something which he previously had. That being the case, the isolated economic man, who surely must make a sacrifice to gain certain products, acts precisely like the one who makes exchanges. The only difference is that the party with whom he contracts is not a second sentient being, but the natural order and regularity of things, which no more satisfy our desires without a sacrifice on our part than would another person. His appraisals of value, in accordance with which he governs his actions, are, as a rule, precisely the same as in the case of exchange; for the economic actor, as such, it is surely quite immaterial whether the substances or labor-energies in his possession are sunk in the ground or given to another man, if only there accrues to him the same result from the sacrifice. This subjective process of sacrifice and gain in the individual soul is by no means something secondary

or imitative in comparison with inter-individual exchange; on the contrary, the give-and-take between sacrifice and accomplishment, within the individual, is the basal presumption, and at the same time the persistent substance, of every two-sided exchange. The latter is merely a sub-species of the former; that is, the sort in which the sacrifice is occasioned by the demand of another individual. At the same time, it can only be occasioned by the same sort of result for the actor so far as objects and their qualities are concerned. It is of extreme importance to make this reduction of the economic process to that which actually takes place, that is, in the soul of every economic agent. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived about the essential thing by the fact that in the case of exchange this process is reciprocal; that is, that it is conditioned by the like procedure in another. The main thing is that the natural and solitary economic transaction, if we may conceive of such a thing, runs back to the same fundamental form as two-sided exchange: to the process of equalization between two subjective occurrences within the individual. This is in its proper essence not affected by the secondary question whether the impulse to the process proceeds from the nature of things or the nature of man; whether it is a matter of purely natural economy or of exchange economy. All feelings of value, in other words, which are set free by producible objects are in general to be gained only by foregoing other values. At the same time, such sacrifice may consist, not only in that mediate labor for ourselves which appears as labor for others, but frequently enough in that quite immediate labor for our own personal purposes.

Moreover, those theories of value which discover in labor the absolute element of value accommodate themselves to this form of conception as to the higher and more abstract idea. Whoever labors sacrifices something which he possesses—his labor-power, or his leisure, or his pleasure merely in the self-satisfying play of his powers—in order to get in exchange for these something which he does not possess. Through the fact that labor accomplishes this it acquires value, just as, on the other side, the attained object is valuable for the reason that it

has cost labor. In so far there is not the slightest ground to give labor a special position as contrasted with all other conditions of value. The difference between these is only of a quantitative nature. Labor is the most frequent object of exchange. In this assertion we forbear to enter into the discussion whether labor or labor-power, and in what form, constitute an object of exchange. Because labor is regarded as a sacrifice, as something painful, it is performed only when an object can be secured by it which corresponds to the eudæmonistic or some other demand. If labor were nothing but pleasure, the products that it wrings from nature would have no value whatever, provided we disregard the difference in abundance of objects. On the contrary, if objects that satisfy our desires came to us of their own accord, labor would have no more value. Thus on the whole we may say that, considered from the standpoint of value, every economic transaction is an exchange, and every single article of value furnishes its additional quota to the total value of life only after deduction of a certain sacrificed quantum of value.

In all the foregoing it is presupposed that a definite scale of value exists in the case of the objects, and that each of the two objects concerned in the transaction signifies, for the one contracting party the desired gain, for the other the necessary sacrifice. But this presumption is, as a matter of fact, much too simple. If, as is necessary, we regard economic activity as a special case of the universal life-form of exchange, as a sacrifice in return for a gain, we shall from the beginning suspect something of what takes place within this form, namely, that the value of the gain is not, so to speak, brought with it, ready-made, but it accrues to the desired object, in part or even entirely, through the measure of the sacrifice demanded in acquiring it. These cases, which are as frequent as they are important for the theory of value, seem, to be sure, to harbor an essential contradiction; for they require us to make a sacrifice of value for things which in themselves are worthless. As a matter of course, no one would forego value without receiving for it at least equal value; and, on the contrary, that the end should receive its value only through the price that we must give for it could be the case

only in a crazy world. This is now, for immediate consciousness, correct. Indeed, it is more correct than that popular standpoint is apt to allow in other cases. As a matter of fact, the value which an actor surrenders for another value can never be greater for this actor himself, under the actual circumstances of the moment, than the one for which it is given. All contrary appearances rest upon confusion of the value actually estimated by the actor with the value which the object of exchange in question usually has. For instance, when one at the point of death from hunger offers a jewel for a piece of bread, he does it only because the latter, under the given circumstances, is of more value to him than the former. Particular circumstances, however, are necessary in order to attach to an object a valuation, for every such valuation is an incident of the whole complex system of our feelings, which is in constant flux, adaptation, and reconstruction. Whether these circumstances are exceptional or relatively constant is obviously in principle a matter of indifference. There can be no doubt, at any rate, that in the moment of the exchange, that is, of the making of the sacrifice, the value of the exchanged object forms the limit which is the highest point to which the value of the sacrificed object can rise. Quite independent of this is the question whence that former object derives its so necessary value, and whether it may come from the objects that are to be sacrificed for it, so that the equivalence between gain and price would be established at once *a posteriori*, and by the latter. We shall see presently how often value comes into existence, psychologically, in this apparently illogical manner. If, however, it is once in existence, the psychological necessity exists in its case, not less than in that of value constituted in any other way, of regarding it as a positive good at least equal to the negative good sacrificed for it. In fact, there is a series of cases in which the sacrifice not merely raises the value of the aim, but even produces it. It is the joy of exertion, of overcoming difficulties, frequently indeed that of contradiction, which expresses itself in this process. The necessary detour to the attainment of certain things is often the occasion, often also the cause, of regarding them as valuable. In the relationships of

men to each other, most frequently and evidently in erotic relations, we notice how reserve, indifference, or repulse inflames the most passionate desire to conquer in spite of these obstacles, and spurs us to efforts and sacrifices which, without these obstacles, would surely seem to us excessive. For many people the æsthetic results of ascending the high Alps would not be considered worth further notice, if it did not demand extraordinary effort and danger, and if it did not thereby acquire tone, attractiveness, and consecration. The charm of antiquities and curiosities is frequently no other. If no sort of æsthetic or historical interest attaches to them, a substitute for it is furnished by the mere difficulty of acquiring them. They are worth just what they cost. This, then, appears secondarily to mean that they cost what they are worth. Furthermore, all moral merit signifies that for the sake of the morally desirable deed contrary impulses and wishes must be fought down and sacrificed. If the act occurs without any conquest, as the matter-of-course outflow of unrestrained impulse, it is not appraised so high in the scale of subjective moral value, however desirable objectively its content may be. In this latter case we are not moral in any other sense than the flower is beautiful; we do not reckon the beauty of the flower as an ethical merit. Only through the sacrifice of the lower and still so seductive good is the height of moral merit attained, and a more lofty height, the more attractive the temptation and the deeper and more comprehensive the sacrifice. We might array illustrations, beginning with the ordinary selfishness of the day, the overcoming of which alone rewards us with the consciousness of being somewhat worthy, and rising to that force of logic whose sacrifice in favor of belief in the absurd seemed to the schoolmen an extreme religious merit. If we observe which human achievements attain to the highest honors and appraisals, we find it to be always those which betray a maximum of humility, effort, persistent concentration of the whole being, or at least seem to betray these. In other words, they seem to manifest the most self-denial, sacrifice of all that is subsidiary, and of devotion of the subjective to the objective ideal. And if, in contrast with all this, æsthetic production and

everything easy, inviting, springing from the naturalness of impulse, unfolds an incomparable charm, this owes its special quality still to the undefined feeling of the burdens and sacrifices which are usually the condition of gaining such things. The mobility and inexhaustible power of combination of our mental content frequently brings it about that the significance of a correlation is carried over to its direct converse, somewhat as the association between two ideas occurs equally when they are asserted or denied of each other. The specific value of anything which we gain without conquered difficulty and as the gift of fortunate accident is felt by us only on the ground of the significance which the things have for us that are gained with difficulty and measured by sacrifice. It is the same value, but with the negative sign, and this is the primary from which the other may be derived; but the reverse is not the case.

If we look for an occurrence of this relationship within the economic realm, it seems to be demanded, in the first place, that we shall in thought separate the economic element, as a specific difference or form, from the fact of value as the universality or the substance of the same. If for the present we take value as a datum, and not now to be discussed, it is at least, in accordance with all the foregoing, not doubtful that economic value as such does not accrue to an object in its isolated self-existence, but only through the employment of another object which is given for it. Wild fruit picked without effort, and not given in exchange, but immediately consumed, is no economic good. It can count as such only when its consumption saves some other sort of economic expense. If, however, all the demands of life were to be satisfied in this fashion, so that no sacrifice was at any point necessary, men would simply not engage in industry, any more than do the birds or the fishes, or the denizens of fairy-land. Whatever be the way in which the two objects, A and B, came to have value, A came to have an *economic* value only through the fact that I must give B for it, B only through the fact that I can receive A for it. In this case, as above stated, it is in principle indifferent whether the sacrifice takes place by means of the transfer of a thing of value to

another person, that is, through inter-individual exchange, or within the circle of the individual's own interests, through a balancing of efforts and results. In the articles of commerce there is nothing to be found but the significance which each has, directly or indirectly, for our need to consume, and the give-and-take that occurs between them. Since, now, as we have seen, the former does not of itself suffice to make the given object an object of economic activity, it follows that the latter alone can supply to it the specific difference which we call economic.

If thus, under the preliminary assumption of an existing value, the economic character of the same coincides with the offer of another object for it, and of it for the other object, there arises the further question whether this separation between the value and its economic form is necessary and possible. As a matter of fact, this artificially dividing abstraction finds in reality no counterpart. In the economic value the economic is as little sundered from the value as in the economic man the economist is sundered from the man. To be sure, man is possible in times and relations in which he does not pursue economic activity. The latter, however, is not possible without being accomplished by men, in absolute unity with them, and only in unreal conceptual abstraction is it to be sundered from them. Thus there are enough objects of value which are not economic, but there are no objects of economic value which are not also valuable in every relation in which they are economic. What is true of the economic as such is, therefore, true of the values of industry, as every condition or quality or function is necessarily a condition or quality or function of that general object to which this quality or function pertains. The economic form of the value stands between two boundaries: on the one hand, the desire for the object, which attaches itself to the anticipated feeling of satisfaction from its possession and enjoyment; on the other hand, to this enjoyment itself, which, exactly considered, is not an economic act. That is, so soon as we concede, as is universally the case, what was just now discussed, namely, that the immediate consumption of wild fruits is not an economic

procedure, and therefore the fruits themselves have no economic value (except in so far as they save the production of economic values), then the consumption of values properly economic is no longer economic, for the act of consumption, in this last case, is not to be distinguished absolutely from that in the first case. Whether the fruit which one eats has been found accidentally, or stolen or bought, makes not the slightest difference in the act of eating itself, and in its direct consequences for the eater. Between desire and consumption lies the economic realm in unnumbered interrelationships. Now, economic activity appears to be an equalization of sacrifices and gains (of forces or objects), a mere form in the sense that it presupposes values as its content, in order to be able to draw them into the equalizing movement. But this appearance is not invincible. It will rather appear that the same process which constructs into an industrial system the values given as presuppositions itself produces the economic values.

To see this we need only remind ourselves in principle of the fact that the object is for us not a thing of value, so long as it is dissolved in the subjective process as an immediate stimulator of feelings, and thus at the same time is a self-evident competence of our sensibility. The object must first be detached from this sensibility, in order to acquire for our understanding the peculiar significance which we call value. For it is not only sure that desire, in and of itself, can never establish a value if it does not encounter obstacles. But if every desire could find its satisfaction without struggle and without diminution, an economic exchange of values would never come into existence. Indeed, desire itself would never have arisen to any considerable height if it could satisfy itself thus. It is only the postponement of the satisfaction through obstacles, the anxiety lest the object may escape, the tension of struggle for it, which brings into existence that aggregate of desire elements which may be designated as intensity or passion of volition. If, however, even the highest energy of desire were generated wholly from within, yet we would not accord value to the object which satisfies the desire if it came to us in unlimited abundance. The important thing, in

that case, would be the total enjoyment, the existence of which guarantees to us the satisfaction of our wishes, but not that particular quantum of which we actually take possession, because this could be replaced quite as easily by another. Our consciousness would in this case simply be filled with the rhythm of the subjective desires and satisfactions, without attaching any significance to the object mediating the satisfaction. The desire, therefore, which on its part came into existence only through an absence of feelings of satisfaction, a condition of want or limitation, is the psychological expression of the distance between subject and object, in which the latter is represented as of value.

This distance necessary to the consequence in question is produced in certain cases by exchange, sacrifice, abstinence from objects; that is, in a word, the foregoing of feelings of satisfaction. This takes place, now, in the form of traffic contemporaneous between two actors, each of whom requires of the other the abstinence in question as condition of the feeling of satisfaction. The feeling of satisfaction, as must be repeatedly emphasized, would not place itself in antithesis with its object as a value in our consciousness if the value were always near to us, so that we should have no occasion to separate the object from that consequence in us which is alone interesting. Through exchange, that is, through the economic system, there arise at the same time the values of industry, because exchange is the vehicle or producer of the distance between the subject and the object which transmutes the subjective state of feeling into objective valuation. Kant once summarized his Theory of Knowledge in the proposition: "The conditions of experience are at the same time the conditions of the objects of experience." By this he meant that the process which we call experience and the conceptions which constitute its contents or objects are subject to the selfsame laws of the reason. The objects can come into our experience, that is, be experienced by us, because they are conceptions in us; and the same energy which makes and defines the experience has also manifested itself in the structure of the objects. In the same sense we may say here: the possibility of the economic

system is, at the same time, the possibility of economic objects. The very procedure between two possessors of objects (substances, labor-powers, rights, exchangeabilities of any sort), which procedure brings them into the so-called economic relationship, namely, reciprocal dedication, at the same time raises each of these objects into the category of values. The difficulty which threatens from the side of logic, namely, that the values must first exist, and exist as values, in order to enter into the form and movement of industry, is now obviated, and by means of the perceived significance of that psychical relationship which we designated as the distance between us and the thing; for this differentiates the original subjective state of feeling into, first, the desiring subject anticipating the feelings; and, second, the object in antithesis with the subject, and containing in itself the value; while the distance, on its side, is produced by exchange, that is, by the two-sided operation of limitations, restriction, abstinence. The *values* of industry emerge, therefore, in the same reciprocity and relativity in which the *economic character* of values consists.

This transference of the idea of economic value from the character of isolating substantiality into the living process of relation may be further explained on the ground of those factors which we are accustomed to regard as the constituents of value, namely, availability and rarity. Availability appears here as the first condition, based upon the constitution of the industrial actor, under which alone an object can under any circumstances come into question in economics. At the same time it is the presupposition of economic activity. In order that the value may reach a given degree, rarity must be associated with availability, as a characteristic of the objects themselves. If we wish to fix economic values through demand and supply, demand would correspond with availability, supply with rarity. For the availability would decide whether we demand the object at all, the rarity the price which we are compelled to pay. The availability serves as the absolute constituent of the economic—as that the extent of which must be determined in order that it may come into the course of economic exchange. We must

from the beginning concede rarity as a merely relative element, since it means exclusively the quantitative relation in which the object in question stands to the existing aggregate of its kind; the qualitative nature of the object is not touched by its rarity. The availability, however, seems to exist before all economic action, all comparison, all relation with other objects, and as the substantial factor of economic activity, whose movements are dependent upon itself.

The circumstance whose efficacy is herewith outlined is not correctly designated by the notion of utility or serviceableness. What we mean in reality is the fact that the object is desired. All availability is, therefore, not in a situation to occasion economic operations with the object possessing the quality, if the availability does not at the same time have as a consequence that the objects are desired. As a matter of fact, this does not always occur. Any wish whatever may accord with any conception of things useful to us; actual desire, however, which has economic significance and which sets our acts in motion, is not present in such wishes in case long poverty, constitutional laziness, diversion into other regions of interest, indifference of feeling toward the theoretically recognized utility, perceived impossibility of attaining the desired object, and other positive and negative elements work in the contrary direction. On the other hand, many sorts of things are desired by us, and also economically valued, which we cannot designate as useful or available without arbitrary distortion of verbal usage. Since, however, not everything that is available is also desired, if we decide to subsume everything that is economically desired under the concept of "availability," it is logically demanded that we shall make the fact of being desired the definitively decisive element for economic movement. Even with this correction the criterion is not absolute, totally separable from the relativity of valuation. In the first place, as we saw above, the desire itself does not come to conscious definiteness unless obstacles, difficulties, interpose themselves between the object and the subject. We do not desire actually until enjoyment of the object measures itself upon intermediaries, where at least the price of patience, of

resignment of other exertion or enjoyment, places at a distance from us the object to conquer which is the essence of desire for it. Its economic value now, second, which rises upon the basis of its being desired, can consist only in heightening or sublimating of that relativity which resides in desire. For the desired object does not pass into practical value, that is, into value that enters into the industrial movement, until its desirability is compared with that of another object, and thereby acquires a measure. Only when a second object is present, with reference to which I am sure that I am willing to give it for the first object, or *vice versa*, has each of the two an assignable economic value. The mere desire for an object does not lead to this valuation, since it finds in itself alone no measure. Only the comparison of desires, that is, the exchangeability of their objects, fixes each of the same as a value defined in accordance with its scale, that is, an economic value. The intensity of the individual desire, in and of itself, need not have a cumulative effect upon the economic value of the object, for since the latter comes to expression only in exchange, desire can determine it only in so far as it modifies the exchange. If now I desire an object very intensely, its exchange value is not thereby determined; for either I have the object not yet in my possession; in which case my desire, if I do not manifest it, can exert no influence upon the demand of the present possessor; he will rather adjust his claims according to the measure of his own interest in the object, or in accordance with his suppositions with reference to average interest; or, I have the object in my possession; in which case my terms will be either so high that the object is entirely excluded from exchange, in which instance it is to that extent no longer an economic value, or my demands must fall to the measure of the interest which a calculating person takes in the object. The decisive factor is this: that the economic, practically effective value is never a value in the abstract, but rather in its essence and idea a determined quantum of value; that this quantity in general can come into existence only through measurements of two intensities of desire against each other; that the form in which this measurement takes place

within the industrial system is that of reciprocal gain and sacrifice; that consequently the economic object does not, as superficially appears, possess in its desirability an absolute element of value, but rather that this fact of being desired operates to give the object a value exclusively as being the foundation or the material of an actual or putative exchange.

Even in case we derive the valuation of objects from an absolute motive, namely, the labor expended upon them, and even if we assert that the value of goods is in inverse ratio to the productive capacity of the labor, yet we must still recognize the determination of the value of the objects as purely reciprocal, instead of a derivative from a single absolute standard. This being admitted, there arises the following relationship: A pair of boots has at a given time the same value as twenty meters of shirting. If now, through a new arrangement, the total labor demanded for the boots falls to one-half, they are worth only ten meters of shirting. Suppose now the labor time demanded for shirting is reduced one-half by improved machinery; the boots will then once more be the equivalent to twenty meters of shirting. If, again, the corresponding improvement affects all the laborers, and no goods are introduced which affect the relations between them, the two articles remain unchanged in their value as expressed in terms of each other. The change in the productive power of labor has an influence upon the value of the products only when it affects *isolated portions* of the economic organism, but not when it affects the organism as a whole. However we may exert ourselves, therefore, to express the value of the object through an absolute quantitative symbol, however qualified, it remains still only the *relation*, in which the various wares participate in this vehicle of value, which determines the value of each. Even under that presupposition, it is for the value of the separate objects as individuals wholly irrelevant how much or how little labor is invested in them. Only in so far as it is a quantity of labor greater or less in comparison with the quantity of labor invested in another object does each of the two acquire an economically effective value. But for the same reason it is, on the other hand, also unwarranted to complain

at absence of the necessary stability of value in the daily wage of labor—by which expression it is implied that the average return of a day's labor is a value-unity. That accusation is founded on the fact that the labor day constantly increases in productivity and power in exchange. Assuming, however, for the moment that labor is the one creator of value, the value of the time-unit of labor *for the purpose of exchange of related goods* is always the same; although, absolutely considered, it has increased, and corresponds to a larger quantum of each separate product. Since the reciprocal relation of the goods has remained the same, the relation of the labor time to each is the same as to the others. It may, therefore, remain, for the purpose of reckoning their relative values, a constant term.

This relativity of value, in consequence of which the given things stimulating feeling and desire come to be values only in the reciprocity of the give-and-take process, *appears* to lead to the consequence that value is nothing but the price, and that between the two objects no differences of scale can exist. Consequently, the frequent falling away of the two from each other would refute the theory. Against that undeniable fact of varying ratio our theory asserts, to be sure, that there would never have been such a thing as a value if the universal phenomenon which we call price had not emerged. That a thing is worth something in a purely economic sense means that it is worth *something* to me, that is, that I am ready to give something for it. What in the world can move us to go beyond that naïve subjective enjoyment of the things themselves, and to credit to them that peculiar significance which we call their value? This certainly cannot come from their scarcity in and of itself, for if this existed simply as a fact, and were not in some way or other modifiable by us, we would regard it as a natural, and, on account of the defective differentiations, perhaps entirely unrecognized, quality of the external cosmos. For, since it could not be otherwise, it would receive no emphasis beyond its inherent qualities. This valuation arises only from the fact that something must be paid for things: the patience of waiting, the effort of search, the application of labor-power, the abstinence from things otherwise

desirable. Without price, therefore—price originally in this extensive sense—value does not come into being. That of two objects the one is more valuable than the other comes to pass subjectively as well as objectively only where one agent is ready to give this for that, but conversely that is not to be obtained for this. In transactions that have not become complicated the higher or lower value can be only the consequence or the expression of this immediate practical will to exchange. And if we say we exchange the things for each other because they are equally valuable, it is only that frequent inversion of thought and speech by which we also say that things pleased us because they were beautiful, whereas, in reality, they are beautiful because they please us.

If, thus, value is at the same time the offspring of price, it seems to be an identical proposition that their height must be the same. I refer now to the above proof, that in each individual case no contracting party pays the price which is to him, under the given circumstances, too high for the thing obtained. If in the poem of Chamisso the highwayman at the point of the pistol compels the victim to sell him his watch and rings for three coppers, the fact is that under the circumstances, since the victim could not otherwise save his life, the thing obtained in exchange was actually worth the price. No laborer would work for starvation wages if, in the situation in which he actually found himself, he did not prefer this wage to not working. The appearance of paradox in the assertion of the equivalence of value and price in every individual case arises only from the fact that certain conceptions of *other kinds* of equivalence of value and price are brought into our estimate of the case. The relative stability of the relationships by which the majority of exchanges are determined; on the other hand the analogies which fix still uncertain value-relations according to the norm of others already existing, produce the conceptions: if for a definite object this and that other definite object were exchange equivalents, these two or this group of objects would have equality in the scale of value; and if abnormal circumstances caused us to exchange the one object for values higher or lower in the scale, price and value

would fall away from each other, although in each individual case, as a matter of fact, under consideration of *its* circumstances, they would coincide. We should not forget that the objective and just equivalence of value and price which we make the norm of the actual and the specific works only under very definite historical and technical conditions; and, with change of these conditions, at once vanishes. Between the norm itself and the cases which are characterized as exceptional or as adequate no general difference exists, but, so to speak, only a numerical difference—somewhat as we say of an extraordinarily eminent or degraded individual, “He is really no longer a man.” The fact is that this idea of man is only an average; it would lose its normative character at the moment in which the majority of men ascended or descended to that grade, which then would pass for the generically human.

In order to reach this perception we must, to be sure, extricate ourselves from deep-rooted conceptions of value, which also have an assured practical justification. These conceptions, in the case of relationships that are somewhat complex, rest in two strata with reference to each other. The one is formed from the traditions of society, from the majority of experiences, from demands that seem to be purely logical; the other, from individual correlations, from the demands of the moment, from the constraint of given facts. In contrast with the rapid changes within this latter stratum, the gradual evolution of the former and its construction out of elaboration of our perceptions is lost to sight, and the former appears as alone justified *as the expression of an objective ratio*. Where now, in case of an exchange under the given circumstances, the valuations of sacrifice and gain at least balance each other—for otherwise no agent would consummate the exchange—yet judged by those general criteria a discrepancy appears, in such a case we speak of a divergence between value and price. This occurs most decisively under the two presuppositions (almost always united), viz., first, that a single value-quality passes as economic value in general, and two objects consequently can be recognized as equal in value, only in so far as the like quantum of that fundamental value is

present in them ; and, second, that a definite proportion between two values appears as a something that must be, with the emphasis of a not merely objective, but also a moral demand. The conception, for example, that the essential value-element in all values is the labor time objectified in them is utilized in both these assumptions, and thus gives a direct or an indirect standard which fixes the value independent of price, and makes the latter vibrate in changing plus and minus differences, as compared with the former. Now it is evident, to be sure, that if we from the start recognize only a single value-substance, only that price corresponds to the value so contained which contains precisely an equivalent amount of that same value. According to this principle the value should be the first and fixed element ; the price should constitute a more or less adequate secondary element. But this consequence, supposing everything else is conceded, does not in fact follow. The fact of that single *measure* of value leaves entirely unexplained how labor-power comes to have value. It would hardly have occurred if the labor-power had not, by acting upon various materials and by creating various products, made the possibility of exchange ; or unless the exercise of the power had been recognized as a sacrifice made for the gain of the object achieved by the sacrifice. Thus labor-power also comes into the value-category through the possibility and reality of exchange, quite unaffected by the circumstance that later labor-power may itself furnish a measure, *within* the value-category, for the other contents. If the labor-power is thus also the content of that value, it receives its form as value only through the fact that it enters into the relation of sacrifice and gain, or price and value (here in the narrower sense). In the cases of discrepancy between price and value, the one contracting party would, according to this theory, give a quantum of immediately realizable labor-power for a lesser quantum of the same. Yet other circumstances, not containing labor-power, are in such wise connected with this case that the party still completes the exchange ; for example : the satisfaction of an economic need, amateurish fancy, fraud, monopoly, and similar circumstances. In the wider and subjective sense, therefore, the equivalence of

value and counter-value remains in these cases, while the simple norm, labor-power, which makes the discrepancy possible, does not on its side cease to derive its genesis as a vehicle of value from exchange.

The qualitative determination of objects, which subjectively signifies their desirability, can consequently not maintain the claim of constituting an absolute value-magnitude. It is always the relation of the desires to each other, realized in exchange, which makes their objects economic values. This determination appears more immediately in connection with the other element supposed to constitute value, namely, scarcity, or relative rarity. Exchange is, indeed, nothing else than the inter-individual attempt to improve conditions rising out of scarcity of goods; that is, to reduce as far as possible the amount of subjective abstinence by the mode of distributing the given stock. Thereupon follows immediately a universal correlation between that which we call scarcity-value and that which we call exchange-value, a correlation which appears, for instance, in the relation of socialism to both. We may, perhaps, indicate the economic purposes of socialism comprehensively and abstractly in this way, namely, that it strives to abolish scarcity-value; that is, that modification of the value of things which arises from their rarity or abundance; for it is abundance which reduces the value of labor. There should be less labor, in order that labor may be appraised according to the quality-value, without depression on account of the quantity. On the other hand, the means of enjoyment should lose that value which they now have on account of their restricted quantity; that is, they should be accessible to all. Accordingly, Marx held that in the capitalistic type of society, that is, the sort of society which socialism wishes to abolish, exchange-value alone is decisive, while use-value no longer plays any rôle. While socialism despises exchange-value quite as much as scarcity-value, it calls attention to the radical connection between the two.

For us, however, the connection is more important in the reverse direction. I have already emphasized the fact that scarcity of goods would scarcely have a valuation of them as a

consequence if it were not modifiable by us. It is, however, modifiable in two ways: either through devotion of labor-power, which increases the stock of the goods in question, or through devotion of already possessed objects, which as substitutes abolish the rarity of the most desired objects for the individual. Accordingly, we may say immediately that the scarcity of goods in proportion to the desires centering upon them objectively determines exchange; that, however, the exchange on its side brings scarcity into force as an element of value. It is a thoroughgoing mistake of theories of value to assume that, when utility and rarity are given, economic value—that is, exchange movement—is something to be taken for granted, a conceptually necessary consequence of those premises. In this they are by no means correct. In case, for instance, there were alongside of these presuppositions an ascetic renunciation, or if they only instigated to conflict or robbery—which is, to be sure, often enough the case—no economic value and no economic life would emerge. Exchange is a sociological structure *sui generis*, a primary form and function of inter-individual life, which by no means emerges as a logical consequence from those qualitative and quantitative properties of things which we call availability and rarity. On the contrary, it is rather the case that these two properties derive their value-creating significance only under the presupposition of exchange. Where exchange, the offering of a sacrifice for the purpose of a gain, is for any reason excluded, there no rarity of the desired object can confer upon it economic value until the possibility of that relation reappears. We may express the relation in this way: The significance of the object for the individual always rests merely in its desirability; so far as that is concerned which the object is to do for us, its qualitative character is decisive, and when we have it, it is a matter of indifference in this respect whether there exist besides many, few, or no specimens of the same sort. (I do not treat here especially the cases in which rarity itself is a species of qualitative character, which makes the object desirable to us, as in the case of old postage stamps, curiosities, antiquities without æsthetic or historical value, etc. I also disregard other cases, interesting in themselves, here however

in principle insignificant, namely, those psychological subsidiary phenomena which frequently arise from scarcity itself, where they have no effect upon acquisition of the object.) The enjoyment of things, therefore, so soon as possession of them is achieved, the positive practical significance of their actuality for us, is quite independent of the scarcity question, since this affects only a numerical relation to things, which we do not have, to be sure, but which, according to the hypothesis, we do not desire to have. The only question in point with reference to things, apart from enjoyment of them, is the way to them. So soon as this way is a long and difficult one, leading over sacrifice in the shape of strain of the patience, disappointment, labor, self-denial, etc., we call the object scarce. Paradoxical as it is, things are not difficult to obtain because they are scarce, but they are scarce because they are difficult to obtain. The inflexible external fact that there is a deficient stock of certain goods to satisfy all our desires for them would be in itself insignificant. Whether they are scarce in the sense of economic value is decided simply by the circumstance of the measure of energy, patience, devotion to acquisition, which is necessary in order to obtain them. Let us suppose a stock of goods which suffices to cover all the demands centered upon it, but which is so disposed that every portion of it is to be obtained only with considerable effort and sacrifice. Then the result for its valuation and its practical significance would be precisely the same which, under the presupposition of equal availability, we have been accustomed to derive from its scarcity. The difficulty of attainment, that is, the magnitude of the sacrifice involved in exchange, is thus the element that peculiarly constitutes value. Scarcity constitutes only the external appearance of this element, only the externalizing of it in the form of quantity. We fail to observe that scarcity, purely as such, is only a negative property, an existence characterized by a non-existence. The non-existent, however, cannot be operative. Every positive consequence must proceed from a positive property and force, of which that negative property is only the shadow. These concrete energies are, however, manifestly only those that are put into action in the exchange, so that

the increase of value starts from that increasing magnitude whose negative is the scarcity of the object.

Finally, by way of corollary, I will add a more conceptual deduction, namely, that the usual conception of the scarcity theory must presuppose the value which it tries to derive from scarcity. According to this conception, an object of economic desire acquires value if no unlimited number of specimens of its kind is at hand; that is, if the present quantity of such objects does not cover a series of needs that look to it for satisfaction. The failure of these needs to be covered is felt as a painful condition which ought not to be, as the negation of value. The covering of these needs must be something having value. Otherwise the failure could exert no such effect. If, however, this defect is necessary to establish the value of the present quantity, the value is thereby presupposed whose establishment is in question. The existing quantity has value because the lacking quantity has value. Otherwise its lack could never establish a value. Let us suppose the quantity A, which would completely cover the need, to be divided into two parts: first, the portion actually present, M, and, second, the merely ideally present, N. According to the theory, the value M is determined by the fact that N is not present. N must, as we said, have a value in order to produce this consequence. In order that it may have this value, we must, however, think it as present, and, on the contrary, M as not present. Otherwise the whole of A would be accessible, and therefore, according to the scarcity theory, no portion of it would have a value. The value of the actual quantity is based on that of the non-existing quantity, that of the non-existing quantity (which I must think in this connection as present) on that of the existing quantity (which I must think as non-existent). The scarcity element is thus to be accounted for only relatively, equally with that element which has its source in the significance of the object for the feelings. As little as the fact of being desired can scarcity create for the object a valuation otherwise than in the reciprocal relation with another object existing under like conditions. We may examine the one object ever so closely with reference to its self-sufficient properties, we shall never find

the economic value; since this consists exclusively in the *reciprocal relationship*, which comes into being between several objects on the basis of these properties, each determining the other, and each giving to the other the significance which each in turn receives from the other.

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SOCIAL CONTROL. XV.

CUSTOM.

It is perhaps safe to think of the lowest savage as a creature of appetite and propensity that is clever enough to reach its ends in round-about ways. But if we take man farther up the path of evolution, we find his life cannot be platted on the lines of a few simple animal desires. He has become polygonal, and no simple formula will fit him. Ideas and idea-motor activities complicate his life. Native promptings are overruled or postponed in virtue of built-up habits and sentiments. His thoughts about things, his notions of himself and other selves strangely perturb him. He is anything but rational, but he is very far from natural. Why is this?

The active life of the primitive man is *little organized*. That is to say, it is not formed about ruling ideas or habits. It is the sport of bodily condition as the sand-dunes along the shore are the sport of the wind. The daily flow and ebb of energy, the unsteady pull of instinct, the rhythm of appetite, the irregular pulse of desire, the explosions of passion—it is chiefly the play of these that gives life its stamp. Then, too, there is a drift in respect to desire and choice answering to the physiological changes that lie between youth and age. But there is no building up of personal character, because there is no stuff for the framework. The shifting sands do not become soil till the roots of some plant bind them. The shifting moods do not become soul till the force of some idea seizes and holds them against the play of bodily suggestions. And an idea that is to have this force should be implanted in childhood.

The association of parents and children is of little moral consequence unless there are ideas to communicate. The rise of a race tradition that can be handed down marks, therefore, a great hour in human development. Nothing so pregnant in social possibilities has occurred since the invention of language. The child now does something more than ape the parents' ways.

It receives at the golden moment those ideas, precepts, prejudices, and habits which are to become the foundation of its character. Thenceforth it is possible to *organize the individual life*, and to lay a solid basis for the social union *by organizing the lives of many men about the same ideas and habits*.

Whatever be the maximum, it is certain that the minimum exposure to family government and tradition lasts until the youth can assert his physical strength against that of the parent. The sure overlap of human generations reaches, therefore, to adolescence in both sexes, and from this period of kneading by authority and shaping by suggestion youth cannot escape. By so much as the first fifteen years dominate the rest of life can the traditions of the group dominate its members. Such is the contribution that the family makes to the social order.

Now, do these years really dominate? Is social custom fixed in early habit powerful? Does the life that is once built up about tradition stay so built? Once the world's wisdom said "yes." If we hesitate to say it now, it is owing to the new phase we have entered. Nowadays no sooner does youth come forth with its life organized about certain ideas than we hasten to disorganize it. After the young have got in the current of custom, they meet and are swung round by the rollers of fashion. Conventionality captivates them, and they cease imitating ancestors in order to imitate contemporaries. Moreover, culture and "the spirit of the age" bid them to drift no longer, but seize the helm themselves. But, after all, these new forces that break us out of the socket of custom are social and can be trusted. Besides, they have been active only in the handful of progressive societies. Throughout the story of the race it has been the normal thing for the social influence that bears on the adult to be one with the domestic influence that bears on the child.

The real question, then, is this: Can the clamping for fifteen years within the family and social order, and the early organization of life about the ideas presented by this order, afterward, avail against the wild and lawless impulses of the heart? Of the answer to this there is no doubt. There is a powerful feeling which keeps the later years welded to the earlier. A kind of

dreadful homesickness punishes any wide departure from the old lines. The strange revulsions to the faith of childhood spring from the same longing that draws men back to the fatherland, the old homestead, the friends of boyhood. Evangelists know how potent is the memory of the old teaching at mother's knee, the old prayers from the trundlebed. Sometimes after periods of breathless innovation whole peoples are seized with a yearning for the old-fashioned. After every radical movement historians have learned to look for a reaction. As a mouse that has ventured from its hole suddenly runs back smitten with a causeless terror, so man is liable to bolt the moment he realizes he is far from home. It is reason and convenience that lure him from the time-hallowed; it is nostalgia that draws him back.

A little novelty charms, but a general invasion of the new makes the world look bleak and dreary. Socialist utopias, no matter how thickly the felicity is spread, strike us as chill and forbidding, because we miss familiar features and homely detail. The main prop of custom is not the fear of the ancestral gods, but the dread of self-mutilation. For to give up the customary is to alienate portions of one's self, to tear away the sheath that protects our substance. Well says the musing Wallenstein:

"For of the wholly common is man made,
And custom is his nurse! Woe then to them
Who lay irreverent hands upon his old
House furniture, the dear inheritance
From his forefathers. For time consecrates;
And what is gray with age becomes religion."¹

It is the prerogative of custom to organize personal life on many lines, to fix bodily habits, language, costume, sports, pleasures, aims, and expression, as well as the attitude toward others. But one thing never forgotten in its organization of life is *adaptation to requirements*. The mold in which the life of the child is to be cast is for the most part not of the parents' own making, but is borne to them on the stream of social tradition. Says Plato, speaking of primitive societies: The families "would have peculiar customs . . . which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would

¹ *The Piccolomini*, scene iv (Coleridge's translation).

incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in their nature And they would naturally stamp upon their children and their children's children their own likings."¹

It is, then, likely that custom will, among other things, transmit and fix attitudes of submission to elders, chiefs, and magistrates, of obedience to precepts and laws, of subordination of private aims to the social order in which one has been reared.²

But to make custom, as such, a cause of order is to lend it a new and striking rôle. Custom has, it is true, received of late much attention as the source of early law. In its spirit the sociologist has seen the first dim realization of the conditions of social well-being. In its unwritten commands the jurist has seen the germ of written laws enforced by threat of punishment. So much for the *content* of custom. But the point I am making now is that this content is in a measure self-enforcing. We have learned to see in custom a primitive code obeyed out of superstitious dread or fear of public opinion. I present it here as a *power*—and an ally and reinforcement of the other powers that bind the individual. The view needs but to be stated, for it has been foreshadowed by many thinkers. Such terms as "tyrant custom,"³ "venerable tyrant,"⁴ "violent and treacherous school-mistress,"⁵ "principal magistrate of man's life,"⁶ "greater power than nature,"⁷ "shifting sway,"⁸ recognize a *power*, not merely an unwritten code.

The secret of this power must be sought, in the last analysis, in suggestion and habit. The child receives the ideas, precepts, and likings which are to become the organizing factors of its life, because it has no habits, because it is not yet obsessed by other ideas and feelings, because it wants something that may help it to bring order out of the chaotic contents of its mind, and because the hunger of a growing creature makes it greedy

¹ *Laws*, III, 681.

² "The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom: everyone having an inward veneration for the opinion and manners approved and received amongst his own people cannot without very great reluctance depart from them." (MONTAIGNE, *On Custom*.)

³ Shakespeare.

⁵ Montaigne.

⁷ Locke.

⁴ Thomson.

⁶ Bacon.

⁸ Byron.

for mental aliment. On the other hand, the adult who has passed the suggestible age and emerged from the family chrysalis allows the early organization of his life to dominate him, because habit is strong and the wrench of mental readjustment is painful. *Chiefly upon these successive ascendancies—the ascendancy of the surroundings and later the ascendancy of the past self over the present—rests the might of custom.*

But there is another factor not to be overlooked. To a certain extent suggestions are accepted according to the *prestige* of their source. Now, one effect of the overlapping of generations is to lend prestige to that which is old and in so far as it is old. Ancestor-worship, for instance, which is simply father-domination writ large, throws the glance over the shoulder, turns the face toward the past. The worshiper trusts the dead more than the living; all his light is from setting suns; the sky is dark save just behind him. To him a custom is the cherished habit of some spirit, and the older the custom the more spirits there are who will make conformity to it a personal matter. On people of this mental habit the old is sure to impose, and the greater its antiquity the more it imposes. Have we not here the clue to that feeling which leads certain peoples to distrust positive laws and to throw everything into the form of immemorial custom?

Says Sir Henry Maine: "Each individual in India is a slave to the customs of the group to which he belongs."¹

"The council of village elders does not command anything, it merely declares what has always been. Nor does it generally declare that which it believes some higher power to have commanded; those most entitled to speak on the subject deny that the natives of India necessarily require divine or political authority as the basis of their usages; their antiquity is by itself assumed to be a sufficient reason for obeying them."²

But

"The body of persons to whose memory the customs are committed has always added to the stock of usage by tacitly inventing new rules to apply to cases which are really new."³

Now, apropos "of the invention of customary rules to meet cases which are really new" by the council of elders of the

¹ *Village Communities*, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Hindoo village, Maine says: "It is always the fact or the fiction that this council merely declares customary law."¹ For instance, the water supplied to village communities by government irrigation canals is distributed according to rules which

"do not purport to emanate from the personal authority of their author or authors; nor do they assume to be dictated by a sense of equity: there is always, I am assured, a sort of fiction, under which some customs as to the distribution of water are supposed to have existed from all antiquity, although in fact no artificial supply had been even so much as thought of."²

The halo of prestige is not always the hoar of antiquity. Tarde³ shows how epochs of custom-imitation alternate with periods of mode-imitation. For a while the course of imitation is between past and present; then the current changes, and the course of imitation lies between contemporaries. To down-transmission or social heredity succeeds cross-imitation or conventionality. In the latter period the old is distrusted and the new has the presumption in its favor. In the former period the recent is weak, the presumption is with the ancient, and the maximum of statesmanship is to let things alone. It is in such an epoch that Wallenstein soliloquizes:

"Power seated on a quiet throne thou'dst shake,
Power on an ancient consecrated throne,
Strong in possession, founded on old custom;
Power by a thousand tough and stringy roots
Fixed to the people's pious nursery faith.
This, this will be no strife of strength with strength."⁴

We are in an innovating age, and the prestige of antiquity seems a slight thing to hold upright a law. But now, when all this is at a discount, it is well to remember with Sir H. Maine:

"It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved, since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by embodiment in some permanent record."⁵

¹ *Village Communities*, p. 116.

² *Ibid.*, p. 110.

³ *Les lois de l'imitation*, chap. vii.

⁴ *The Piccolomini*, scene iv.

⁵ *Ancient Law*, p. 21.

"To the fact that the enthusiasm for change is comparatively rare must be added the fact that it is extremely modern. It is known but to a small part of mankind, and to that part but for a short period during a history of incalculable length. It is not older than the free employment of legislation by popular governments."¹

"Vast populations, some of them with a civilization considerable but peculiar, detest that which in the language of the West would be called reform. The entire Mohammedan world detests it. The multitudes of colored men who swarm in the great continent of Africa detest it; and it is detested by that large part of mankind which we are accustomed to leave on one side as barbarous or savage. The millions upon millions of men who fill the Chinese empire loathe it and (what is more) despise it. The enormous mass of the Indian population hates and dreads change."²

Now, this reverence for antiquity—which prevails so widely even today—was very pronounced in the historical civilizations. Tradition, we know, availed to keep the Jewish type fixed despite the vicissitudes of Israel. Roman society founded on ancestor-worship and *patria potestas* was for many centuries intensely conservative. Greece we think of as a model of emancipation. Yet Plato, discussing the art of establishing a commonwealth, says:

"No one can easily receive laws at their first imposition, but if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; . . . then, I think, there would be very little danger at the end of the time of a state thus trained not being permanent."³

So far two principles have been established. One is that the social order is greatly strengthened when the laws, precepts, wisdom, ideas, and feelings which make for adaptation have entered the very warp and woof of a civilization, so that they are passed on as a matter of course from sire to son. The other is that every visible prop of order becomes able to sustain more with the lapse of time.

Now, have these principles any bearing on social control? Apparently not. Use and wont is certainly not one more regulative device. It is rather a gain got for nothing, like the toughness of old mortar, the strength of a old ramparts, or the hardness

¹ *Popular Government*, p. 134.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 133.

³ *Laws*, VII.

of long-exposed stone. To impart venerableness to an institution is within the power of no man. Society cannot at will make the moss grow or the ivy run, although it can gladly avail itself of the charm they lend to the granite walls of authority. Is custom, therefore, something to be recognized and then passed by?

No, the binding power of custom is more fecund of consequence than that. It calls forth certain adjustments. Every regulative institution pays homage to the empire of use and wont; at many and various points society deflects its policy in order to get the utmost service that custom is able to render it.

The segments of social life in which custom-imitation prevails fall naturally into two groups. In the one group, which embraces language, costume, *cuisine*, games, sports, greetings, folk-lore, etc., we find an unconscious and passive persistence in old ways. An improvement has to contend less with the resistance than with the indifference or the inertia of people. Little controversy is waged between the old and the new. The many follow the well-worn path unthinkingly; a few deliberate and then adopt the better. With certain changes, such as the spread of reading, the rise of discussion, or the substitution of teacher for parent, the old is more rapidly displaced, and the new triumphs with hardly a protest.

But there is another group in which improvement arouses opposition. In politics, law, religious belief, ritual, ceremony, and moral codes the time-hallowed finds staunch defenders, and the tension between the old and the new calls forth the hostile camps of conservatives and radicals. To the superior new the old shows itself pugnacious and uncompromising. And the removal of the young from home to school changes the theater, but not the fierceness, of the strife.

Whence this pig-headed conservatism? Shall we say that the old becomes bound up with the interest of a class, and that it is this selfish interest that fights innovation? No, not this. In the case of change in the dogmas or rites of a church, or in the procedure of a court, there need be no private interest at stake. And again there are private interests arrayed against a new

machine, a change of fashion, or an improvement in medicine; and yet they soon succumb.

The real cause of the truculent and stubborn conservatism that crops up in questions of government, law, belief, ritual, ceremony, etc., is the superior value of the old for purposes of control. It is easy to see the connection. In language, sport, or costume a change may do violence to one's habits and wrench one's feelings, but the cost of it is borne by the one who enjoys the improvement. But in the field of control we find society engaged in a desperate struggle with the human will. And the replacement of the old constitution, law, dogma, or formality by something newer and fitter is at the cost of society. For, putting intrinsic merits aside, the old, *just because it has been sucked in with mother's milk*, is better than the new. Every change, then, is a surrender of an advantage in the struggle with the individual—a coming out from intrenchments to fight in the open. To innovate in law, religion, or state is to re-form an army in the presence of the enemy. *And society is always in the presence of the enemy.*

The old political thinkers let these truths appear very plainly as the basis of their conservatism. Aristotle contrasts the art of control with such arts as medicine or gymnastic:

"The law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time; so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law."¹

Says Bodin:

"Newness in matter of laws is always contemptible, whereas, to the contrary, the reverence of antiquity is so great as that it giveth strength enough unto a law to cause it to be of itself obeyed without the authority of any magistrate at all joined unto it; whereas new edicts and laws, with all the threats and penalties annexed unto them, and all that the magistrates do, cannot but with great difficulty find entertainment; in such sort that as the fruit we are to receive of a new edict or law is not oftentimes so great as the harm which the contempt of the rest of the laws draweth after it for the novelty of some one."²

¹ *Politics*, II, 8.

² *Of a Commonweal*, Book IV, chap. iii.

Montaigne takes the same view :

"It is a very great doubt whether any so manifest benefit can accrue from the alteration of a law received, let it be what it will, as there is danger and inconvenience in altering it; forasmuch as government is a structure composed of divers parts and members joined and united together with so strict connection that it is impossible to stir so much as one brick or stone but the whole body will be sensible of it."¹

Says Hooker :

"What have we to induce men unto the willing obedience and observation of laws but the weight of so many men's judgment as have with deliberate advice assented thereunto; the weight of that long experience which the world hath had thereof with consent and good liking?"²

Bacon declares that "it is good also not to try experiments in states," and recommends :

"It were good, therefore, that men in their innovations would follow the example of time itself, which, indeed, innovateth greatly, but quietly and by degrees, scarce to be perceived."³

And after him comes Burke, whose watchword was "prescription," and who thought "a sacred veil" should be drawn over the beginnings of all government.

We can now lay down the law that *all institutions having to do with control change reluctantly, change slowly, change tardily, and change within sooner than without.*

A second consequence of the spell of custom is that change in regulative institutions is masked when possible by *fictions*. In *government* we have the fiction of legitimation, by which usurpers are anointed from the holy ampulla; the fiction of constitutional monarchy, whereby the leaders of parliament figure as advisers chosen by the king; and the fiction of the protectorate, by which, as in Egypt or Tunis, the real ruler is disguised as the minister resident of the protecting state. In *law* we have the Roman fiction that the prætors and jurisconsults were only interpreting the ancient Twelve Tables, whereas they were really developing law, and the English fiction that the decision of a judge only declares the common law, whereas it

¹ *On Customs.*

² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book IV, § 14.

³ *Of Innovations.*

often creates it. In *belief* we have only to recall biblical interpretation, by means of which the Scriptures are made to teach whatever the age thinks, and citation from the Fathers, by which the way may be paved for any new dogma the church wants to set up. In *ceremony* we have the convenient discovery of the "real significance" of an impressive rite when the old theory of it breaks down. How often, for instance, such ancient rites as the mass, the eucharist, or the taking of the oath have been given fresh vitality by reinterpretation! In *moral ideas* we have the constant teasing of a complete code for modern life out of the Decalogue, and the scourging of wholly new sins with the rods of the old prophets.

A third consequence of the superior restraining value of the old is that abundance of survivals which makes regulative institutions the great fossil-bearing strata of the sociologist.¹ In law we have the persistence of parchment, of Latin terms, of obsolete phrases, of seals, of criers, of wigs and gowns. In religion we may instance the Roman *pontifices*:

"Just as they adhered to wood for bridge-building after masonry had been discovered, to wooden nails and spears after iron, to scourging to death after decapitation had come in, to the assembly of the people by word of mouth after the bugle had long been known, so they adhered also to oral proclamation of the calendar and oral communication of legal suits long after the secular power had substituted writing for them."²

Government is almost as archaic as this, and as to ceremonial it has been well termed "the museum of history."

Finally there is the consequence that those in charge of the instruments of control—senates, ephors, magistrates, officials, judges, lawyers, priests, clergymen, masters of ceremonies, rabbis, Brahmins, Brehons, ulemas—develop the conservative habit of mind. Wanting a social science which might account for it, they *feel* rather than *understand* the prudence of guarding unbroken the hallowing spell of time. Hence they make a principle of that which is wise policy only for institutions of control. They come to resist innovation in the arts or sciences

¹ See SPENCER, *Study of Sociology*, pp. 106-10.

² VON IHERING, *The Evolution of the Aryan*, p. 321 (translated by A. Drucker, 1897).

as well as in law or religion. So that too often the black bat of obscurantism gets them at the last. Over against them, then, must stand the investigator, the artist, the reformer, the prophet, to level the "forts of folly," to open new paths, and to keep mankind on the march.

It must be admitted that, in Christendom at least, custom now holds things together less than ever before. The family is no longer the secure seat of tradition it once was, and the spirit of the age has broken the scepter of the Past. The hoop of precedent has become a streak of rust, and the ferment is spreading the staves of the social cask. Consider the meaning of the democratic reorganization of society in the nineteenth century. In the United States free land has supplied an economic lever for the leveling-up process. But in western Europe the democratic movement arose, beyond all doubt, out of the radical movement of thought in the eighteenth century which discredited traditions by requiring them to submit their credentials at the bar of reason and justice. The shock broke the spell of use and wont, and weakened the bonds of society beyond their power to hold those under-classes which bore the most and got the least out of the social union—those who, from the nature of the case, required the most control to keep them quiet. The undermining of authority left only physical force confronting them, and against this the disadvantaged classes have gradually fought their way to political recognition and a certain equality of opportunity. Whether, after this is fully attained, power can dispense with that custom which was once, in Pindar's phrase, "lord of all things"—whether, in other words, the centrifugal tendencies will continue until property goes the way of privilege—is a question to be seriously pondered. But there is another consideration.

In social architecture the prime desiderata have always been order and progress. If one must come first, it is the former, for there can be no progress without order, although there can be order without progress. But their real rivalry lies in the fact that order can be somewhat impaired for the sake of quicker progress, or progress can be somewhat checked for the sake of

better order. Which will be favored in such interference depends on how they are esteemed. For obvious reasons order was prized before progress was, and until modern times enjoyed far greater consideration. But the visible triumphs of physical science in these latter days have implanted the idea that progress is vastly beneficent and must be provided for.

This, however, by no means implies a general recognition of the principle of progress. How few there are who honestly believe that improvement is possible anywhere and everywhere! Who expects change in dress or funerals, as he expects it in surgery? Who admits that the marriage institution or the court of justice is improvable as well as the dynamo? Who concedes the relativity of woman's sphere or private property, as he concedes that of the piano or the skyscraper? No; the sway of custom has been weakened. But who will say that too much room has been made for social progress?

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THE SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD — (*continued*).

RECAPITULATING our argument, we may say that all the students of society who properly belong in the gild of philosophers of history have virtually undertaken to interpret human life as too exclusively a function of some single influence, about which they have formed *a priori* conceptions. They have done their best to arrange all the knowledge about human life within their reach so that it would tally with this hypothesis of prevailing influence. Their method has exhibited only a minimum of positiveness or objectivity. In spite of this long-distance communication with reality the philosophers of history have bequeathed to present social science a perception of a complex problem, which may be stated in this form: "Given the fact of these influences, which are evidently real in some degree of force in human affairs; to discover when, how, in what proportions, under what conditions, and with what additional influences these factors operate in human associations."

While the philosophers of history have been shaping study of society in such fashion that students of society must inevitably propose their problem at last in the above form, dissatisfaction with the method of gaining knowledge has been growing. A few men have been moved by a feeling rather than by a clear perception that there has been defective realism or objectivity in the treatment of human experience. They have virtually said to themselves: "Let us plan methods of research by which we may know actual facts, to take the place of the irresponsible fancies with which social philosophers have been content to speculate." One outcome of this movement is modern sociology.

The implication is not intended that the sociologists have invariably been more scientific than the philosophers of history. On the contrary, they have been, as a rule, equally and sometimes more unscientific. They have, however, undertaken more

deliberate attempts to construct plans of research that would conform to the principles of exact science. The consequence is that, while sociology up to date can show comparatively little in the way of absolutely new knowledge about society, it has accumulated a wealth of perception about the value of different portions of knowledge, and about ways in which knowledge of society must be tested and organized. Although these perceptions are not yet coördinated in any system which is generally accepted by sociologists, there is an unformulated consensus about standards of objectivity and correlation which is steadily reducing sociological speculation to the soberness of observational and experimental science.¹

Each of the chief types of sociological theory has contributed something to this result. Perhaps the largest contributions have been not direct, but indirect. There may be close parallelism here between the merit of the sociologists and that of the philosophers of history. The share of the sociologists in the result may be quite different from the spirit of their own premises. We may trace, however, in the progress of sociological theory, first, a reaction and a protest against speculative social philosophy; second, a struggle by men still wearing the shackles of speculative tradition to perfect a positive method; third, attrition among pseudo-positive methods. Reciprocal criticism of schools and programs of sociological inquiry is still the order of the day and unfortunately the chief employment of the sociologists. Out of all this preliminary maneuvering a sociological method is emerging. It is an organization of ways of knowing society as it is. This is a substitute for the ways in which people

¹ "Unfortunately, the relation of facts is always less simple than we think; the demand of our intellect for unity is often a little too strong, especially in the realm of social science. Hasty conclusions are still the order of the day. One assumes something, not because it is so, because one has actually so observed it, but because it would agree so finely with something else. This is all very unscientific, but it suits our best thinkers not seldom. Really, we proceed still from the theory and seek facts merely for illustration. If one does otherwise, starts from the facts and goes no farther than they permit, then people are astonished that his result is not so beautifully rounded off, not so faultless, as their own fancies. That the latter, even if ever so consistent, harmonious, complete, are yet absolutely worthless—that does not appear to such people." (STEINMETZ, *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, August, 1898.)

thought about society without knowing it as it is. We shall comment upon certain typical proposals of sociological method, for the purpose of illustrating this last proposition.

A. *The importance of classification.*—Disregarding earlier prophets of scientific method, we may consider Comte (1798–1857). It is worth while to emphasize the contribution of Comte to the method of sociology, not because his method in his own hands accomplished much that is in itself memorable, but because he made the inevitable problem more obvious. He defined it more precisely than it had been defined before. His point of departure is indicated in the following propositions:

It cannot be necessary to prove to anybody who reads this work that ideas govern the world or throw it into chaos; in other words, that all social mechanism rests upon opinion. The great political and moral crises that societies are now undergoing are shown by a rigid analysis to arise out of intellectual anarchy. While stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order, we are suffering from an utter disagreement which may be called universal. Till a certain number of general ideas can be acknowledged as a rallying-point of social doctrine, the nations will remain in a revolutionary state, whatever palliatives may be devised; and their institutions can only be provisional. But whenever the necessary agreement on first principles can be obtained, appropriate institutions will issue from them without shock or resistance; for the causes of disorder will have been arrested by the mere fact of the agreement. It is in this direction that those must look who desire a natural and regular, a normal state of society. (*Pos Phil.*, Introd.)

Accordingly, Comte attempted to classify the sciences. His fundamental principle was described as follows:

We may derive encouragement from the example set by recent botanists and zoölogists, whose philosophical labors have exhibited the true principle of classification, namely, that the classification must proceed from the study of the *things to be classified*, and must by no means be determined by *a priori* considerations. The real affinities and natural connections presented by objects being allowed to determine their order, the classification itself becomes the expression of the most general fact. (*Idem*, Book I, chap. ii.)

Upon this basis Comte classified the sciences in his well-known hierarchy: astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology, and social physics; mathematics being treated as antecedent to all the sciences.

Comte's ideas of method are further illustrated by his use of the distinction between statical and dynamical relations. On this point he says :

This division, necessary for purposes of exploration, must not be stretched beyond that use. The distinction becomes weaker with the advance of science. We shall see that, when the science of social physics is fully constituted, this division will remain, for analytical purposes, but not as a real separation of the science into two parts. The distinction is not between two classes of facts, but between two aspects of a theory. It corresponds with the double conception of order and progress; for order consists in a perfect harmony among the conditions of social existence; and progress consists in social development; and the conditions in the one case and the laws of movement in the other constitute the statics and dynamics of social physics.

Further peculiarities of Comte's method are alluded to by Barth as follows :

We find in Comte's proposal an antithesis, namely, on the one hand he insists that the social series is a continuation of the animal series, but it is impossible to deduce the one from the other. The development of society cannot be traced to the peculiarities of individuals. Sociology cannot be derived from physiology, however important biology may be in laying foundations for sociology. Biology furnishes only certain general notions; for example, that of evolution, the specialization of organs, solidarity, etc. On the other hand, the positive law of evolution, according to Comte, is that of the three states, namely, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. This, however, is not a biological, but an epistemological principle.

In view of this antinomy in Comte, the fact of value for our purpose is not the intrinsic merit or demerit of his theory of the three states. That theorem is not close enough to reality to deserve any attention except as a curious conceit long since discredited at the author's valuation. The important point is that the conceit, although incorrect, posited a mental, not a physical, principle, as the clue to the social mystery. Comte had a rigidly mechanical conception of the forms in which the social principle works, but he still had a presentiment that the principle itself is not mechanical. Comte is therefore not a successful monist. In his scheme these two elements are left antithetical, as must always be the case so long as we confine ourselves to descriptions of phenomena. The physical and the spiritual aspects of phenomena may be assumed to be

manifestations of one underlying reality, but no one has succeeded in making that unity visible.

It is accordingly not surprising that the followers of Comte took two divergent courses. Some of them pursued the spiritual clue; others worked in accordance with the mechanical or physiological conception. It would have been very natural if those followers of Comte who were most impressed by the spiritual conception in his doctrine had emphasized the idea which superficial readers have always fixed upon as the most important part of his teaching, namely, his division of human experience into the three stages. With more correct insight, or instinct, however, the tendency which we have now to notice followed rather the methodological clue in the doctrine than its material content.

We have noticed how important in Comte's mind was the principle of classification. Beginning with the simpler sciences and continuing through the subject-matter of all science, including sociology, Comte insisted upon classification dictated by the peculiarities of the things classified. Thus classification with Comte is itself science. To know enough about objects or facts to arrange them in scientific classes, we must obviously have enough knowledge of their essential peculiarities to mark a good degree of scientific progress. Conversely, an attempt in the Comtean spirit to classify the subject-matter chosen as a scientific field amounts to a pledge that the things to be classified will be duly investigated, so that their likenesses and differences may be known. For this reason those writers whom Barth calls the "classifying sociologists" deserve sincere respect, whether the categories which they have proposed prove permanent or not. Their attempt has been to discover those essential attributes of social facts which constitute marks of likeness or unlikeness. So far as it goes, this search for the signs of similarity and dissimilarity is true science, provided it observes scientific principles in deciding what are the qualities attributed to the subject-matter in question. It is not an invention of the sociologists. It is merely a sign on the part of the sociologists that they have so far heeded the lessons taught by the maturer sciences.

Among the followers of Comte there has not been due observance of the limitation just suggested. Descriptive analysis is logically presupposed as a condition of validity in genetic classification, or in causal analysis, which is another aspect of the same thing. Social facts and forces have been arranged in classes by sociologists whose haste to reach genetic classification has made them neglect necessary descriptive analysis. This criticism may be applied at once to De Greef. His famous schedule of social phenomena involves a thesis about the order in which those phenomena emerge.¹ That hypothesis turns the schedule, to a certain extent at least, into a genetic classification. In that character De Greef's proposition is more than questionable. As a descriptive analysis for certain purposes it has not been excelled. We may then at once set down to the credit of the sociologists of this group a commendable beginning of the process of grouping like social facts. This is a necessary preliminary in all science. The "classifying sociologists" have been criticised not so much because they did not do their part well as because the critics did not see that this part was worth doing at all. Such judgments condemn the critics rather than the criticised. Classification is not the whole of science, but it is an essential stage in the scientific process. The men who belittle it tend to disregard the authority of facts, and to claim scientific authority for their lucubrations independent of facts.

The processes that have given the group-name to the "classifying sociologists" have sometimes been called collectively "descriptive sociology." This term stands for all that is involved in arranging the material facts in classified order, without attempt to enter upon the next step, namely, interpretation. Whether this designation is to be permanent experience alone can decide.

A passage from Barth is pertinent at this point:

According to Comte, sciences must be parallel with things. When we arrange the latter according to their decreasing generality, and their increasing complexity, we have at the same time their actual correlation. Just so, when we arrange the sciences according to the same principle, we have the

¹ *Introduction à la sociologie*, Vol. I, p. 217.

sequence of their origin, that is, their history. Since the same logical motives which operate in humanity as a whole are in force also in the individual, he not only may but must repeat in himself the developmental course through which the knowledge of the race has passed. Otherwise his development is incomplete. He must, in other words, recapitulate in himself the history of science. Comte's classification of the sciences, accordingly, purports to be, not merely descriptive, but at the same time genetic and reconstructive.

The idea was close at hand that the same should be done for society which Comte tried to do for the world at large and for general science. A subdivision of society, from its most general to its most complicated phenomena, was attempted by Comte only incidentally and imperfectly. Accordingly, he produced no classifications in sociology that satisfy his program of scientific division. If this omission could be supplied, it would mean, according to the presuppositions of the Comtean system, that we should have, not merely a division of social phenomena, but also the way in which society came into being and grew to its present state.

This idea is the clue to the significance of those "classifying sociologists," as they are named by Barth, who have attempted to complete Comte's work. The best representative of this group is De Greef.¹ His methodological merit in applying and developing the Comtean idea consists primarily in carrying the attempt to classify phenomena, and consequently sciences, into the societary realm. Some of his most characteristic work has been in connection with his proposal of a hierarchy of societary phenomena and of societary science. Selecting De Greef as a representative of the classifying tendency, we appropriate Barth's account with certain variations.² De Greef's idea is that classification of the sciences has more than a merely subjective significance. If it is successfully objective, it reproduces the real interdependencies of things in particular and of reality as a whole. The universal is the least dependent. That which rests

¹ *Introduction à la sociologie*, 2 vols., Paris, 1886-89; *Les lois sociologiques*, Paris, 1893; *Le transformisme social*, Paris, 1895; *L'évolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques*, Paris, 1895.

² Pp. 67 sq.

upon it is the more dependent, the more special it becomes. It is in the same degree more modifiable. For teleological theory this consideration is cardinal. It is useless to apply effort to the unchangeable. Effort is practical in proportion as it is applied to the changeable. Hence the desirability of finding out the degrees of generality among societary phenomena as a basis for programs of ameliorative action.

De Greef regards inattention to the foregoing principle as the reason for poverty of results in sociology since Comte. Society is not simplicity, but extreme complexity. Comte wanted society to be regarded as a whole. He wanted explanation of its parts to proceed from explanation of the whole, instead of procedure from the parts to the whole. He did not encourage study of the isolated parts. Referring possibly to Comte's fourfold division of societary evolution in the modern world—namely, the industrial, the æsthetic, the scientific, and the philosophical¹—De Greef seems to have attributed to Comte a classification which cannot be found in the *Positive Philosophy*. At all events, he argues that Comte did not draw the obvious practical conclusion from subdivisions of the phenomena.² De Greef's motive, then, is desire to furnish a scale of societary activity that will show decreasing orders of generality, increasing orders of complexity, and consequently relative susceptibility of artificial modification.

De Greef's point of departure is selection of a psychical factor—contract—to mark the division line between the physical and the social. Upon the basis of conclusion that Spencer's criteria of distinction between the physical and the social are merely quantitative and mechanical instead of qualitative (*i. e.*, the greater distance between the elements and the distribution of consciousness among the elements), De Greef claims that neither Comte nor Spencer has adduced adequate reasons for separating sociology from biology.³ Throughout De Greef's work the differentiating factor of human volition is insisted upon as marking a separate body of phenomena.

¹ *Pos. Phil.*, Vol. VI, pp. 51, 53, 54, 56.

² *Introduction*, Vol. I, p. 228.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 19-23.

Up to this point we have practically no controversy with Barth as to the significance of the classifying tendency. It is, however, a mistake to seek in such a writer as De Greef important contributions to knowledge of the concrete. As in the case of the one-sided views of history, we get some methodological details from inspection of the method of approaching reality represented by De Greef. His classification is in essence a series of theses to be tested. In the classification the elements of social activity are made more distinct than in any previous classification. His claim with reference to the hierarchical order of the phenomena so arranged must stand or fall as a result of specific investigation of the activities and subactivities distinguished in the schedule. Sociological method is changed, however, by this scheme of categories, from a confused dumping together of miscellaneous information, as called for by Spencer's famous catalogue of what history should teach,¹ to an orderly arrangement of phenomena according to scientific principles of classification. This is not to assert that De Greef's classification is final. It has, however, admirably served the purpose of tentative analysis of social activities, while criticism of the characteristics of the activities is proceeding.

Barth discusses under the present subtitle Lacombe² and Wagner.³ Neither of these writers has added anything of value to the portion of methodology with which we are concerned, and we may allow De Greef to stand as the representative of the classifying tendency.

Recurring to the claim made above,⁴ and in accordance with our argument upon the different philosophies of history, we repeat of the different emphases in sociological methodology: each has contributed something to be worked in some way or other into the final sociology. It is not in accordance with the facts to speak of a "classifying sociology." Certain men have won recognition for the fact that classification is a necessary

¹ *The Study of Sociology*, Am. ed., Introduction.

² *De l'histoire considérée comme science*, Paris, 1894.

³ *Grundlegung der pol. Econ.*, 3te Auflage, Leipzig, 1892.

⁴ P. 617.

element in scientific method, but classification was not beginning and end of their conception of sociology. It was one of the means of developing a sociology. It would be as fair to describe the work of succeeding generations of farmers in this country by the phrases: "the tree-felling agriculture," "the stump-pulling agriculture," "the plowing agriculture," "the rock-picking agriculture," and "the rotation-of-crops agriculture." The men who had to give most of their strength to the different partial processes respectively may have had all the other processes as clearly in mind as though circumstances permitted their use. The feller of trees functioned with reference to rotation of crops just as truly as the men who lived to practice it. So of the men who emphasized the need of sociological classification.

Classification is an arrangement of abstractions around selected centers of interest. No single classification can ever visualize the social reality, because that reality presents as many aspects as there are subjective centers of attention. The object cut up into abstractions has to be represented by combination of all the classifications which our alternative centers of interest incite us to make. These alternative classifications cannot be put together in any hierarchical order if faithfulness to reality is to be maintained. To visualize the social reality, it is necessary to learn how to think these classifications as they shoot through and through each other in objective fact, forming the most complicated plexus ever observed. If we try to symbolize or formulate this plexus in categories appropriate to any lesser order of complexity, we shall either give up in despair or we shall rest satisfied with a falsification of the reality.

B. *The use of biological figures.*—No scientific movement has been more misunderstood by both friends and foes than that phase of sociological thought to which the present title applies. Barth exemplifies radical misconception of the situation in using the title "the biological sociology." The essential idea which has supplied impulse and suggestion to all the investigators in this group is that everything somehow hangs together with everything else, and that science is incomplete until it includes discovery of the forms and principles of this coherence. In other

words, the emphasis here is upon the *organic concept*, not upon biological analogies in formulating the concept. Not merely in sociology, but in every department of knowledge, the organic concept is the most distinctive modern note. It has been a serious oversight and blunder to confound the organic concept with the nonessential device of employing biological analogies when using the concept. Accidents in connection with this merely mechanical detail have been magnified by some thinkers into essentials, and misrepresented by others as the substance of the subject-matter in question, instead of merely means of finding out and reporting a certain portion of reality. The most intimate and complex and constructive coherence of elements that we discover previous to our study of society is the coworking of part with part in vital phenomena. Men who wanted to understand the social reality more precisely began, about a generation ago, to make systematic use of ascertained vital relationships as provisional symbols of societary relationships. In general it has been true from the beginning that the so-called biological sociology has not been biological at all except in its figurative modes of expression. Men have detected apparent analogies between better understood vital processes and less understood societary processes.¹ They have said virtually: "So long as terms of these vital processes put us in the way of approaching more truth about societary processes, let us use them as means to that end." Following this clue, descriptive analyses and many interpretations of social relations have been worked out in biological terms. It is not absolutely certain that any single writer who has been taken seriously by the sociologists has ever been a "biological sociologist" in any other sense than the foregoing. There have been many lapses into linguistic usage that *prima facie* meant a very fantastic literalism. In general, however, the use of biological figures has amounted to about this: There are functional relationships between men in association that are analogous with functional relationships between parts of living bodies. No analogies seem to be closer on the whole to the

¹The converse was for a time the case. *Vide Ann. of Am. Acad.*, March, 1895, p. 745.

societary facts than those in biological facts. We will, therefore, follow out these clues. We will discover all the biological analogies we can. We will test the closeness of the similarities. We will make them divulge all the truth possible about the literal terms of social relationships. We will report these discoveries in biological metaphor, if no better medium of expression is available. We will get nearer to the truth with some other medium of expression, whenever we can invent it.¹

In order to deal properly with the actual use which has been made of biological analogies, it would be necessary to discuss at length Lilienfeld, Spencer, and Schaeffle. This would take us too far afield. For our present purpose we may assume such a review. After all the controversy about the organic concept, the gist of the whole matter is that knowledge of human associations involves knowledge of the most complex interdependence of function that has been discovered in the whole realm of reality. Precise formulas of the interrelations of functions among associated men are mostly desiderata for future social science to supply. Meanwhile, approximate statements of social relationships must employ the best available means of expression. At our present stage of knowledge our insights into the social mystery express themselves most adequately, in certain of their phases at least, in biological figures. In other words, there are vast reaches of societary fact our present apprehension of which falls into symbolical expression in biological forms more conveniently and satisfactorily than into any alternative mode of expression. This proposition recognizes the provisional and inexact character of such expression. The use of biological terms to symbolize societary relationships is, therefore, desirable only so long and so far as they are on the whole better vehicles of expression than any available substitutes. Beyond that the device is a snare and a delusion.

For these reasons we repeat, the title "biological sociology" is a misnomer.² There is a method of presenting problems and

¹ For the most recent discussion of the biological method of expression *vide Annales de l'institut international de sociologie*, Tomes IV and V.

² In his paper, "The Failure of Biologic Sociology," *Ann. of Am. Acad.*, May, 1894,

of stating results in sociology by means of biological terms. That method does not make nor wish to make the subject-matter biological, any more than the graphic method of presenting statistics makes the subject-matter geographical. To be sure, Lilienfeld, Spencer, Schaeffle, and a numerous host who have lighted their tapers from these flames, have sometimes appeared to carry symbolism into realism. They have sometimes seemed to treat society as though it were the last term in the zoölogical series. Whatever faults of this sort may be on record, they do not lie along the trunk line of advance from Comte to securely scientific sociology. They are excursions which call for very little attention at present. Apart from the men, if there are any such, who actually think that society is a big animal, the investigators who have use for biological figures in connection with societary relationships no more convert their subject-matter into biology, by using organic metaphors, than use of Arabic notation in astronomy would convert the subject-matter into Semitic philology. The term "biological sociology" implies what is not and never has been true of that which is most essential in the method to which it applies. The assumption of the critics is that behind all use of the biological terms there is a supposition contrary to fact; namely, that society is a zoölogical species. The truth is that the method thus misunderstood does not assume that human associations are anything at all except a plexus of relationships formed by the mingling together of many human beings. The method starts with the perception that has coined the sociological axiom: "All men are functions of each other." Setting out with this perception of the complexity of associations between men, these particular sociologists, as we have said above, cast about for relationships of equal or like complexity. They found none apparently more similar in that respect than those between parts of animal organisms. Scientific study of animal organisms has progressed relatively farther than scientific study of human associations. It serves to spur the imagination and to sharpen

PROFESSOR PATTEN has disposed of certain real errors, but his blows are delivered chiefly at straw men, so far as the epithet "biologic" is concerned.

the curiosity of investigators who want to know the literal truth about the social reality. For these reasons biological science has been called to the assistance of sociologists, not merely in furnishing truth about the physiological substructure of human associations, but in furnishing thought-appliances for investigation of those relationships which are beyond the competence of biology. It is thus sheer muddle-headedness to confuse the tool of investigation and the medium of expression with the supposed nature of the portion of reality investigated.

It must be admitted that some of the most perspicuous thinking on this subject has uttered itself in language that encourages this confusion. It has doubtless been a mistake to allow the terminology of sociological inquiry to seem to overshadow in importance the subjects of inquiry themselves. Sociologists who are perfectly free from uncertainty about the above distinction have frequently used terms in a way that has prevented less discerning persons from reaching the distinction. The phrase "biological sociology," whether used with correct or incorrect connotations, has always been unfortunate in this respect. It seems to imply what has been denied above. Hence it is to be pronounced a misnomer, whether adopted by friends or applied invidiously by foes.

It must be admitted, too, that use of biological figures is worth only what it is worth. Its utility depends largely upon the temper, training, and taste of the investigator, or, in the case of teachers, upon the mental content of their pupils. Doubtless much discovery among social relationships may be made by men whose method of approach and whose form of expression are predominantly mathematical, or mechanical, or philosophical. Whatever may be claimed to the contrary, the prevailing note in sociology, from Comte down to the present time, has been belief in a psychical something and somehow, marking a sphere of societary reality distinct in thought from physical reality. This proposition is not intended in a dualistic sense, although it may have been true in that sense of some men. It is used here in a sense in which the stoutest monist might employ the terms, namely: sociologists actually distinguish orders of fact and

process which we cannot yet reduce to terms of a single unity, no matter how sure we may be that the underlying unity exists. Though we may be monistic in our theory of reality, we are necessarily dualistic in our apprehension of phenomena.¹ Accordingly, every form of expression whatever which tends to obliterate the distinction in consciousness between the physical and the psychical in societary relationships must be regarded as a crudity in our symbolism. We all regard the social reality as something that cannot be reported accurately in terms of factors more elementary than the attributes of human individuals. Whether we shall symbolize what we can find out about associations of individuals in terms of quantity, or quality, or form, or function, or ideal conception; or how much of each sort of symbol we shall employ, is purely a question of technique, not to be settled by any stereotyped formula. With all the dangers of abuse, the device of physiological symbolism has very considerable advantages at certain points, although it is a stumbling-block to men who lack "the analogical imagination." The use of the device for what it is worth will not be discouraged by dogmatism or misrepresentation or ridicule. It has a quite incomparable pedagogical value within wise limits, and it is likely to be more or less useful, even to investigators, for a long time to come. Indeed, there is not a sociologist in the world who can write upon any part of sociology today, even if his subject be the total depravity of "the biological method," without framing some of his own arguments in tropical use of biological terms.² We cannot think the social complexity to the limit of our ability to apprehend it without assistance from the next lower degree of complexity that we know. The extent of our use of this aid is a mere matter of detail, and must be determined by expediency.

C. *The investigation of dynamic laws.*—In the case of the philosophers of history we saw that any characterization is inaccurate which purports to distinguish all that their conceptions

¹ Cf. below, p. 632.

² How it would have scandalized the critics of "biological sociology" if anyone outside of their own number had suggested "social anastomosis" or "social inosculation"! Vide TARDE, *Les transformations du pouvoir*, p. 8.

contain. Not merely in such an instance as that of Herder, but likewise, though in less degree, in case of the most contracted view, each philosophy of history leaves some room for factors not thrown into prominence in its formulations. The like is true of the sociologists. Each group manifests something of all the tendencies which peculiarly mark the other groups. Under the present head we are to consider a portion of the group in which Barth places Lester F. Ward, J. S. Mackenzie, Hauriou, and Franklin H. Giddings. Barth's title for the group is "The Dualistic Sociology." Except in the case of Professor Giddings, we may waive the question whether the most significant resemblances and differences of method justify classification of these men in the same group. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that their methods are sufficiently alike to place the first three in a group by themselves, we must insist that the group is neither adequately nor fairly classified by the phrase "the dualistic sociology." We may concede that Comte was predominantly materialistic and mechanical in his conceptions, though we have seen that even among his views an insistent spiritualism had a place, and that he had no self-consistent synthesis of the two phases of reality. Whether we count Comte as an example or an exception, there is nobody in the whole series of men who have made an impression upon sociology to whom the epithet "dualistic" would not apply as properly in the last analysis as to the men here named. In point of fact, all the philosophers in the world today are dualists in the sense indicated above. The fact that a few will not admit the impotence of their formal monism does not affect the proposition. That is to say, no matter how prominent the assertion of fundamental unity may be in our philosophy today, there is practically no difference of opinion as to the methodological necessity of recognizing a phenomenal duality.¹ The diversity of matter and spirit must be admitted by all to this extent, namely: whether we assert an underlying unity or not, we cannot successfully express what we see in the objective world without describing elements that seem distinct in quality. That which is phenomenally psychic is not reducible by any means at our disposal to terms of physics.

¹ Cf. above, p. 631.

On the other hand, it may be said with equal truth that there are today no philosophers of any influence who are not in the last analysis monists. However vigorously they may insist upon the phenomenal distinction between the spiritual and the psychical, they assume sooner or later that underneath the duality of appearance there is an inscrutable unity of reality. It is accordingly a mark of inferior rather than of superior insight to characterize philosophers as monistic or dualistic. Practically all philosophy today is monistic in its ontological presumption; it is dualistic or pluralistic in its analytical methods and in its classification of phenomena. In the case of the sociologists the epithet is of very doubtful utility in any instance.¹ It is certainly so in the case of the men named by Barth in this group. Ward makes the physical element, which must be taken account of by the sociologist, so prominent in the scale that he has more than once been denounced as a materialist. On the other hand, his distinctive effort has been to get for the psychic factors in social reactions due recognition and adequate formulation. If we use the term "dualistic" as a mark of commendation, it is appropriate to this group. The men named deserve praise for their efforts to show that a psychic as well as a physical phase of the underlying unity is wrought into, and must be recognized in, the social complexity.

More precisely, the significance of Ward is historically this: He first published (1883) when the influence of Herbert Spencer was probably at its height. In sociology that influence amounted to obscuration of the psychic element, and exaggeration of the physical factors concerned in shaping social combinations. Whatever be the fair estimate of Spencer's total influence upon sociology, it certainly operated for a time to concentrate attention upon the mechanical and vital elements in social combinations, and to obscure the psychic elements which are in excess of the physical. While the Spencerian influence was uppermost, the tendency was to regard social progress as a sort of mechanically determined redistribution of energy which

¹ Particularly as it is a term without meaning unless it bears the tag of the particular doctrine from whose viewpoint the fault is alleged.

thought could neither accelerate nor retard. Against this tendency Ward, a most energetic monist, opened a crusade. He undertook to show that mind can control the conditions of human life to such an extent that it is possible to inaugurate a new and better era of progress. According to Ward there is a difference between the progress of the past and the progress to be anticipated when mind shall have applied itself to the problem, so great that we may speak of the latter as artificial progress and the former as accidental progress.

At the time of its publication (1890) Mackenzie's book, *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, was the ablest survey that had been made of the whole field properly so designated. Nothing that has since appeared has made the book obsolete, although the strategic points in sociological inquiry have shifted greatly, and have become in many respects more salient since he wrote. It is a mistake on Barth's part to represent Mackenzie as the exponent of any particular type of sociology. He did most successfully what he attempted. In his preface he says:

Little, if anything, of what is now published can be claimed as original It is scarcely necessary to add that this work is not intended as a systematic treatise on the subject with which it deals, but only as a slight contribution to the discussion of it. It is, indeed, not so much a book as an indication of the lines on which a book might be written. The only merit which I can hope it may be found to possess is that it has brought into close relation to each other a number of questions which are usually, at least in England, treated in a more disconnected way. (P. viii.)

Mackenzie's work has been appraised by the sociologists generally at a higher valuation than the author's modest estimate claims. It not only furnished a conspectus of relationships which had frequently been confused or ignored, but by so doing it promoted systematic sociological inquiry. It thus deserves a high place among the factors that have developed sociological method. It tried to make real the subject-matter of sociological inquiry, and to indicate in large outline the manner in which approach must be made to knowledge of this reality. This is plain from the author's own summary.¹ Professor Mackenzie carefully guards against calling himself a sociologist at all.

¹ First edition, pp. 369-57.

That he is an exponent of a special type of sociology in Barth's sense is, we repeat, a mistake. He has certainly contributed a large share toward the introduction of sanity into thought about social relations. He has not attempted, however, to influence sociological method except in the general way above indicated.

Hauriou is for our purposes a wholly negligible quantity.¹ Professor Giddings stands for certain tendencies which deserve distinct mention under another head. We accordingly return to Ward as the proper representative of the phase of methodology to which the title of this section refers.

We must observe once more that none of the methods with which we are dealing entirely lacks or entirely monopolizes any factor of scientific process. Ward, for instance, did not invent the quest for formative social influences. Men had been searching for them since the world began. When Ward wrote *Dynamic Sociology*, however, the sociological fashion set by Spencer was to treat social forces as though they were mills of the gods which men could at most learn to describe: which they might not presume to organize and control. Ward did not declare independence of the natural conditions within which the human problem has to be worked out. He declared that we may learn physical conditions, and at the same time mental conditions, to such purpose that we may eventually make human progress a scientific program. His emphasis, then, was upon knowledge of the effective forces in social conditions, with ultimate reference to deliberate telic application.²

Altogether apart, then, from any specific theorems to which Ward committed himself, his work has a secure place as a force making for modification of the aims of sociological theory. It is Comte, to be sure, from whom Ward takes his cue, but Comte had no scientific standing-ground broad and firm enough to permit clear prevision. Spencer was virtually training prevision backward. The primary meaning of Ward's appearance in the

¹ *La science sociale traditionnelle*, Paris, 1896.

² *Vide* first ed., Preface, p. vii; Vol. I, p. 81; and Vol. II, p. 159. For SPENCER'S unlike views *vide* *Social Statics*, American ed. of 1892, pp. 233 *sq.*; also DE GREEF, *Introduction*, Vol. II, p. 13.

sociological field was that a bold campaign of advance was proclaimed. He virtually said: "It is possible to know enough about the conditions of the conduct of life to guide society in a deliberate program of progress. Let us proceed, then, to organize knowledge and research, with the definite purpose of applying it to social progress. Let us not be content longer merely to analyze and describe what has taken place in the past without the assistance of knowledge at its best. Let us get familiar with the factors of human progress, and when we have learned to understand them let us use them to the utmost for human improvement."

Ward is by profession a biologist (palæontological botany). He would naturally give full faith and credit to all those elements in human conditions which the physical sciences must explore. With this taken for granted, he proposed to learn particularly the conditions of psychic cause and effect in society. He demanded inquiry into the laws of psychic action, for the purpose of molding society; just as we learn the laws of physics in order to build houses or bridges or engines. While the emphasis of other sociologists at the time was upon the ways in which non-sentient nature works, Ward demanded knowledge of how mind combines its work with that of the non-sentient factors of human conditions. Thus Ward called for knowledge of that neglected factor of reality which is the differentiating element when phenomena emerge from the stage of unconsciousness and become conscious.¹

Without attempting to weigh the specific results of Professor Ward's effort, we must, in the interest of clear thinking, do justice to his aim and to his general conception of method. He demands investigation of the psychic element of societary facts that shall be in all respects comparable with the investigations of the physical basis of life which the appropriate sciences are pursuing. It would be extraordinary if he had succeeded in completing the task which he undertook. It is also extraordinary to demand of any class of scholars that they shall say the final word upon all the inquiries which they suggest, or be denied appreciation.

¹ Cf. *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, pp. v and vi.

The work of Ward made an era in American sociology, and the fact will be admitted in the future even by men whose methods are very different from those which Ward proposed.

The animating conception of Ward's work is that dynamic sociology must be the application of all available forces, physical, industrial, spiritual,¹ to the attainment of rational social ends. It may be said that this is a platitude. On the contrary, compared with certain very firmly intrenched views of society it is practically a paradox. For instance, Gumpłowicz' *Grundriss der Sociologie* appeared two years later than *Dynamic Sociology*. In the chapter on class structure and the aristocratic order (p. 133) the author browbeats those bold democrats who presume to question the desirability of priests and lords. While he very properly shows that each of these classes corresponds to a social need, and that the merit of each is to be determined by its discharge of the indicated function, he adds: "Besides, sociology must refrain from all such criticism of nature. For sociology only the facts and their conformity to laws have an interest." According to him the question, "Could things not be different and better?" is not permissible from the sociological standpoint, for "social phenomena follow necessarily from the nature of men and from the nature of their relationships." In other words, Gumpłowicz assumes that what *is* is nature. Ward assumes that what *is* may be nature partially realized, and that the destiny of nature is to realize itself completely through action by its conscious parts upon its unconscious parts. This "artificial progress" will not nullify nature, but will make potential nature actual.

The antithesis between Ward and sociologists like Gumpłowicz, or even Spencer, appears in his belief that mind can work natural laws to more splendid demonstration of the laws. He therefore demands more knowledge of all the laws concerned. "The attitude of man toward nature should be twofold: first, that of a student; second, that of a master.² In a word Ward's fundamental proposition is: we must learn the quality and modes of

¹Of course, this use of popular terms does not imply that Ward classifies social forces under these categories.

²*Dyn. Soc.*, II, 11.

action of the efficient social forces. Regardless of debatable details of applications and conclusions, Ward's central idea is unassailable.

D. *Assumption of psychological universals.*—All thinking strives toward a final stage in which the object may be represented, not as it seems to any partial perception, but as it is in reality. Many sociologists have been so eager for their science to reach this degree of maturity that they have entertained the idea of a method capable of conducting directly to the desired end. Zeal for discovery of universals has prompted some of the best work, and has betrayed into some of the most serious mistakes, in sociology. Nothing more sharply distinguishes the sociologists, as a class, from the specialists whose fragmentary programs promise nothing conclusive, than the explicit aim of sociology to reach knowledge which shall have a setting for all details of fact about human associations, in a complete view of human associations as a whole. Demand for the universal is thus the very reason for the existence of sociology, and it is perhaps small wonder that men who are able keenly to feel the demand are allured by the notion of a method peculiarly related to the supply.

It is in this connection that it is most just to speak of the fourth writer, whom Barth dismisses with a brief reference in his group of "the dualistic sociologists." All that has been said above about the inappropriateness of the phrase is applicable to Professor Giddings. It would be superfluous to volunteer any additional disclaimers in his behalf. He is a monist and a dualist in precisely the same sense in which all modern thinkers are both and neither.

Professor Giddings deserves recognition for earnest championship of an element in method without which the other elements are abortive. His mistake, however, seems to consist in the assumption that the intellectual end toward which all valid methods converge may be anticipated and made a means for securing the end. The cabalistic sign of this potent method is the phrase "subjective interpretation."¹ This phrase may mean

¹ *Prin. of Sociol.*, pp. 11 and 36.

in practice either of two things : First, the reading of the interpreter's personal equation into the thing in question. In this case it deserves no further notice. Second, an image of the thing as it is in its essence, in all its qualities and dimensions and relations. In this case "subjective interpretation" is without question the goal to be reached, but it ought to be equally self-evident that it cannot meanwhile be the method by which it is reached.

Sociology, as it appears in its confused literature up to date, is *one* in the implicit or explicit purpose to make out the details of relationships involved in human associations, and to reconstruct them in thought in such a way that each element will be credited with its true value within the whole. This is the psychological universal. But there is no plenary indulgence in favor of sociology to dispense with the purgatory of all the necessary logical stages between the specific and the universal. Sociology has escaped the provincialism of less ambitious social sciences in proportion as it has kept ultimate universals in view. Hypothetical universals serve the same uses and lend themselves to the same abuses in sociology as elsewhere. Nothing is added to their authority by the title "subjective interpretation." The phrase is merely a name for the same reconstructive synthesis which every philosopher, from the Sophists down, has aimed to achieve. It stands for the mind's effort to represent details of a whole in their adjustments to each other within the whole. Mental organization of parts into wholes, or analysis of wholes into parts, is a constant reaction between the objective and the subjective.¹ The history of thought teems with examples of the dangers of giving excessive credit to the subjective element. It usually results in reading into objective reality undue proportions of premature impression about reality. All formation of concepts is "subjective interpretation." All descriptive analysis, all classification, all explanation is "subjective interpretation" in the only sense admissible in science.²

¹The terms are at this point relative to the consciousness of the individual organizer.

²Viz., the second above, mediated by progressive correction of the first.

It cannot be anything else. The fault of "subjective interpretation" as an arbiter of method is that it is likely to be too little the mind's organization of elements observed in the object. It will consequently be too much the mind's fiction stimulated by certain impressions received from the object, but completed by extraneous material. The report of the object proves, then, to have in it relatively too little of the object and relatively too much of the subject. This danger is inevitable in the long process of deriving universals. It may be averted only by curbing the impertinences of the subjective presumption.

Sociology is essentially an effort to find more adequate categories with which to conceptualize social details, and to organize the contents of these categories into a universal conception. It is dangerous, however, to think anything in categories which cannot be observed, but have to be imputed. In applying such categories we are likely to interpret by deduction from unauthorized impressions that fill the mind in the absence of adequate analysis of the object.

The whole argument of these papers is virtually upon the problem here presented. As the essentials involved will be discussed in various relations, further detail may for the present be postponed.

E. *The desirable combination of methods.*¹—It may be said in general that men who have tried to explain social life have tended to vibrate between two extremes. On the one hand they have exaggerated fragments, sections, phases, abstractions, *dissecta membra* of human activities and conditions, and have neglected the containing whole; or they have adopted a presumption of the whole which took away their freedom so to investigate the parts that more appropriate conceptions of the whole might result. Our thought about human affairs has consequently been a farrago of snap judgments, partial formulations, and promotions of narrow generalizations to the rank of universals. In order

¹ Among recent contributions to this subject the following deserve special notice: BOSANQUET, "Relation of Sociology to Philosophy," *Mind*, January, 1898; CALDWELL, "Philosophy and the Newer Sociology," *Contem. Rev.*, September, 1898; BALDWIN (F. S.), "Present Position of Sociology," *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, October, 1899; GIDDINGS, "Exact Methods in Sociology," *Pop. Sci. Monthly*, December, 1899.

that worthy beginnings of societary science might be made there must needs have been developed a sense, first of societary continuity, second of societary integrity; *i. e.*, of societary wholeness, both consecutive and contemporary. More especially this conception makes of human association a whole, developing without break of continuity from origins. It is a whole which exists at any given moment as a reciprocity between all its parts. It projects itself into the future in the form determined by the ratio of effectiveness between the elements and conditions that mold its character. This view requires a corresponding methodological conception. Such a conception involves the view that human association is a congruity, an integrity, a unity. Knowledge of such a reality accordingly implies comprehension of the parts, of the whole which they compose, and of the relationships by virtue of which parts and whole are one. This means that, however study of human affairs may be divided for convenience, the division is only provisional and partial and temporary. This knowledge is not reached until that conceptual division has been resolved again into conceptual unification, in which part and whole are more accurately apprehended than before as phases of one.

The view to which our survey leads is, therefore, that we need a scheme of inquiry into societary fact which, as a scheme, will provide in form for all the phases of reality that the societary unity presents. Then the task of determining and expressing these various phases of reality imposes a network of problems. We may call them primarily, if we will, problems of anthropology, ethnology, history, politics, economics, or whatever. That is, we may group certain classes of problems, and call the processes and results in connection with them "sciences." In fact, however, each of these problems, or groups of problems, or "sciences," sooner or later involves all the rest. Our hierarchy of sciences then proves to be, like the unity which it tries to interpret, one instead of many. The social sciences are merely methodological divisions of societary science in general.

In different parts of the world authorities of various sorts have created more or less arbitrary classifications of the social

sciences. This occurs chiefly in the universities. It would not require a long argument to show that at best these divisions are likely to become obstructive, in spite of their adoption for scientific and academic convenience. Whether inquiry into the principles of human association be conducted by use of a traditional or an extemporized division of labor, it is all virtually one search into one reality. The divisions exist in our minds, not in the object. The aim of science is to comprehend these apparent diversities as members of the unity of which they are aspects.

There should be a name to cover all study, of whatever sort, which contributes to knowledge of the societary reality, or associated human life, just as the name "biology" designates no specific field of research, but the whole realm of inquiry into the conditions and processes of vegetable and animal life. It is theoretically of very slight importance in itself what name is chosen for that whole organon of knowledge about society. The tendency among sociologists, at least, seems to be toward reassertion of the judgment that the name "sociology" is, on the whole, most suitable and convenient.¹ This tendency is parallel with gravitation in use of the name "biology." The latter is now understood as the comprehensive term for the whole of vital science. Similar use of the term "sociology" would, of course, give it a much broader application than belongs to it as the designation of a university chair, or of a specific division of social science. Every investigation of a phase of societary reality would in this sense be a chapter of sociology, just as vegetable and animal embryology, morphology, physiology, ecology, zoölogy, etc., are each and all chapters of biology. The persons now known as sociologists are no more sociologists in the proposed sense than the ethnologists, historians, economists, political scientists, etc. In parallel fashion there are no biologists today who are

¹ Thus TARDE (*Les transformations du pouvoir*, p. v): "S'il n'est pas vrai que les diverses sciences sociales doivent se confondre désormais en une seule, qui serait la sociologie, il est certain qu'elles doivent toutes s'y plonger l'une après l'autre, pour en sortir soit retrempées et rajeunies, soit glaciales et inanimées. Cela dépend de la qualité du bain."

not more specifically botanists, physiologists, zoölogists, neurologists, etc.¹

In other words, the outcome of thought about men in association amounts to dawning perception that human association is not a mere academic conventionality. It is the objective reality which is the setting for the ultimate human problem of the conduct of life. Knowledge of this reality depends upon organization of the results of a multitude of investigations, many of which have not yet been proposed, and few, if any, of which have been completed. Sociology then, in the large sense, or the organon of knowledge about human associations, is today a vast system of problems concerning the essential elements and correlations of human association. This being the case, all the ways and means thus far devised for investigating human associations have their uses at the proper time and place, but it is evident that the conventional "sciences" are at best rudimentary means for advancing knowledge of association in general. There must be diminishing regard for the lines drawn by "sciences," and increasing attention to the direct import of problems.

For example, it has been said by Herbert Spencer, with prescience far in advance of his science, that "the question of questions for the politician should ever be: 'What type of social structure am I tending to produce?'"² There is no difference of opinion among social theorists as to the abstract desirability of knowledge about the relation of different sorts of acts to social structure. One at least of the large problems of social science is accordingly this: "How do different sorts of acts affect social structure?" Now there is no conventional academic "department" or social science to which such a problem belongs. On the contrary, there is no department or science to which it does not belong. It is a real problem, just as truly as the question of the effect of electrolysis upon steel construction is a real problem. The anthropologist, the psychologist, the ethnologist, the historian, the political economist, the political scientist, and an indefinite number of subsidiary specialists, must necessarily coöperate in the solution of the problem.

¹ *Vide* above, p. 508.

² *Social Statics and Man vs. the State*, Am. ed. of 1892, p. 312.

Again, it is equally important to know what individual type any social arrangement tends to produce. In this case the same proposition holds. The concrete truth about the effect of human conduct is not the preserve of any abstract science. We might schedule in turn all the genera and species of problems that we encounter when we search for the meaning elements in society. They are threads in a tapestry. There can be no such thing as a self-sufficient science of the separate threads. The meaning of the threads depends upon knowledge of the complete design of the whole fabric.

Accordingly, over and above the multitude of more concrete sociological tasks for which a place is conceded without much opposition, there are two distinguishable procedures of a general character for which thorough and comprehensive societary science must provide. The former of these is the division of labor appropriate to that species of sociologist who may be called the methodologist. It is the task of making out and exhibiting in the most general way the forms and interrelations of societary facts, and the consequent interdependencies of processes which undertake scientific formulation of these facts. The familiar De Greef schedule of societary activities may serve as an illustration of the beginning of this procedure. A classification of associations under the forms called for by Simmel's method would represent a much more advanced stage of the procedure. A classification according to the functional utilities of various associations would be a still closer approach to the desirable universal.

The general *genetic* question about all associations is: Through what course of differentiation did these activities come into existence? This question demands the researches of all species of historical science. The general *statical* question about associations is: What forms and qualities of forces, in what proportions, maintain social structures in equilibrium? This question demands organization of the results of the systematizing abstract sciences of society, *i. e.*, sciences of abstracted phases of social activity; *e. g.*, economics, æsthetics, demography, comparative law, comparative politics, comparative philosophy, and comparative religion. These

too are largely, of course, dependent upon historical processes. The general *kinetic*¹ question about societies is: What influences operate, and in accordance with what formulas, to change the equilibrium or type of societary status? The general *teleological* question about associations is: "What ends or systems of ends are indicated by the foregoing exhibits of human resources? What is the apparent goal toward which human coöperation tends, and toward which it may be directed?" This is a question of valuations, to be answered in accordance with logical and psychological principles which have a competence of their own in sociology, but always dependent upon recognition of principles of knowledge involved in the antecedent stages of analysis and synthesis. The methodologist consequently has to detect the relations between problems that arise, primarily in one of these divisions of inquiry, and evidence which other divisions of investigation are alone competent to furnish. The methodologist has to show the fundamental relations of one portion of societary inquiry with other portions, and so far as possible to organize corresponding coöperation among sociologists.

The second procedure is not logically coördinate with nor entirely separable from the first. Its practical value is so great, however, that it deserves distinct and prominent rank. It is determination of the relative significance of different orders of knowledge about society, and also of the proportionate stress to be laid at a given time upon different lines of inquiry. No knowledge is trivial that helps to complete the whole system of knowledge, yet untold energies are wasted in the name of science upon minutiae that are morally certain to remain so unrelated to the developing organon of knowledge about society that they are,

¹ In a later paper additional reasons will appear for following the physicists in use of the terms "dynamics," "statics," and "kinetics." Although the present application of the terms is not precisely parallel with their use in physics, they may be made more serviceable than any alternatives in sight; *i. e.*, "dynamics" including the theory of the social forces in general, while "statics" is the theory of the correlating, and "kinetics" of the evolving activities; or of "order" and "progress." This variation from the usage which Ward has so forcibly recommended (*Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 167 *sq.*, and elsewhere) is merely a difference in terms, but it seems better adapted to the demand for clear discrimination than the usage which has prevailed of late.

and will remain, in effect trifles. A notorious case is much of the work done by certain disciples of Le Play upon the budgets of workingmen's families.¹ At every stage in the advancement of sociology there is need of signals from observers on the high places about the kind of knowledge most in demand at that moment to reinforce the system of knowledge at its weakest points. This second procedure, like the other, is of the philosophical rather than of the scientific order of generality. It may be said to belong to the social philosopher rather than to the methodologist; yet the connections between the two must be so close, even if there is an actual division of labor at this point, that we may, without serious inaccuracy, speak of this second procedure as belonging to general methodology.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the growth of sociological method tends to undermine the walls of division that have been constructed between the social sciences, and indeed between those sciences and psychology and general philosophy. It tends to call for restatements of social problems in terms of their relations to the whole social reality. It tends to repudiation of pedantic academic statements of problems, merely in terms of their interest for the isolated division of research in which they have been considered. It tends to subordinate all the valid means of investigation and report, that have been perfected within the field of societary research, to any uses that may arise anywhere, at any time, in the solution of any species of societary problem.

Thus sociological method has developed into demand for concentration of mediate methodological resources. Sociology indicates that the fragmentary problems of the "sciences" are to be made real by restatement in their objective relations as problems of association. Sociology is a symptom that points to restoration of the "sciences" from the effort to live unto themselves. Sociology points to discharge, by each of the partial sciences, of the function of furnishing appropriate parts

¹ It is only necessary to compare the sort of information referred to with the standards of Le Play himself and his more intelligent followers to expose its futility.

of the knowledge needed to construct a rational basis for the conduct of life.¹

Few scholars are ready to accept the foregoing analysis. This is partly cause and partly effect of rejecting the term "sociology" in the proposed sense; or worse, of denying the existence of the thing for which the name is proposed. It is contended by many that everything here outlined is implied in traditional divisions of knowledge, and is actually provided for by them. In one sense it is, but the same thing is true over and over again of every portion of our knowledge. If we were to refuse license to new forms of reflection upon perceptive material simply because, either in fact or by implication, it had been in consciousness before, we should directly reduce thought to the idiot's reaction upon sensations.

The essential question is: Do all these things need to be done by somebody, and under some designation or other? Is the social fact encountered in all its dimensions if it is less comprehensively conceived? Can a less intensive and extensive examination of the social reality arrive at the body of knowledge of which we are beginning to perceive the need? Can all this be realized and not be one at last? If the correct answer were given to these questions, and if all thought about society were correlated accordingly, sociology and sociologists might be read out of separate existence, so far as a name goes, and the indicated scientific and philosophic processes might go on as before. The names are nonessentials. Complete conception of societary relationships, and corresponding investigation and arrangement of facts about those relationships, are the essentials upon which the sociological methodologist insists.

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[To be continued.]

¹ Allowing for the physical bias noted above (p. 633), Spencer seems to have had nearly this conception in mind when he said: "That which is really needed is a systematic study of natural causation as displayed among beings socially aggregated" (*Social Statics and Man vs. the State*, Am. ed. of 1892, p. 355).

POPULATION AND WAGES.

THE PSYCHO-ECONOMIC CHECK *VS.* THE SO-CALLED INSTINCT OF REPRODUCTION.¹

THE reader who is familiar with the memorable *Essay* of Malthus will not fail to notice the resemblance between some of the ideas here expressed and those contained in that great work. Nor is the resemblance purely accidental; and for whatever opinions I entertain that are really Malthusian I am willing to acknowledge my indebtedness to the bold heretic. I am not, however, his defender, his follower, nor his commentator; and the doctrines presented in this article, whether Malthusian or not, I advance on my own responsibility.

It is an undoubted fact that the human race, like all inferior creatures, has the physiological capacity to produce, and does produce, more individuals than can satisfy the normal wants of existence, *i. e.*, the wants on the satisfaction of which their bodily health and the full development of their lives depend. That an unrestricted exercise of the reproductive power is the source of much suffering is a proposition that can scarcely be controverted; for, children being unproductive members of the community, the means for their support must be subtracted from the generally scanty means that the parents can command; the result being that both parents and children are underfed, poorly clothed and lodged, and fall easy victims to the ravages of disease, both ordinary and epidemic. To this subject I shall revert farther on; but I would remark, in passing, that a numerous family, being a multiplier of wants, compels the workingman to offer his labor for what wages he can obtain, and, by increasing the demand for labor, naturally decreases the price of it.

In former times, to contribute new members to the community was supposed to be one of man's most imperative obligations.

¹ This article was written nearly three years ago. Its statistical data are not later than 1896.

Today, however, owing to various causes, the "propagation of the species" is ceasing to be considered as either a religious or a social duty. With the increasing sense of independence and the equally increasing habits of comfort and of luxury is developing in civilized communities an aversion, not only to overmultiplication, but to multiplication in general. In so far as this aversion is considered as an individual feeling, it may be described as a psychic check to population; and, because it has grown partly out of economic conditions, it may be termed an economic check. The application of this psycho-economic check is becoming the *de facto* solution of the population problem; and, although such a solution is still denounced as a Malthusian heresy, it is one of those solutions that mankind has accomplished "by marching," and that, notwithstanding the accepted dogmas of political economy and Christian ethics, may before long have to be invested with the serious title of "natural law"—as something that simply *is*, whether it ought to be or not.

The correctness of these statements will, I hope, be substantiated in the course of the present discussion.

The increase of population depends, as M. Gustave de Molinari observes, upon the reproductive power of man, upon the exercise of that power, and upon the available means to preserve and develop the fruits of that exercise; and, by implication, the growth of population can be checked only by actual sterility, by a limited exercise of the reproductive power, or by the destruction of the redundant numbers arising from an excessive application of the reproductive power.¹

That the first of these three checks does not exist will be generally admitted; for, although Mr. Spencer's law—that fecundity decreases as organization develops—may be accepted, the diminution of fertility in the human race has not (owing, probably, to a mitigation of the struggle for life) proceeded far enough to establish equilibrium between the demands of the race and the demands of the individual. In other words, it is still *possible* for mankind, no matter how fast the means of

¹ G. DE MOLINARI, *Cours d'économie politique* (2^{me} édition, Paris, 1863), t. I, p. 397.

existence can be increased and improved, to multiply faster than these. There remain, then, the two other checks, in which we at once recognize Malthus' preventive and positive checks.

It is plain, on the one hand, that, if every person married and had as many children as he could have, the immediate effect would be, or tend to be, an enormous surplus of population, whose demands for food could not be met by the best means of production known to our civilization, and must of necessity be kept down by an equally enormous rate of premature death; and, on the other hand, that, by a moderate exercise of the reproductive power, multiplication could take place at such a rate as not to require or to cause the intervention of the positive check—premature death. Between these two theoretically conceivable extremes, both of which are realized in the animal world, there may exist all possible gradations; and, if it is true that we are far from the former, we are, perhaps, equally far from the latter, as is shown by the great mortality still taking place among the lower classes, which are also the more prolific.

Malthus repeatedly insisted on the obvious truth that the poor classes multiply much more rapidly than the rich; and, as might be expected, it is among them that disease and mortality are greater. As early as 1839 Hippolyte Passy called attention to the fact that, from statistical data, it appeared that the number of births per marriage was much larger where, as in the maritime and manufacturing towns, the majority of the people belonged to the working classes. He also found that in Paris the number of births per marriage averaged 1.97 among the rich, and 2.86, or about one more, among the poor; a difference which he ascribed to the greater prudence and foresight prevalent among the wealthy.¹ In 1888 it was estimated by Drysdale that 100 women of Montmartre, the democratic part of the city, had, on an average, 175 children, while in the Champs Elysées, the quarter of the aristocracy, the same number of women had only eighty-six children, or only half as many.² The average birth-rate for 1,000 inhabitants has been estimated to

¹ See ÉDOUARD VAN DER SMISSEN, *La population* (Paris, 1893), pp. 349-53.

² M. G. MULHALL, *Dictionary of Statistics* (London, 1892), s. v. "Births," p. 93.

be: in Paris, 28 among the poor, and 20 among the rich; in London, 35 among the poor, and 25 among the rich; in Naples, between 39 and 50 among the poor, and between 24 and 28 among the rich. Among the richest Parisian classes the average birth-rate per 1,000 is 16.4, and among the poorest classes it goes as high as 38.8.¹ And, if we compare the birth-rates of various countries, we may notice that, broadly speaking, the greatest number of births occur where poverty is greatest, wages lowest, and the death-rate highest.

It is not to be inferred, however, that mortality depends on the birth-rate *alone*, nor that the birth-rate is invariably high where poverty is great. That a great mortality must accompany a high birth-rate in a country where poverty prevails can be regarded as an axiom; and that the birth-rate, and consequently the death-rate, is greater among the poor, is a truth established by actual observation. But it does not follow that the ratio of births to mortality, or of births to wealth, is a constant quantity; nor that, because England has a greater birth-rate than Belgium, it should have also a higher death-rate, or the English laborer be in worse conditions than the Belgian. There is no intrinsic relation of cause and effect between poverty and fecundity; and if a country is in possession of abundant means of existence, its inhabitants can multiply rapidly and yet be relatively prosperous and happy. England, owing to her great manufacturing enterprises, her extensive commerce, and her rich colonies, as well as to her progress in agriculture, is enabled to supply employment and high wages for a great portion of her people; so that, the facilities for supporting a family being proportionably great, and sanitation being considerably advanced, mortality among the working classes, and in the early periods of life, has been very much reduced. The case is simply one of a rapid increase of population following a correspondingly rapid increase of the means of existence. A very important factor influencing the growth of the English population is that, owing to the common language and the similarity of habits, emigration to the United States

¹ F. NITTI, *Population and the Social System* (London and New York, 1894), pp. 154-8.

(without mentioning Canada and Australia) is made exceedingly easy ; as, in fact, an Englishman can scarcely regard his emigration to North America as a change of country. The United Kingdom is one of the nations furnishing the greatest per cent. of emigrants, the others being Norway, Sweden, Germany, and Italy : between the years 1877 and 1886 it was ascertained that, on an average, 32.7 per cent. of the natural increase of the British population left their country, mainly for the United States. The proportions for Italy and Germany were 22 and 20, respectively.¹

Leaving all comparison of nations aside, the general fact remains that overmultiplication takes place especially among the poor ; and, as mortality is ordinarily greatest among children, it must be, and is, greater in the lower than in the higher classes of all communities. The cause of this excess is twofold : in the first place, there being many children among the poor, disease will be more common ; and this is one reason for their greater absolute mortality ; in the second place, the poor having at their command very few means to either prevent or combat disease, their hygienic conditions and their habits being very favorable to sickness of all kinds and to the spread of epidemics, disease is necessarily more fatal among them ; and this accounts for their greater relative mortality. To what extent the unavoidable neglect of children influences mortality among the poor can be approximately judged from estimates made by Professor Conrad. According to him, of every 1,000 persons who die in the working classes 479, or about 50 per cent., die during the first five years of life ; while among the higher classes the proportion is only 241 per 1,000, or about half as many.² The difference in the total

¹ See figures given by G. B. LONGSTAFF, *Studies in Statistics* (London, 1891), chap. v, p. 49 ; also, GEOFFREY DRAGE, "Alien Immigration," in *Journal of the Royal Society of Statistics* (London, 1895), Vol. LVIII, p. 7 ; and MULHALL, *s. v.* "Emigration." It appears that of late years the emigration from England has decreased, probably, among other reasons, on account of the business depression in this country. It is also to be noticed that between 1881 and 1888, when the population increased fastest, the wave of emigration reached a very high mark (170,000 emigrants—from England alone—in 1888 ; the annual average between 1853 and 1889 having been 92,950).

² MULHALL, *op. cit.*, *s. v.* "Deaths," p. 177. Still-born children, or those that are born dead, are here included. Among the rich they number 28 per 1,000 dead ; among the poor, 53.

mortality of the two classes is still more striking: in Paris, between 1817 and 1836, the annual number of deaths in some districts inhabited by wealthy families was 1 to every 65 persons; in those parts where the poor dwelt it was 1 to every 15 persons; that is to say, for every dead rich there were over four dead poor.¹

It is thus evident that, although the reproductive power is not exerted to its full capacity, it is exerted to such extent as to produce more individuals than can, in the present state of society, command the means of full existence. For, obviously, it is to the want of these means that the high mortality among the lower classes is due; and it is also obvious that the want of these means ultimately reduces itself to insufficient wages — insufficient not only for the complete satisfaction of the wants of every wage-earner, but also, and more especially, for the proper rearing and protection of his children. It can, I think, be stated as a general principle that low wages is the check that in civilized countries keeps population within the means of existence; and that, as wages rise, if the habits of the people remain unchanged, mortality decreases, and population increases more rapidly; always, however, being kept within certain limits by one check or another.

It may sound paradoxical and contradictory to speak of a rise in wages, at the same time that it is held that population constantly presses on the means of existence, and that the supply of it tends to be greater than the demand for it (I say *tends*, for in reality the supply is kept nearly within the demand by premature death). But the apparent contradiction is susceptible of a very adequate explanation. Here the law of supply and demand operates in an indirect manner. When a new industry is undertaken, the capitalist does not have his men made to order, as he has his machinery: he pays certain wages, proportionable to the demand for the kind of work he requires. On such wages the well-being of his employés, their facilities for supporting a wife and children, and for keeping them in a more or less comfortable and healthy condition, depend; in short, the

¹ J. GARNIER, *Du principe de population* (2^{me} édition, Paris, 1885), chap. iii, p. 56.

portion of the population devoted to that particular industry will, generally speaking, depend on the wages paid; and as these wages (I refer, of course, to the low trades and professions, where children usually follow the occupations of their parents) are low, the means of existence they represent are also low, and the supply is kept within the demand by premature mortality. There is thus established an equilibrium between the number of men produced and the number of men required. But, with the constant division of labor, and the creation of new industries, the equilibrium is continually broken in favor of the working classes; for it usually happens that a new industry, especially if it requires a higher kind of labor, will be obliged, in order to establish itself, to pay higher wages than are already paid by the existing industries; the result of the competition being a general rise of wages; and the new wages again determine a new rate of mortality, necessarily lower than the preceding, and the equilibrium is established on a higher level. As a matter of fact, events do not take place with all this distinctness and by successive leaps, but through very small changes and in a rhythmic manner. The law, however, although its operations may not always be clearly discernible, I believe to be as here stated.

It seems to me, then, that some economists and demographers have misinterpreted the facts when they have maintained that population has a "virtual and organic tendency" to keep within the means of existence. In this respect the views of M. de Molinari are worthy of close consideration, as many writers have drawn very liberally from his works, and his explanation of the law of population has been accepted as a death-blow to the "terrible" theories of Malthus. He contends¹ that, from an economic point of view, men are like machines, whose market price depends upon the relation between supply and demand, and the production of which requires a certain amount of labor and capital; or, in more common language, that the rearing of a

¹ See his *Cours d'économie politique*, 2^me éd., t. I, 15^e et 16^e leçons. It is not to be supposed, however, that the "virtual tendency" argument is of contemporaneous origin. It was advanced by Weyland against Malthus, and discussed by the latter in the Appendix to his *Essay* (pp. 513-17).

family requires that the wages of labor should be sufficient, not only for the bare support of the parents, but also for the support of their offspring. This excess of wages represents, he says, the portion of the existing capital that is devoted to the production of workers. As the number of workers increases, a large part of the "available capital" is withdrawn from the production of people; *i. e.*, labor is more scantily remunerated, the result being that the workingman has no longer the means to continue his multiplication; for, there being now no excess of wages available for the purposes of reproduction, or wages being insufficient for the support of a family, the family, as a matter of fact, is not formed: multiplication is thus arrested, until the broken equilibrium is reëstablished, without the necessity of such positive checks as those mentioned by Malthus. The reverse phenomenon, of course, takes place when population is scarce: wages are raised, and the laborer is thus enabled to manufacture more articles, that is, more people, and to produce them faster. Both phenomena, Molinari adds, are more striking in such exceptional cases as commercial crises, during which the people, finding themselves without employment, or receiving low wages, immediately cease to multiply, as is attested by the great and abrupt fall in the marriage-rate; and in the opposite case of sudden or rapid industrial improvements, which, calling for a greater number of workers, produce a rise of wages, or an increase in the multiplying power of the population, which also manifests itself in the exceptional elevation of the marriage-rate. Furthermore, he argues that, did population constantly press on the means of existence, it would be an absolute impossibility for it to increase; for in such a case there would be no available capital for the production of men: every man's wages would be what he required for himself alone, and, there being no surplus for the rearing of a family, population would move backward, instead of forward.¹

¹ Molinari's theory, it will be noticed, is nothing but a more elaborate exposition of the action of the prudential check in extreme cases, to which Malthus himself called attention: "When the demand for labor," he says, "is either stationary or increasing very slowly, people, not seeing any employment open by which they can support a family, or the wages of common labor being inadequate to this purpose, will, of course, be deterred from marrying" (*Essay*, Bk. III, chap. xiv, p. 379).

There may be some truth in this theory ; but it neither accounts for all the facts nor can be considered a refutation of Malthusianism. Leaving aside the unwarranted assumption that the prudential check is by itself sufficiently strong to prevent overmultiplication, it must be noticed that, while the theory is a partial explanation of how equilibrium between supply and demand is *established*, or *re-established* when it has been broken by accidental causes, the principal thing to be explained — how that equilibrium is *maintained* — does not seem to have received enough attention. I have already referred to the process by which wages are continually raised through a division of labor, which forms in the industrial world a sort of hierarchy by which the various standards of living and the social stations of men are regulated. He who has been accustomed to do a special kind of work will consider the manner of living he can command with the wages paid in that department of labor as his normal way of living, and the commodities he can procure he will consider indispensable necessities of life. On such wages he will base all his calculations, among which the support of a wife and children is never left out of consideration ; for, no matter what his condition, his standard of living is always of such nature as to include a family among the expenses to be met by his wages, how small soever these may be. But if, by an accidental crisis, his earnings are diminished, he considers that they are no longer enough to supply what, *to him*, are necessities of life ; and if this diminution of wages is only temporary, he will abstain from marrying ; will, that is, *delay* his marriage. This accounts for those falls in the marriage-rate to which M. de Molinari refers, while the corresponding rises are in great part due to the occurrence of delayed marriages. Here we have only a particular case of that general tendency to equilibrium of bodies moving within a certain amplitude of oscillation — what the French call the law of compensation, and is also known as the law of rhythmic motion. But the obvious fact is ignored that equilibrium, or approximate equilibrium, once reestablished, is only maintained through the agency of premature death. M. de Molinari seems to take it for granted that the available capital for the

production of men produces just as many men as are wanted, and no more. Such, indeed, is the case, if by men we understand full-developed individuals — perfect articles for the population market. But these articles are not the only ones produced; they are the results of many trials, the survivors of many unsuccessful competitors reduced to the required number by the leveling hand of death.

The question whether population so presses on the means of existence as to live on what is strictly necessary to support life is involved in much ambiguity, owing to the character of relativity attaching to any solution of the problem — the diversity of standards by which living is, and can be, judged. If we consider the question in the light of modern civilization, and of the knowledge we possess of the conditions of full existence, it must be admitted that very few, if any, laborers in the world receive for their work what is required for the complete sustenance of life — including abundant and wholesome food, good lodging and clothing, as well as sufficient rest to repair the losses caused by muscular exertion. As, however, man will gratify his sexual instincts, and this usually in marriage, he shares with a family the scanty wages that, even if spent exclusively upon himself, would not meet all the demands of his physiological wants. The members of such a family, being necessarily underfed (using the term "food" in a general sense to include all means of existence), fail, in the majority of cases, of attaining to their complete development. That they do not receive all the necessities of life is plainly shown by their great mortality. How, under these circumstances, population can actually increase is not difficult to understand. For if the means which would support one generation to an average age of thirty years are shared with a new generation, the result will be that both the new and the old generation will, on the average, be more short-lived than they could otherwise have been; *i. e.*, other things being equal, the working population increases at the expense of the mean duration of life.

It follows, then, that, if we take into account only the number of individuals that attain to a working age, the supply may

be roughly said to keep within the limits of the demand (although this does not exclude the fact that both the supply and the wages are greatly kept down by competition); but if in the supply we include all the individuals produced, it is equally plain that the supply greatly exceeds the demand.

Although the data of experience do not warrant the conclusion drawn from them by some writers — that voluntary checks already exist in a measure sufficient to prevent all redundancy of population; although society is still greatly under the influence of that general biologic law by virtue of which inferior creatures cannot perpetuate their species except by the production of more individuals than can attain to the full development of life; and although much human misery still exists owing to the unavoidable operation of that law; yet there are some facts warranting the induction that, in future generations, reproduction will take place within more and more restricted limits; that the necessities of life will be more efficiently distributed, the demands of full existence more completely satisfied, and much suffering avoided.

Of the causes at work in bringing about this result too much stress has, perhaps, been laid on Spencer's law; the law, namely, that, in proportion as organization develops and the organic demands of the individual become more numerous and intense, a greater portion of energy is consumed in the satisfaction of individual wants, and a smaller portion remains for the purposes of reproduction, the result being that reproduction takes place at a constantly diminishing rate of speed.¹ Regarded simply as "a broad fact" (these are Mr. Spencer's own words), the law seems to be confirmed, both by *a priori* considerations and by the actual facts of the organic world. But it must be remembered that purely biologic laws act, as a rule, with exceeding slowness, and that we can scarcely expect to be able to verify them by such scanty statistical data as are at our disposal. The decreasing birth-rate of civilized countries has been quoted in

¹ It is curious to notice the similarity between this law and the economic law of M. de Molinari. In both cases we have a certain amount of capital devoted to the production of new individuals.

corroboration of the biologic law; but this is not a reliable criterion, as there has been a corresponding diminution in the marriage-rate, and this is to be ascribed to the psycho-economic check, to which I shall presently revert. The only legitimate data that can be used for the purpose under consideration would be found in the marriage-birth rate, *i. e.*, in the number of births per marriage, or the prolificness of marriages at various periods. But even this is a very imperfect guide, owing to the circumstance that unprolificness is very often voluntary—that parents who are naturally fertile restrict the number of their offspring by one means or another. To this must be added that the prolificness of marriages of course depends upon the age of marriage, which seems to be constantly rising. Notwithstanding all these opposing conditions, the prolificness of marriages does not seem to have sensibly decreased during the first three-quarters of the century, and such changes as have occurred of late years can be easily explained by other than biologic and physiologic causes.

The case of France, where prolificness has almost uninterruptedly declined from over four births per marriage, at the beginning of the century, to about three and under, is indeed very remarkable, as in no other country do we notice so rapid and so regular a decrease in the marriage-birth rate. Add to this that the marriage-rate has remained practically constant during the greater part of the century (about 7.9 yearly marriages to every 1,000 inhabitants), and that France is, with the exception of Russia, the country furnishing the largest proportion of women marrying under the age of twenty. This reduced rate of multiplication, joined to the circumstance that the death-rate has not fallen in proportion, has kept the French population practically stationary for a great many years past, and has been the constant preoccupation of French demographers, economists, and moralists. The majority of them, however, and those who have studied the question most thoroughly, seem to be convinced of the voluntary nature of what is by some considered a terrible national calamity.¹ The people, having acquired a deep sense

¹ See E. LEVASSEUR, *La population française* (Paris, 1889-92), t. III, pp. 161, 162, and E. VAN DER SMISSEN, *La population*, p. 418. Levasseur says that "les familles

of independence, and what some deem an excessive love of comfort, are loath to lose their freedom and sacrifice their ease for the supposed duty of preserving the species and giving citizens to the nation; and they either abstain from having any offspring or restrict it within such limits as will permit them to preserve their station in society and the comforts to which they have grown accustomed. In corroboration of this view of the matter attention has been called to the great prolificness of the French population of Canada, which by far exceeds the prolificness of the English. Another fact that may, perhaps, be quoted as pointing in the same direction is that public opinion, far from lamenting the growing infecundity, as if it were a national misfortune, rather considers it the result and expression of wisdom, while for prolificness it has nothing but reproach and derision. "A family of five or six children," says Dr. J. Rochard,"¹ "was once a normal thing; today it is considered a real calamity. The unfortunate parents are not only blamed, but pitied, which is worse; and, what is the worst of all, they are laughed at." To the same effect is M. de Vogüe's ironic remark: "We have children sometimes; that still happens."²

A more significant feature of this acquiescence of the French nation in the voluntary restrictions on multiplication is to be found in the indifference with which, according to some high authorities, abortion and infanticide are regarded. M. Leyasseur states that the chances of death are twice as great among illegitimate as among legitimate children, and accepts in part the explanation, given by Bertillon, that illegitimates are purposely killed by parents, especially mothers, either by depriving them

en France n'ont pas beaucoup d'enfants parce qu'elles ne veulent pas en avoir beaucoup," and adds that, "were it necessary to produce testimony, there would be no lack of physicians, trusted with the secrets of the higher classes, to attest the fact." Bertillon, himself a physician, is of opinion that "on peut aujourd'hui en France faire des enfants tout aussi bien qu'en 1856, seulement on en fait moins."

¹ *Hygiène sociale*, p. 322.

² "Les enfants, on en a quelquefois; cela arrive encore" (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1^{er} nov. 1889, p. 189). Both this and the preceding quotation are taken from VAN DER SMISSEN, *La population*, p. 392.

of nourishment or by some other means.¹ He also quotes the opinion of several physicians to the effect that abortion is of very frequent occurrence among married women, but is not himself inclined to accept their testimony, adding that the problem is "a mystery" of difficult solution. In this, however, we may feel certain that he is carrying his (may I say *affected*?) incredulity and his "agnosticism" a little too far. The American people may be assumed not to have gone beyond the French in this line of "improvement;" and who would speak of abortion as being "a mystery" in this country? But the circumstance to which I especially wish to call attention is the view the public take of the matter. M. Levasseur himself, referring to the trial of a man whose professional occupation was to bring about miscarriages, remarks, as a "characteristic feature of [French] sentiment" (*trait de mœurs caractéristique*), that neither the accused, who were nineteen in number, nor many of the spectators seemed to attach any seriousness to the act.² And not only the spectators, but the judges themselves, seem to join in the general indifference (or the general approbation), if it be true that, as M. van der Smissen tells us, "the history of crime shows how the number of abortions and infanticides increases through the leniency, and even the connivance, of juries."³

It is, however, difficult to determine with all exactness the extent to which the French unprolificness is entirely voluntary. It is not improbable that the psycho-economic check may react upon the organism and accelerate the physiologic or biologic check. A continued aversion to, and dread of, reproduction, and

¹ LEVASSEUR, *La population française*, t. II, pp. 168-71, 184, where several tables are given. Bertillon's opinion, which M. Levasseur properly qualifies, seems too absolute. Among other causes, shame and poverty must be counted as greatly influencing the mortality of illegitimates, which in all countries by far exceeds that of legitimate children. In Switzerland, out of every 1,000 legitimate children, 77 die under thirty days of age, and 180 under twelve months; for illegitimates the corresponding numbers are 136 and 280. In Saxony, during the six years ending in 1870, the average annual death-rates were 256 and 353 per 1,000 born, for legitimates and illegitimates, respectively; in the city of Dresden the figures were 250 and 705—70 per cent. of the illegitimates died. (MULHALL, s. v. "Deaths," pp. 186, 187.)

² LEVASSEUR, *op. cit.*, t. II, p. 58.

³ *La population*, p. 400.

the habits induced by that aversion and dread, may in the end cause a diminution of fertility. Dr. J. Rochard, quoted above, speaks of the "injustice" of attributing the lack of prolificness of French marriages exclusively to voluntary causes; for it is an actual fact, he says, well known to all physicians, that there are in the cities a great many young couples who eagerly desire to have offspring, but are prevented through absolute barrenness; and he adds that the number of such marriages is constantly on the increase.¹ I would also notice that of the European residents of Algeria the French are the most unprolific, the average number of births per marriage between 1853 and 1876 having been 3.6, while among the German, Italian, and Spanish residents the numbers were 4.8, 5.7, and 6.3, respectively.² Although this may be due to the same voluntary checks prevailing in the mother country, and although the opposite phenomenon is observable in Canada, where the fecundity of French marriages is very great,³ the phenomenon, whatever its cause, is remarkable.

I have dwelt a little at length on the reduced birth-rate in France, as (though we may admit the existence of some real sterility) it is one of the most striking illustrations of the tendency of the psycho-economic check to anticipate the biologic check to overmultiplication. Nor is it unreasonable to believe that, as claimed by M. Leroy-Beaulieu and others, France may be taken in this respect as a type to which advancing civilization tends to reduce all nations. In so far, at least, as the marriage- and birth-rates can be taken as indications of that tendency, the conclusion is fully warranted by statistical data. The following is a table showing the birth- and marriage-rates of various countries for periods differing by intervals of six years; it gives the average yearly marriages and births for every 1,000 inhabitants, and the corresponding ratios of births to marriages:⁴

¹ VAN DER SMISSEN, *La population*, p. 407. In 1856 the number of childless families in France was 15.5 per cent. of the existing families; in 1886 the number had increased to 19.9 per cent. (MULHALL, *s. v.* "Births," p. 94.)

² MULHALL, *s. v.* "Births," p. 98.

³ *Statistical Year-Book of Canada for 1891* (Ottawa, 1892), § 142, p. 102.

⁴ For the construction of this table I have taken the birth- and marriage-rates from the *Bulletin de l'Institut international de Statistique* (Rome, 1894), t. VII, 2^e livraison,

Country	Marriage-rates			Birth-rates			Ratios		
	Years 1865-9	Years 1876-80	Years 1887-91	Years 1865-9	Years 1876-80	Years 1887-91	Years 1865-9	Years 1876-80	Years 1887-91
France	7.89	7.61	7.26	25.9	25.4	23.0	3.3	3.3	3.2
Switzerland	—	7.40	7.11	—	31.3	27.7	—	4.2	3.8
Belgium	7.58	6.90	7.22	31.8	31.9	29.3	4.2	4.6	4.1
England	8.36	7.67	7.51	35.3	35.4	31.3	4.2	4.6	4.2
Germany	—	7.83	7.93	—	39.2	36.5	—	5.0	4.6
Holland	8.10	7.84	7.02	35.1	36.4	33.4	4.3	4.6	4.7
Sweden	6.18	6.58	5.98	30.4	30.2	28.4	4.9	4.6	4.7
Norway	6.45	7.18	6.36	30.3	31.5	30.6	4.7	4.4	4.8
Italy	7.30	7.51	7.69	37.2	36.8	37.6	5.1	4.9	4.9
Austria	8.69	7.74	7.74	37.9	38.8	38.0	4.4	5.0	4.9
Hungary	10.28	9.61	8.64	40.7	44.1	42.8	4.0	4.6	5.0
Ireland	5.29	4.56	4.41	26.4	25.8	22.8	5.0	5.7	5.2

It appears from this table that, in general, marriage has declined very perceptibly in almost all European countries; and, as might naturally be expected, the birth-rate has also fallen with much rapidity. It also appears that in the more civilized countries marriage is less frequent than in the less civilized; a fact due, no doubt, to a superior standard of living, making married life both more difficult and (owing to other and less expensive attractions) less desirable. Such exceptions as Ireland, Sweden, and Norway are easily explained by the great emigration constantly draining those countries of their marriageable population. But the relation appears still more strikingly when we glance at the column of ratios, giving the approximate prolificness of marriages: we see from it that prolificness varies, almost without exception, inversely as the degree of civilization and prosperity;¹ while in some countries, as in Belgium, Switzerland, and England, a notable fall of prolificness is observable; the opposite phenomenon being of rare occurrence, and that in such backward countries as Hungary and Spain. M. Leroy-Beaulieu² has shown from statistical data that, in France and

pp. 5, 17. The ratios I have calculated myself. It is sometimes customary to call these ratios "number of births per marriage." This method, however, of estimating the prolificness of marriages can give only very rough approximations, especially for short periods. (See MALTHUS, *Essay*, Bk. II, chap. xi.)

¹ It must be remembered that England, as I have noticed above, is placed in very exceptional circumstances; yet it stands fourth in the order of increasing (approximate) prolificness.

² *L'Économiste français*, 1892, 2^e vol., pp. 353-6, 385.

Belgium, the departments and provinces where the birth-rate is the greatest are also the poorest and the most ignorant, and those where labor is scantily remunerated. In Germany, he says, instruction is no doubt widely spread, but the people still cling to the religious and political ideas of the dark ages: they have little love of freedom, equality, and independence; and their wages are as low as their aspirations are limited.

Of course, no one acquainted with the great complexity of demographic phenomena would expect the foregoing statements to be more than general conclusions, which must be modified in accordance with the special circumstances and peculiar conditions of different countries.¹

It seems, then, that civilized mankind is solving the population problem on the lines pointed out by Malthus. Although the motives prompting people to this line of conduct, and the means adopted, are not always as "pure" as those advocated by the reverend author of the *Essay*, the bare fact cannot be denied that reproduction is becoming more and more a matter of careful calculation. Nor can it be denied that when these feelings and this conduct become more widely spread among the working classes, their condition will be by far better than it is at present. It is obvious that their unchecked (and effective) exercise of the reproductive power is always accompanied by much misery, arising from the double cause of mortality and competition; for, while some of the children produced are doomed to die of indirect starvation, those who survive become rather the antagonists than the partners, or helpers, of their parents, especially where children are extensively employed. And here I would call attention to a very common opinion, founded on arguments that appear to me erroneous and fallacious. It is claimed that a numerous offspring is burdensome and expensive in their early age only, when the parents, being young and strong, are capable of providing the necessities of life for a large family; that, as the parents advance in age and decline in energy, the children

¹ Thus, in estimating the prolificness of marriages, the age of marriage (usually influenced by the psycho-economic check) is a very important factor to be considered. The marriage-rate, again, is greatly dependent upon the number of persons between the ages of twenty and thirty.

become able to work and add their contingent to the common fund; and that, in proportion as the number of children is greater, the greater are the probabilities that some of them "will count it a privilege to help their parents."¹

Without mentioning the sad but obvious truth that poor parents are seldom supported by their equally poor children, and that where they are so supported their share of the necessities of life is exceedingly meager, and is subtracted from the little larger portion of their children, we must bear in mind, not only the physical and moral evils arising from the employment of very young children, but also the evident circumstance that one reason why parents need help is just because there are too many children in the market, and that the suffering that children are supposed to alleviate has been greatly caused by their very existence. As to the effects of child labor on the children themselves, Malthus, referring to the habit of early marriages and to the employment of children in some manufacturing parishes of Scotland, says that the evil of the too rapid multiplication "is not very perceptible, though humanity must confess with a sigh that one of the reasons why it is not so perceptible is that room is made for fresh families by the unnatural mortality which takes place among the children so employed."² By paying low wages, another writer remarks,³ capitalists oblige women and children to come to the aid of husbands and fathers, and, as the former work for still lower wages (about two-thirds of the wages of adults), the latter are either thrown out of employment or have to work for very scanty salaries. When capitalists have thus succeeded in lowering the wages of adults (this is the testimony of the inspectors of the English factories), they cease to employ children, whose work is naturally of an inferior kind. In some parts of England the proportion of working children to adults has been as 55, and even 60, to 1. At the beginning of the present century about 4,000 children were employed at the

¹ This argument, which is indeed very old, has of late been adduced by REV. R. F. CLARKE, S. J., in an article on "Neo-Malthusianism" (*North American Review*, September, 1896, pp. 350, 351).

² MALTHUS, *Essay*, Bk. II, chap. x, p. 222.

³ F. NITTI, *Population and the Social System*, pp. 136-8.

English factories; of these, only 600 reached the age of thirty; and their sufferings, M. Nitti adds, are evidenced by the occurrence of "something which antiquity never saw, and which is still rare in our day—the suicide of children."

One more subject, intimately connected with the interests of the laboring classes, must here be considered—the question of immigration. Capital, of course, constantly seeks to augment itself at the least possible expense, and, where the number of workers it requires is not cheaply produced, it will import them, thus defeating the good results that the prudent native laborer might have anticipated from his moderation. The argument has been advanced, and statistical data quoted in corroboration thereof, that countries where the birth-rate is low and the population increases slowly or not at all are only making room for the redundant numbers of overpopulated countries, which are ever "ready to pour into the vacant places."¹ In the United Kingdom, where the native population has been growing very rapidly, the number of foreigners has never exceeded 0.006 of the total population, or 6 aliens for every 1,000 inhabitants,² and in Germany the proportion was only 8.8 in 1890; while in France, in the year 1886, there were 30 foreigners per 1,000 population, and in the United States, 143 and 148 in 1880 and 1890, respectively.³ A comparison of the increase of the native and the foreign population in the latter country makes it manifest that, in proportion as immigration has increased, the rate of growth of the native population has been very considerably reduced.⁴

These facts, as said before, seem to show that the population of a country will be fatally kept at a certain level, whether the

¹ G. DRAGE, "Alien Immigration," in *Journal of the Royal Society of Statistics*, 1895, Vol. LVIII, pp. 5, 8.

² The proportions for the years 1841, '51, '61, '71, and '81 were 1.3, 2.3, 3.5, 5.2, and 4.4, respectively. (MULHALL, *s. v.* "Emigration," p. 248.) In 1891 it was, as stated by Mr. Drage, 5.8.

³ G. DRAGE, as above, p. 13.

⁴ See figures given by CARROLL D. WRIGHT in "Lessons from the (1890) Census," in *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XL, p. 369, and Vol. XLI, p. 760. Those given by MULHALL (*s. v.* "Population," p. 451) are very different. I do not know the reason for the *exceedingly great* discrepancy. It is to be regretted that Mr. Mulhall's collection of data is somewhat indiscriminate and undigested.

vacant spaces left by death be filled by aliens or natives; and that voluntary checks, far from bettering the condition of the people, rather aggravate their misfortunes, by exposing them to the fierce competition of foreign labor. And the conclusion, of course, is that, unless those checks be universally adopted, their adoption in individual cases, and even in whole nations, will be of little or no avail.

Here again some of the necessary factors of the alleged phenomenon have been overlooked. Evidently the condition of the workman is not better in Italy than in France, nor in Germany than in the United States; and not only it is not better nor equal, but it is by far inferior. This is already presumptive evidence that there must be some flaw in the argument. The source of error is not too recondite to detect. Migration is always directed from those places where labor is lowly remunerated toward those places where labor is highly or less lowly remunerated: the natives of a country will never emigrate to another country where wages are lower than in theirs, or as low as in theirs. And not only must there be some difference in the wages paid, but the difference must be sufficiently great to compensate the emigrant for abandoning his friends, very often his family, and leaving his native land to go among strangers that lead a life entirely different from his own, speak a different tongue, and look down upon him, sometimes with hatred, sometimes with contempt, seldom with sympathy, and more seldom with love. Thus the very occurrence of immigration shows the superior condition of the country where it occurs; and, although it no doubt diminishes the advantages of the prudential check, its effects neither are nor can be sufficient to make that check entirely nugatory. And this without mentioning the fact that, whatever his wages may be (they are never *excessive*), the laborer, by a proper restriction of his multiplication, will secure for himself and his few children (if he has any) a more comfortable and respectable living, and be able to give them a better education, by which they may not only remain at the level of their parents, but rise to higher stations; while, at the same time, he will spare himself and those depending upon him the miseries

of privation, sickness, and death, and often domestic war, which are the ordinary lot of poor families, especially where they are large (and, indeed, it begins to be almost a *contradictio in adjecto* to speak of *large rich* families).

These considerations I advance on rational grounds. Whether the working classes can be *educated* in this direction; whether they are sufficiently advanced to grasp the complex relations of cause and effect in economic and demographic phenomena; and whether it can be expected that they will forego their almost only pleasure, so long as they have no other; or whether we must wait for civilization to do its slow and unconscious work, are questions beyond the scope of this essay.

Although the fate of future generations concerns us very little, I would, before closing this article, add a few considerations which, if it is true that they are of no practical importance to us, are not lacking in interest from a scientific and speculative point of view.

Malthus founded his great theory on the truism that, by the law of our nature, we cannot live without food. Unfortunately, he gave his conclusions a mathematical form, which, having been misunderstood and misinterpreted, has had the effect of making his views distasteful. He, moreover, did not anticipate the vast changes in the production and distribution of food that have taken place in the course of the present century, when the progress of the arts and sciences, and the revolution caused in the industrial world by steam locomotion, have made possible an unparalleled increase of the means of existence, at a rate which by far exceeds his supposed arithmetical progression. Leaving aside the question of the relation that the increase of food has borne to the increase of population, and of how far the one has been influenced by the other, let us glance at the possibilities of the future. Mr. Longstaff remarks that, while our exceptional circumstances have made us neglect, and even scorn, the warnings of Malthus, the coming generations may have to think of him again; for, although we may grant that our descendants will progress with the same rapidity with which we have progressed, "no such marvel is in store as the opening up of the present

western prairies of North America, or the colonization of such an island as Australia."¹

As it is evident that the population of the earth cannot increase beyond the products of the earth, and as the productive capacity of the earth is not unlimited, the time may (it would be rash to say *will*) come when the Malthusian doctrine will have to be faced in all its ugly nakedness. There being, however, two continually increasing obstacles to multiplication—the biologic and the psycho-economic check—it is difficult to foretell whether the equilibrium between food and population will be established by those checks or by the positive check—premature death. At any rate, a fact worthy of notice is that the food production of Europe (Russia and other few backward countries excepted) seems to have reached almost its limit, and that the population is greatly dependent upon importation both for its maintenance and its growth. From a comparison of the actual production of cereals in the year 1880 with calculations made by M. Tousaint Loua in 1868, Dr. V. I. Broch concludes that, while the population of Europe increased by about thirty millions, the grain produce remained almost stationary.² In the particular case of Great Britain, Lord G. Hamilton, after a detailed discussion of the changes in food and population in the United Kingdom between the years 1871 and 1892, concludes "that foreign imported food produce has increased enormously—about 88 per cent.; that the home production of food has been practically stationary; and that the growth of the population during the same period has been at the rate of 20.7 per cent."³ He adds that the population of Ireland, which is self-supporting, is diminishing very rapidly, so that the increase of population takes place in that part of the kingdom depending upon foreign supply. In conclusion he draws an appalling picture of what might happen were England obliged to live on its own resources.

¹ G. B. LONGSTAFF, *Studies in Statistics*, chap. iv, pp. 22, 23.

² "The Agricultural Crisis in Europe," in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (London, 1885), Vol. XLVIII, p. 312.

³ "Ocean Highways," in the above *Journal*, 1894, Vol. LVII, pp. 112, 113, where several tables are given.

How much longer the exporting countries, especially the United States, will be able to supply the European markets, it is, of course, impossible to determine; nor can it be doubted that, in proportion as importation becomes less, greater efforts will be made everywhere, and agriculture will be much improved. As to the adaptation of the population to the means of existence, it seems probable, from the tendencies already manifest in our civilized communities, that the psycho-economic check will grow stronger and act as the main equilibrating force.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY OF WOMEN CRIMINALS.

II.

It has been stated that the sociological factors are important. Though these are not entirely separable, and are so often closely interrelated with psychical conditions, what are some of the facts ascertained by the sociological investigation? The sources and methods included these: The former consisted in visits to the habitats of the criminals, an acquaintance with such facts as institution records show, possession of such observations as lay within the matrons' grasp, and an interrogation of the criminal and her associates. The method was: In the visits to the habitats sanitary and social surroundings, localities, habits, children, associates, condition of the homes, etc., were noted. From the records were made tables of the nationality, age, occupation, religion, conjugal condition, etc. Matrons usually furnish such facts as those relating to recidivism, condition of prisoners upon arrival, habits, conduct, industriousness, etc. The interrogation of the criminals and their associates is most frequently conducted in the laboratory, during the conversations while the tests are being taken, or are secured during seemingly chance conversations with the women in the prisons. It will be seen that these results are less accurate, less specific, and depend more upon what the criminal thinks and says. Thus they are lacking in the precision and definiteness of the psychological tests. It is precisely here that the value of the psychological tests may be seen, that is, in revealing the facts, or reasons for them. The sociological data are gathered from a much larger number of criminals, for they include those in the records, in the laboratory, and such as I could reach personally who were resident in the institution.

In presenting these results it becomes necessary here also to separate felonies from misdemeanors, the latter representing the workhouse type. Though these latter commit crimes

less grave, they are more degenerate, and present the most hopeless aspect of the criminal problem. As in the psychological results, so in the sociological, the workhouse inmates show the greatest variation from normal or successful functioning and have a less advantageous environment.

The results obtainable from these sources and by these methods may be grouped under the following topics: nature of crime, age, nationality, religion, conjugal condition, number of children, occupation, education, habits, recidivism, degradation, moral sense, economic influence, parents and their occupation, industriousness, associates, disease, biological influences.

The question often arises: What crimes do women most frequently commit? During the summer months of 1899 there were incarcerated at Blackwell's Island (a typical workhouse) 1,451 prisoners, for the following offenses: disorderly conduct, 948; intoxication, 369; vagrancy, 122; petit larceny, 12; disorderly house, 3. The crimes of the workhouse inmates are thus against public morals, public peace, and public policy. Out of 88 prisoners confined in the penitentiaries, 19 were for robbery, 28 for larceny, 17 for murder, 6 for manslaughter, 11 for burglary, 1 for receiving stolen goods, 2 for forgery, 2 for assault, 2 for keeping girls, and 1 for conspiracy. Here the crimes are largely against property and public safety. The reasons for this are obvious: Women's crimes are more closely associated with immorality, because biologically she inclines to this rather than to crimes of force. In the penitentiaries, where robberies and larcenies are more numerous, the woman is often the accomplice in some disorderly house, or is a shoplifter or swindler in a gang with men. Where public safety is threatened, as in homicides, emotional conditions in woman, as contrasted with motives of gain in man, are often at work.

With reference to the age of women criminals almost nothing can be said. This depends entirely upon their statements, which are untrustworthy. While the workhouse contains young women, it is usually those whose habits of inebriety have rendered them incapable of securing a livelihood, even through an immoral calling. As a rule the women are older, and this does not include

the paupers, who are usually old women, many of whom become intoxicated so they can be sentenced to the workhouse as a place of shelter. The penitentiary inmates are younger. This must necessarily be true, as their crimes require better vitality, more accurate thought, and quicker execution. Where I had an opportunity to learn the true age, I found the ages given me were always younger.

Records of institutions place stress upon nationality and upon religion. These seem of negative value as compared with some other facts. These records give the nationality, but whether foreign-born or where the parents were born is not stated. I found nationality to vary much with the locality; and often, when tracing the line of descent, a half-dozen distinct nationalities were found. Few claimed "American," though the majority were American-born. The census shows that a greater percentage of women than of men are foreign-born, but my results included only one city where the influence of migration was great. Results in nationality, in order to be representative, must be extensive, and in ratio to the population of the nationality represented by the criminal class. Thus 24 Irish criminals out of a population of 100 Irish in a community would be a startling fact, but out of 5,000, scarcely noteworthy. I consider the results of this observation of negative value in social study, unless the nativity of the parents, and the time spent by parents and criminals in America, are known. The social forces and their effect upon them are otherwise unascertainable.

The first objection to deductions from statistics upon religion is that it is closely related to nationality. Thus in an Irish or German community from which the criminal class comes the Catholic would predominate, and the rash deduction would be that more Catholics than Protestants were criminal. It is true, some religions represent a broader, more cultural plane, and where nationality can be eliminated statistics would prove valuable. What I did find of interest as bearing upon the cultural and educational side of the problem was the denominations represented in the Protestant religion. Thus out of 29 who claimed the Protestant religion 11 were Methodists, 7 Baptists, 5 Presbyterians,

5 Episcopalians.¹ This demonstrates from another point of view that emotional religions appeal more to this class than do the severer types, and are more suited to the desires and needs of the class from which the criminal comes. Religion has an important bearing upon the moral sense, which is considered later.

The conjugal condition presents an interesting phase, though not consistent in the various parts of the country. From 86 women in the penitentiaries visited, 50 were married. Out of 49 workhouse inmates measured, 35 were married and 11 admitted divorce. The percentage of separations was also large. Many said they were not living with their husbands, though no legal decree had been sought. Of the 1,451 women at Blackwell's Island workhouse, 1,012 were married. The reports of the Sherborn reform prison and of the Cincinnati workhouse show a contrary result. Numerically whether more married or unmarried women are criminals is not so much the important question as is the fact that so large a number of married women are found in prisons. Often these women are mothers. Where it was possible I ascertained the number of children. Among 44 married women recorded there were 48 children, and the 35 married women measured had 28 children. These figures vary with locality, but they show that forces stronger than a home and motherhood are in operation in sending women to penal institutions. Among these forces are: The marriage of many of these women does not withdraw them fully from the competitive world, for they must frequently contribute to the support of the family. If their lives have been previously immoral, and often when not so, they frequently marry men whose associates and habits continue, or induce their depravity. Association of ideas, the quality test, the number of separations and remarriages, and the conversations with some of the women reveal a high degree of domestic infelicity. These, together with the condition in which many of the women come to the workhouses, show a harshness of environment and a brutality of associates. This

¹ From the annual report of the Joliet penitentiary, where a record of the religions is kept, the Methodist and Baptist largely predominate.

latter also applies to the unmarried women. A woman who marries lessens her opportunity for successful functioning in the industrial world: if she is secluded in the home, she has the keen edge of the competitive spirit, so essential to success, taken off; if there are children, she is handicapped physically and socially; there is a growing tendency to discriminate against married women, unless the appeal is made through sympathy rather than through capacity for labor.

Occupation, for many reasons, I consider important. Of the 1,451 at Blackwell's Island, 1,298 were domestics, 125 housekeepers (usually a doubtful occupation and closely related to courtesanship). The remainder were distributed among laundresses, laborers, seamstresses, dressmakers, cooks, peddlers, not any of these exceeding eight each and frequently including but one. The reports of other institutions show the same predominance of the domestic class. Besides showing that the domestic class furnishes the most criminals, it also shows a low degree of industriousness, for many become domestics only when all other shiftless means of securing a livelihood fail. An analysis of the domestic class, as found in cities, may suggest reasons:

This occupation offers the only solution of an economic problem to a large number of foreign women, to those who have no trade, and to those for whom no other field is open. It also includes many who, for mental or physical reasons, cannot earn a livelihood through any other means. This occupation includes those who enter it through choice, necessity, or by reason of limitations in their functioning capacity. The standard of the domestic class is necessarily fixed by the people within the group. The standard may not be that of *every* domestic within it, but there are common factors in each occupation. In the first place, there is a common grade of education. Some may be able to read and write, some may be illiterate, but there are common opinions, common points of view, and life is interpreted from a similar standpoint. There is a common moral standard. Some may be better, some worse, but the common standard is conditioned by the community of interests, degree of education, and kind of associates. It cannot be seriously questioned but

that in the city occupation to a large extent determines one's associates. The class, as such, has similar temptations, and this tends to produce a similar moral status. They have similar opportunities. Some are greater, some are less; some are taken advantage of, some are not; but those remaining within the domestic class respond to these in a similar way. They enjoy similar amusements; and here again, as through all social intercourse, the tastes and desires are influenced. For the following reasons, then, there is no occupation among women which includes so many criminals: (1) the large number of women in this occupation; (2) many of the lowest classes go into this occupation when other means fail; (3) inadequate salaries for the gratification of tastes in dress and amusements, which are developed through association (the domestic class is extremely social), and through leisure; (4) the easy route which this occupation furnishes to prostitution, through its temptations, almost all cases of prostitution resulting from seduction being from this class; (5) the employment bureaus for servants, which are often but procuring places for prostitution; (6) the limited education and erroneous perception of the relation of things, especially true of the foreign class. Not a few immoral women ply their vocation under the guise of domestics. These are a few of the explanations which suggest themselves. Many of these reasons apply lower down in the scale, as to laundresses, scrub-women, etc. It is a notable fact that these women all claimed some occupation, showing a dependence upon their own efforts for subsistence. Almost all the occupations involve physical work, require a minimum mental expenditure, are accompanied by small salaries, and their tenure is dependent upon the whim or will of a single employer.

A number of the institutions have data regarding education, but I found these records most confusing. The great difficulty is that there is no standard educational test. The education was frequently designated by such phrases as "common school," "limited," "convent." There were no explanatory notes. It is unfortunate that no better educational test has been devised than the crude one of reading and writing. This test throws but little

light upon our problem: How can the individual best function in society, and has she the requisites for so doing? An individual who can read and write can often adapt herself less readily to her environment, and if this is the test for education, it may well be said that the uneducated alone are not criminals. Experience and more accurate perception may not involve the ability to read and write, but may enable the individual to better adjust herself. Using this very inaccurate standard, out of 86 penitentiary inmates 35 claimed "common school," 12 "read and write," 11 "illiterate," 5 "convent," 22 "limited," 1 "high school." I found, when measuring the women, that "common school" might mean "six months in a country school," "two years in the public school," or "left at fifteen." I found that "limited" might mean barely able to form letters and read words, or that it might exceed the fluency of those registered "convent." "Illiterate" and "read and write" were more definite, but in the latter there were various degrees of proficiency, and no facts are ascertainable about the knowledge gained through experience and training. It is difficult to secure a definite statement, as the women generally desire to convey an impression of their superior intelligence. One subject insisted she had had mathematics, not arithmetic. After much parrying as to what specific part of mathematics she had, she finally named decimals, to which I responded: "Then, of course, you have had algebra?" to which she readily assented. This serves to demonstrate that education must be tested, and not the criminal's verbal assurance accepted. In my tests I learned the grade and reader in use when the subject left school. From such tests as those for memory, association of ideas, reading, respiration, etc., I was able to judge if their statements were true. These tests also showed the kind of spelling, proficiency in handwriting, capacity for attention and for memorizing, and rapidity of mental operation and association, which are criteria of education.

The penitentiary class is better educated than the workhouse class, but few of them rank out of the eighth grade or fifth reader, and most of them below this. Of the workhouse class this general statement is true: Though my tests required only the rudiments of education—reading and writing, and

associating of ideas, and a fair degree of concentration—out of 400 women in the workhouse, deducting say 50 who would not come, I could secure only 20 who could give me satisfactory results. These 400 included nearly one hundred paupers, and I learned that but few of these could write. Again, out of these 400 women, with the privilege of writing home letters but once a month, only about one-sixth wrote letters, and one person often wrote for others. Of course, here such elements as short sentences, weak family ties (no one to whom they care to write), enter. I read 132 of their letters, and found the spelling, composition, structure, and thought such as would entitle but very few to the title "educated." It is impossible to treat fairly or accurately the education or non-education of the criminal class with tests depending upon their verbal assertion.

Regarding the habits of criminal women, the records are again inaccurate. Here again the workhouse class is more degenerate and more frank about their habits. Out of 30 measured, I found 27 used alcohol, 7 chewed tobacco, 8 smoked, 13 swore, 15 used snuff, and fully seven-eighths were immoral. Probably the number using snuff is too small, as it is used as a substitute for alcohol and tobacco during incarceration. I found by inquiry among the matrons that these results were true for a much larger number. The results regarding immorality are secured from resident physicians. Disease through immorality, as reported by physicians, is not an absolutely trustworthy report where so large a percentage of the women are married. This element is eliminated in the reform-school statistics. Out of 108 girls ranging between the ages of ten and sixteen, 84 were immoral and 55 diseased. This percentage would increase with advanced age and increasing temptations and opportunities. Through such tests as hearing and smell my attention was called to the existence of catarrhal and scrofulous diseases. In general the workhouse women showed an impoverished condition of the system, and the hospitals were always filled with inmates awaiting surgical treatment.

Recidivism is the rule among the workhouse classes. This is true because their environmental conditions are more constantly

unwholesome, and they have more degenerate habits which enthrall them. There is more abandon among this class. Supplementing the records I found in my tests that nearly two-thirds were recidivists. Some of them answered my queries regarding previous arrests thus: "Oh my, yes," "Of course," "Lots of times," "Sure." They often seemed surprised that I should find it necessary to ask. The penitentiary class are less frequently recidivists, are less frank, and often seemed insulted at the query and wept a negative reply.

It is a prevailing opinion that when women are criminal they are more degraded and more abandoned than men. From the observation of the two sexes, this seems due rather to the difference in the standards which we set for the two sexes. We say woman is worse, but we judge her so by comparison with the ideal of woman, not with a common ideal. For instance, I have included swearing and use of tobacco as bad habits among women; among men we should not consider them in the same light. These make a deeper impression by reason of the requirements of *our* ideal, not in the light of plain fact. Licentiousness in conversation and manner, uncleanness in habits and person, do exist to a high degree; but the men and women come from the same classes, have the same standards, and know the same life. Thus from this point of view the woman is not more degraded than the man. Judged from the effect upon our ideals and upon society's life of, for instance, an intoxicated man or woman, the degradation seems more extreme.

Closely related to this is needed a word upon the moral sense of these women. Among the penitentiary class it is more intelligent, more wholesome. Granting that many are immoral because of perversity of instincts, because of desires, there is a large number for which deficient moral training is responsible. It is impossible to secure adequate moral training when the mental has not preceded it and opened the way for its comprehension. Here again the reform-school facts are most instructive. Many of the girls ranging between the ages of ten and sixteen have to be taught what morality means. A child born in or out of wedlock has for them the same meaning. It is not the theoretical

teaching of morality which is needed, but a morality whose practical bearing upon every phase of life can be seen—one which shall quicken the moral sense in self-interest.

From the number of children in the criminal's family, combined with such knowledge of the financial condition as was obtainable, I attempted to gather some light upon the opportunities as a child. Out of 21 women, 18 had brothers and sisters, the number varying from 15 downward, the average being 5.5 for each. The occupation of the parents and wage rate furnish the financial data. I found several instances in which the criminal had deserted home when young. Among the common reasons were: "too much church," "too strict," self-willed," "desire for excitement," "to earn money," "ran away to marry." I also obtained data as to whether parents were living or dead, but as the age of the criminal when the parents died was so untrustworthy, I consider this valueless. It is, however, suggestive for other workers.

The number of children, together with the occupation of the parents, which was usually one of the trades or unskilled labor, and the early age at which many of them sought work, show that the opportunities for self-advancement must have been less than where good educations obtain.

The industriousness of these women furnishes another interesting condition. Out of 115 recorded, 60 admitted they were idle when the crime was committed. Matrons state that almost two-thirds of the women are idle when arrested, and but few have trades. The cause is not always discernible. It may be due to inertia, to inability to secure work, to lack of interest in the only labor for which they are fitted, to a love of indolence and social life. Whatever the cause, it is a predisposing factor, giving the opportunity for crime which a busy life would not permit. Within the prisons the women show little disposition to work, but this must be true where labor possesses nothing to which the interest of the individual can respond—not even remuneration. Love of variety and excitement becomes a chronic desire, especially with the workhouse type, and this, with their habits, renders them incapable of sustained labor.

That the economic conditions of woman render her liable to immorality has been so fully discussed elsewhere that I give only one illustration, the result of an investigation in New York. Clipping from the newspaper some thirty advertisements for clerks, stenographers, bookkeepers, etc., I had an assistant answer them. Although she visited only a little more than half the places, almost every one of them was a snare for immoral purposes, and the proposals were so bluntly made that she declined answering more. To a girl dependent upon herself in a large city an opportunity for immorality is thus offered in an attractive way. This is only one of a large number of temptations to immorality which come to women with economic independence.

A visit to the homes of the criminals verifies the above. The penitentiary class does not so uniformly come from the same district, so it is more difficult to trace out their homes. The workhouse class comes so uniformly from these "crime-breeding" districts that if a first offender from a new quarter comes in, they gather about her and say derisively: "Why, who be *you*?" "*You* must be innocent;" "*We* don't know the likes of you." The districts have bad sanitary conditions, the houses are poor, ill-kept, and crowded, the quota of children being large. These districts are well supplied with places for social intercourse and for securing intoxicants. It is undoubtedly true that there are many criminals among the better classes and in more favorable districts, but they do not often find their way into the workhouses.

While presenting such factors as the preceding as distinguishing the workhouse and penitentiary type of criminal, no attempt is made to negative the biological side of crime, namely, the selfishness, greed for gain, luxurious tastes and lustful desires, need for excitement, elements of variety, jealousy, etc., which exist in the whole human race, and which predispose any or every individual to a species of crime.

At least the first step has been taken in the direction of the fulfillment of the three purposes of this investigation. Some differences between the senses and faculties of the criminal and the student have been noted. There remains much work here

and in investigating the classes which are not criminal, but from which the criminals come. At various points throughout there have been suggestions of the way in which the psychological tests have suggested social factors or have supplemented the data secured through them. The ascertainment of a condition, such as defective hearing or taste, has stimulated inquiry which has revealed methods of living, habits, disease, etc., and almost all the tests have suggested the need of a more complete investigation. Association of ideas, the respiration curves, reading and hearing tests, and those for memory have thrown valuable light upon mental faculties and their operation; respiration tests sensibility to pain, precision and reaction time tests have been of great suggestive value in the emotional nature, which the criminal has so well developed. Thus psychology and sociology are indispensable in scientific research in criminality.

Psychology makes possible a quantitative sociology. This is a step in advance of statistical sociology. The psychological method applied to sociological data renders them more accurate, more definite. Two things are needed in a study of criminal sociology: such a presentation of facts as shall make possible a more rational, helpful attitude upon the part of the non-criminal class; legislation which shall be compelled to recognize these facts, and not revert to the precedents of the Middle Ages for its initiative. The needs are such as to press into the service of social investigation any science which renders it more trustworthy and liberal, and which relieves it from the charge of mere theorizing.

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A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER X.

THE FAMILY.

WE have seen that coercion, when it has been transferred from private to public control, takes on the attributes of order and right, thus becoming sovereignty. The institution which is thus differentiated out from the primitive blending of all institutions is the state. It becomes the supreme institution, because it is looked upon as the proper custodian of the decisive social relation, coercion. In thus emerging from the social mass the state has set off other institutions, based each upon its own peculiar persuasive sanction. The family, originally a coercive institution, becomes the custodian of sexual and filial affection. The church becomes the voluntary association of believers in common worship, based on the sanctions of belief in moral perfection and consciousness of guilt. Industrial property is transformed from slavery and serfdom into free contract and mutual interest. These are the three original institutions from which the state has been differentiated. There are also certain derived and secondary institutions which have sprung up with the free conditions that followed the differentiation of the four original institutions. Those to be especially noted in these papers are political parties and business corporations.

We have found the starting-point of the human family in the patronymic and resulting patriarchate order of society. We are now to analyze more closely the threefold character of the institution—its persuasive beliefs and desires, its material basis, and its coercive organization.

In modern society the family has been differentiated as the custodian of sexual and parental affection. Its persuasive principle is family love. But in its primitive origin we cannot expect to find affection so clearly isolated. It was inextricably blended with ancestor-worship, with the desire to secure a son who should perform the sacrifices on which the happiness of his deceased

father depended, and with the desire for power and success which could be obtained mainly through a large following of wives, sons, daughters, and dependents. The principle which held together this aggregate was in theory the worship of a common ancestor, to whom the aggregate belonged as his private property. The patriarch himself was only the priestly mediator between that ancestral proprietor and the living generation. In practice he was, therefore, the living proprietor, and he exercised direct coercive power over the group by means of physical penalties. It was on this simple basis that the organization of the family was effected. Implicit obedience to one man, the priest-father, provided the unity and centralization needed for survival. The ownership of the material basis of the family—its lands, houses, subsistence, earnings—by this same ancestor, and the unquestioned administration of the same by the living priest-father, placed in his hands also the power of indirect coercion through material penalties, as well as direct coercion through physical penalties. This is the social organization so completely explained by Fustel de Coulanges.

Here was a complete blending of all social institutions and all personal beliefs and desires in a simple centralized group. The theory of its union, however, was blood-relationship traced through male ancestry. Seeing, now, that the struggle for existence requires the increasing size of the group and the monopoly of its organizing principle throughout the social body, the primitive man is met by the fact that blood-relationship is physically limited. He resorts, therefore, to the fiction of adoption and the ceremony of initiation, by which the ancestral blood and worship are transmitted to the new accessions. This applies even to slaves. The organizing principle of blood-relationship, thus fictitiously enlarged, is now capable of indefinite expansion, but a new limit again is reached, namely, the scarcity of land. The Claudian gens which moved to Rome, and certain of the gentes of the Albanians, mentioned by Strabo,¹ numbered as high as ten thousand souls, but it is doubtful whether this number was ever exceeded. If blood is

¹ LIPPERT, *Allgm. Gesch. des Priesterthums*, Vol. II, p. 572.

the basis of union, such basis can maintain monopoly only while the different gentes are separated by wide areas of neutral territory. As soon as increasing population compels confederation or conquest, the blood principle loses its monopoly, and certain of its coercive features are transferred to a larger group composed of the newly combined gentes. The territorial basis is substituted for the gentile basis. Individuals set up new contractual relationships with individuals in other gentes; the family property is broken into by sale and bequest; inheritance becomes a matter of actual blood descent and not of corporate gentile descent; plebeian families enter the social organization without the ancestral worship; clients and serfs become conscious of a class interest cutting across gentile lines,¹ and thus gradually and unknowingly the family lops off its collateral lines, its fictitious members, its serfs and dependents, and is reduced to its modern proportions of husband, wife, and children. The principle of private property, however, still remains as the organizing basis both of the family and of the feudal monarchy which has been differentiated out from the associated families. The monarchy is but one form of private property, and the monarch's property in his wife and children, similar to his property in other objects, is also similar to the property of his subjects. The latter are supreme rulers in the family circle, and the content of the monarch's power is constituted more from the small increments which he has absorbed from the increasingly large number of families under his control, than from the amount of power which he has taken from each. In other words, his power is confined to inter-familial, intertribal, and international relations rather than to the internal control of the domestic institution. Marriage is therefore a private contract. For the weaker member it is a necessity. Married women alone are protected as chattels. Unmarried women are protected by their fathers as chattels. Adultery is a violation of property rights, not a matrimonial offense. Severe punishment is meted to the wife by the husband, and he alone can give a bill of divorce.

¹ FUSTEL DE COULANGES, *La cité antique*, liv. iv.

Up to this point the development of the family and the state had occurred in the realm of empirical self consciousness. There was no theorizing concerning right and wrong, no investigation, no idealism. The institution was judged solely by results, and was handed down by blind custom and imitation. We are now to notice the way in which the newly formed state, having asserted its superiority, begins to turn upon the family from which it empirically sprang, and to consciously regulate its internal structure by the further extraction of coercive features.

The earliest interference with private domestic control in Anglo-Saxon history was undertaken by the church. The church, not yet separated from the state, employed the coercive sanctions of the latter to enforce its decrees. Under the ecclesiastical laws of Theodorus and Edmund marriage was made a sacrament, polygamy was prohibited, the wife's consent was made a condition to marriage, as against sale by her parents; the bridegroom was required to give pledges for her protection, and she was granted the right of divorce.¹ By these laws the prospective state began to use its coercive sanctions to regulate the family in the interests of right as conceived by the church. The succeeding triumph of feudalism subordinated certain of these marriage rights of the higher tenants in the interests of the feudal proprietors, but at the same time it elevated the slaves through serfdom and settled habitation to the rights of marriage. Not until the practical separation of church and state through the annulment of the sacramental character of marriage following the Reformation, and the innovation of parliamentary divorce in 1687, did the way open for the unequivocal interference of sovereignty in the family on the ground of its social importance. Finally, under the influence of nineteenth-century theories of the "rights of man," the legislature extracted from the head of the family so many incidents of private property in his wife that the structure of the state itself received a new differentiation in order to manage specifically this new access of sovereignty. Ecclesiastical courts and parliament were dispossessed of their judicial control over marriage and divorce, and this was

¹ See A. R. CLEVELAND, *Woman under English Law* (London, 1896).

transferred to the civil courts. Under these sovereign regulations the position of the wife has been advanced from "honorable servitude" to companionship and partnership. She is granted divorce, not only on account of adultery, but on account of cruelty and desertion; she has a right to independent industry, to the ownership of property, to political suffrage, to the possession of her children. The family, thus, through the extraction of the coercive sanctions, ceases to be a coercive institution and becomes a persuasive institution based on its own peculiar sanction of love. Society has here branched out into two institutions, the one based on coercion and the other on sexual love. The coercive institution has taken to itself nearly all that pertains to the structure and organization of the family. Organization, as we have seen, was based on the control of the coercive penalties, the power to punish, reward, promote, discharge, deprive; and in extracting these penalties from the family the state becomes itself, as it were, the structure, with its legislative, judicial, and administrative organizations adapted for sustaining order and right, and in this structure the family proper lives. The vital principle of the family thus environed is not coercion, but affection. Affection is a purely psychic relation, whereas coercion depends on the control of external means. The family, thus deprived of these external props, is itself exalted to a clarified psychic principle and calls out, through mutual persuasion, in the individual characters of its partners those personal qualities and charms which strengthen, deepen, and ennoble the passion itself.

In so far as there still remains an element of external dependence of the weaker and less privileged sex upon the stronger, there still remains an element of the original coercion which characterized the family. Polygamy, the direct control of women through coercive corporal sanctions, has been eliminated, but prostitution, the indirect control of women through the privative sanctions springing from control over their means of subsistence, has taken its place, and is, equally with the family, its legal successor. Such direct inquiries as have been made seem to show that in but a small proportion of prostitutes is

mere lust the basis of their life; it is rather their situation of dependence, whether from physical or from social and legal subjection, that has led to their acceptance of the wage-system of the family. It may be that this dependence can never be eliminated, as was polygamy. It shows itself, not only in prostitution, but also in many families, where marriage is contracted and maintained for the sake of support as well as affection.

The *patria potestas* covered also the children as the property of the father, including the power of sale and exposure. This was later restricted in Anglo-Saxon times by the marriage laws requiring the consent of the daughter, and by the general laws against homicide. The children were protected by the church and religion. In recent times, however, the social importance of training for citizenship and the higher ideas of human rights have led to compulsory education, factory legislation, and child-saving laws, which recognize rights of children against their parents, even to the extent of coercively finding them a new home. In the adoption of these laws and the administrative provisions for their enforcement the state has become a larger institution through the abstraction of important incidents from private property in the family, and the governmental structure has been correspondingly increased with newly devised machinery of coercion formerly controlled by the head of the family. The public-school system is held in law to be a branch of the family, the teachers and authorities standing *in loco parentis*; yet this system is at the same time a branch of the state. The state has here interfered in the private ordering of the household by taking the child from its parents for one-third of its waking hours, and has introduced order and system into the training of children, together with the assertion of rights on their part. The family becomes thereby less a coercive institution, where the children serve their parents, and more a spiritual and psychic association of parent and child based on persuasion. A more searching interference on the part of the state, together with a new set of governmental organizations for its enforcement, is found in the boards of children's guardians, the societies for the prevention of cruelty to children, orphans' asylums, state

public schools, with their investigating and placing-out agents, empowered under supervision of the courts to take children away from parents and to place them in new homes. A large part of the unlimited coercion of the *patria potestas* is here extracted from the family and annexed to the peculiar coercive institution where it is guided by notions of children's rights, and all families are thereby toned up to a stronger emphasis on persuasion as the justification of their continuance.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CHURCH.

The church may be looked upon as both an original and a derived institution. As original, it belonged to the segmentary form of society, the blood-relationship of communicants, the empiric stage of self-consciousness, and the ethnic stage of religious belief. As derived, it appeared in the organic or territorial form of society, the contractual relationship of individuals, the reflective stage of self-consciousness, and the ethical stage of religious belief. We are to inquire now into the threefold character of this institution—its persuasive motive, its material basis, and its coercive organization. The psychic basis of the church we name religion. The church itself is the organization which grows up about religious belief in the struggle for existence. The material basis is the social products, which, being reduced to private property, constitute the material penalties which support organization.

What is exactly the peculiar psychic principle of religion? Sociology must answer this question somewhat more narrowly than philosophy and psychology. Professor Baldwin,¹ summarizing current theories, reduces the factors of religion to two: the feeling of *dependence* and the feeling of *mystery*. Sociology, having the definite problem of social relations and social organization in mind, must narrow this description so as to imply its social bearings. It is but a particular deduction from Baldwin's generalized terms if we describe the religious motives as the belief in moral perfection and the consciousness of guilt. From the

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 327.

belief in a morally perfect invisible ruler originated the belief in order and authority. These found expression in the customs and ceremonial laws of primitive man, and in the political authority which always claimed divine sanction. From this sprang the first conception of the moral right of property, as distinguished from the legal right. The latter did not appear until the reflective stage of society and the emergence of the state. The former was its precursor, and could not have gained respect in the minds of men without religious sanction and support. Felix holds, indeed, that the very concept of private property was religious in origin.¹ At the death of a proprietor his belongings were sacrificed that they might accompany him beyond. To the gens and its patriarch, as the administrator of the ancestor, the property which was not sacrificed was held in usufruct, and not of private right. To the deities primitive man yielded in sacrifices a large part of his belongings, without material or physical coercion. The discovery and punishment of thieves belonged to the deities as the protectors of property. In this way the religious sanctions, which are purely persuasive in character, were diffused throughout the entire life of man and served to vivify each new institution as it began to emerge in the form of private property. In ethical religions, especially Christianity, for ceremonial observances is substituted the law of love in the heart toward God and man. The belief in perfection is turned from outward imitation to inward reflection, and remains as before a psychic principle evoked, not by coercion, but by persuasion.

The consciousness of guilt is the counterpart of the belief in moral perfection. Lippert has shown² that it is upon the foundation of sacrifice that priesthood is erected. The priest is not teacher nor preacher. He rather is often arrayed against these. His duty is that of administering and giving efficacy to sacrifices. The need of sacrifice follows from the consciousness of guilt, which everywhere holds sway in the human breast. The evils, misfortunes, and sufferings of life, as well as torments following

¹ FELIX, *Der Einfluss der Religion auf die Entwicklung des Eigenthums* (Leipzig, 1889), p. 7.

² *Allg. Gesch. des Priesterthums* (Berlin, 1884).

death, are held to be penalties inflicted by deities whose commands have been rejected or neglected. From these evils men must be saved by propitiating the deity concerned. In the empiric period the disobeyed commands were the customs and ceremonies; the means of propitiation were the animal and food sacrifices which the offended deity could enjoy. Here we discover the first material basis of religion, the sacrifices. He who alone could make the sacrifices acceptable to deity, whose word and touch could alone make them sacred, must needs, through them as a material basis, gain control over the believers. Add to this the power over fetiches and medicines which he possessed, and we have the material products whose production by the sacred labor of the priest and whose private ownership by him furnish the basis for the growth of a hierarchy with coercive control over the community. If it should ever come that popular faith in these material products thus monopolized by the priesthood should fail, then they would lose their value for want of demand, and the entire structure of coercive control would fall. This was the work of Jesus. For animal sacrifice he substituted his own death. Here no priest was needed, for no material sacrifice was demanded. The believer laid hold on forgiveness of sin and salvation from evil, solely by faith in Christ. He became his own "high priest." Had this been the only inference and practice which could have been drawn from the teachings of Jesus, it is difficult to see how there could have followed the organized church with its masterly discipline and subordination. Each believer would have come directly to God without intervention of priest or material sacrifice.

But Christ had left with his disciples certain observances which, under later beliefs, came to be looked upon as sacraments, and therefore as under the control of priests. These were especially the supper, the baptism, and the laying on of hands.¹ Initiation into the body of believers was celebrated by the former two, and the transmission of the sacred offices and healing of diseases by the latter. There were originally no priests, because no sacrifices. The presbyter was the presiding member of the

¹ LIPPERT, Vol. II, p. 643.

local community ; the deacon, the poor officer, having disposal of the common funds ; the "episcopus" was "overseer ;" the apostles were teachers. Later the communion became a symbol instead of a common meal ; the bread and wine became the very body of Christ, made so by the word and touch of the priest ; excommunication became deprivation of Christ's forgiveness for guilt, and later, with the church's wealth and political power, it even deprived the subject of property and subsistence. With the introduction of relics and sacred places where temples and convents were built, those who were put in charge exercised power over the superstitions of the people. Believers, desiring forgiveness for their souls, contributed gifts, and the introduction of wills opened the way for bequests, until one-third of the land of Europe was in the hands of the church. Tithes, immunity from taxation, the seizure of judicial and legislative functions in the absence of a constituted monarchy or state, the celibacy of the clergy, made the church the wealthiest corporation of the time. Its material equipment now was twofold in character. First, religious, such as the eucharist, relics, and sacred places, whose value depended on the faith of believers ; second, industrial, such as lands and vested incomes, whose value depended upon the bodily wants of mankind. In both cases scarcity was a necessary decisive condition of value ; but in the first case the demand, existing in the mind alone, was liable to vanish with changes of belief ; while in the second the demand, existing in the bodily wants of the masses, was certain to increase with the growth of population. In either case, while demand and scarcity played together, these material products were the valued objects of private appropriation and the basis of organization. We are now to notice briefly the steps that led to monopoly and centralization.

Originally each local community of worshipers elected its presbyter, episcopus, deacons, and other leaders. But induction into office required the sacred apostolic succession, and laying on of hands. Here was the germ of the power that ultimately crowded out local election and substituted centralized appointment. Centralization then centered about the see of Rome

because of the abundance of its relics and because it was the seat of the apostle Peter. The beliefs of the people gradually made the bishop of Rome the head of the church. In his hands was centered the control of the church's property, with the resulting privative and remuneratory sanctions, backed by material penalties and rewards. Appointment, promotion, and removal of the priests throughout Christendom came from Rome. Excommunication became exclusively the pope's weapon, with its unparalleled sweep of spiritual and material penalties. Finally, trials and punishments for heresy, conducted by the pope's subordinates, added to his power the physical penalties of death and bodily suffering.

We have here again the universal law of monopoly and centralization, enforced by necessity and the struggle for existence. The religious teachings of Christ, love of God and man, meekness, self-sacrifice, devotion to law, order, and property rights, showed themselves in the martyrs of the early church, but the results were not commensurate with the sacrifices. There was the wastefulness, the loss of energy, which follows lack of organization. With the barbarian invasions, with a rude people needing discipline, the church required unity and energy, and the insignia of the same, pomp and wealth. Only with the discipline of organization and the wealthy material basis therefor could even those meek, persuasive qualities of Christ's religion, apparently so opposite, hope to survive and pervade society.

But monopoly, when once attained, is prone to exalt its material basis above its persuasive principles, and the interests of its hierarchy above the interests of the community. Organization should be perfected for struggle, not for gathering the fruits of victory. A continuation of the methods of competition now becomes aggrandizement instead of public service. The community had been educated by the church and by the forces that followed on its path, up to the point where it became equipped with the persuasive susceptibilities which constituted the church's mission. The community was now developing a crude state consciousness, whose essential qualities are that respect for law, order, authority, property, and moral

right which the church had fostered, but which the church's aggrandizement now threatened to suppress. This state consciousness became concrete in the person of the emperor and the king. In the century of the Reformation two lines of evolution lay open to Europe. Either the church should become wholly sovereign and the state its coercive instrument, or the state should be sovereign and the church one of its subordinate institutions. The former was the path of India, the latter the path of Europe. In the contest of the century the church became the opponent of the very qualities it had fostered; no longer a supporter, but a destroyer of authority; not a peacemaker, but an inciter of war and insurrections; not a guardian of security, but a source of universal unrest through persecution of heretics and witches; not the supporter of law, but its violator; not the defender of the poor, but their oppressor; and always the disturber of property relations.¹ The decisive steps of the contest by which the church was subordinated were the following: First, the loss of popular faith in transubstantiation, relics, sacred places, and clergy. The supply of relics had been so largely increased through the enterprise of competing monasteries that their value materially depreciated, and ultimately disappeared. Second, secularization of lands and treasures; statutes of mortmain. By the foregoing measures the material basis of the organization was drawn from under the feet of the priest proprietors. Third, appointment of clergy by the king. This measure substituted the king for the pope as the head of the church, and later, through cabinet government and responsibility to parliament, the people were taken into partnership within the religious organization, with a voice in determining its will. Fourth, toleration acts; acts removing disabilities from dissenters, Catholics, Jews; acts incorporating dissenting congregations and legalizing their holdings; acts legalizing affirmations as well as oaths; and, in the United States, the disestablishment of the church by the exclusion from public taxes. By these acts ethical principles, securing the right

¹FELIX, *Der Einfluss der Religion auf die Entwicklung des Eigenthums* (Leipzig, 1889), p. 386.

to free belief and expression of opinion, were introduced into the structure of religion. The state, by extracting the coercive sanctions from the priesthood, constituted itself the structure within which the religious principle operates. In these and other ways the religious motive has been separated out from dependence on external sanctions and penalties, and has been compelled to rely upon its own peculiar psychic and persuasive sanctions. No longer able to enforce its doctrines through coercion, the church now seeks converts through preaching, conversion, and persuasion. The religious revivals of both Protestantism and Catholicism of the past one hundred and fifty years, the missionary societies, the charitable and reformatory work of the church, are witness to the increased emphasis and deepening of the religious principle when once differentiated in its own proper institution. The state, through its laws of property and its creation of ecclesiastical corporations, determines the coercive structure and organization within which the spiritual life of religion moves and breathes. By thus insuring to all believers certain partnership rights in the external means and machinery of worship, and removing therefrom the individual caprice of a priesthood, the state has freed religion from the supremacy of those who rise by mere diplomacy, shrewdness, and manipulation of church machinery, and has transferred it to those whose spiritual and personal preëminence commands in its own right the devotion and coöperation of the community of believers. The spiritual defect in all combinations of church and state has been the dominion of the priest and the ostracism of the preacher and teacher. The church as a purely persuasive institution is the field for the gifts of the preacher.

The state has increased its bulk and complicated its structure by the increments of coercion extracted from the church. The confiscation of monasteries, the secularization of charities, the rise of direct taxation, ecclesiastical laws adjudicated and enforced, all have occurred as a result of the transference of dominion from the private control of ecclesiastics to the public control of those who share in sovereignty.

JOHN R. COMMONS.

REVIEWS.

Liberty in the Nineteenth Century. By FREDERIC MAY HOLLAND.
G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. viii + 257.

As AN index to certain literary aspects of the subjects referred to this little book may have a place. It is hardly more than a catalogue of events, with very summary judgments about their meaning. For instance, under the chapter heading "Fruits of Peace," "Owen and other philanthropists," viz., Bentham, James Mill, Wordsworth, Scott, Cobbett, and Landor, are disposed of in four pages, and in that brief space we get a clue to the author's estimate of the men who write books. He seems to have no doubt that books produce liberty more than liberty produces books. If he is right, he will at least have to go back of the nineteenth century to find the books that have produced nineteenth-century liberty. Again, sixty-three pages suffice to review nineteenth-century liberty in continental Europe and in Great Britain. The remainder of the book is devoted to the United States. "The founders of American literature" claim four pages, in which there is room for Sidney Smith's overquoted fling: "Who reads an American book?" Meanwhile two pages (64, 65) are all that are necessary to represent the concrete conditions constituting liberty down to 1860. From the sociologist's viewpoint the proper description of the book would be "a sketch of the things that theorists have spoken and written about liberty, chiefly in the United States, during the past century." Of the things that actually constitute liberty, of the condition of our people with reference to them, of the precise nature of the obstacles to be overcome in extending liberty, the book reveals hardly more than it does about American geology or geography or climatology. The book is of precisely the type which the opening sentences of the preface would lead a sociologist to expect, viz.: "This book is a result of having studied the development of political and religious liberty for forty years. How well I have *selected my authorities* the reader can judge. I will merely say that I have mentioned no writer whom I have not studied carefully." Liberty is thus an affair of writers. If the author had secluded himself during these forty years in the Boston Athenæum, he would have had all the contact with liberty

or the absence of it that was necessary for his task. What a nice, genteel, ladylike affair human liberty is, to be sure! The book belongs rather less than the letters of Howells' "Utopian" in the world of capitalistic combinations, and party bosses, and wars of union *vs.* non-union labor. It is a distinct addition to our conceptions of things that are not so.

A. W. S.

Le malaise de la démocratie. Par GASTON DESCHAMPS. Paris : Armand Colin et Cie., 1899. Pp. 359.

THE French literature of morbid national self-consciousness grows apace. It tends to convince disinterested onlookers that it is not as well with France as it should be, whether the writers affirm or deny exceptional evils in their society. Americans who are anxious to avoid premature and superficial judgments cannot repress suspicion that so much introspection and self-accusation is not a sign of superior national austerity, but of national uneasiness for which there must be peculiar reasons. The book before us is typical of a considerable class. It finds very little to praise in present French society. It begins with the creation, for modern French philosophers; "the beginning of the democratic régime." In successive chapters it describes, both historically and in their present form, the politician, Cæsarism and "mediocracy," pornocracy and scandals, the almoners of democracy, German pedagogy, the Anglo-Saxon mania, the unrest of the university, the unrest of the rising generation, the army, and the democracy.

We have had treatises on the psychology of crime, of democracy, of socialism, and there will soon be material enough for a psychology of current French self-defamation. Without this setting it will be impossible to appraise writers of this class at their proper valuation; but, on the other hand, an estimate of the personal equation in each of these cases is necessary in order to construct such a general view. Just now we are at the mercy of miscellaneous impressionists. Whether the anonymous newspaper essayists, or the popular feuilletonistes, or Zola, or Anatole France, or sociologists like Demolin, or editorial writers in book form like the present author, their evidence is scrappy, incoherent, without perspective. Even foreigners who have had but casual opportunities for first-hand observation detect the partial and partisan character of these exhibits, but no way appears to make the one fragmentary report complement the others. The general effect, however,

is cumulative, in spite of the probability that, if we could cross-examine the witnesses, some of them would cancel each other.

The De Tocqueville of the third republic has not appeared. Mr. Bodley has given us a saner view of France as a whole than any native writer has furnished. Meanwhile such books as the one before us serve the purpose of cartoons. They call attention to real conditions, but they would lead us far astray if we permitted ourselves to draw the indicated conclusions. Such books would not be taken very seriously, on their own merits, if they were written in English. Of course, there must be a "Vive la France!" in the concluding chapters, but this rather confirms the impressions, first, that the books were made to sell, and, second, that they "do protest too much." Their total effect is unfavorable upon our estimate of prevailing tendencies in French civilization.

A. W. S.

Economics and Industrial History for Secondary Schools. By HENRY W. THURSTON, Head of the Department of Social and Economic Science in the Chicago Normal School. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1899. Pp. 300.

THE teacher who wants to guide beginners in the study of society, who is not content to have them merely absorb the doctrines of one book, who wants to show them how to find out social facts and social relations for themselves, will find in this book an outline of the method by which one teacher has tried all this with success. It does not follow that every teacher could take the book and make an equally successful venture with a class of bright pupils. The teachers are rare in secondary schools who have specialized sufficiently upon these subjects to be safe in giving their pupils such wide range. The exceptional teachers who know the ground as intimately as it is known to the author of this little book ought to be able to follow the method with constantly increasing satisfaction both to themselves and to their pupils. The author does not intimate that college students might be inducted into the study of economics by use of this guide. In fact, however, much college instruction in this subject shoots over the heads of students, and for a long time fails to rouse the interest that it might and should, from unwillingness on the part of the instructors to start with rudiments simple and concrete enough to fix the attention. It would by no means be beneath the dignity of college

classes to begin the study of economics with this book as an outline. Under competent instruction it would be a syllabus that would set as high a standard for attainment as the strongest students would be able to satisfy. The method deserves wide use.

A. W. S.

Chicago Conference on Trusts. Speeches, Debates, Resolutions, List of the Delegates, Committees, etc. Held September 13-16, 1899. Chicago: The Civic Federation of Chicago, 1900.

THESE 626 pages contain very few facts, and fewer arguments, that were not previously familiar to everyone who had followed either academic or popular discussions of capitalistic tendencies. While the book cannot therefore be said to have added to known facts about trusts, it certainly does constitute a very valuable exhibit of the ways in which different types of our people are today thinking about them. While the more recent "Anti-Trust Conference" in Chicago simply served to give certain partial views a chance to advertise themselves, this book is a better index than could be found elsewhere within brief compass of the currents of thought in the United States upon nearly all phases of the subject. For this reason the book will soon be ancient history, but at the present moment it is well worth the attention of all who are concerned with our social and political problems.

A. W. S.

Les transformations du pouvoir. Par G. TARDE. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1899. Pp. x + 266.

THE substance of two courses of lectures read by the author in 1896 and 1898 in the *École libre des Sciences Politiques* and in the *Collège libre des Sciences Sociales* is presented in this book to a wider public. The author tells us that the argument is an application of his previously published sociological ideas to political interpretation. He recognizes that there is a physical side to the phenomena of the transformation of social power, but he wisely leaves this group of factors to sciences competent to deal with them, and confines himself to the psychical phases of the problem.

The idea which the book develops is that there is demand for a science of political power to be placed by the side of economic science (1). Compared with economic, scientific, æsthetic, or religious

activity, political activity is relatively simple, whether considered as a system of ends or of means (4). All political action is consciously or unconsciously legislative (5). It does not follow that all political action is essentially egoistic (6). The attempt of a party or of a nation to get the upper hands is always mixed with something else, viz., the desire to realize a program of social reorganization which, conceived by the chief of a party, is the true reason for its being; or, in the case of nation against nation, a program of reorganization in which there is a more or less developed idea of a good common to conquerors and conquered. Expanding this conception the author reaches the corollary that political power is to the nation what conscious and personal will is to the individual (7). Advancing a step he asserts that government is to administration what will is to habit, what perception is to recollection (11). Power is nothing but the privilege of getting itself obeyed, and public authority, like wealth, is very multiform (15). Distinguishing (*a*) indeterminate and (*b*) determinate authority, M. Tarde shows a certain insight into the facts of social control, though not to the extent of Professor Ross' analysis, of which more presently.

Another distinction, which the author regards as equally fundamental, is that between internal and external power (17). We have inventories of public wealth, stock exchanges that give us the numerical variations of its different sources. Why may we not hope to have some day good inventories of political power—political "bourses"? It would be very difficult, but very desirable. If, with reliable statistics, we could measure approximately the maximum or minimum of quantities of power incarnated in the English cabinet, or in the queen of England, or in the different sovereigns or ministers of Europe, America, and Asia, nothing would be more valuable for diplomats (18).

After these preliminary considerations there follow ten chapters upon the following subjects: "The Sources of Power;" "Invention and Power: Various Criticisms;" "Orders of Nobility;" "Capital Cities;" (Part II) "Amplifying Repetition;" "Political Opposition," (*a*) "The Struggle of Parties," (*b*) "War and Diplomacy;" "The Laws of Political Transformations;" "Political Art and Political Morality."

Throughout the book the work of Professor Ross in the series above referred to is repeatedly suggested. With Tarde the emphasis in the first part is on the genesis of political power rather than upon its statics, while with Ross the reverse is the case. Tarde's survey is

much more summary than that of Ross. Tarde commits himself to theses, in the direct line of his argument, that obviously call for closer analysis. For instance, in general his often forced appeal to his stock explanation "imitation." Our objection to his use of this "principle" is that he has long ago reasoned himself away from his earlier and better-known judgments about its rôle among social forces. He has described the companion facts of "opposition," of "invention," and of "adaptation." Yet he seems unable to restrain himself from implying that "imitation" is the same pass-key to all social changes which he claimed that it was before he had reached these later perceptions. Again, in particular, M. Tarde gets dangerously distant from his base of supplies in such theorems as that legitimate authorities rest chiefly upon *belief*, tyrannical authorities upon *desire* (36-44 *et passim*). In the latter case the author is partially aware of his own omissions, to be sure, for he acknowledges that the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate" involve a certain vicious dualism. In the same connection his insistence that the family is the source of all political power is followed (35) by admission that the family is, at first, shop, church, school, regiment, state; and that the nature of power differs according to the one of these sources (*sic*) which predominates. By this admission Tarde throws his own argument into confusion about the very distinction between *source* and *channel* of power with which he sets out (23). On the whole, the first part of the book seems to emphasize demand for a treatment of the genesis of political authority on a new scale of thoroughness.

In the second part Tarde opens up a mass of material for kinetic theory with originality of conception quite as distinct as that shown in Ross' program. Indeed, in chap. 10 Tarde throws down the gauntlet in this fashion (187): "It is our business to formulate *laws of causation*, of logical causation, which at once state and partially exemplify rules proclaimed by the philosophers of history, and at the same time exhibit frequent exceptions to the rules. Moreover, these logical laws will lead to other solutions both more comprehensive and more penetrating." In showing how he would go to work to carry out this plan, Tarde suggests problems enough to convince the most skeptical that there is work to do in this field. Perhaps the same skeptics are not yet in a state of mind to be convinced that the work is worth doing, but this may be too much to expect at this early date. For instance, the author points out (192) that "Social evolution is a problem in which it is important first of all to distinguish with care the independent variables

from their functions. Before treating an important branch of this complex evolution, for example juridical or political evolution, we must decide whether it is proper to assign the same rank to these social phenomena as to religious, or scientific, or industrial evolution. Are not the two last in combination the relatively independent variables of which the evolution of law and of political power are only the functions? And, if that is the case, is it reasonable to expect as much simplicity or relative regularity in the march of political and juridical evolution as in that of religious, scientific, or industrial evolution?" In accordance with this suggestion, Tarde at once sketches subdivisions of the problem of political power corresponding with the variety of culture stage in which it belongs. Quite likely the folk-psychologists will say that Tarde has proposed in all this no problem which they have not already formulated, and they may not be far from correct, but Tarde has certainly approached the problems from an angle of his own, and has helped to show their importance. At the same time he has not gone far beyond the enunciation of some promising theses, with illustrations profuse enough to make them plausible. It remains to enlist special workers in sociology who will begin to subject suggestions of this nature to all the applicable scientific tests.

ALBION W. SMALL.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Beginnings of Currency.—An exchange of goods is always based on a comparison of their respective utilities, *i. e.*, of their values in use to the possessor. But a comparison of values always presupposes a common measure of values. In the form of barter this common measure is implicit in the consciousness of the two parties without being represented by any material denominator. Barter is thus exchange of possessions pure and simple. I exchange my grain today for your fruit, and my adze tomorrow for your knife; that is barter. But when our daily transactions become so far complicated as to require some other article having a permanent and daily use or value for all of us, to be interposed between the grain and the fruit, between the adze and the knife, as a common measure of their values, we have set up a currency and medium of exchange. Thus all the members of our tribe have cocoanuts in varying quantity and can find a use for them every day. I want fruit and you want grain; but, instead of exchanging my grain for your fruit, I give you six pairs of cocoanuts for the fruit I want, and later on you come to me and give me five pairs of cocoanuts for the corn you want. This procedure—one simple transaction at a time containing but the two factors—is uniform for peoples just beginning the use of a medium of exchange. This is simply bartering through a medium, and cocoanuts, say, are our currency. But with the progress of civilization, and with the multiplication and increasing complexity of our wants, we proceed to make those articles which most invariably stir our cupidity and sense of value by attracting to us the attention and services of others into a system of money, which thus makes everywhere explicit and convertible in concrete form our common mental experience of value. Thus currency becomes a common conventional symbol—usable only as a medium of exchange. As, however, commerce reaches its most complicated stages we are able to set up a system of transactions, through the help of this common denominator of value, money, in which system we balance accounts and dispense with the actual handling of the money almost altogether, it simply standing back of the transaction as a guarantee of its faithfulness. Thus, when I want fruit and you want corn, instead of actually exchanging the cocoanuts or the metal money that has taken their place, we may simply set down one cocoanut or one unit of money to your credit in future transactions. This is the system of credit.—COLONEL R. C. TEMPLE, "Beginnings of Currency," in *Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, August–November, 1899.

Totemism as a Factor in the Evolution of Religion.—The place of totemism in the history of religion has lately begun to attract considerable attention. To attempt to reduce all forms of plant and animal worship to totemism, or to insist that all religious cults can be traced to it, would be narrow and inexact. But there are certain important considerations which indicate that totemism must be given much value as an element in the growth of religion, as follows:

1. It may fairly be said to be conceded, by most sociologists today who deal with the phase of the subject, that the totem-clan is the earliest distinct social organization known in the evolution of society.
2. Both social and religious aspects of evolution look to the totem-clan as the earliest society of which the members could habitually worship a common deity.
3. The immense importance of sacrificial feasts as means of binding societies together in the worship of a common divinity is widely admitted by students of anthropology, sociology, and theology.
4. The evidence is becoming very strong (see especially Spencer and Gillen's *Native Tribes of Central Australia*) to show that totemism *must* have been a stage in the evolution of religion. In the work above cited it is shown that in the cases observed the whole of the tribe, without regard to totem-clans, is present at the celebration of each and every totem rite and cult. Not only so, but any member of the

tribe may by invitation be the celebrant of any rite, and "need not of necessity belong to the totem with which the ceremony is concerned." In fact, the various clans which compose the tribe have come to "pool" the whole of their cults. Thus the transition from totemism, as it is known elsewhere, to polytheism is here more than half accomplished.

5. That the ritual immolation and the sacramental meal are especially intimately connected with the sanctity of domesticated animals, and that such rites go back to times when the animals in question were rather domesticable than as yet domesticated, are propositions also generally admitted. And at the same time, it is maintained, the animals were totems.—F. B. JEVONS, "The Place of Totemism in the Evolution of Religion," in *Folk Lore*, December, 1899.

A Plan for Controlling the Trusts.—As an example of one of the most glaring abuses connected with the trusts the present situation in New Jersey may be cited: Under the laws of that state, which make it impossible for the taxing authorities in other states to get at the New Jersey stock held by residents of their respective states for the purposes of taxation, fifteen thousand trusts, combinations, and other corporations are today operating with an aggregate stock legally issued for upward of \$8,000,000,000. As the total coin currency of the world is only about \$7,600,000,000, it will be seen that the little state of New Jersey has authorized the issuance of stock by corporations to a greater amount than that of all the gold and silver money of the whole world; to such an extent is the unbridled capitalization of stock being carried. On the 21st of last September the trust conference of state governors and attorneys-general at St. Louis suggested by resolution "the enactment and enforcement, both by the several states and the nation, of legislation that shall define as crimes any attempted monopolization or restraint of trade in any line of industrial activity, with provisions for adequate punishment both of the individual and the corporation that shall be found guilty thereof; punishment to the corporation to the extent of dissolution, an efficacious system of reports to state authority by corporations, and the strict examination of all such as are organized under its laws; the prevention of entrance within a state of any foreign corporation for any other purpose than interstate commerce, except on terms that will put it on a basis of equality with domestic corporations, making it mandatory upon foreign corporations to procure state license as a condition precedent to their entry; the enactment of state legislation preventing corporations created in one state from doing business exclusively in other states; providing that no corporation shall be formed in whole or in part from another corporation, or hold stock in another corporation engaged in similar or competitive business; recommending that each state pass laws providing that no corporation which is a member of any pool or trust in that state or elsewhere can do business in that state; that the capital stock of private corporations should be fully paid up, and that shareholders shall be liable to twice the face value of the stock held by each." It may be conceded, for the sake of argument, that these remedies would be efficacious if they could be enforced; but it seems certain that they could not, since the courts have come to assume the real paramount power over legislation in the country. State statutes on this subject have recently been set aside by the supreme court (in the case of *Reagon vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.*, 154 U. S. 362), because, in the opinion of the court, they "were unreasonable and unjust." Now, in Art. 3, sec. 2, of the federal constitution there is a largely unused provision governing the action of the supreme court as follows: "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which the state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such EXCEPTIONS and under such REGULATIONS as the Congress shall make." What we need is that Congress shall use this prerogative and *except* some of these subjects of appellate jurisdiction from being exercised by the court. Then we may hope to have legislation which the country needs, successfully exercised by the legislative department of the government.—SYLVESTER PENNOYER, "How to Control the Trusts," in *American Law Review*, November–December, 1899.

Influence of Railway Discriminations on Industrial Corporations.—A monopoly is, by its derivation and in its simplest definition, the giving to one in the

sale of an article an advantage which all do not possess. The central idea of the trust is the combination of large amounts of capital in such enormous transactions as to afford its members monopoly privileges. That railroad discriminations have a marked influence in promoting the trusts is coming to be widely recognized. The conditions of these discriminations are as follows: Previous to the enactment of the act to prevent these abuses it was the usual method for the railroads to give a specially low rate, or pay a rebate, to large shippers, whom it is obviously to the interests of the railroads to encourage. The act made the giving of a lower rate to one shipper than to another a crime for both parties concerned. To escape this provision the favors have been made to take, sometimes the form of an elevator commission, sometimes an excessive car mileage; sometimes to make a particularly long haul cheaper than a shorter haul; sometimes the shipper pays the full interstate rate in consideration that he shall receive preferential rates within the state to which the Interstate Commerce Act does not apply. The effect is to reduce the number of persons with whom these transactions are had to a minimum; both because of the desire of avoiding the risk of detection, and because of the inability of the small dealers to compete. In such large operations the small advantages thus granted to the large dealers often represent more than the entire margin upon which the business is transacted, and are in the aggregate millions of dollars annually. The unavoidable result is to exclude the small competitor more and more from these operations and center the business in the hands of the large competitor.—CHARLES A. PROUTY, "Railway Discriminations and Industrial Combinations," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1900.

Publicity the Greatest Need in Our Industrial Development.—That the transition which has in the last few years been rapidly taking place in business from the partnership form of organization to the corporation has been necessitated by economic conditions and has proved of great economic utility is now very generally conceded. The great corporation is properly considered as a useful invention—a valuable industrial machine. But its introduction, like that of every labor-saving invention, has been attended with confusion and hardship. The chief cause that has occasioned and is occasioning these great corporations is the growing impossibility of doing business on the separate competitive basis. Eminent business-men, among them F. B. Thurber for the grocers, some of the foremost insurance men, coal dealers, and merchants of the middle West, agree in the testimony of one of them: "Competition has got us now where the only dress we ought to wear is the cap and bells." Under these conditions it is grotesque to talk about "the rights of independence of the small middle class." Combination and organization on a large scale has been the only available method of meeting the demands of these conditions. But the very size and character of such organization, involving the interests of a large number of stockholders, and of a very much larger public, necessitates a degree of publicity of accounts and methods which has not been at all adequately recognized in the United States. Indeed, most of the evils will be found to center in the underhand methods which no civilized nation except the United States any longer permits. Overcapitalization and the rank abuse of special rates by railroads, increasing the power to crush small dealers and force strikes with employes, are parts of the same corrupting methods. As an instance of the failure to require publicity Dr. von Halle says in his book on *Trusts, or Industrial Combinations and Coalitions in the United States*: "It is one of the most disastrous holes in the corporation law of the United States that stock companies are not forbidden to buy or sell their own securities. In Europe such transactions have been punishable for many years." And the very men who manage the trusts are condemning these evils with most emphasis. The dominating peril of the trust—the peril that includes most others—is the influence of the large corporations upon politics and the bearing this influence has upon economic privileges. The part that certain corporations have played in corrupting the sources of political life in the United States is quite the greatest danger under which the country suffers. And the most drastic condemnation of these practices has not been by the socialists, but by some of the very men who do these things. In this whole matter we are working in the dark; and our cut-throat competition, unjust favors,

disregard of employes' rights, and political corruption are very largely due to the concealment of the conditions with which the business world has to reckon clearly in order to conduct its affairs harmoniously, justly, and profitably. The period of reorganization is upon us. The necessity for publicity will insure the means for securing it, and the strength to guide the movement.—JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS, "The Strength and Weakness of the Trust Idea," in *Engineering Magazine*, December, 1899.

Important Aspects of the Law and Government in America.—It is possible to summarize in a few brief points a general idea of American law, because the virtual authority of the common law of England, common legal traditions, and the intimate social and economic connections between the several states count for a good deal more than their legal independence of each other.

The legislative power of the government has come to be restricted by numerous limitations. To fully appreciate their effect it is necessary to bear in mind (1) that the process of changing the constitution is different from, and much more complicated than, the process of changing the statutory law; in the several states every constitutional amendment must be ratified by popular vote, and other complex provisions must be observed; while an amendment to the constitution of the United States requires the concurrence of three-fourths of all the states, a condition hardly to be fulfilled where there is a conflict of interests; (2) that laws contrary to the constitution are treated by the courts as void, and that the courts interpret the constitution in such a manner that the presumption is almost against the validity of a radical change of the laws. Legislative periods of one or two years are the rule, and in most states the legislature meets only every other year. The character of the legislative assemblies leaves room for much improvement.

There is a radical difference in the administrative organization of the United States and the several states. The provision of the federal constitution that all officers shall be appointed either by the president or by a head of department insures a strictly centralized organization for the government of the United States, which, in contrast to that of the German empire for instance, acts exclusively through its own officers and not through the officers of the states. Since 1883 civil-service reform has done much to make clerical appointments non-partisan and permanent.

The whole system of state government, on the contrary, is characterized by an extreme decentralization. The organization of the administration is fixed almost altogether by the constitution; only some parts of the central and the details of the local organization being left to be regulated by the legislature. The most important administrative functions are in the hands of the local communities. The highest state officials are responsible directly to the people who elect them, and thus in their official functions are independent of the governor. The most important function of the latter is his concurrence in legislation through the veto power. Civil-service reform principles have been introduced into but few states and cities. In the cities there is at present a strong tendency to concentration of power, particularly in the mayor. The administrative organization of the city government is thus, in many respects, similar to that of the United States.

Since all the higher offices are generally either elective or appointive for fixed terms, the civil service does not offer a life career, and there can be no official class. On the other hand, purely honorary officers are almost entirely unknown. An official as such has no special social standing, if we except those who fill the highest offices. Thus the best people are not always willing to accept offices, though naturally there is never a lack of candidates for any office.

The position of the courts is of the greatest importance in respect to government as well as law. There is hardly any administrative independence as against the courts. They are all administrative courts in the German sense of the word. Thus the states, with their decentralized organization, secure orderly administration of official functions only by detailed statutory regulation bringing them under the direction of the courts. The judges are almost everywhere elected, but their generally long terms and responsible positions make the office rank much higher on the whole than that of other officials.

Criminal procedure is dominated by the institution of the jury. But if the defendant has sufficient means, a trial can be long drawn out and a verdict had on the ground of formal errors. Criminal justice is thus often felt to be inadequate, and cases of lynching are not rare, especially in the southern states and in the cases of the negroes.

In regard to form as well as matter, statutory legislation leaves much to be desired; the lack of uniformity between laws of different states is sometimes striking; and as long as the methods of legislation are not greatly improved, it is to be hoped that legislatures will deal with private law as little as possible.—DR. ERNST FREUND, "Government and Law in America," in *American Law Review*, January-February, 1900 (translated from *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, Berlin).

The Genius of Invention among Women.—Nietzsche says that woman has only to aspire to attain the same degree of mental superiority that her male contemporary enjoys. An inspection of the products of the inventive powers of the female mind throws an interesting light upon this statement of Nietzsche. Among the articles and processes for which patents have been granted to American women we find a corset (in 1815 and again in 1841), an ice-cream freezer, building bricks to be used without mortar, various electric and extractive appliances, a washing machine, sub-marine telescope, shirt for men, rocking-chair, fountain-pen, locomotive wheel, operating table for use in surgery, various cosmetics, button-hole machine, and processes for the fixation of colors and the desulphurization of minerals. Among the most interesting is a hammock for two, a mud-guard for men's pantaloons, and a mustache protector. Previous to 1860 the United States had granted to women less than a dozen patents, but in the last two decades the number of patents granted to women has risen above several hundreds. The greater part of the patents have been granted for articles of furniture, machines for cloth and fabric working, toys, musical instruments, pharmaceutical preparations, household conveniences, and agricultural machines. The financial returns from these patents is often considerable; one woman realized five thousand dollars from her royalty on a glove buttoner; another was not less successful with a corset support. The most remunerative articles have been games and children's toys. The commercial world is ever on the lookout for new productions in these fields and is willing to pay well for an invention which strikes the fancy of the buying public. Many women in the United States have patented several articles and enjoy comfortable incomes from the sale of the same.

The French woman has certain natural gifts which would seem to fit her peculiarly to be the rival of her American sister in the inventive field; she is quick of eye and deft of hand; she has a bright and flexible mind; but nevertheless she seems to lack something—mayhap the patience, mayhap the incentive—necessary to her success in the sphere of inventive genius. There is danger of overestimating her shortcoming in this respect, however. Very recently the French woman has shown great activity in perfecting inventions; she seems about to dispute the field with her sisters of the far West, at least in point of number of inventions. The nature of the inventions must be confessed to be somewhat fanciful in many instances. Thus we find among the articles recently patented by French women a comb by means of which liquids can be more readily brought into contact with the scalp, a cigar wrapper made from compressed rose leaves, *mise en scène* fitted for the parodying of the serpentine dance by various animals, an aromatic antiseptic toothpick, a galvanic belt, an appliance for preventing the mispairing of overshoes, a vehicle for aerial and maritime navigation, a *portfleur* in the shape of a butterfly, an appliance for writing in the pocket, a skirt for female bicyclists, and a surgical bandage. From this list it cannot be said that the inventive genius of the French woman has shown itself of an ultra-practical nature. The French woman shows herself particularly apt in the invention of articles of adornment and wearing apparel, and in the field of toys and games she is perhaps unexcelled.—DR. A. DE NEUVILLE, "De génie de l'invention chez les femmes," in *Revue des revues*, January, 1900.

Exact Methods in Sociology.—Exact method in social research is statistical. The development and application of this method to social problems has been one of the most striking scientific achievements of the present century. The whole

field of descriptive sociology is being more and more exhaustively studied by statistical methods that are yearly improving in precision. No science is making surer and better progress in the development of this method than is sociology. But it is most important to note that the first step in the application of the statistical method is classification, that the starting-point of all classification is resemblance, and that this coefficient of resemblance which I have contended is a mark of social phenomena is the basis of all social statistics—of all application of the statistical method in sociology. The most significant fact is that from the first known beginnings of statistical research to the present time all extension of the statistical method has been due to my consciousness of kind; the census taken in Greece in 594 B.C. and most of the refinements of statistical inquiry of these later years alike are due to this one cause. In making provision for the taking of our own census consciousness of kind, rather than general utility or the interests of science, was the one thing which prevented Congress from denying, without a moment's hesitation, the appropriations necessary for the prosecution of costly inquiries relative to religious denominations, labor organizations, distribution of wealth, etc.—FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, PH.D., "Exact Methods in Sociology," in *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*, December, 1899, pp. 145-59.

The Criterion of Progress.—Progress is made through *the law of least effort*. Man has sought to procure the useful through the least expenditure of effort, and all history of invention conforms to that law. One characteristic of progress is *the increase of man's power over things*. The suppression of slavery is an act which demonstrates the second characteristic of progress: the emancipation of the individual from the oppression of another individual. This emancipation shows itself in the relation of capital and labor. The idea of patronage is only a survival of patriarchal and feudal traditions. It has disappeared in England and America. The contract of labor is more and more assuming the character of a contract of exchange which assures the independence of the contracting parties. Both parties negotiate on a plane of equality, and the progressive employer renounces the desire to impose religious, moral, or political restrictions upon the employed. In the case of most peoples the mode of acquisition considered for a long time as the most noble was violence. It survives still among many people living in civilized nations who think that they cannot become rich except through the exploitation of others. The idea of exchange has cost a great struggle. The transformation of an enemy into a client is a conception which implies a series of very highly developed intellectual efforts: comparison of objects, estimation of reciprocal values, conclusion and execution of a contract. All these efforts have habituated man to think and decide for himself and not before an external authority. They have prepared him for discovery, invention, and freedom from the yoke of tradition and sacerdotalism. They have increased his individuality. The separation of the individual from both man and things grows more complete. According to the observation of M. Sumner Maine, the progressive evolution of societies consists in substituting contract for the arrangement of authority.

While the idea of contract has emancipated the individual, publicists who have essayed to establish it theoretically as the basis of the existence of societies have desired to make it an instrument for crushing the individual. The false conception of social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau dominated the Revolution, and continue to dominate the greater part of our publicists and politicians. The written and positive constitutions are affirmations of right: such are the Bill of Rights of 1689 in England, the constitution of the United States of 1787, and finally the French constitution of 1791.

In these acts men designated certain things as held in common; but they took care to specify those which they intended expressly to reserve, and these took the name of liberties. Every recognized right fixed in a constitution is a conquest of the arbitrary to the advantage of the individual; it is the substitution of contract for oppression.

That which distinguishes political from commercial contract is that the latter has for its object the exchange of services or of merchandise, with gain, while political contract ought to have for its object only the assurance of the security of the action of participants.

The state, or more properly the government, has a positive and a negative duty :

1. The state ought to administer the common interests which cannot be divided without being destroyed, as external and internal security.

2. The state ought to do only what private initiative is incapable of doing, and this in the interest of all; nor should it undertake any enterprise for profit. Such is the theory of Quesnay, Turgot, Mirabeau, Humboldt, Labaulaye, Cobden, John Bright, Herbert Spencer, and of all individualists. This is the basis of the declaration of the rights of man and conforms to all the facts which distinguish the landmarks of human progress. It is opposed to the liberty of others which calls upon any power other than that of the individual. Necessity is the criterion of such intervention. The positive duty of government is, according to M. G. de Molinari, to secure the liberty of the multitude.

That which men call their right is the consciousness of their individuality. The individual is a reality; and, notwithstanding his theory of the utility of the greatest number, Bentham has been obliged to recognize that "the individual interests are the only real interests." In an individualistic society man is not only a means, but is its proper end. Coöperation of effort is more assured as the division of labor is established. The state is static; its dynamic effects proceed from individualities and minorities. For the most part the great governments have denied or recoiled from, when they have not persecuted the originators of, the great discoveries and inventions.

Sacerdotalism and the army are the two great institutions which have, in all countries, been the great obstacles to progress, opposing all new truth and all reformers. Sacerdotalism is dominated by tradition. Militarism rests on passive obedience. In spite of appearances to the contrary, the great effort of the nineteenth century is to substitute scientific and productive for sacerdotal and military civilization. All efforts to the contrary have as their ideal a regression, a reversion to an ancestral type. Saint Simon rightly perceived the criterion of progress which can be expressed in the following formula: "Progress is in direct ratio to man's action upon things, and in inverse ratio to the coercive action of man upon man."—YVES GUYOT, "Le critérium du progrès," in *Journal des Economistes*, December 15, 1899.

British Municipal and Educational Legislation in 1899.—No enactments making any organic constitutional changes, and, with the exception of the act for the relief of the beneficed clergy of the established church from a portion of the local taxation hitherto charged on tithe rents, no measures over which there were any party conflicts, were passed in the 1899 session of the British Parliament. The legislation of 1899 was of a domestic character. There were several acts making noteworthy changes in, or extensions to, the powers of municipal governments, and three measures amending the elementary- and secondary-education systems.

The chief measures of the session were the act for the establishment of metropolitan boroughs in London; the act breaking down the monopoly hitherto existing in respect to telephone communication; the act creating the board of education, taking over the supervision of education, which since 1839 has been in the hands of the Committee of the Privy Council for Education; the Small Dwellings Acquisitions Act; the Tithe Rent Charge Act; the act transferring the early stages of private legislation for Scotland from Westminster to Scotland; and the act raising from eleven to twelve years the age at which children may begin work as half-timers.—EDWARD PORRITT, "British Municipal and Educational Legislation in 1899," in *Yale Review*, November, 1899.

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March — for January-February.

CONDUCTED BY C. H. HASTINGS.

NEW BOOKS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS REVIEWED.

Explanation. *Titles not starred* represent new publications announced in the standard publishers' lists since the last issue of the bibliography. A *star prefixed* to a title indicates that it was taken from a review of the work in the periodical cited after the title. It may or may not be a new announcement. The *arithmetical signs* following the citation to a review indicate the tenor of the review: ×, uncertain; +, favorable; -, unfavorable; +-, favorable, but with reservations; -+, unfavorable, but with commendation; ++, very favorable; --, very unfavorable; +-+, very favorable, but with reservations; -+-, very unfavorable, but with commendation. Absence of any sign indicates that review has not been read. The *publication date* when not given is understood to be the current year. *Prices quoted* are usually for volumes bound in cloth in the case of American and English books, in paper in the case of all others. *New editions, translations, and new periodicals* are bracketed.

Abbreviations. See at end of Bibliography.

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| A. | Arena. | JHS. | Johos Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science. |
| AA. | Americao Anthropologist. | JPE. | Journal of Political Economy. |
| AAC. | Archives d'anthropologie criminelle. | JNS. | Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik. |
| AAE. | Archivo per l'antropologia e la etnologia. | JRS. | Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. |
| AAO. | American Antiquarian. | LC. | Literarisches Centralblatt. |
| AAP. | Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. | LG. | Labour Gazette. |
| AC. | L'Association catholique. | LoQR. | London Quarterly Review. |
| ACQ. | American Catholic Quarterly Review. | LQR. | Law Quarterly Review. |
| AGP. | Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. | MHM. | Mansfield House Magazine. |
| AHR. | American Historical Review. | MIM. | Monatsschrift für innere Mission. |
| AIS. | Annales de l'Institut de sciences sociales. | MA. | Municipal Affairs. |
| AJP. | American Journal of Psychology. | NA. | Nuova antologia. |
| AJS. | American Journal of Sociology. | NAR. | North American Review. |
| AJT. | Americao Journal of Theology. | NC. | Nineteenth Century. |
| ALR. | American Law Register. | NS. | Natural Science. |
| ALRV. | American Law Review. | NW. | New World. |
| AMP. | Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Séances. | NZ. | Neue Zeit. |
| AOR. | Archiv für öffentliches Recht. | PhR. | Philosophical Review. |
| ASA. | American Statistical Association, Publications. | PSM. | Popular Science Monthly. |
| ASAR. | Allgemeine statistisches Archiv. | PSQ. | Political Science Quarterly. |
| ASG. | Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik. | PsR. | Psychological Review. |
| ASP. | Annales des sciences politiques. | QJE. | Quarterly Journal of Economics. |
| ASPh. | Archiv für systematische Philosophie. | QR. | Quarterly Review. |
| BDL. | Bulletin of the Department of Labor. | RBP. | Rivista beneficenza publica. |
| BC. | Blätter für Gefängniswissenschaft. | RCS. | Revue de christianisme sociale. |
| BML. | Banker's Magazine, London. | RDC. | Rivista di discipline carcerarie. |
| BMN. | Banker's Magazine, New York. | RDI. | Revue de droit internationale. |
| BOT. | Bulletin de l'Office du Travail. | RDM. | Revue des deux mondes. |
| BS. | Bibliotheca Sacra. | REA. | Revue mensuelle de l'Ecole d'anthropologie de Paris. |
| BST. | Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée. | Réfs. | Réforme sociale. |
| BUI. | Bulletin de l'Union internationale de droit pénal. | ReS. | Revue socialiste. |
| C. | Cosmopolis. | RH. | Revue historique. |
| CHOR. | Charity Organisation Review. | RHD. | Revue d'histoire diplomatique. |
| Chr. | Charities Review. | RIF. | Rivista italiana di filosofia. |
| CoR. | Contemporary Review. | RIS. | Revue internationale de sociologie. |
| DL. | Deutsche Literaturzeitung. | RISS. | Rivista italiana di sociologia. |
| DR. | Deutsche Revue. | RISS. | Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali. |
| DRu. | Deutsche Rundschau. | RMM. | Revue métaphysique et de morale. |
| DZG. | Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. | RP. | Revue philanthropique. |
| EcJ. | Economic Journal. | RPe. | Revue pénitentiaire. |
| EcR. | Economic Review. | RPh. | Revue philosophique. |
| EdR. | Educational Review. | RPP. | Revue politique et parlementaire. |
| EHR. | English Historical Review. | RRL. | Review of Reviews, London. |
| EM. | Engineering Magazine. | RRN. | Review of Reviews, New York. |
| F. | Forum. | RSC. | Revue sociale catholique. |
| FR. | Fortnightly Review. | RSI. | Revisita storica italiana. |
| GEc. | Giornale degli economisti. | RT. | Revue du travail. |
| GM. | Gunter's Magazine. | S. | Sanitarian. |
| HLR. | Harvard Law Review. | SR. | School Review. |
| HN. | Humanité nouvelle. | SS. | Science sociale. |
| HR. | Hygieoische Rundschau. | VWP. | Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. |
| HZ. | Historische Zeitschrift. | YR. | Yale Review. |
| IAE. | Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie. | ZE. | Zeitschrift für Ethnologie. |
| IJE. | International Journal of Ethics. | ZGS. | Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft. |
| JAL. | Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. | ZPK. | Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. |
| JCB. | Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association. | ZPO. | Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht. |
| JEc. | Journal des économistes. | ZPP. | Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane. |
| JFI. | Journal of the Franklin Institute. | ZS. | Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft. |
| JGV. | Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft. | ZVR. | Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft. |
| | | ZVS. | Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung. |

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THE CITY IN HISTORY.

IN every system of social philosophy from Aristotle to Spencer the relation of city growth to national progress has occupied an important place. While the diversity of interpretation becomes less marked with the more recent writers, we are still far from a consensus of opinion.

The interest of the philosophers, as of the people of ancient Greece and Rome, was centered in the city. Beyond its limits life was stunted and incomplete. With the simpler concept of life which ushered in the Middle Ages a reaction against the conventionality and artificiality of city life makes itself felt. The city is looked upon as the center of vice and crime rather than as the focus of the elevating and ennobling pleasures. "Return to nature," which is the cry of the eighteenth century as well as of the sixth, expresses the revolt against the excesses to which the temptations of city life had led. Not until the changes accompanying the industrial revolution had demonstrated that economic progress and city growth were connected as cause and effect, do we find a marked change of attitude. With the evolutionary philosophy of the present century the city is again given a position of importance among the factors of advancing civilization.

If we turn from the interpretation of philosophers to the facts of historical development, it is evident that concentration of

population is a primary requisite to advancing civilization. The temptations and dangers which city growth involves are dangers incident to progress. That nations have succumbed to such temptations is merely an illustration of the fact that every change in the conditions of life brings with it a new strain upon national character requiring increased self-control and discrimination.

Throughout the history of civilization we can readily trace the close relation between the aggregation of population and the development of the arts and sciences. The close association of city life first makes possible the division of labor, and with such division of labor comes increased productive power. Every advance in productive power creates new wants and involves new possibilities of enjoyment. In all the earlier civilizations menial duties were performed by slaves, which set free the energy necessary to supply the wealthy and leisure classes with comforts and luxuries. The possibility of leisure, which becomes a reality through the division of labor, opens new avenues of intellectual development. We speak of the country as the best place for meditation and reflection, but constantly lose sight of the fact that it is "the crowd, the hum, the shock of men" that sharpens the intellect, develops inventive genius, stirs commercial activity, and arouses the spirit of coöperation.

The primary incentive to intellectual advance comes from the city. For the mass of the population a constant stimulus is necessary to assure even a small amount of intellectual activity, for left to himself the individual rapidly sinks to the intellectual stagnation characteristic of isolated rural districts. The constant contact of mind with mind, which can only be obtained in the city, is necessary to any general intellectual advance. The social life of our modern cities clearly shows that in the great majority of cases the incentive to intellectual effort comes from without; the desire to imitate some person or group of persons who have acquired a commanding position in the social circle to which they belong. It is only within recent years that we have come to appreciate the full importance of this principle of imitation in progressive as well as in regressive evolution. The growth of custom is but one of its applications. Bagehot was the first

clearly to perceive the far-reaching importance of this factor in making possible concerted action and in establishing social order.¹ But custom presupposes the close association of a considerable number of persons, whether it be the primitive family or the more highly organized modern community.

The limitations of a civilization devoid of cities is well illustrated in the history of the early Aryans, of which Ihering² has given us a masterly analysis. Their slow advance was due to the peculiar economic conditions, which were distinctly unfavorable to city growth. A people of shepherds cannot found cities; their occupation is inconsistent with the close aggregation of population necessary to city life. The fact that the parent stock of the Indo-Europeans did not even reach the agricultural stage explains their inability to advance beyond the village as the highest form of social organization. Even as late as the time of Tacitus the Teutons had not advanced to the city stage. Ihering truly says that no progressive people that has once made this tremendous stride toward a higher civilization would take the step backward to a lower type of organization. The word "city" is unknown to the Sanscrit tongue. Its nearest equivalent—*vastu*—means "abode, domicile, place of habitation." Furthermore, each of the Indo-Germanic tongues has a different term for "city," which goes to show that the phenomenon of urban growth was subsequent to the splitting of the parent stock into separate nations.

We are apt to underrate the importance of the transition from the village to the city economy. It constitutes the last, the most important, and, to the minds of many, the final step in the progress of civilization. In all the nations of western Europe the city represents the highest type of social organization. The nature of the forces determining this transition from the village to the city economy has been the subject of endless dispute among historians. According to one school, led by Fustel de Coulanges,³ the closer association necessary to the

¹ *Physics and Politics*, chap. v.

² IHERING, *Evolution of the Aryan*.

³ FUSTEL DE COULANGES, *The Ancient City*, English edition, p. 167.

development of city life was made possible through the adoption of a common religion. Community of religious worship constituted the basic civic bond. "The tribes that united to form a city never failed to light a sacred fire and to adopt a common religion." Another and more recent interpretation is that advanced by Ihering.¹ According to this view the city was originally the fortified place which served as a refuge for the surrounding agricultural population in periods of danger.

From our present knowledge of the conditions of life in primitive communities, it is evident that the latter explanation strikes closer to the root of the problem. Community of religious worship was the result of certain definite economic and social needs; a necessity incident to the closer coöperation which city life demands. While common religious ties accompanied the founding of the city, it is not the cause to which the aggregation of population is to be ascribed.

The early history of the Semites furnishes abundant testimony—most of which is cited by Ihering—that the fortified center always accompanied increasing density of population, and that in a great many instances it was within the walls of the fortified inclosure that the city first developed. Just as the towns of the tenth and eleventh centuries grouped themselves under the protection of some fortified castle, so the cities of the early Semites were nothing more than walled inclosures to which men, women, and children fled, and in which household goods were stored and cattle collected at the signal of an approaching foe. From a mere place of refuge this walled inclosure gradually became a place of residence; at first for a few artisans, then for those whose estates were nearest the fortifications.

It required many centuries to make fully apparent the radical changes which this new form of association was destined to work in the conditions of national life and thought. The fundamental political ideas upon which modern governmental organization rests, the characteristic features of our economic activity, the higher standards of social intercourse which distinguish modern from primitive society—all rest upon conditions for

¹ *Evolution of the Aryan* (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898).

the development of which the growth of the city was a prerequisite.

The idea of territorial attachment, which is at the root of our modern idea of patriotism, was greatly strengthened by the influence of city life. It is true that the origin of the idea is to be found in the changes incident to the transition from the pastoral to the agricultural stage. We are prone to forget, however, that one of the most important factors in the development of agriculture was proximity to the city. Until the new market possibilities are developed the amount of labor expended upon the soil is comparatively small, and the attachment to any particular locality is correspondingly weak.¹ Strong territorial ties are largely dependent upon "the memory of long and hard struggles, upon the consciousness of effort expended in the past and willingness to make further sacrifice in the future." No such feeling seems to have moved the early agriculturists. With the city, however, an entirely new basis for the development of economic and social relations was offered. In the purely agricultural stage each household was sufficient unto itself; everything necessary to the daily routine of life was manufactured in the home. Division of labor between different groups of occupations was unknown. With the certainty of a ready market comes the possibility of specialization in trade and industry; relatively complex relations of service and counter-service are soon developed, which strengthen the territorial tie. The city soon comes to mean the territorial unit within which the activity of the artisan has its limits, as well as the center of social amusement for the well-to-do landed proprietor. Thus the new economic relations, combined with the social pleasures which never fail to arise when population becomes dense, give a new meaning to the idea of residence. Citizenship, with the feeling of loyalty and attachment to the territory itself, becomes a reality. It is important to note that the feeling of attachment is no longer limited to the property owned by the individual, as is the case in the agricultural stage. The whole territory of the city, as the center of new economic opportunities

¹ See IHERING, *Evolution of the Aryan*.

and the theater of social pleasures, becomes the "home" of the individual. He is no longer the inhabitant of a small piece of ground, but the resident of the city—in short, a "citizen."

Another important result of this development of economic and social relations is the influence upon social manners and customs. Language has here recorded the accumulated experience of the race with great accuracy. The Latin *homo rusticus* and *homo urbanus*, which indicate the contrast between the city- and country-bred, were also used to describe the difference between the boorish, the unrefined, the vulgar and the cultured, the polished, the courteous. The influence of city life upon the individual took some time to make itself felt in the cities of the earliest historic time. The principle of social imitation already referred to shows itself with peculiar force in the growth of the customs, forms, and ceremonials which constitute the outward signs of the refining of social relations. The great landowners, who were as a rule the heads of the oldest families of the town—those who were regarded as the founders of the city—were the first to develop the more refined forms of social intercourse. They were at the same time the political leaders, a fact which gave to all their actions additional prestige and authority. To appreciate the influence of such leaders we need but glance at the conditions of social life in modern society. Each class—in fact, every social set within each class—has its leaders, those who set the standards of social intercourse. The constant search for "*the thing to do*," the uncertainty as to whether a particular form is correct until sanctioned by a social leader, is one of the most interesting illustrations of the law of social imitation. The attempt of each class to imitate the forms of social intercourse of that just above it often appears to be one of the great weaknesses of human nature. Viewed from the sociological standpoint, however, it is one of the great forces making for progress. Its influence as a unifying force extends far beyond the limits of the city. Social classes in different cities are constantly taking from one another new standards of conduct and intercourse. This is particularly true of the relation of the capital city to provincial towns. Thus in ancient times the customs of the

Athenian citizens were copied throughout Greece ; the patricians of Rome were the models to the ruling classes in other cities of Italy ; just as today the man of leisure of Lyons apes the manners of the *boulevardier* of Paris. The more polished manners of the wealthy and leisure classes gradually filter down from stratum to stratum. With each class the form of intercourse is modified, until some traces of it are to be found even in the lower classes. Babylon, Athens, Rome, Constantinople, each in turn served as model for the provincial towns, in much the same way as Paris, Berlin, and London serve at the present time.

With these primary results of city growth in mind we can readily appreciate the significance of city life in the history of civilization. It creates new economic activities, new political ideas and ideals, new forms of social intercourse, new possibilities of interchange of ideas. Discussion, the contact of mind with mind through which the general level of intelligence is raised, becomes one of the prominent factors in the political life, first of a class, then of the whole people. A constant and ready audience is furnished to the orator, the poet, and the philosopher. Although it required centuries to develop all these possibilities, they were in process of formation from the time the inclosing walls of the first cities were built.

THE CITIES OF GREECE.

The records of Greek civilization begin and end with its cities ; no other nation has so completely concentrated its life and thought upon the perfecting of city life. To the Greek mind the history of the race begins with the founding of the city. The facts of historical development are made to harmonize with this view by means of a kind of social-compact theory according to which primitive tribes were brought together by some supernatural power, and as the result of their union the city was formed. Though this explanation of the origin of the city may lack foundation in fact, it is interesting as an indication of the dominant position occupied by the city in the thought of the time. This early form of the social-compact theory was used at

a later period to explain the origin of Rome and of the other cities of Italy.

The rise of Athens furnishes one of the best instances of the influence of environmental conditions upon urban growth. The city is situated in the center of a plain surrounded by mountains on all sides except to the south, where it approaches the sea. This protected position offered a resting place for the more advanced clans and tribes, especially those who were prepared for the settled pursuits of agriculture. The introduction of the olive, which requires great care and attention, served to strengthen the attachment to the soil and thus assure a relatively stable population.

In the immediate vicinity of Athens, furthermore, the greatest variety of soil and climate was to be found.¹ Within a comparatively short radius of the Acropolis the grape, the olive, and the staple agricultural products were raised with comparatively little difficulty. Mineral resources of considerable importance were within easy reach, clay pottery offered employment to a large number, while close proximity to the sea opened the seafaring careers to the population. Another important element in the situation of Athens was the abundance of water due to the proximity of the mountain ranges. The early deification of these springs and the important position ascribed to the water nymphs, such as Agrauleon, Nysa, and Krene, are indications of an early appreciation of the necessity of husbanding these resources with the greatest care. The fact that the early settlement of the native tribes was not made immediately on the seacoast is not surprising when we bear in mind the constant exposure to inroads of marauding pirates which such situation involves. In ancient times the seacoast was the haunt of robber bands rather than a place for permanent settlement.

With the combination of physical and economic conditions described above, the rapid growth of Athens is readily explained. In fact, the country districts of Greece never developed a distinctive life of their own. Citizenship itself meant membership in the body corporate of some one of the "city-states." Not

¹ Cf. CURTIUS, *Stadtgeschichte von Athen*, Berlin, 1891.

only was everything planned to meet the demands of the city, but the soil itself was owned by persons living within the city walls. Agriculture was carried on by slaves, and the produce sent to the city. To be compelled to live in the country was a mark of social degradation. Citizenship of Athens was the goal of civic ambition.

We have some difficulty at the present time in picturing to ourselves the conditions resulting from the complete absorption by the city of all the political and social interests of the community. At a time when political, social, and religious institutions were still undifferentiated, when the city concentrated within itself the ties which today are scattered over an ever-increasing area and among an indefinite number of institutions, it is not surprising that an intensity of city life was developed which has not been again attained. For this reason the social and civic life of the cities of Greece is of far greater interest to us than the form of governmental organization and administration.

The identity of state and municipality makes comparisons with modern conditions misleading rather than helpful. Athens seems to have lacked the nice coördination of authority which characterizes our modern system.¹ During the early history of the city-states kinship seems to have been the guiding principle in administrative organization, which accounts for the growth of an aristocracy of birth monopolizing public office. Coincident with the increase of the privileged class we find the first clear differentiation of governmental functions. The king was first induced to delegate certain of his powers to his immediate advisers, which marked the first step in the transition from the early "king-priest" form of government, in which all power, civil and ecclesiastical, was vested in one person, to the aristocratic and oligarchic system. Those whom the king called in as advisers soon came to regard their office as a proprietary right. A narrow aristocracy of magistrates was thus formed, which in Athens absorbed all political power and gradually degenerated into an oligarchy of the worst type. Most of the other cities of Greece went through the same stages of development.

¹ BOECKH, *Staatshaushalt der Athener*.

The transition to democracy in Athens was preceded by important economic changes which completely altered the class relations within the community. The primary cause of these changes was the increasing industrial importance and consequent social power of the artisan class. This class arose in response to the higher and more refined wants of the governing and wealthy classes. Selected at first from among the dependents, because of special aptitudes as handicraftsmen, they gradually acquired social privileges which became more important as their clientage became wider. The imitation of the fashion set by the social leaders of Athens aroused a constantly increasing demand for the better class of products. Economic independence brought with it gradual social emancipation. It required long years of struggle before this condition of fact was recognized in law. The inherent contradiction between legal and social relations was a fruitful source of discontent and a constant menace to the peace and safety of the community. The drastic legislation of Solon sought to reestablish harmony between law and fact. The first step was to give those who had acquired economic independence the right to participate in the political life of the community. To make civic emancipation complete all outstanding debts on land and person were abolished. The entry of a relatively large class of former serfs and slaves into the political life of the community led to the formation of the first popular assembly. From this time until the Athenian democracy reached the height of its development we have a series of assemblies comprising an ever-increasing percentage of the population. The best authorities seem to agree, however, that at no time did the citizen body exceed one-tenth of the total population of 200,000. To this general assembly of citizens all important questions were submitted. A standing committee or council of five hundred, elected from the larger body, was intrusted with the general administration of public affairs. That Athens was able to make this rapid extension of rights without bringing about political anarchy represents her most important contribution to the development of political institutions.

The ideals which dominated the period are so different from our own as to make the contrast suggestive and profitable. In Athens, as in most of the cities of the ancient world, the individual was completely subordinated to the community. His welfare had no existence independent of the welfare of the city as a whole. The Greeks could not conceive of an opposition of interest between the individual and the group, or, if such opposition did arise, there was no question as to which should prevail. Ideas of imprescriptible, inalienable rights were foreign to Greek thought until the time of the Stoics. Adjustment of individual activity to the harmony of communal life seems to have been the guiding principle of social conduct. The contrast between the splendor and attractiveness of social life and the relative crudity of family life is difficult for us to grasp at the present time. This is largely due to the fact that in modern communities the welfare of the family rather than that of the community commands the best energies of the individual. With us the common, inclusive pleasures of communal life play a very small part compared with the intense pleasures of home life. In the cities of Greece, however, these public pleasures strengthened the feeling of local attachment which found expression in an inexhaustible local patriotism.

ROME AND THE CITIES OF ITALY.

The fact that the conditions of soil, climate, and immediate physical environment were less favorable to Rome than to Athens was far outweighed by the commanding position of the former in the Italian peninsula and its more favorable geographical relation to the other countries of the Mediterranean basin. Although the plain of Latium—of which Rome occupied the strategic position—did not offer the variety of soil and climate of the central plain of Attica, it was sufficiently fertile to attract and furnish support for a large population. With the Sabine mountains to the east, the Volscian to the south, the hill lands of Etruria to the north, and the sea to the west, its position combined to a remarkable degree security with accessibility to other portions of Italy, Europe, and Africa. The desire to protect

themselves from the attacks of pirates, which led the early settlers of Athens to remain at a distance of some five miles from the sea, was equally powerful in the case of Rome. At a distance of some fourteen miles from the mouth of the Tiber the series of surrounding hills furnished a readily defensible position most favorable to permanent settlement.

The founding of the city has been lost in a mass of legend and tradition. It is quite certain, however, that a number of separate tribal settlements existed on the several hills long before the formation of a unified city. The division of the city into wards, known as *tribus rusticæ*, long after such unity had been attained, is conclusive evidence of the nature of the constituent factors in the formation of the city. The explanation now generally accepted is that the necessities of common defense forced the tribes into closer relationship, which ultimately developed into political unity. The first organization of the *populus romanus* is in the three tribes—the Ramnes, the Tities, and the Luceres—which were probably the original tribal settlements.

The cities of ancient Italy, while lacking the charm of high artistic development which characterized some of the cities of Greece, mark a distinct advance when viewed from a political standpoint. The Greek concept of restricted city territory was ill-adapted to the larger view of political relations developed by the Romans. Furthermore, the growth of a world-empire made it necessary to give a broader interpretation of citizenship. Roman citizenship was conferred upon the leading citizens of conquered districts, even when situated at great distance from the city. This intangible political relation marked a long step toward the idea of nationality. Of all the cities of the Italian peninsula of this period Rome is the only one which commands our attention because of its enormous influence upon western civilization, the magnitude of the municipal problems with which it had to deal, and the striking analogies with modern urban growth. In her history one can detect the presence of most of the forces which explain the increase of urban population in recent times. In advancing beyond the "city-state" and developing the idea of

world-empire she created the conditions requisite for the growth of large centers of population. The extension of political influence to distant countries led to the development of an elaborate administrative system having its center in Rome. The conquered countries, instead of being reduced to a condition of complete subjection, were permitted a large measure of local self-government. Political centralization brought with it well-developed means of communication between province and capital, and a system of police protection to life and property. Thus freedom of migration was for the first time made possible and resulted in the influx of the country population into the cities. The economic opportunities offered by a city of the size of Rome, combined with the fascination of the spectacular display of court life, proved irresistible to the most energetic and capable of the inhabitants of the rural districts. The constant tension of interest and excitement which the city offered made poverty seem more desirable than comparative ease in the rural districts. The metropolis was open to every new idea and eagerly welcomed every invention and discovery. Men of science, philosophers, and poets, all sought the audience of Rome.

With all these influences at work it is not surprising that the population soon approached the million mark. Owing to the absence of a census the exact number is not known, the estimates varying from one and a half to two millions. The best authorities place it at about 800,000.¹ There is abundant evidence that when this point was reached all the phenomena of overcrowding made their appearance. While the walls of the city embraced a comparatively large territory and were being continually moved farther from the original limits, the lack of means of transportation led to the concentration of population in the central districts. Everyone wished to be near the center of social life and amusement. The *clientes* had to be at the door of the patron early in the day and were unwilling to take the risk of a long journey from the peripheral or suburban districts. A degree of overcrowding resulted with which no modern city offers a parallel.

¹ Cf. BELOCH, *Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt* (Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1886).

Hundreds and thousands were crowded into cellar dwellings. The narrow streets, characteristic of all the ancient Italian cities, added to the difficulties of the situation. In Rome we can clearly see the relation of the standard of life of a people to the question of overcrowding. It is true that most of our modern cities contain districts far more densely populated than any quarter of Rome, but, owing to the low standard of life of the poorer classes and the lack of effective sanitary supervision, the resulting conditions in Rome were far worse. Fortunately, the habits of the people led them to spend the greater portion of their time in the streets, which counteracted, in part at least, the unwholesome effects of the conditions of habitation. This love of street life, which contrasts so strongly with the conditions in the American cities of today, led to the congestion of the thoroughfares to such a degree that Cæsar found it necessary to issue a decree prohibiting the passage of wagons through the central districts during the ten hours after sunrise. The strict enforcement of this regulation was made imperative by the great number of traders' booths that were erected along the sidewalks. Not until the time of Augustus was any systematic attempt made to regulate the building of dwelling houses. Their height was then limited to seven stories, and some elementary sanitary requirements prescribed.

It is curious, and at first sight rather surprising, that the municipality of Rome—and the same is true of all the ancient cities—while neglecting the regulation of private sanitation, gave considerable attention to everything connected with public convenience and comfort. Great public baths, a magnificent water supply and splendid public places were provided with a munificence which has not since been equaled. By such means the emperors gained the support of the masses. To make way for such public improvements whole sections of the city were torn down, thus increasing the congestion in adjacent districts.

In short, the municipal activity of Rome was directed mainly toward the development of the social amusements of the city. The regulation of individual health and welfare was largely lost sight of. In modern times the tendency seems to be in exactly

the opposite direction. The great—and probably the only—lesson which Rome has to teach modern municipalities, *quâ* municipalities, is the importance of the rôle of the public authority in providing healthful recreation for the citizens. Our strong individualistic instincts have led us to develop only those sides of municipal activity that contribute directly to individual welfare; we are still far from accepting the idea of the social rôle of the municipality. It is clear to every student of our industrial and social conditions that we must sooner or later give due weight to this more positive view of governmental power. In the readjustment which is gradually being effected the experience of the ancient cities will be of considerable value.

CITIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES.¹

With the breaking up of the Roman empire, Europe enters upon a period of disintegration which finds expression in the most extreme forms of political decentralization. The feudal system, while containing the germs of city growth, did not permit of the free movement of population necessary to the growth of large centers. Settlement was dependent upon the will of the feudal lord. The earliest towns grouped themselves around the feudal castles, mainly to enjoy the protection afforded by the fortifications, while others owe their origin to special market privileges granted by the feudal lords. To one or the other of these two causes, or to both combined, the growth of the mediæval towns may be traced. None of the early towns could boast of more than a few thousand inhabitants—hardly larger than a modern village; in fact the largest English borough of the thirteenth century contained but five thousand inhabitants.² At the beginning of the fifteenth century London itself had a population of but forty thousand. The three primary requisites for city growth were lacking:

1. A large territory from which to draw population.

¹See ASHLEY, *End of the Middle Ages*; MRS. J. R. GREEN, *Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*; JASTROW, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Stadtgemeinde*, Düsseldorf, 1889.

²MRS. J. R. GREEN, *op. cit.*

2. An advanced state of commercial and industrial development offering opportunity for remunerative employment to large numbers.

3. A strongly centralized government guaranteeing freedom of migration from district to district, thus permitting the city to exercise its full powers of attraction upon the country population.

The absence of these conditions brings the social life, the economic activity, and the position of the mediæval city in the loosely coördinated political system of the time into striking contrast with modern municipal institutions.

We have become so accustomed to regard the city as an administrative subdivision of the state, enjoying certain subordinate powers of government, that we have great difficulty in picturing to ourselves the town life of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries. The greatest differences relate to the activity rather than to the form of city government. The mediæval town was primarily an economic unit, the modern city is mainly a political and administrative division. A study of the town life of the Middle Ages leaves the impression that we have to do with great commercial corporations, exploiting special economic privileges. The monopoly of market rights, the power of regulating trades and industries, the complete control over every economic activity, all rights wrested from the temporal or ecclesiastical feudal lord, are the most important factors in the development of town institutions. Those who participated in the struggle for these privileges share equally in their enjoyment. When we stop to consider that all our modern ideas of political and civil rights, patriotism, and national allegiance were as yet undeveloped, it is not at all surprising that the early burghers looked upon the town as a complex of economic privileges, and that the town life of the period should receive its character from this principle. The exploitation of the tangible property and of the intangible rights of the town is the key to the institutions of the period.

The main problems with which the mediæval towns had to deal were connected with the exploitation of these property

rights. Not until late in their history was any attempt made to develop the distinctive municipal services with which we associate the modern city. No public water supply, no public drainage or lighting system, no sanitary regulations; in a word, nothing to remind us of the purely public or governmental side of the city's activity. On the other hand, innumerable regulations concerning trade and industry, prescribing with great minuteness every detail in the industrial activity of the individual, seem to have occupied the attention of the local authorities. Those who were fortunate enough to be parties to the original privileges were naturally anxious to assure exclusive enjoyment to themselves and to their posterity. Active participation in the benefits of these privileges was the mark of citizenship; strangers were admitted as a matter of grace. The idea of political rights was the product of a much later period. The city authorities not merely regulated, but were the leading spirits in the trade and commerce of the town. In many cases the city had the first option on all goods offered for sale. A curious trait of the policy of the mediæval towns was the strong desire to protect the consumer as against the exactions of the producer. The price, time, and place of sale were fixed for every class of goods. The few foreign merchants who were permitted entry into the city markets were carefully watched, the supervision of the public authority often extending to the assignment of their dwelling place.

The contrast between mediæval and modern citizenship is readily explained when we keep in mind that the former carried with it certain specific economic advantages, quite as definite as membership in the modern business corporation. It is no wonder, therefore, that citizenship became a marketable, inheritable property right. In some cases it could be acquired by ownership of land within the limits of the town or by serving an apprenticeship in one of the trades under guild regulation. But in every case the extension of citizenship was under the control of the town authorities. The usual methods of acquiring full membership in the community were, first, through inheritance; second, through gift from the municipality; third, through purchase.

The desire of the citizen body to retain the exclusive enjoyment of the town privileges explains the form of government of the mediæval towns. It is but natural that those who had participated in the early struggles with the feudal lords should participate in the advantages accruing from the results of the conflict. In the early history of many of the towns the market rights furnished the economic basis for city growth. Equal participation in these advantages and political equality went hand in hand. The democratic movement of the Middle Ages was checked as soon as the original settlers or their descendants had established the rule of exclusive enjoyment. After the twelfth century distinct traces of a nascent oligarchy are to be seen, which became well marked at the beginning of the fourteenth. "The English borough in its first condition, and probably during a considerable part of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, realized the ideal of a true democratic community."¹ The forces that undermined the early democracy were twofold—first, the denial of equal economic opportunity to newcomers, which led to their political subordination; second, the social ascendancy of the more prosperous trades, which gave to certain classes the leadership in political affairs.

The first of these requires but little explanation, as the monopoly of economic and political privileges which the founders of the towns had secured for themselves was inherently inconsistent with the principles of democracy.

The second is closely connected with the growth of the guilds which were, at first, conglomerate associations of employers and employés—the organization of producers as against consumers. Within each guild, rank was determined by individual skill and efficiency; inherited privileges were unknown. Democracy within the guild continued to exist long after democracy in town government had disappeared. The intimate relation between the guilds and the town government, which developed very gradually, was due to the fact that the main function of the public authority was to guard the economic privileges of the town and to further its industrial

¹ MRS. J. R. GREEN, *Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*.

prosperity. Constant consultation with, and in fact the active coöperation of the trade organizations was necessary to the efficient performance of this function. It is but natural that they should be called upon for advice in the solution of purely commercial questions, in much the same way as municipal authorities call upon chambers of commerce at the present time. In the mediæval city, moreover, municipal functions were almost exclusively concerned with questions of trade, commerce, and industry. With organizations so well equipped to deal with commercial questions as were the guilds, it was only a question of time when their advisory power would develop into real authority over this branch of municipal activity. The absorption of the most important public functions by the trade organizations gave them a strength of political power which resulted in the subservience of all other public authorities to their will. This shifting of public power completely changed the character of the city government.

The consciousness of acquired power reacted upon the guilds, transforming them into aristocratic associations of the most pronounced type. The temptation to use this power to secure a monopolistic control over the trade and industry of the city was irresistible. Membership in one of the guilds was made a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of a trade. Thus a twofold incentive to withhold membership from newcomers was created: first, to prevent the overcrowding of trades; and, secondly, to maintain the high value of guild membership. Thus the same economic forces which in the early history of the mediæval towns were instrumental in creating a democratic society became destructive of this form as soon as the desire to retain exclusive possession of market and trade privileges began to show itself.

It was not long before the guild aristocracy degenerated into an oligarchy, due in part to exceptional power enjoyed by the leaders of the guilds, but mainly to the decreasing interest in town affairs incident to the expansion of commercial relations. As is the case with all associations of this character, the affairs of the guilds were carried on by a comparatively small number

of officials who naturally enjoyed the political power connected with their position. Thus a small fraction of the total guild membership became the real rulers of the town.

That this assumption of power aroused no great opposition is due to the fact that at the time when it took place the economic and political interests of the citizen were beginning to extend beyond the limits of the town. At the close of the fourteenth century the English towns had reached the height of independent development. "With the ages of restless growth lying behind them, and with their societies as yet untouched by the influence of the Renaissance or the Reformation or the new commercial system, the boroughs had reached their prosperous maturity."¹ During the succeeding century England passed through her first industrial revolution. From a cloth-importing she became a cloth-exporting country. The establishment of commercial relations with foreign countries carried the interest of the citizen beyond the territorial limits of municipal control. The spirit of independence and assertive individualism thus created reacted unfavorably upon local institutions, while local ties, being largely economic, were weakened with the disappearance of economic dependence upon the community. As soon as the citizen began to appreciate the possibilities of individual activity independent of the coöperation and sanction of the public authority, the vigor and intensity of town life began to decline.

With the fifteenth century we enter upon a period of political development which was destined to destroy the importance of the town as a political unit, reducing it to the condition of a subordinate administrative subdivision of the state. The growth of national life proved fatal to town independence in England, as well as on the continent. In England, however, the period of local autonomy was considerably lengthened by the failure of the feudal lords to extend their political power at the expense of the crown. Before reaching national unity the countries of continental Europe passed through a period of territorial integration, in which the small but independent sovereignties were in a state of constant conflict with the towns.

¹ MRS. J. R. GREEN, *Town Life in the Fifteenth Century*.

In France, on the other hand, the necessities of war developed a strong central government as early as the twelfth century, cutting short the period of municipal independence. In England the centralizing policy of Henry VIII. and Wolsey demanded the subordination of the towns to the purposes of the king. The crown saw clearly that independence of local policy develops political ties and political ideas inherently antagonistic to a strongly centralized system. The necessity of obtaining control over the towns was made imperative by the desire of the king to maintain his supremacy in parliament through the manipulation of the borough representation. In order to assure himself of the support of this important element of parliamentary representation, a system of returning members was devised, to which the peculiar development of borough government lent ready aid. As the concentration of municipal authority in the hands of a few guild representatives became more pronounced, it became the custom, in adjusting inter-municipal relations, to identify these individuals with the municipality. The corporate concept, which was just making its appearance in the English law—having been first applied to ecclesiastical and eleemosynary institutions—furnished a ready means of effecting the purpose of the crown. The essence of the corporate idea is the legal personification of a collection of individuals. If, by any means, the crown could make its own nominees the corporate body, there would be no difficulty in controlling the parliamentary representation of the borough. This was done by issuing writs of *quo warranto* and substituting for the charters forfeited under this proceeding a form of organization in which those constituting the corporate body (*i. e.*, the returning parliamentary organ) were specifically named.

Such proceedings would have aroused a storm of opposition, even revolution, at an earlier period, when the citizen body was in closer touch with municipal powers and prerogatives. As we have already had occasion to point out, the growing industrial independence had greatly weakened local ties. With the exception of the larger cities, such as London, little opposition was encountered. The people were too much absorbed in exploiting the new commercial and industrial opportunities to

pay much attention to changes in the mechanism of local government. Furthermore, the increasing importance of national affairs was absorbing the political energies of the people. Thus a change, which at first glance would seem to violate the fundamental political principles of a liberty-loving people was effected without violence, and almost without opposition.

In granting the new charters the crown appointed the members of the corporation, giving to these appointees power to fill all vacancies. Thus the community as a body of citizens and the borough as a corporation became distinct entities. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the civic life of the boroughs of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries possesses little of interest to the student of local institutions. Town life does not again offer a fruitful field of investigation until the appearance of the new urban centers, which owe their rise to the industrial changes of the end of the eighteenth century.

THE MODERN CITY.

With the breaking up of the mediæval system of independent town units we enter upon a period of political development in which the city is given a position fundamentally different from that which it occupied during previous periods. The change was one that affected not merely the relation between city and state, but also profoundly influenced the attitude of the population toward the city and its government. With the Reformation period the transformation of political ideas and ideals becomes distinctly apparent; a movement which was hastened by the radical changes in territorial relations throughout Europe.

In the cities of the ancient and mediæval world the individual in all his personal and property interests was subordinated to the community. The *communitates* occupied first place in the political thinking of the time; political ideals were grouped about the city. Individual welfare was, in fact, so closely bound up with the city's activity that this interpretation of the relation of the individual to the community was not only logical but necessary. Every relation of trade, industry, or commerce was dependent upon the public authority. In fact, in the mediæval towns, as

we have had occasion to see, membership in the political community was a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of any trade or calling.

The new and distinctly modern spirit first asserts itself in an intense individualism which completely changed the concept of government. The idea of the individual as an end, rather than as a means, begins to dominate the political thinking of the time. England of the seventeenth century gives clear evidence of the influence of the new political principles. The rôle of government, which in the mediæval cities had been construed to include the regulation of every field of individual activity, receives a new and distinctly negative interpretation. Ideas of inherent and imprescriptible individual right obtain general acceptance, while government is regarded as the guarantor and protector of these rights rather than as a positive factor in industrial activity. The settlement of America gives to these ideas a new and wider environment in which to develop. There they receive definite formulation in law. The bills of rights and the prohibitions upon government of the early compacts are dominated by a spirit of individualism which has been fostered by the industrial evolution of the present century. In a country of unexploited resources the opportunities for individual initiative and enterprise are so great that a feeling of independence toward government inevitably arises.

Due, in large part, to the combination of these forces, the negative view of government, which limits the public authority to the protection of individual rights, received its fullest development in the United States. It has met with no such counter-acting political forces as has been the case in England. Not only the conditions of economic growth, but also the character of our political life, has fostered these individualistic tendencies. The political issues which the present generation has had to face have made prominent individual rather than national interests. The manufacturer desires a tariff to increase his profits; the workingman, to raise his wages; the debtor advocates a silver standard; the creditor, a gold standard. In none of these questions have the interests of the nation, as such, been made prominent.

It is taken for granted that public and individual interests are essentially identical.

That this attitude toward government has strongly influenced the civic life of our cities is evident to every observer of American political conditions. To one section of the community the city government is a necessary evil designed to avoid the greater evil which would result from the clash of individual interests. To another it is akin to a great business corporation, justifying the use of the ordinary standards of commercial morality in obtaining favors and privileges. No civic or social duty is violated if franchises are obtained by questionable methods ; transactions of this character being judged by the prevailing standards of business life. If the municipal authorities are unable to safeguard the city's interests, they deserve to be outclassed in the commercial struggle as would any incompetent business-man. The city's interests are rarely, if ever, identified with those of the public, and in taking advantage of incompetent or corrupt officials there is no thought of depriving the public of rights to which it is entitled.

Another important influence in strengthening this negative attitude toward the city is closely connected with one of the strongest traits of American national character—the high development of the domestic virtues and the resulting intensity of home life. While no one can deny the great service which these qualities have rendered to our national life, we must recognize that upon our civic life their influence has been distinctly negative. The concentration of effort upon the exclusive pleasures of the home has retarded the growth of the distinctive civic ideals. The feeling of social solidarity and civic responsibility, so necessary to the maintenance of high standards in public life, has remained undeveloped. Administrative efficiency has only been attained in those departments—such as the police and fire service—which directly affect the safety and integrity of the home.

In European cities, on the other hand, the branches of the public service which contribute most to the public, inclusive, and social pleasures have received the most attention. The street-cleaning, highway construction, and architectural services

of Paris furnish a striking illustration of this principle. In the life of the French capital the outdoor pleasures play a most important part, pleasures which to a very large degree are dependent upon the degree of care given to the streets. As a result, the failure to maintain high standards is immediately felt by the population and arouses violent opposition. In our American cities the streets are regarded as means of communication and nothing more, and the mass of the population remains satisfied so long as such communication is made easy and rapid. Not that the mass of the population does not desire clean streets. But the fact that dirty streets do not arouse resentment sufficiently strong to give rise to positive action makes such opinion as does exist ineffectual. Standards of efficiency in government are determined by the dislikes rather than the desires of the population.

From this analysis it is evident that the problem of city government is one which involves more than the question of governmental organization or reorganization. Its successful solution requires, not merely the most efficient administrative machinery, but such a change in the life and thought of the people as will bring an increasing number of city services into organic, vital relation with the daily life, the pleasures and recreations of the population.

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A NEGLECTED PRINCIPLE IN CIVIC REFORM.

THE most distinctive feature in programs for civic reform is an excess of utilitarianism. Reformers are training their energies to impress the public consciousness with the advantages—pecuniary and qualitative—of certain changes in municipal methods. For example, in the line of public works the arguments for and against the day-labor system are addressed to the selfish interests of different classes of individuals. The laborer is assured that his interests will be furthered in respect to his compensation, in greater security of tenure in his employment, to the conditions under which he labors, and to shorter hours of labor. The same line of selfish appeal is resorted to in addressing the taxpayers and the consumers of public utilities. It is either the taxpayer who is assured that the work will be more economically done because of the diminished opportunities for jobs and corruption, or the general public which is assured that it will be better done for the same reasons. Schemes for municipal lighting, for municipal water-works, and for municipal tramways are all supported exclusively by utilitarian arguments. The arguments are economic rather than social.

It is also to be noted that what may be termed municipal radicalism extends no farther than to those utilities which have come to be denominated necessities—utilities which belong to the practical, everyday side of life. They include such household necessities as water, lighting, and heating, and they sometimes include such services as municipal telephone and tram systems. In every case the proposition is supported, either from the standpoint of the taxpayer, who may be offered a relief from his present burden of taxes by the net earnings of the proposed municipal system, or from the standpoint of the general public, which is offered cheaper rates or fares.

Civic radicalism never goes so far in this country as to present a program which invades the sphere of æsthetics, or which offers to minister in any new lines to the culture-pleasures of the

people. If a bridge is to span, even a narrow stream, there is no suggestion that art be joined to utility, that it be made to minister to and quicken the sense of the beautiful, while it is serving the simple convenience of the public. Such a blending of art and utility as is found in the *Schlossbrücke* in Berlin is never dreamed of in America. We have developed but scant ideas of architecture in our public buildings; the lines of the severest utility are seldom passed. Where there is a fringe of ornament to relieve the severe plainness, it comes through the force of imitation.

Into the sphere of pure æsthetics the programs of municipal radicalism do not intrude. Æsthetic culture has acquired some local expression in museums of art. It must be said that some of our cities, as Boston, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, Washington, and Milwaukee, are in possession of the germs of art collections of some promise. But these have come in response to non-political forces. They have largely developed under the patronage of individuals or of art societies, as the names designating the institutions or special collections within them attest. They do not stand so much for the culture of the community as they bear witness to the public spirit and taste of a few wealthy individuals. In the line of socio-culture institutions—institutions in which the delight-compelling faculty is more dominant and more sure of its mark—such as the municipal play-house and the municipal opera, we never read a word of advocacy from any quarter. A suggestion of a municipal opera-house, in which the art of music would have a setting fitted to its high character—which it never has found as a money-making institution—in a building whose four walls would bring the people to a higher sense of the beautiful, would sound strange to the practical ear of the American burgher.

Such a suggestion never finds its way into the platform or program of a municipal reform movement. It would be a very impractical dreamer who would hope to excite a popular demand for such an institution.

Private philanthropy may have made a beginning in this direction, in the endowment of academies of music and in the

construction of music halls, which on rare occasions have—as in case of the operatic and dramatic festivals in the Cincinnati Music Hall—enriched the culture of the community by bringing together the cream of American talent. But in this line no creditable architectural effect has been reached—and it can hardly be said that even the seeds of a continuous culture institution have been planted.

The institutions of this class which we now have can scarcely do more than cater to the *élite*; they can rarely offer the best there is to the masses.

The large expense incurred in the presentation of the exceptional entertainments offered necessitates a scale of prices which must exclude the class which most needs to develop an appreciation of art. The prices of admittance to the Cincinnati events are not high from the standpoint of the theater-going classes, considering the returns for the money, but they are beyond the reach of the poor man's purse. The lowest price of admission to the "Messiah," rendered during the Christmas holidays at Carnegie Music Hall in New York, was one dollar.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the economies and the possible results of municipal patronage of such institutions. They will be perfectly evident, however, when we recall that private enterprise has never constructed a building for the opera or the drama of any exterior architectural merit on American soil. There is not one which does not share one or more of its walls with other buildings, and there are very few such buildings which are not used in part for stores and offices. The inadequacy of both private interest and private philanthropy should be very clear when it is recalled that the grand opera has scarcely gained any footing in America.

Municipal radicalism is extremely solicitous about the municipal and the individual budgets. It is full of schemes to serve the masses with the necessities of life at the lowest cost. They have no place in their demands for institutions which irresistibly delight and elevate the masses.

This utilitarian note of radicalism may seem to harmonize with the American practical way of looking at things; it may

seem best adapted to appeal to the hard sense of the people. It may seem to be following the line of least resistance to base an appeal for a compromise with our inherited extreme of individualism upon the most immediate and pressing interests of that individualism. It proceeds upon the theory that a people essentially selfish and egoistic can only be induced to extend the sphere of collective activity where the inducements can be set forth in terms of dollars and cents. It may be argued that the considerations which move our industrially disposed people are not soulful, but pecuniary. So it is probably a question of practical politics which determines the policy of radical municipal reformers. They are not carrying out a propaganda for a utopia which may or may not be realized in the distant future. They are after results, and their program is meant to appeal to the present sense of the community; it is a program designed for immediate adoption. The term "radicalism" is fastened upon municipal reformers by their enemies. They would have themselves called progressivists as opposed to reactionary conservatives. They desire only to facilitate a healthy movement of evolution; they are the farthest from being intentional revolutionists; above all they want to be considered men of practical sense. Hence they present programs designed to meet with the favor of hard-headed, practical men, who are the slaves neither of individualist economic theory nor of the conservative instinct.

However practical and level-headed have been the designers of municipal programs, and with however much of cautious deliberation they have been worked out, it may be said that the results of their endeavors are almost despairingly meager. The water service has become to some extent municipal. A very few cities have made a start in municipal lighting. Franchise-holders are sometimes curbed in their power of exactions. Street-car and other franchises are sometimes made to pay a partial equivalent for the privileges which they enjoy. Almost an inappreciable start has been made in the direction of public restraint over municipal monopolies; still less has been the movement in the direction of positive municipal control and ownership. Almost nothing has been done in the direction of

purifying municipal government. It is a question if municipal corruption is not on the increase. Municipal reformers have not begun to save us from the scandal of American municipal stupidity and municipal corruption. In spite of some most wholesome direct expedients, such as the extension of civil-service examinations, the elimination of the spoils system, and the divorcement of municipal from national politics, it may be a question if the too utilitarian programs of our reformers are adapted to the purpose of infusing purity into our municipal life. Without this element other reforms may only plunge our municipalities into deeper and more difficult complexities. It may be that a wholesome sentiment for recreative and culture utilities will need to be joined to the more material considerations to give the reform movements the impulse requisite to their complete success.

The fundamental errors of the municipal radicals seem to consist in a too material conception of the municipality and a failure to appreciate the capacity of the people to respond to æsthetic appeals. The municipality is not the mechanism which they conceive it, and individuals are not the sordid creatures which they think them. A successful radical propaganda would seem to call, first, for a more careful inquiry into the essential nature of the municipality, and, second, for a deeper study of human nature.

As to the municipality, our radicalism ignores its organic nature and treats it as a mechanism. Theoretically a city might be a pure mechanism, viz., it might consist of a body of people living in the same vicinage, incorporated under the laws of the state into the form of a body politic with the spirit wholly absent. Such a body is purely mechanical. It is mechanically planned, mechanically constructed, and it is kept in motion according to the principles of mechanics. Its bolts and cogs may be taken apart and oiled or replaced, old parts may be eliminated and new ones added in so far as mechanical laws are not violated. People may be induced to operate the machine—to sit in the municipal council, patrol its streets and alleys, and to lubricate the machinery through taxes where a *quid pro quo* is offered

which appeals to selfish individualism. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that such a condition could exist in any municipality including more than a handful of people. Where any considerable number of people are living in close proximity, the birth of the community spirit is almost inevitable—that is, a form of social organism is almost bound to come into being. There are, however, small villages and groups of houses where there is nothing more than a mechanical relationship existing between the families thus congregated, where there is no community spirit, and no sort of organism.

This distinction between a mechanism and an organism may be further illustrated by any gathering of people for a purpose, or even without any purpose. Take the case of a political convention. The delegates are mechanically assembled—they are assembled through the machinery of party politics. The mechanical relationship may never merge into an organism. The speeches may be mechanical, according to pattern. The platform may be adopted and the candidates named all according to a prearranged program, or under the calculating manipulation of the boss. At any point in the proceedings, however, the mechanical relationship may have served to ignite a spirit of the occasion; the occasion may become animated with a throbbing, controlling life; in which case it has become a living organism.

Or, take a more homely illustration of the principle—a dinner party. Here the sensation is most painful if the organic spirit does not develop. If the spirit of conviviality does not rise above the board, if the guests are simply acting a dinner party and not realizing it, if the mechanical stiffness refuses to yield to the entreaties of *comraderie*, the hostess is in despair. If she is competent for such an office, she institutes a search after the hostile elements—in her own want of tact, in any untoward remark, in the *personelle* of the gathering. The consciousness of the organic nature of a proper dinner party would often prevent its failure.

Certain conditions, more or less determinate, but not absolutely, conduce to the birth of a social organism. As in animal

organisms, the absence of the genetic principle under conditions very similar to others which are fruitful may sometimes baffle explanation. The directive spirit may operate within limits for the creation of this spirit, and its peculiar development may to some extent be influenced by determinate culture forces. But it is all-important to understand that a social organism, whether it assumes the form of a body politic or a social gathering, is not made, but born; that it is subject to the laws of growth and decay; that it is subject to disease and death. This view will impress the reformer with a proper conservatism. If he conceives of the municipality as a mechanism, he draws plans for its modification—for its rebuilding, with mathematical decision. He proceeds to execute the plans with a tape-line, hammer, and saw. If the municipality is an organism, such heroic treatment must subject it to a terrible shock without producing any good results, if it does not utterly destroy its life. On the other hand, if the municipality is considered as an organism, the reformer proceeds with great caution and circumspection. The treatment must proceed upon a thorough knowledge of the physiology, anatomy, and hygienic laws of the organism. It must not undertake more than to stimulate the growth and educate the life of the organism, and it must be informed as to the character and limitations of its life-principle.

When the practical reformer understands the organic nature of the municipality, he will soon discover that the vital principle is extremely weak in American cities. In this fact he will discover the source of such organic weaknesses as dishonest municipal governments and incompetent municipal executives. If the municipality were a simple mechanism, its strength and honesty would be determined by the vigor and integrity of the individuals who constitute its substance. The individuals of our cities would average well alongside the people of the most splendid cities of Europe. There are other conditions besides people which determine the vital force of the city.

To understand why the municipal spirit is weak in America we need only recount a few of our determining conditions. We recall first that the genesis of cities in America consisted of

trading settlements situated along the harbors of the Atlantic and along the banks of navigable streams. The virgin continent most needed for its development a people actuated by the exploiting principle. Our immigration called for the most virile individualism of Europe. The organic principle would necessarily be of very slow growth among a people whose absorbing passion is private gain. When we add to the natural individualism of the people the large injection of theoretical individualism about the time of the American revolution, we find the difficulties in the way of the growth of the communistic spirit greatly increased. We find another impediment in the isolation of the dwellings and the measure of opulence enjoyed by the people. The great mass of the people live in separate houses, many working people own their own homes. The dwelling and its surrounding grounds serve to make the family more of a social sphere. The social activities find a very large measure of satisfaction in the home and in a small circle of homes. These conditions make exclusiveness a normal state. It leaves little room for the development of wide community interests. How in contrast with this is the German city, where communism found its inception in association for offensive and defensive measures, where communism was intensified by the intensive growth of the city, the extent of which was limited by the fortified wall! The smallness of the dwellings and the absence of private gardens were conditions which bore fruit in the public inn, the public gardens, and the municipal provisions for public amusement. The conditions of their growth thus insured a vigorous circulation and keen and alert municipal intelligence. Our municipal circulation has been sluggish, and consequently our municipal wit has been heavy, because the lives of the people have touched in so few places. There has been a scarcity of vitalizing conditions.

The first task of the reformer must be to find a tonic for this low vitality, a quickening influence to arouse this sluggishness. The problem of problems is how to build up a strong and healthy community spirit. The growth of a fuller community life must depend upon a closer interrelation of the lives of the members of the community, a larger stock of common utilities and common enjoyments.

A large increase of common utilities is not sufficient. The conception of the city as an agency for the distribution of water and fuel, as a coöperative express agency for the transport of freight and passengers, as an agency for the construction and maintenance of highways, is a mechanical rather than an organic view. Such a union of mere convenience can be in no proper sense organic. It does not attract the people from their isolation into closer contact. The utilities which the people coöperatively own they individually consume. Collective control of gas-pipes and water-mains may demonstrate the powers of coöperation in the same way that a judicious purchase of stock in a sound and dividend-earning corporation attests the business sense of the purchaser. Such a conception reduces the civic corporation to the mechanical level of the soulless commercial corporation. It is, in fact, inferior to the ordinary corporation in that responsibility is less definite, the relationship of principal and agent is not so clearly recognized, the penalties for neglect and evil-doing do not seem so imminent. Hence self-interest is not so great a spur to administrative alertness and honesty.

To exite the municipal spirit into vigorous action something more than business methods and schemes are required. An organic life must be nourished by a certain amount of sentiment. In time past the spirit of nationality, and to some extent the spirit of municipality, have been nourished and strengthened by the tragedies of war, but peaceful means must now be found to excite the spirit of the new municipality. The roots of the municipal spirit must extend deeper than the brain; they must penetrate the heart. The commune must have the love of the people. The spirit is the creature of love and devotion, and it is weak and inert when it has not these. To strengthen the municipal spirit means must be found to arouse love and devotion on the part of the people.

People love that which gives them happiness. Some institution or institutions must be introduced which will call forth a thrill of pleasure. The people must come to look upon the city as ministering to their joys as well as their conveniences. The life of the people in its lighter moods must be made to flow to a

greater extent in community channels. The heart must be profoundly reached in order to quicken demand and awaken jealousy; and when these conditions are realized, we have the necessary ingredients for a pure, vigorous, and efficient municipal life.

To find institutions precisely adapted to this purpose may be a difficult matter. It is suggested that the municipality provide a public club—a place where the citizens may come and go at any time, where they may meet friends, have their lunch, or read the papers and magazines. Such an institution is not adapted to present conditions in America. Owing to our established exclusiveness, to our comfortable private homes and private clubs, the public club would not be patronized by all classes.

Again one thinks of systems of public parks and gardens—places where the people will revel amid fragrance and beauty provided by the municipality. We recall, however, that our park facilities are considerable now; but they are little resorted to. Our home lives are not cramped and our private gardens suffice for breathing space and outdoor recreation, so we do not use the public gardens.

The public schools, as they are now constituted, would not be thought of in this connection, and they do not reach even the children in an attractive way, involving, as they do, an amount of painful discipline and restraint. In no sense do they get fast hold upon the hearts. Certain modifications of the school system, however, may reach deeper into the feelings of the people. The extension of the principle now introduced into the public schools of New York city, of offering free popular lectures to the public, would serve at once to make education more pervasive and to bring some people to a higher consciousness of civicism. The capacity of the project to develop the sense of civicism would, however, be very limited. No scientific or literary subject can be made so attractive as to appeal to the masses. They must require an amount of mental effort, if they are to prove helpful, which the workingman after a day of hard toil is not willing to make.

Art collections are in every way elevating in their tendency, and their value as popular educators cannot be overestimated. They will at the same time bring those whom they are able to reach to a higher sense of civicism; but it must be noted that they do not attract a great many people. Even on free days museums of art are never crowded. Fine work in painting and sculpture is not only not recognized by the masses, it is not even attractive to them. The discriminating sense that finds delight in it is the product of considerable previous culture. These forms of art occupy a height which can be viewed with appreciation only after an amount of hard climbing. Their beauties are not universally penetrative and irresistibly compelling.

The institution which is most universal and irresistible in its fascinations is the stage. It has been so among all cultured people and in all ages, and most of all when art in general has been at its greatest height and loyalty to the city has been most intense. This is the only phase of art which meets with universal acceptance, for the reason that it delights the senses before it engages the thought. Even high dramatic art is universally pleasurable. Artistic stage-setting and costuming, graceful movements, and pleasing elocution, blending with the harmonies of orchestral music, may be as purely sensual in their appeals as a shaded brook on a summer day. This combination of effects will compel the enjoyment of all sorts and conditions of men. A purified and elevated municipal theater and opera would serve two great ends—they would educate the people, and impress the consciousness of civicism.

As a culture influence the stage presents great possibilities. High art here will attract all classes. With many the discriminating capacity will at first be absent; only the capacity to respond to sensual appeals will be present; but under wholesome circumstances the growth of the spiritual and intellectual out of the sensual is inevitable. The discriminating sense comes with familiarity with the best, and then the low and vulgar in acting becomes hateful and repellent.

To elevate the masses to an appreciation of fine acting would be in itself a great achievement, but the educative influence of

the municipal theater would not stop here. It would bring the people into touch with the best there is in literature. The dramatized forms of literature would tend to excite an appetite for the better quality of reading.

The ethical force might be made very great. The play is well calculated to appeal to the higher emotions. It has often been observed that nobility of character in the play is always applauded, while the craven and cunning character is hissed. The audience instinctively loves the hero and hates the villain. It has been said that an assemblage of people represents a composite of nobility and high-mindedness in excess of the highest type of individual nobility and high-mindedness present. It is owing to this fact that in a religious meeting the most consecrated and devoted Christian always feels the contact with higher virtues than his own. In the same way a meeting for any improving purpose tends to elevate and purify every character present. Habitual appeals to the nobler impulses through the drama—the universally attractive institution—will greatly tend to make virtue lovely and vice hateful.

The opera and concert together represent a higher stage in culture than the drama. They tend more to give wings to the imagination, and to cultivate a responsiveness to beauty in its more essential and less substantial form. When the appeals of fine music have met with a response in the nature of a person, the capacity for poetic imaginings has been aroused. It brings a fine sense of harmony and a sensitiveness to discord which become woven into character. The play tells the whole story to the dullest wit, and may be enjoyed with scarcely the aid of thought. Music is more positive in its results. At the same time it is almost as universal in its appeal.

The culture effects of such an institution would be largely unconscious. It is the pleasurable effects that would create a keen consciousness, and upon this would depend the advantage to the growth of civicism. With the growth of a delight in good acting and good music, which would not be satisfied with anything inferior, a keen demand for quality would be established. The people would begin to look to the city for excellence.

Starting with a demand for a man of superior talents for director of the municipal play-house, a demand for excellence in all lines of municipal administration would logically follow.

The municipal play-house would need to offer a scale of popular prices which would make fair seats accessible to all. In addition to this the generous promenade space of the continental theaters—a place for the intermingling of all the people during the long intermission—should be provided. This relaxing expedient affords opportunity for social contact, a basis for the growth of the community spirit under the very roof of the most delight-giving of the community's properties.

The sense of community enjoyment thus aroused might find greater expression in the enjoyment of the public gardens and parks. They might become more social and pleasure institutions, and less places for the parade of ostentation.

The culture development achieved by the theater and the opera would provide a larger *clientele* for other forms of art, and the art museum would become, in a broader sense, a community institution. The people would come to constitute a spur to its excellence.

Following the growth of the social habit, and with the demand for excellence in provisions for culture and pleasure, would come a demand for expert skill in the construction and administration of the practical utilities.

As to the political side of the question, which is the practical side, such a program may be far from realization. A considerable amount of educational work may be necessary to convince the citizens of American cities that catering on a large scale to the pleasures of the people is the proper function of the city. Quick returns for such a propaganda are not among the probabilities, but if returns are attainable at all, they are worth waiting for. Other reforms had better be deferred until civic consciousness has been directed to this vital point.

The coöperation of private philanthropy may need to be enlisted at first. The habit of private persons making the municipalities the beneficiaries of gifts for such purposes, conditioned

upon similar contributions out of the funds of the city, would probably be the most hopeful beginning.

An example of this sort on a magnificent scale in one of the larger cities, say the organization of the greater New York, would have been a happy beginning, as setting a pattern of excellence for the smaller towns. The birth of the greater city would have been most propitious had it been accompanied by two splendid structures—one devoted to the opera and one to the drama. Such an object-lesson should first of all impart an idea of a proper setting for art. They should be centrally located, but at any cost not jammed in with other buildings. They should stand out in clear relief. The buildings should be marvels of architecture, and their beauty should by no means be obscured by the wings of a sky-scraper. Each should be deemed worthy of an entire square for a setting. It would seem that such a consummation might have been within reach. There is a sufficient stock of private philanthropy, if it were properly organized and instructed. The coöperation of the city might also have been attainable at that time. The people were more plastic in their thought, and more ambitious for great things, as they were conscious of emerging into a larger municipal form.

Whatever the immediate difficulties, the final achievements of such institutions for our municipalities ought not to seem an impossible task. The hope of having them depends upon the unselfishness of men; but men are not so sordid in the depths of their natures as our reformers think. Our people are safely conservative, but it is a mistake to suppose that they are only open to selfish appeals. The most acquisitive members of society are moved every year to give many millions to philanthropic uses. Labor organizations are far more solicitous for larger social opportunities than they are for a higher wage scale. Appeals to the generous and unselfish natures of men are seldom made in vain. There is a delight in contributing to the larger life of others, which few men are entirely strangers to.

When practical reformers understand the true nature of the municipality they will modify their programs, they will

cease to base their appeal solely on the ground of practical utility. They will seek rather to pave the way for practical utilities by establishing renovating and purifying institutions—institutions calculated to arouse the civic spirit into jealous activity.

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THE GENESIS OF ETHICAL ELEMENTS.

I. SELECTION AND SURVIVAL.

IF we would understand how a race becomes acclimated in a new region—the French in Algiers or the Dutch at the Cape—we must make large use of the principle of selection and survival. The immigrants always vary considerably among themselves in power of resistance to the climate, and if we divide them into two equal groups, of those who are little suited to it, and those who are more suited to it, we shall find the death-rate much higher in the former group. This enables the offspring of the latter group to gain on the others, till in a few generations the immigrating race has, as it were, been made over and adapted to the new climate. Now, this principle of unequal death-rates (or birth-rates) is the key, not only to acclimation, but to all manner of fitnesses in nature.

But something very like it is at work in society. There were many styles of gold-washing on the Sacramento in 1849. But one style was gradually found to be more convenient than the others, and became after a while the standard way of washing out gold, which newcomers adopted as a matter of course. A like weeding out of inferior individual practices brings to light a standard form of pot or tool or weapon, a standard mode of tilling or breeding, a standard sex relation or education of the young, which is uniform for all, possesses authority, and may be termed a *culture element*. Besides this evolution of customs and forms of life guided by the principles of convenience, there is an evolution of beliefs guided by the principle of verity. When many sayings concerning anything are afloat, opinions about dreams or sickness or darkness or weather or good luck, the high death-rate among them insures the triumph of those views which for the time and place seem to be the *truest*. In this way arise general beliefs which come in time to get a good deal of social force behind them.

Once an element has run the gauntlet and emerged triumphant from the rivalry, it becomes fixed in custom and thus shielded from competition, until perhaps it is confronted with a different practice or belief that has won the favor of some other group. Then deadly comparisons are made, and weeding out begins again. One of the great agencies in human progress, then, has been the extension of intercourse between peoples which have been working independently at civilization, for this brings in once more the healthy process of selection and survival, and permits an all-round advance in the culture elements. Here, for one thing, is the secret of the great historic cross-fertilizations of culture—Phœnicia with Egypt, Greece with the Orient, Israel with Hellenism, Christendom with the Moors, the Occident with India.

This struggle of rival elements of culture is by no means the same thing as the struggle between persons. When one race has overrun and trampled down another, it is always interesting to see if the spiritual contest of the two civilizations has the same issue as the physical contest of the two races. Will the upper civilization smother the lower, as in the case of the Spaniards and the Aztecs, the Germans and the Wends, the Romans and the Etruscans, the Saracens and the Roman Africans; or will the one beneath grow up and subdue the one above, as the Romans were captivated by Greek culture, the barbarians by Roman civilization, or the Mongols by Islam?

The reader will hardly have failed to notice that in such forms of control as *public opinion*, *law*, *suggestion*, *personality*, there is a pretty direct and immediate management of one person by others. But in other kinds of control something comes between controller and controlled—some ideal, religious belief, symbol, or standard that is a necessary means in the business, and that is not originated for the particular occasion. The idea as to what is "nice" or "not nice" for a woman to do, the low appraisal put on "the flesh," the labels "right" and "wrong" pasted on to every species of action, the belief that "God sees," the doctrine that men are "brothers," the ideal known as

"the good citizen," the symbol "Columbia"—these are examples of what we may call *ethical elements*, to distinguish them from other classes of culture elements. Now, some of these are very old. They are detached from persons, and float free in the descending stream of culture. They are ownerless, unless we can regard them as the possession of society. In some cases we cannot trace them back to wise or good individuals. They seem rather to be the results of social reflection, products of what we might term the social mind. But, in that case, how is their genesis to be understood?

It may be suggested that an ethical element such as a social ideal or valuation results from the compounding of many private admirations and estimates. Tom, Dick, and Harry, it may be said, cast their ideas on a subject into the common stock of ideas on that subject, circulating about in the channels of social intercourse; and from this mingling there is precipitated after a time a typical or average opinion. Each ethical element, then, is the expression of a consensus, the result of a vast social symposium. In the social mind is formed a composite photograph of what Tom, Dick, and Harry have contributed to the common stock; and in this image rises a social standard or estimate which can be used in the fashioning of individual character.

The weak point in such a theory of genesis is that it gives no room for moral progress. In conduct man's path has been upward; and this not so much by an improvement of his nature as by the influence of ethical factors external to him. But if he has been pulled upward by certain elements, these must have been ahead of and above him, not simply on his level. If the ideal of "man," "gentleman," or "citizen" is simply an ungolden mean between the aspirations of the topmost and those of the bottom-most people, then when it becomes a ruling force in the lives of individuals it is just as certain to drag some downward as to draw others upward. The ethical elements we have made so much of would then be as impotent to lift the average man as those heathen Canaanite deities of whom we read: "The attributes ascribed to them were a mere reflex of the attributes of their worshipers, and what character they had was

nothing else than a personification of the character of the nation that acknowledged their lordship."¹

But the fact is, the genesis of ethical elements, as well as the genesis of customs and beliefs, is a process of selection and survival. Just as the development of Zuni or Lydian pottery is due to a competition which makes the handiest and handsomest form of pot the prevailing type, and to the renewal of this healthy competition whenever an inventive potter or a foreign art supplies a new pattern, so the improvement in the ethical strand of a civilization is due to the survival and ascendancy of those elements which are best adapted to an orderly social life.

Let us now follow closely the selections and rejections whereby the ideal or judgment of conduct that emerges and reigns in a body of associates comes to be so different from the actual ideals or judgments of the persons themselves. In the first place it must be recognized that human intercourse is far from being a complete mutual *exposé*, inasmuch as converse is a social act implying a willingness to tolerate and a wish to please. Without adopting the *mot* that "language is given us to conceal thought," we can yet safely say that only a part of the contents of one's mind is communicated to others. How much is withheld for fear of disagreeable consequences! How much is kept back lest it stir up trouble and widen the space between people! How often an exploring party has kept on longer than anyone wished because each dreaded to speak out! How often a body of reluctant men have carried through a mad enterprise because each feared his protest would meet with jeers! In their baptism of fire, recruits conceal a "blue funk" under an assumed nonchalance; and this serves as a reassuring badge of the courage that the company as a whole exhibits and finally inspires in its members. The suddenness of recoil one witnesses in the retreat of a garrison, the abandonment of a strike, or the collapse of a boom is due to the fact that in a body of men the inner tension may become very great before someone speaks the word everyone is thinking, and so breaks the spell. Locked in a kind of charm we run farther and farther out on the dizzy

¹ W. ROBERTSON SMITH, *The Prophets of Israel*, p. 66.

trestle of make-believe, till, as in Hans Christian Andersen's tale of the invisible clothes, the word of truth is spoken and we drop to the solid ground of fact.

These striking cases of reserve illustrate the truth that all speech has reference to the hearer. The communication by which associates come to have ideas and ideals in common is carried on in a propitiatory spirit, and is more or less suited to the taste of the listener. If it be otherwise, if intercourse becomes an avowal of hostile intentions or a mutual hurling of defiance, all friendly talk is soon broken off and association ends in flight or avoidance. This being granted, it is easy to see that a man will prudently lock within his own breast those notions and projects which are so egoistic and aggressive that nobody else can share them. He will cast into the stock of ideas circulating through the capillaries of intercourse only those which are not hateful or shocking to his hearer.¹ What the thug proposes to his fellow-thug is to butcher some third person. What the Bedouin imparts to Bedouins is not his admiration of stealing, but his admiration of stealing from outsiders. The Dyaks, talking of scalps about a camp-fire, may praise the taking of heads, but not the taking of heads from each other. Yet, if they tell us true, just that project may lurk in the recesses of each Dyak's mind. Blackfeet do rob each other. But the only predatory project that can be openly talked of, justified, and glorified in the council lodge is the robbery of aliens like Crows or settlers. The talk of a band of Mohocks about a tavern table will dilate, not on the fun of maltreating one of their own number, but on the fun of sallying out and baiting the belated burgher.

So at the very outset the contents of the social mind are morally superior to the contents of the ordinary individual mind. The stream is purer than the springs that feed it, because so much badness is stopped at the source. Now let us see, furthermore,

¹ "Though it may be true . . . that every individual in his own breast naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face and avow that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with him, and that, however natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and extravagant to them." (ADAM SMITH, *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, Vol. I, Part II, sec. ii, chap. 2, p. 168.)

what happens to the matter thrown into the channels of intercourse. Just what is the nature of the selection and survival that takes place there?

The clumsier ways of making pots or carts perish by refusal to imitate, the sillier beliefs about sickness or spirits by refusal to adopt. But the more sinister ideals and appraisals are eliminated chiefly by refusal to communicate. A man may take up with an anti-social idea, but he hesitates to pass it on. Occasionally a thief declares the propriety of "saving one's own bacon," but the sentiment that circulates most easily in thieftom is the vileness of "splitting on one's pals." Whispers slip fur- tively from mouth to ear about "discretion being the better part of valor," but what the stay-at-homes shout to the warrior is: "Bring back your shield, or be brought back on it." Take Latins in small batches under tongue-loosening conditions, and you get chuckling confidences about feats of gallantry. Take the same men in larger groups, and the ideas and ideals of conjugal fidelity enjoy as much currency as they would among Anglo-Saxons. We must not forget that a man recommends to others, not what he likes, but what he likes others to like. The opinion of buccaneers is strangely disdainful of wassail and women till snug harbor is reached. The libertine is careful not to spread an appetite that might ravage his own family. It is the predacious who have the most to say for the sacredness of the rights of property. Men, for the most part, take superior moral standards, as they take coins, not for personal use, but to pass them on to the next man.

We see, then, that some of the ideas communicated circulate readily, while others meet with difficulties in passing from man to man, and, like bad pennies, are always being rejected. In other words, there are moral ideas of short circuit and moral ideas of long circuit. The wicked ideas are not put into circulation so often as the good ones, and they drop out sooner. The ideas which propitiate, inspire confidence, and draw men closer, pass up and down in conversational channels till, like worn coins, the image and superscription of the utterer is effaced, and they are imputed to the public—or to human nature—passing current in its name and authority.

It is just this selection which explains the snug fit of early ethical elements to the needs of the group that develops them. Many of our modern moral notions have been generalized till they are out of relation to the welfare of any particular group. They prescribe a certain conduct toward *all men*. But all primitive ethics exhibits a strange double standard. Thus and thus must you treat your clansman, but on the stranger you may wreak your will. Now, if the judgments of rude men about conduct spring from faintly stirring instincts of right, from a dim sense of the good, why is there an abrupt change at the frontier of the group? If in these standards of dealing with clansmen we have the gropings of a half-awake conscience, what becomes of this conscience when the stranger appears?

But if they develop very naturally by a process of unconscious adaptation out of the mental contacts and long intercourse of associates, it is the most natural thing in the world that these ethical elements should have a short radius of operation. The Tscherkesses of the Caucasus have developed an ideal that includes prowess in cow-lifting and is a great formative influence in the lives of the young Tscherkesses. But the cows it is so fine and noble to lift are never Tscherkess cows, but always the cows of the plainsmen. Whence this limitation? Clearly it is not the voice of the natural conscience. It is rather the outcome of unconscious adaptation. However the clansmen regard each other's stock, they cannot make a cult and a glory of lifting each other's cows. The only ideal that could possibly take root and grow up was the stealing of strange cows. The radius of the moral taboo is in very truth a function of association. If any section of the clan moves away, they can no longer keep the taboo wide enough to protect their cattle. If newcomers associate freely with the clansmen, they can probably widen the taboo till it covers their herds. *For each element in a body of associates is able to influence the trend of the selections in the group-mind, and to modify thereby the ethical equipment of the group to its own advantage.*

If we understand by *ethos* a body of related standards, ideals, and valuations, then we can say that *a social ethos* distinct from

the private *ethos* is formed under the following conditions: First, the intercourse by which superior ethical elements are selected and gain currency must be long and intimate. Second, the individuals must not be very unlike or prepossessed by clashing traditions. Third, the group must not receive many strangers or have close contact with alien groups. Fourth, there must be a matrix of folk-lore, religion, literature, or art, in which the ethical gains may be imbedded and held fast. Fifth, the new ethical varieties are not safe from swamping until they have entered into tradition and the young have been reared under them.

Hitherto, when the genesis of ethical civilization has been considered, the sociologist has stood aside and let the psychologist step to the desk. But if the fitness of the ideals and standards that become paramount in the group is due to a blind selection for which nobody deserves any credit, then we no longer need trace the ethical strand in a civilization to the individual conscience. We do not need to start from a native sense of right and wrong. Men do not need to be sheep in order to develop the *ethos* of the herbivore. Even in a band of brigands or buccaneers there spring up after a while certain conventions that are moral. The conscience of the social group, as soon as it appears, is several points better than the private conscience, just because it is social. A wholly wicked idea, in being imparted to another, becomes a little less wicked, because now it excludes the thought of evil toward him. And a wickedness that can be communicated to and adopted by all persons in the group can be directed only against outsiders. There is honor among thieves because they mingle, and so arrive at a professional ethics. Pirates develop among themselves a taboo on pirate property because they live together. Accomplices develop a double standard of right, and the morality of primitive groups everywhere is nothing else at bottom than the morality of accomplices. The old notion that only men with good innate ideas can initiate a moral civilization is too much like the saying: "Who drives fat oxen must himself be fat."

In insisting that ethical elements may and do grow up in a natural way out of peaceable intercourse, we do not mean to say

that by this means men can get very far or rise very high. No advanced race has come by its moral heritage in just this way. Such noble ethical achievements as the character of Jehovah, the Persian dualism, the Stoic ideal, or the Beatitudes cannot be ascribed to slow evolution. They are as much the creation of genius as the higher gains in the arts and sciences. The reason why standards cannot become very exacting or ideals very high by way of selection and survival is that they can never rise quite clear of the vulgar private fact. The conventional valuations of things cannot shake themselves quite loose from the sensual views of the individual. The ideal that triumphs in the social mind is anchored close to earth by the base admirations of the common mortal. The notions of right that become sole legal tender in the community are tainted by the sweat and grime of private hands they must pass through. Not entirely can the ideal disengage itself from human clay.

The "volunteer crop" of morality that springs up quickly and passes into the tradition of tribes of Arabs or Samoyeds or redskins or negroes, is marked by a regard for the obvious and nearly lying conditions of individual welfare. It is sure to exalt personal prowess and martial courage, and to frown upon murder, wanton aggression, theft, arson, malicious injury to property, adultery, false witness, the settlement of disputes by violence, the use of unfair weapons such as poison. But when the harm of a line of conduct is not so clear and plain, it is ignored until the more far-sighted few set up stricter standards. The development of the clan *ethos* in disapproval of lying, slander, vengeance, gambling, drunkenness, unchastity, feud, exposure of infants, or the sacrifice of widows, as well as the discovery of new forms of old vices and new corollaries of old virtues, is usually traceable to superior persons who see farther than the rest into the consequences of conduct and the laws of well-being.

II. THE ÉLITE.

The distinct and separate ethical threads that are woven into a civilization are rarely of anonymous origin. They can usually be traced back to men of unusual insight into the requisites of

good personal and social life. The humble beginnings of a social *ethos* can be conceived as the outcome of a folk-evolution. But its later and higher stages require the inventive genius. As the origin of a form of pot or hoe is likely to be more anonymous than that of the printing press or the sewing machine, so the origin of a taboo on clan property is likely to be more anonymous than that of the Golden Rule. We can account for the clan *ethos* by selection, but we need invention to explain the rise of a national or race *ethos*. If this is so, we ought to be able to trace back the leading ethical possessions of the higher races to the influence of the few or the one. Let us see if this can be done.

It is usual to explain the ethical monotheism of Israel by a Semitic genius for religion. But, as a matter of fact, the religions of other Semitic stocks, such as Phœnicia, Moab, or Edom, never came to anything. They were not even as respectable as the religion of the primitive Celts or Germans. What gave the faith of Israel its wonderful career was its conception of an ethical god. But at first the national god of Israel was not distinct from the gods of the neighboring nations. He had made Israel his chosen people because Israel covenanted to give him worship. He was interested, not in the morals of his people, but in their loyalty to him. When evils and disasters suggested that Jehovah was estranged, his people thought to win him back by greater zeal in acts of external worship.

Later, however, we find Jehovah comes to be unlike Moloch, Melkarth, or Chemosh, the deities of the other Semitic peoples. It was discovered that he loved mercy and not sacrifice, obedience and not the fat of lambs. In him was no variableness. His will was steadily directed toward a moral aim and could not be turned aside by flattery or offerings. His dealings with his people aimed to lead them on "to higher things than their natural character inclined toward. To know Jehovah and to serve him aright involved a moral effort—a frequent sacrifice of natural inclination."¹

¹ W. ROBERTSON SMITH, *The Prophets of Israel*, p. 67.

Now, this holy and righteous God, who championed absolute justice without weakness and without caprice, was the discovery of a handful of men, namely the Reforming Prophets. Amos, with the idea that Jehovah is an upright judge unbribable by firstlings or praise; Hosea, whose Master hated injustice and falsehood and required, above all, righteous conduct; Isaiah, whose Lord would have mercy only on those who relieved the widow and the fatherless—these were the spokesmen of a minority that finally destroyed the national character of the old religion and founded ethical monotheism. The folk were not in sympathy with the leaders who sought to impose this higher deity, and only amid continual struggles with the recalcitrant backsliding Hebrews was the moral reform carried through.

It is again to an élite that we can trace the ethical tendencies in the old Greek religion. The gods of the Greeks were mere nature gods, and had at first little interest in the conduct of their worshipers. Like all superior human beings, they demanded cleanness and comeliness in those who would approach them acceptably. Defilement, at first physical in character, debarred from intercourse with the god until certain purificatory rites had been performed. But after a time the idea grows up that not liturgical impurity alone, but moral guilt as well, debars from public worship. Wrongdoing is conceived as leaving a smirch or stench most abominable to the senses of the gods. This offensiveness could be removed, if at all, only by moral means, that is, by expiation, atonement, or reparation. Through such regulation of the terms of admission to public worship the gods were utilized to promote peace and obedience. Later, indeed, some of this ground was lost, and the philosophers, like Xenophanes and Heraclitus, found public worship in Greece useless and superstitious.

Now, the belief that the guilt of a worshiper gave offense to the god, and that only in innocence could men approach the altar, was not due to the slow spontaneous clarifying of the popular consciousness or to selection and survival among the various notions men formed of the godhead. It was the discovery of an élite. The doctrine seems to have radiated from the masters of

the Apollo cult at Delphi, and to have been diffused by pious singers and by poets like Pindar. Says Pfeleiderer: "The rules to be observed in conducting the purificatory rites were fixed by the priesthood of Delphi, and by tradition and public law received public sanction over the whole of Greece."¹

A system of law that functions without the civil arm is an ethical element in a civilization. And such a system is always the creation of the intelligent few. The law of Manu was not a code actually administered, but a *résumé* of what a small enlightened caste thought ought to be the law. The Law of Israel was worked out and interpreted by doctors and scribes who discussed its provisions freely among themselves, but presented an unbroken front to the outside world. The long apprenticeship required for admission to the learned caste, and the contrast between the freedom of thought within the four walls of the school of the law and the reticence observed outside the school, show that the Torah was the instrument of the Pharisees and not the custom of the people.*

For more than four centuries one of the great possessions of the classic world was the ideal of a life lived by a plan, a life superior to the play of the emotions, framed in accordance with reason, and having the beauty of unity, simplicity, and symmetry. Such an ideal becomes the parent of the political and civic virtues as soon as human law and justice are regarded as the dictate in the field of social relations of that Reason which rules the universe and which it is man's duty to put himself in line with. Now, this ideal of life was created and perfected by a handful of men, the Stoic philosophers, who succeeded in combining the Hebrew earnestness about right and justice with the Hellenic ideals of beauty and wisdom.

The romantic ideal of love we owe to an artistic élite, the troubadours. Arising from the sentiments felt by wandering lyrists for great ladies far above them in social position this ideal was spread by their songs through the castles and courts of mediæval Europe. There it blended with the ideals of

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. IV, p. 243.

* BRAGIN, *Die frei-religiösen Strömungen im alten Judenthum*, pp. 78, 79.

chivalry, and thence it has passed downward through the people until it bids fair to govern the sentiments between most of the young men and women in western societies.

The knightly ideal exalting valor, loyalty, courtesy, and generosity was perfected within a religious-military caste. Since the days of the crusades nothing has been done to make that ideal more lofty or more attractive. But at first its virtues were of the few and for the few. Since then we have universalized them, making them binding in the treatment of all ranks. And by modifying the pattern of the knight into that of the gentleman, the chivalrous ideal has been fitted to become a reigning personal ideal in an industrial society.

In like manner Bushido, the knightly ideal that has been and still is the mold of Japanese character, was perfected within the fighting caste of *Samurai*. Says Nitobe: "As the sun in its rising first tips the highest peaks with russet hue, and then gradually casts its rays on the valley below, so the ethical system which first enlightened the military order drew in course of time followers from amongst the masses" (*Bushido*, p. 105). "In manifold ways has Bushido filtered down from the social class where it originated and acted as leaven among the masses, furnishing a moral standard for the whole people. The precepts of knighthood, begun at first as the glory of the *élite*, became in time an aspiration and inspiration to the nation at large; and though the populace could not attain the moral height of those loftier souls, yet *Yamato Damashii* (the soul of Japan) ultimately came to express the *Volksgeist* of the Island Realm." (*Bushido*, p. 108.)

It is perhaps in respect to men's valuations rather than their ideals that the influence of an *élite* is most marked. The prophet is the master of enthusiasms and detestations. But to the superior class it is given to modify the estimates of men. One line of improvement has consisted in drawing people away from turbulent pursuits liable to bring them into collision. Our ancestors, the primitive Germans, passed their time in drinking, gaming, and brawling, leaving industry to women and thralls. Their conversion to regular toil was not owing to contact with

Rome. In the classic world slavery had put a stigma on all manual labor. The great work-tradition of the Germanic race is traceable to the Benedictine monks, who in the Dark Ages taught from a thousand monasteries the lesson that labor is worthy and pious.¹ Again it was the Puritan minority that championed the quiet home pleasures and induced the English to give up the old orgiastic communal pleasures so prolific of harm. In India, the taste for learning and the contemplative pleasures has spread from one small section of the Brahman caste.

The spread of the superior ideal or valuation developed in the bosom of an élite is not wholly by the contagion of example. The van of the social procession urges and stimulates the rear to a double quick. The few press their desires, tastes, and opinions upon the many. This may be because it is to the interest of the few to get their ethical contribution generally accepted. Or the Hebrew or Puritan notion of joint national responsibility may spur the élite to an active campaign against ways of living or acting that might draw down on the nation the divine wrath. Again, when the general social consciousness is intense as compared with the class-, caste-, or sect-consciousness, we find in the possessors of the superior ethical view a disinterested eagerness to press it on the rest. The proselyting missionary spirit is awakened and inspires the minority to leaven the entire lump with their new ideal.

The ethical capital of a race is increased, not only by the contributions of minorities, but by those of individuals as well. The first elements of a social *ethos* may be spontaneously generated within a body of associates. The development of an ethical content in old local cults may be due to the influence of a priesthood. New value-scales that favor social tranquillity may be worked out in a class of men with superior economic vision or in a better economic situation than the rest. But such sublime paradoxes as that enemies are to be forgiven, that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and that it is better to suffer than to do injustice, are the discoveries of genius. So at the

¹ See MONTALEMBERT, *The Monks of the West*.

beginning of many an ethical element stands the figure of the Great Man.

Pythagoras contends with the evils of a soft and luxurious society by reviving the Dorian ideal of abstinence and hardihood. Confucius contributes to Chinese civilization the Silver Rule and the majestic outlines of the "superior man." Zoroaster assists the transition from nomadism to tillage with new moral standards, fortified by a book of account and a last judgment. In his injunctions looking to the welfare of agriculture, the extermination of noxious animals, and the care of useful ones, we recognize the sage pioneer of progress. Mahomet, with his discovery of the just and compassionate Allah, creates among heathen nomads an ethical monotheism that becomes the corner-stone of a great civilization. Buddha puts new meanings into good and evil, and revalues the objects of human endeavor. St. Francis charms his age with his glowing ideal of a life of pure love freed from the servitude to material things. George Fox makes an appeal to the inmost self that evokes the Quaker conscience.

Whence comes the great man's ethical contribution? Shall we credit it all to his conscience or to his religious inspiration? No, we ought rather to lay it to his superior social insight. Usually the ethical grandee appears, as did Confucius or Amos or St. Francis, at a time of disorder, anarchy, and misery. He gazes upon society as the compassionate man looks upon a fever patient. Calmly he makes his diagnosis, thoughtfully he ponders the relation of symptom to deep-seated cause. "Here thou ailest," he says, "and here." Then confidently he proclaims his remedy. The prophet is therefore more than "one who pities men." He is a sociological genius. He divines the secret of peaceful union. He knows the terms on which men can dwell happily together. He utters the formula for coöperation. Confucius, with his doctrine of the five relations; Zoroaster, with his principle of piety in thought, word, and deed; Pythagoras, with his ascetic ideal; Jesus, with his maxim of returning good for evil—each brings his prescription. Each comes forward as a social physician.

There are prophets, however, who envisage a personal as well as a social problem. They offer redemption. They point out the way of salvation, not for men alone, but even for man. Buddha, believing that man is the dupe of his will to live, provides escape along the eight-fold path. Zeno sees that man is the sport of inherited appetites and affections, and can be saved only by that spark of the Universal Reason, which has been implanted in his breast. Epicurus finds man in bondage to custom, or superstitious fears, or speculative abstractions, and invites him to break away and enter on the quest of happiness. St. Paul beholds the unhappy struggle of the spiritual man with the natural man, and offers salvation by grace.

The genius who is to impress the mind of coming generations, as the hand impresses the waxen tablet, does not commend his ideal on the ground that it is good for society. He does not advertise it as a means of securing order. He knows that men will not do as they would be done by, or forgive injuries, or subject the impulses to reason, for mere utility's sake.* The genius that succeeds takes high ground from the first. His way is not merely a better way of getting along together. He declares it the one possible path of life. It is the God-ordained type of living. It is prescribed by man's nature. It is the goal of history. It is the destiny of the race. So it comes to pass that the inventors of right and wrong, the authors of ideals, not only disguise their sociology as ethics, but often go farther and disguise their ethics as religion. The magistral tone of the heaven-sent prophet and the menace of divine wrath drive home the message of Zoroaster or Isaiah or Mahomet. It is possible for a secular thinker like Confucius to succeed. But, for the most part, men of the religious type, men of what we might call the religious temperament, are the ones whose ideals are accepted. No doubt hundreds of geniuses have lived who have had the insight into life and society needed to improve on the ideals of their time. But they have failed to score. Their message has not been listened to. The world has hearkened only to the seer of visions and dreamer of dreams.

There is another condition of prophetism that favors the religious enthusiast. Emphasis and the lofty tone can easily be

counterfeited, and hence for every true prophet there have been scores of pretenders. How then mark the true prophet from the false? How can the multitude tell the disinterested sage from the ambitious imposter? The masses have met this difficulty by applying the rude but effective test of renunciation. They will not receive a sterner ideal unless the author renounces all that common men strive for. The false prophet makes the credulity of his disciples the stepping-stone to power and ease. The true prophet proves his devotion by putting the world beneath his feet. Hence the locusts and wild honey, the staff and the sheepskin, have always been the sure credentials of the moral reformer. Even today, over most of the world, it is the *yogi*, the fakir, the saint, or the ascetic who wins authority over the popular mind in matters of conduct.¹

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¹“We were surprised to find last year that the Gonds of an extensive tract in the Rewah state had given up drinking; and on inquiry we found out the reason to be the *fat* of a *yogi* who had visited the state the year before. His order had gone forth from village to village, and the Gonds without question had become total abstainers.”
— P. N. BOSE, *Hindu Civilization during British Rule*, Vol. I, p. xi.

THE SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.

III. THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY.

CERTAIN readers who might write with authority on this subject will conclude that much in the present chapter is without justification. Beginners will doubtless decide that more of it is without meaning. The attempt will be made to deserve a reversal of both judgments before the series closes. It seems necessary, however, to present some general introductory propositions that are necessarily vague. They must be repeated and amplified in subsequent chapters as the argument proceeds. Even in the present chapter the device of slightly varied repetition will be liberally used.

Chapters i and ii have made our first theorem as superfluous as it is trite, viz.: *Sociology is not concerned with an isolated segment of subject-matter; it is concerned with the same subject-matter that furnishes material for all the other sciences which study men in aggregates, rather than as mere individuals.*¹ A cardinal desideratum of social science is that the apparent gap between the separate parts of study shall be closed, and that in the last constructions of all the social scientists the divisions of labor shall be integrated into one labor. It is not at all necessary to the dignity of that part of social science to which the name "sociology" will be specifically applied in these papers, that it be represented as anything more than a connecting link between other forms of knowledge about society. What it is more than that will appear soon enough, if the simpler notion is once entertained. On the other hand, it is not to be understood that sociology is merely a mechanical device to join living sciences together. It is a living member in a body of science. It is not a mere set of

¹ Schaeffle states that he is merely expanding the thought which he tried to express in his first edition (1875), when he describes general sociology as "eine Philosophie der besonderen Socialwissenschaften, soweit solche beim heutigen Stande der einzelnen gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Disciplinen überhaupt schon versucht werden kann." (*Bau und Leben*, 2d ed., Vol. I, p. 1.)

points to which the active and fruitful sciences may attach themselves. The claim to be emphasized is that sociology is the combining, organizing, correlating, integrating stage in the process of knowing human society. It is primarily formal. It is only secondarily material. Through the processes of sociology knowledge of society first begins to approach objective reality. It is previously disintegrated and consequently fictitious substitutes for reality. At the same time the fragments of reality are brought to sociology by sciences or experiences that deal with those fragments, as sociology does not, at first hand.

It is often said that the sociologists are not even agreed among themselves as to the subjects with which sociology has to deal. There is more truth in the statement than were to be wished, yet it is not so close to the truth as would be inferred by the uninformed. The more exact truth is that the sociologists are each reasonably sure of what they are driving at, but the unknown elements are so numerous that sociologists are working on many distinct problems. They are more or less inclined to reserve the name "sociology" for the particular problem or type of problems upon which they are individually engaged; and they are disposed to bestow other names upon the problems that occupy their neighbors. There is thus among the sociologists themselves a yielding to the temptation to ignore the whole for the part, and there is difference of opinion about proper names for the parts. In the large, however, the differences among the sociologists really concern this comparatively trifling matter of names much more than the real quest of their researches. To be sure, there are no universally accepted formulas of the sphere of sociology, but there is a considerable parallelism of tendency among the workers who call themselves sociologists. Whatever be the sociologist's definition of his science, or his proposed method, he is likely to be bent upon reaching an account of the social whole *as a whole*, instead of resting with an account of an abstracted part of the whole.¹ It has been true until sociology began to develop its program that all sciences short of cosmic philosophy, whether we have

¹ Cf. above, pp. 506, 507.

called them abstract or concrete, have actually been sciences of abstracted portions even of that whole to which they immediately belonged. There is an evident movement among students of society toward a view that will include these parts in a containing whole. In spite of their disagreements with each other, the sociologists have been most directly and consciously devoted to this enlargement and integration of knowledge.

Without surrendering the preference expressed above, the discussion from this point will employ the term "sociology" in a specific rather than in the proposed general sense.² This specific use does not claim the sanction of all sociologists. It is merely the writer's variation of the usage current among those sociologists with whom he is most closely affiliated. The term "sociology" will accordingly from this point connote merely those parts of social science referred to in our formula at the beginning of the first chapter,³ viz., those phases of societary theory that are concerned with the common facts of human association and with composing them into the most general forms and formulas.

The peculiar problem of sociology may be indicated at first in a very commonplace way. Every man, whether John Smith or the German Kaiser, has to have a tacit conception of life, by which to place himself with reference to the rest of the world. What every man has to assume as a matter of practice sociology aims to work out systematically as a matter of theory. What is our life? What facts compose it? What facts influence it? What forms does it take? What limitations does it betray? What tendencies does it exhibit? What ultimate or distant prospects does it suggest for attainment? What is the connection of each individual life with this total and complicated process?

This partial indication of the problem implies that sociology has to deal with facts which had long been under investigation

¹ Pp. 642, 643.

² Since the world will probably not adopt out of hand the usage that the writer would prefer, he must content himself under protest with this provisional *synecdoche*.

³ P. 506.

in one way or another before the term "sociology" was invented. Indeed, we may approach a little nearer to exact definition by saying that the business of the sociologist is to organize available knowledge of the conditions of human life, so that all concrete questions of conduct will be more easily, or at least more truly, answered when placed in the setting that this organized knowledge furnishes. The sociologist has the duty, first of all, to lay a reliable foundation for reflective conduct in analysis and in synthetic interpretation of general social relations, as given in all available knowledge of past and present associations.

To illustrate: The historian may describe a given period or episode of human experience, say the Gracchan revolutions in Rome or "the Revolution" in France. It is a piece of very highly specialized work to find out the facts and their correlations in a particular instance. Quite likely the man who studies the Gracchan revolution, for example, branches out into generalizations about causes and effects of all revolutions. He may, however, be completely incompetent to speak with authority on any part of the subject other than the single fragment of evidence contained in the period which he has particularly studied. Now, the sociologist is not primarily and specifically a historian. He is dependent upon the historian. He has to learn how to take the facts that many historians authenticate and coin them into general truths about associated human life. For instance, the historian should furnish material for answering such questions as these about the period of which he treats: On what terms did the people live together? Under what constraints did they maintain those terms? For what ends did they endure the constraints? With what institutions did they act? In what way did they presently change their manner of living together? What part did individuals play, and what rôle was assumed by the society as a whole, and by the inanimate surroundings, in postponing or promoting these changes?

All such questions, when generalized into inquiries about universal tendency, have to be answered by first collecting instances. Here is the place of anthropology, ethnology, history. Then

these instances have to be put together in order to discovery, through comparison, of the common element of truth, *i. e.*, of the factors contained in all. This work is always attempted, or the results that presuppose such work are to a greater or less extent assumed, by every person who deals with any part of social science. This is an evidence, by the way, that it is all one subject artificially divided.¹ When we come to criticise the working division lines between scientific tasks, it appears that the historian, as such, has the duty of getting out some of the raw material. The sociologist is trying to show, among other things, how these different kinds of raw material may be organized into a fabric of general knowledge about the essentials in human society. In other words, sociology gets all of its real content through old and new search-sciences dealing with factors in the social whole. The special social sciences get their correlation from sociology; or better, the particular aspects of the common subject-matter dealt with respectively by the special sciences get their rendering in terms of the whole through sociology.²

After this unequivocal assertion that sociology is not concerned with a reality apart from the subject-matter of many familiar sciences, a restatement of the *raison d'être* of sociology is due. All human thought moves within the apparent bounds of *things* on the one hand and of *people* on the other. All the study that men devote to people converges properly toward generalization of specific, accidental, non-universal details into knowledge of what is universal and essential in human conditions and in human characteristics. The central question in the science of people is: What is the content of the human *per se*? This question cannot be answered except as we progress toward answer to the question: How does it fare with the human throughout its career of progressive self-realization? What subjective and objective forces are always concerned when the human puts itself forth in action, and according to what formulas do the reactions occur?

¹ Cf. above, pp. 639, 641, *et passim*.

² Cf. MACKENZIE, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, chap. i, "The Scope of Social Philosophy."

These questions call for the conclusions toward which all inquiries into the facts about people properly converge. Sociology has undertaken to bring together the straggling ends of social research so that this remotely implied result will begin to appear in reality. The standpoint of sociology is thus an outlook that contemplates humanity in its wholeness. Sociology deliberately undertakes to establish the perspective in which to view all that may be learned about humanity. Sociology proposes to reconstruct the life of man, not by substitution of a new science to displace the older sciences of man, but by organizing these sciences into a system of reciprocally reinforcing reports of humanity as a whole.

Let us be more specific by taking the "trust" as an illustration. It is possible to analyze the trust from the standpoint of law, or from the standpoint of economics, or from the standpoint of politics, or from the standpoint of diplomacy, or from the standpoint of morals in the larger sense, or from the standpoint of industrial or technical evolution. The sociologist sees that each of these view-points affords an angle of vision from which to look upon the trust as it reveals certain combinations of human conditions and human quality. Now, the sociologist wants something more and better than these detached views. He wants to combine them into one view. He wants to have such a panorama of human conditions and qualities present to the mind that this incident, the trust, will fall into its relative place and proportion in the interplay of constant and general with temporary and special forces throughout the whole moving spectacle.

It may be asked whether all this is merely for purposes of thought, or has it a relation to further human action? Most certainly the latter. Just as the supplanting of Ptolemaic by Copernican astronomy affects the daily life of every sailor in the world, so the development of a sociology that is a report of what is objectively discoverable in the conditions and processes of human society will furnish the premises and the platform for a constantly improving art of living. As, in the case of navigation, the science has to be diluted through many simplifications

before it is available for the sailor, so with general sociology. Like any other science at its best, when it is at its highest power it will be comprehended by relatively few people. It will first influence the forms of thought among select specialists. These will influence the forms of thought among leaders who come into direct contact with larger numbers. The authorities of secondary orders will in turn distribute guiding conceptions throughout classes more and more removed from the technical viewpoint of the sociologist. Meanwhile experiment with the arts of life will progressively create a social practice between which and social theory there must be an increasing interchange of correction and corroboration.

Possibly it will appear in a few hundred years that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the relation of the sociologists to right thinking about the world of people was closely analogous with that of Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century to right thinking about the world of things. We have to establish a perspective that visualizes the whole human world in place of the unrelated parts that our abstract sciences have dissected out of the whole. Studying the human reality thus as a whole we have to learn how to measure more genuinely the parts out of which this reality is composed. This knowledge of general conditions will not guarantee intallibility about specific tasks, but, other things being equal, it will insure more intelligent grasp of the special conditions.

Virtually the same things that have been said so far in this chapter may be restated as follows:

"Held together in social relations men modify each other's nature."¹ This proposition presents the social fact in its most evident form. It involves the initial problem of sociology, viz., what are the details of the modifications which men's natures undergo through reciprocal influence?

The social fact may be described from another angle of view thus: The social fact is, first, the evolution of the individual through, second, the evolution of institutions, and the incidental reaction of all the individuals and institutions upon each other. That is, at any given moment individuals and institutions are

¹ GIDDINGS, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 377.

alike in full course of modification by the action of each upon the other. The individual of today is being modified by his contacts with other individuals, and by his contacts with today's institutions. Tomorrow's individuals will not be wholly the causes or the effects of tomorrow's institutions. Each is both cause and effect of the other.

With reference to this social *fact*, or social *process*, as we may name it according to the special aspect of it which we have in mind, certain general considerations may be urged, partly by way of repetition and partly in advance upon the position we have now reached.

Perhaps there is no phrase which is used with more vagueness of meaning than the phrase "the social point of view," or "the sociological point of view." Everybody who is intelligent today supposes himself to be first "scientific" and second "sociological" in his mental attitude. We need not now discuss what is involved in the "scientific" attitude, but under this title, the "social fact," we may note some of the marks of the sociological attitude toward the world. The use of this appears in the consideration just dwelt upon that the sociologists are trying to focalize within one field of vision all the activities that are going on among people, so that men and women who get the benefit of this outlook may see their own lives in their actual relation to all the lives around them. The sociological outlook is a position chosen for the deliberate purpose of placing each of us in his relations to all the rest, so that the meaning of each one's part in the complicated whole may appear.

Most people are more familiar with political economy than with sociology—or they think they are. Now political economy does an essential part of the work of mapping out relations between different human actions, viz., those actions that have for their primary and decisive aim the gaining of wealth. But the work of political economy, as compared with the demand which sociology discovers, may be likened to the work which an ordinary railroad map does in showing up the features of a country. When we look, for instance, at a map issued by either of the railroads that have terminals in Chicago, we are able to learn from

it all that it sets out to show about its own routes and connections. From that map alone, however, we should be likely to get little or no conception of the topography and climate, of the kinds of soil or varieties of products, of the density of population, of the political divisions, or even of the precise geographical relations of the country through which the road runs. In order to have the knowledge necessary for all departments of life in the locality, it is necessary for us to possess the information that would be represented by a series of geological, topographical, meteorological, political, and even transportation charts, picturing in turn different phases of natural and artificial conditions within the selfsame portion of territory covered by the map of a single railroad system.

In a somewhat analogous way political economy deals with the system of industrial lines of communication in a society — the industrial nerves and arteries of the body politic, so to speak. But the *life of society*, or the social *fact* or social *process*, is a vast system of physical, physiological, psychological, and personal action and reaction. The associational process is this social reality when we consider it in motion. In order to understand it we have to comprehend not merely the industrial element. That would be like seeing only one thread or figure that runs through the design of a tapestry. To know the social fact and the social process we have to be able to take in all these departments of action that make up the fact and the process; *i. e.*, the complete design of the fabric. We have to understand what these different kinds of action have to do with each other, and how each reacts upon the others.

When we speak of all this in cold blood, it seems to be a far-off and vague affair, with which we have the least possible concern. That, however, is the same mistake which we make if we think we have no concern with what the chemist calls "sodium chloride." When we find out that it is merely the salt that we want to use every day, we discover that it is our concern. In the same way we may be indifferent to the subject of "hydrous oxide," but if it is presented to us as drinking water we may see the wisdom of knowing something about it.

So the "social fact" or the "social process" is not an affair that exists outside of our circle of interests. Our whole life—from our eating and sleeping to our thinking and trading and teaching and playing and praying and dying—is a part of the social fact and of the social process. In us the fact and the process has its lodgment. In the fact and the process we live and move and have our being. Instead of not being concerned with them, they are the whole of our concern, so far as we are citizens of the world. We do not know our personal concerns until we see through and through the social fact and the social process.

Moreover, everything that we learn and try to apply as action gets its meaning in its connections with this social fact and social process. For instance, taking parts of school discipline as a sample of the larger whole: what is the good of geographical knowledge? If it stops with geographical facts alone, it is not worth having. Geography is worth studying because it helps to explain the lives of people, past and present, and the possibilities of people in the future. Or why is literature worth studying? Simply and solely because, in the first place, it shows us the inner explanations of the lives of people, past and present, and the internal resources upon which to build their future; then, in the second place, because it imparts to us some of those resources. In studying geography we are, or we ought to be, doing on a broader scale just what the immigrant does, when he scratches the ground where he halts his prairie schooner to see what sort of soil is under his feet. In studying literature we are doing somewhat more disinterestedly and calmly precisely what the lover does when he studies the moods and tastes of his mistress, so as to know how to make successful suit. He is after deep facts of human nature as betrayed in an individually interesting specimen. We are after similar facts of human nature in general.

In other words, we do not know anything until we know it in connection with the social fact and the social process. The things that we think we know are merely waste scraps of information until they find their setting in this reality, to which all knowledge belongs.

To recapitulate: The social fact is the incessant reaction between three chief factors: (1) nature; (2) individuals; (3) institutions, or modes of association between individuals. Each of these factors is composite, but at this point we may disregard that phase of the situation. The social process is the incessant evolution of persons through the evolution of institutions, which evolve completer persons, who evolve completer institutions, and so on beyond any limit that we can fix.

Sociology sets out to discover how all the details which anyone may learn about things or about people have to do with each other and are parts of each other in the social fact and the social process. These two phases of reality are, therefore, the setting in which sociology places all detailed knowledge in order to make it complete and true.

Instead of advancing at once from the position which we have repeatedly explained, we may add another alternative statement which will presently lead to a forward step in our argument. We have described sociology as the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association. As was asserted in the beginning, this is no new study. Men have been engaged upon sections of it ever since they began to be reflective at all. Sociology is the emergence of consciousness that all these sections of study about men in association are parts of one study. This perception necessarily leads to criticism of the previous conduct of the study in its conventional divisions, and to theorems of reorganization of the study. Much of the work which has been done in the territory of the social sciences has been wasted, or worse, because the workers have either lost or never had the perception that their particular inquiry is merely a detail in a larger inquiry. That inclusive inquiry is: *What are the conditions, the contents, and the operations of human association?* This question will receive partial and approximate answers as the result of progressive application of reciprocal induction and deduction. We shall learn to know details in association by generalizing them into principles of association. On the other hand, we shall learn to know the details better by thinking them in terms of the general expression thus derived by induction,

while in turn we shall complete that induction by comparing it minutely with the details which it purports to generalize. In other words, we shall in turn interpret the part by the whole and the whole by the part. We might illustrate this proposition by tracing the history of the economic theory of value. We learn rather late that value is a product of association. We have developed our present ideas of value by a succession of conclusions, now from restricted economic premises, now from larger social premises, now from reduction of concrete occurrences to terms of the states of consciousness from which they proceed. At a given time we are using conclusions of more general and of more special orders, as reciprocal checks. Our theory of utility in general holds a sort of suspensive veto over conclusions about the laws of economic value. Our observations of the phenomena of value become in turn censors and reorganizers of our theories of utility. Our knowledge of association is not gained by following a straight series of logical links. The process is rather an alternation of judging our conception of wholes by closer analysis of parts, and then a testing of our analysis of parts by fitting them back into wholes. We might illustrate the same at length, if we could trace the steps in the changes that have taken place in our conceptions of political society. Judging from the accounts that fill the larger part of historical literature, most men have thought of political association as a combination of a few rulers and generals who were the meaning factors, with a vast human herd of no particular consequence in the association. Partly of course through an actual shifting of the balance of power, but principally through gradual ability to analyze the functions of political association, we have now reversed this immemorial judgment. We see now that the generals and rulers are the accidents in political association, while the masses are the essentials. The same thing is true of our conceptions of industrial association. We once imagined that industry was a divinely ordained means of creating tribute for a select few who did nothing, and of utilizing the labor power of the many whose reason for existence was the consuming capacity of their superiors. We now see that, if there are any

consumers who do not perform an industrial function, they either perform some other equivalent social function which is properly exchanged for the output of productive labor, or they are parasites whose existence has no justification in the social process. In a word, we have reached the perception, so simple that it seems too commonplace for mention, so sagacious that it has eluded the wise until very recently, that *the world of people is a community of individuals associating*. We have discovered that each of these terms—"community," "individual," "associating"—is a function of each of the other terms. We have learned that our conceptions of the content of these terms have been unreal: that is, we have not penetrated far into the essentials of their meaning. The psychologists are just beginning to restate the problems of the individual. The ethnologists, historians, political scientists and economists are trying to formulate the facts of community in different aspects, and the sociologists are just learning to state the problems of association in its most universal aspects as the largest generalization of human relationships.

The sociologist wants to discover a program by which he may begin to learn better than they have been learned before the things that are most characteristic of the world of people. He wants to get all that we can learn about the world of people into such correlation that the different parts of our knowledge will complement each other as a credible reproduction of the reality. He wants to know the regularities that recur wherever there are human associations. He also wants to know the kinds of variations that are actual and possible within these regularities. The sociologist finds that our concepts of the world of people are so conventional that they frequently mask the most essential relationships among people. For instance, in order to understand "industry" we may need to investigate much wider categories, viz., "interdependence" and "coöperation." In order to understand "government" we may need to see it as an accident of the more universal form "coördination" or "control;" etc., etc. Sociology therefore finds it necessary to start with the universal phenomenon association; to analyze it, in the first instance, without reference to the conventional social

sciences, in so far as that is possible, seeing that the bulk of what we know of human associations up to date is given us by the social sciences; and later to see how the conventional social sciences may be used to get more intimately acquainted with the content which the sociological formulation discloses.

All this may be indicated in still another way that to certain minds will be more vivid. The world of people, as it presents itself to the sociologist's preliminary survey, might be represented by a series of charts, which we may merely suggest in passing.

Using the largest surface available, describe a circle and outline within it all the continental areas of our globe (Chart A). Without drawing lines of political division, cover the inhabited areas with points representing individuals, with degrees of density corresponding with the population statistics of the different countries. Chart A would then stand for the "big buzzing confusion" that confronts the mind when it first encounters entirely uncriticised elements of the social fact, viz., variously dense multitudes of persons.¹

On the same scale describe a second circle (Chart B), in which the points symbolizing individuals begin to represent rudimentary perceptions of groupings. So far as the mechanical limitations permit, arrange the points denoting individuals in pairs, in constellations numbering from three to an arbitrary maximum—say ten—and scatter among these groups a number of detached points corresponding with the ratios of unmarried adults in the various areas. Chart B indicates the primary fact of family grouping, characterizing all human populations, but in no case precisely accounting for the whole population. The family may not be monogamous; the monogamous family may or may not increase beyond the original pair; and in no population of self-styled civilized people are all the adults members of family groups. In successive charts (C, D–N) on the same scale represent in turn associations that are dependent upon contiguity in space, and then those associations, commercial, scientific,

¹ "Der soziale Körper ist auf dem ersten Blick eine Vielheit von Einzelpersonen. . . . Wir fassen vorläufig das Individuum allein ins Auge, beziehungsweise die Bevölkerung als eine Vielheit und Mannigfaltigkeit von Individuen." (*Bau und Leben*, 2d ed., Vol. I, p. 35.)

religious, artistic, that overspread the same space, or in the most diverse fashions link individuals widely separated in space. Add occasionally in the series a chart showing lines of persons passing from each of these groups to each of the others, and thus maintaining inter-associational association. The whole sum of things that these diagrams would symbolize and vaguely suggest would be that association which is the total of activity in the world of people. Men have analyzed and described this association in whole or in parts in various conventional ways which sociology by no means wishes to supplant. Sociology finds, however, that, whatever may be the value of the different conventional ways of treating association, they do not suffice to bring out all the most essential relationships in association, or to exhibit those relationships in their actual functional dependence. We may treat sexual, racial, civic, ecclesiastical, or industrial association in turn without discovering the universal traits of association, or the most essential relationships of individuals to the association under either form. Hence the sociologist looks out over this seething complexity of men conditioning each other, and he says to himself: "These institutions that men maintain are products and incidents and accidents. The essentials are men themselves and their reactions with their physical and spiritual conditions. It may be that the reactions of men with their conditions are not best indicated in terms of race, and state, and church, and trade. It may be that these give too fragmentary and superficial reports of the essentials in men and associations. Therefore we will try to look through and beyond these conventionalities and to see the more significant realities that are behind them. We will try to look at men in more general categories, in order to see if we cannot in this way get more profoundly acquainted with them."

Accordingly the sociologist, analyzing for himself the contents of the circle in the diagrams, finds in the first place universal and manifold association. Getting his observation a little more precise, he first distinguishes between the men associating and the physical environment which forms the place and base of association. He then makes out certain characteristic facts which seem to be ever-present phases of association. These

facts are not terms in a series, but they are coexistent aspects of a constant reality. They have various relations to the whole associational unity, but they are equally and alike traits of that unity. In a later chapter we shall name a score of such traits. It by no means follows that these terms must be the categories under which sociology is to arrange its processes or results. They are rather some of the phases of reality which sociology proposes to investigate more closely. They are data which we derive from all our present means of thinking men as associating. These data present the sociological problems, viz.: In what forms do men associate? By force of what influences do men associate? What are the indicated ends of association? What are the available means for attaining these ends?

To repeat again: The sociologist looks out on the same world of people that other students of social sciences confront, but he looks with a differentiation of interest that focalizes his attention in a distinctive way. Other students want to know orders of facts and relations that to him are merely helps to perception, and then to comprehension of other facts and relations which inhere in the same social reality. The ethnologist, for instance, wants to know the facts of racial association. The sociologist says: "Perhaps we assume too much when we start with the presumption that the profoundest truths about racial association are to be discovered by studying racial associations alone. It may be that some of the peculiarities that we find in racial associations, and which we regard as attributes of race, are incidents of geographical, or political, or vocational, or cultural, or sexual, or merely personal association. It may be that some of the things which we attribute to race occur in mobs made up of an indiscriminate mixture of races. There are innumerable sorts of association in which there is action and reaction of individuals with very marked results. Consequently we need to investigate associations of all orders, if we are to be sure that things which we attribute to membership of one association are not equally or more characteristic of other associations. It is by this extension of view alone that we shall be able to trace the ultimate and fundamental relationships between individuals."

When we approach the study of men from this center of attention, we at once perceive in the world of people certain facts that are evidently of tremendous significance, which, however, have not yet attracted sufficient notice to be made the objects of severe scientific investigation. We have these facts given to us piecemeal by all the perceptive means and processes within the competency of ordinary experience and of the traditional social sciences. Our education makes it impossible for us to think of the world of people without thinking certain relations between people. This is both an advantage and a disadvantage from the sociological point of view; for, on the one hand, we must use these particular means of knowing people in association in order to get our data; but, on the other hand, we thereby get our data mixed with conventional construals of the data that to a greater or less extent prejudge the very questions which our center of interest brings into focus. This, however, is not peculiar to sociology. It takes place in every field of research, as knowledge advances from the less exact to the more exact.

The sociologist has taken up the clue that certain principles of regularity run through all human associations, and he wants to find out what these principles are. There are various possible ways of approaching the study, and we are now to exhibit the beginnings of one of them. In a word, the preliminary process that we shall outline is this. We survey all human associations that we can bring within our present field of view, and we set down features that seem to us to be common to human association in general. If there is any force in the precedents of all other scientific inquiry, the data that we thus select as the material to be studied have a very different look at the outset from the appearance which they will have after all available processes of investigation have been exhausted upon them. We do not select scientific data and forthwith pronounce them dogmatic conclusions, any more than we sit down at the beginning of a journey and declare ourselves at the end. The things that we see in human associations in general, with such insight as we are able to bring to bear on them now, are merely some of the data of sociology, and with these data sociology must begin to do its

peculiar work. How accurate are these preliminary generalizations? What similar generalizations must be added in order to schedule all the traits common to associations of men? What more intimate laws are contained in these data? Such questions set the problems for sociology.

To illustrate: We have long had statisticians of various sorts. They have tried to enumerate and classify various details of human association. Whether or not they have ever thought it worth while to formulate such an obvious truism as that association always involves a greater or less numerousness of individuals associating, the generalization is a datum of common and of scientific experience. The query arises: Do associations take on varying qualities with varying numerousness of the associated individuals? This query at once makes the axiom and truism of statistical science a datum that demands a whole system of inquiries which belong in wider reaches of sociological science.

Again, the ethnologist discovers that one human association is what it is because of other associations with which it is in contact. The church historian discovers that religious associations have been molded by political associations, and the political historians tell us that governmental associations in one state have been modified by contact with governmental associations in another state. Here is the fact of interdependence. The sociologist says: This is not an isolated phenomenon. Wherever there are human associations there are interdependences among the units, and between the association itself and other associations. This fact of interdependence must be understood, then, in its full significance, if we are to comprehend the conditions and laws of human association in their widest and deepest scope.

Again, demography and the history of science and philosophy show people in their spatial distribution and in their various degrees of remoteness from each other in ideas. The social psychologist generalizes this commonplace circumstance, and detects in it a clue to significant regularities of fact and process in association. He derives from all that he knows about

men in association the datum that discontinuity of some sort and some degree is universal among men in association. He sets this datum down in the list of things that must be known more completely in all its bearings upon the actions of men in contact with each other.

So we might go through a list which we may name "incidents" of association. They are data of sociology: deposits of much observation of the world of people from many points of view, but raw material with which we begin a study of men from the point of view of the sociologist, *i. e.*, when we want to correlate all that we can learn about the world of people into accounts of the laws of human association in general. In other words, there are larger truths in the laws of human association than emerge when we study in turn particular kinds of association. Those studies of particular kinds of association are incomplete, therefore, until they are merged into knowledge of these larger truths. The task of finding out precisely what these larger truths are and how they are related to each other furnishes the primary problems of sociology.

Our survey up to this point suffices to sharpen a simple perception which must presently afford much needed light on sociology. There has been endless perplexity among sociologists about the concept "society." It has been asserted, on the one hand, that if there is to be a science of society, there must first be a definition of society. By others it has been urged with equal confidence that the definition of society must of necessity be a product of a science of society, and cannot be had until the science is relatively complete. There is an element of truth in both these contentions, and both may be urged with somewhat similar force in connection with the reality "association."

The perception that should resolve the difficulty, however, is that the universal fact of association in the world of people is not to be taken as a closed concept, containing consequences to be drawn out by deduction as a system of sociology. The fact of association is rather an open world to be inductively described and explained. It is a fact of indefinitely varied forms, kinds, degrees, extents. Wherever there are two men there is association.

Between all the men in the known world there is association. There is the close, constant, firm association of the family group. There is the loose, transitory, precarious association of the world's sympathizers with Dreyfus or Aguinaldo or the Boers. There are associations spatial, vocational, purely spiritual. There are associations as persistent as the Celestial Empire and the Roman Catholic Church, and there are associations that form and dissolve in a day. In short, association can be defined in advance only in a formula which is essentially interrogative, viz., as *the functioning of related individuals*. This functioning has to be traced out, not merely at the first point of contact between individuals, but throughout the whole chain of relationships of which a particular contact closes the circuit.

Sociologists are accordingly less and less inclined to go through the motions of performing the impossible. Indication, not definition, of subject-matter belongs at the beginning of every inductive process. The task of sociology is primarily to make out the orders of human association, and so far as possible to determine the formulas of forces that operate in these several orders. Association is activity, not locality. Like states of consciousness, it has to be known in terms of process, not in dimensions of space. To make headway with the sociological task we must abandon pretentious *a priori* conceptions of all sorts, and patiently investigate concrete human associations until they reveal their mystery. Human associations overlap and interlace and clash and coalesce in bewildering variety of fashions. Sociology has at last become conscious of the problem of reducing this complexity to scientific statement of form and force and method.

Once more, recurring to our definition, "Sociology is the study of men considered as affecting and as affected by association," we may state the general problem of sociology in this among other variations, viz., *to make out the proper content of the concept social, or associational*. We will for convenience use chiefly the shorter synonym. We mean that the proximate task of sociology is so to analyze and then to synthesize the contents of associations, as such, that our abstract notion "association,"

with its attributive correlates "associational," "societary," or "social," shall receive a specific and systematized content. We want to answer the question: "What regularities recur in associations, from the lowest and simplest to the highest and most complex orders?" Only by so answering do we take the concept "social" from among merely formal categories, and fill it with a precise concrete meaning. We may vary our proposition by saying that the formal term "social" is a symbol for all that in associations which is of direct concern to sociology. Or, conversely, sociology is in quest of those things which pertain to associations as such, and the general term for those things is "the social." The initial task of sociology is to find and formulate the reality for which this symbol stands.

We may approach this task by elaborating this formal symbol. "The social" being our term for all that is of distinctively sociological interest in the whole area of associations, we have the task at the outset of making this formal concept as definite as possible. At the beginning of our inquiry, how much are we able to make the concept "social" mean?

The answer may be approached by reference to De Greef's thesis, that the distinguishing factor of the social is *contract*. In dissent from this position we have urged¹ that "it would be more correct, though still vague, to say that sociology deals especially with the phenomena of *contact*. The reactions which result from voluntary or involuntary contact of human beings with other human beings are the phenomena peculiarly 'social' as distinguished from the phenomena that belong properly to biology and psychology."

This claim may be expanded as follows: In the first place, we want to indicate, not the *essence* of the social, but the *location*, the *sphere*, the *extent* of the social. If we can agree where it is, we may then proceed to discover what it is.² In the first place, then, the social is the term next beyond the individual. Assuming, for the sake of analysis, that our optical illusion, "the individual," is an isolated and self-sufficient fact, there are many

¹ SMALL and VINCENT, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 60, 61.

² Of course the converse is true, with different ratios of content in the terms.

sorts of scientific problems that do not need to go beyond this fact to satisfy their particular terms. Whether the individual can ever be abstracted from his conditions and leave him himself is not a question that we need to discuss at this point. At all events, the individual known to our experience is not isolated. He is connected in various ways with one or more individuals. The different ways in which individuals are connected with each other are indicated by the inclusive term "contact." We will not now extend the meaning of this term to other contacts of persons than those with other persons. The reason is that, if we did, we should thereby take ourselves into a still more general field, within which the laws of the social are subordinate orders. Starting from the person, to measure him in all his dimensions and to represent him in all his phases, we find that each person is what he is by virtue of the existence of other persons, and by virtue of an alternating current of influence between each person and all the other persons previously or at the same time in existence. The last native of central Africa around whom we throw the dragnet of civilization, and whom we inoculate with a desire for whisky, adds an increment to the demand for our distillery products and affects the internal revenue of the United States, and so the life-conditions of every member of our population. This is what we mean by "contact." So long as that African tribe is unknown to the outside world, and the world to it, so far as the European world is concerned the tribe might as well not exist. The moment the tribe comes within touch of the rest of the world, the aggregate of the world's contacts is by so much enlarged. The social world is by so much extended. In other words, the realm of the social is the realm of circuits of reciprocal influence between individuals and the groups which individuals compose. The general term "contact" is proposed to stand for this realm, because it is a colorless word that may mark boundaries without prejudging contents. Wherever there is physical or spiritual contact between persons, there is inevitably a circuit of exchange of influence. The realm of the social is the realm constituted by such exchanges. It extends from the producing of the baby by the mother and the simultaneous

producing of the mother by the baby, to the producing of merchant and soldier by the world-powers, and the producing of the world-powers by merchant and soldier.

The "social," then, is the reciprocity and the reciprocity between the persons that live and move and have their being as centers of reaction in a world filled with like centers. Here is the material for the "organic concept." It gets its meaning as the antithesis of the atomistic individualistic philosophy. We are what we are by virtue of the fact that other men from the remote past and from the immediate present are continually depositing a part of themselves in us, and taking a part of us into their make-up in return.¹ This interaction of persons is the realm of the social. It is the next higher order of complexity above that set of reactions which we call the individual consciousness.

Tennyson gave us a picture of the "Two Voices" in the same personality—a very slight variation in detail upon Paul's psychological analysis of himself: "For the good that I would I do not; but the evil that I would not, that I do."² Each man is in himself a society, not of *two*, but of innumerable voices, each striving for utterance, but composing themselves into some resultant activity that stands for the algebraic total of stimulus and response in each particular case.³ Two men become a society in which conditions that were possible in the consciousness of each without contact with another personal factor now have to compose themselves with reactions set in motion by contact of each with the other.

The social, then, is all the give-and-takeness there is, whether more or less, between the persons anywhere in contact. The

¹ I hope to be forgiven for a figure that harks back toward the notion of stuff, rather than process, as the reality behind associational phenomena. No one will feel the difficulty but the psychologists, and I trust them to accept my word that I do not mean to press the figure to that length.

² Rom. vii: 19.

³ After this was written and discussed in seminar, I happened upon Tarde's remark (*Les transformations du pouvoir*, p. 196): "Il y a deux sortes d'associations: premièrement, celle des divers esprits individuels unis en société; en second lieu, celle en chacun d'eux, des états de conscience qui s'y sont peu à peu agrégés et qui lui proviennent, pour la plupart, d'autres esprits. En chaque esprit individuel se répète plus ou moins cette agrégation plus ou moins systématique d'états de conscience qui constitue le type social."

realm of the social is the total of all the give-and-takings, considered severally or collectively, that occur among men. If we want to know the quality or the qualities of the social, we have to inspect these givings and takings in the largest possible number and variety of associations, and to note and classify their qualities. So far as we have gone, we find that the social is, qualitatively, not one thing, but many things. It is Tarde's imitation and it is Ward's misomimetism. It is Durkheim's "constraint" and it is Nietzsche's defiance of constraint. It is attraction and it is repulsion. It is mutual aid and it is mutual hindrance. It is consciousness of kind and it is consciousness of unkind. It is selection and it is rejection. It is adaptation and it is the tearing to pieces of adaptations. Furthermore, if we want to know the laws of the social, we have the task first of formulating these give-and-takings in all their meaning relations, and then of deriving the equations of their action, just as astronomers or chemists or physiologists have to derive the laws of reactions within their several fields.

To vary the foregoing propositions we may put the same thing in this form:

Human association is men accomplishing themselves. Here is a dialectic the two poles of which are perpetually reinforcing each other. The men are making the association, and the association is making the men. Parallel with this reciprocity in fact there must be a reciprocity in theory. The two poles of the dialectic must perpetually interpret each other. We cannot know the men except as we discover them in terms of their accomplishing; and we cannot know the accomplishing except as we discover it in terms of the men. If we are satisfied with any less comprehensive statement of the case, we either make up a false process, or we fail to see that the whole thing is one process working itself out from centers of consciousness that are poles of other centers of consciousness. The psychologist and the sociologist are trying to tunnel the life-process from opposite sides; the one from the individual, the other from the associational side; but there is no way for either of them through the life-reality, unless it is a way in which they meet at last. Dropping the

clumsy figure we may say literally that the sociologist has the task of formulating man in his associational self-assertions. The psychologist has the task of formulating man in the mechanism of his self-assertions.¹

As was said above, our ability to look out over the field of human association, and to reproduce it in thought, however imperfectly, is due, in large part, to the conventional social sciences. The supposition now to be proposed, for the sake of varied statement of our main proposition, is accordingly strained as well as extravagant, but it will serve a certain purpose. Let us suppose that all human activities had occurred precisely as we observe them, with the exception of the activities which may be called collectively the social sciences. Suppose that men had associated precisely as we know them to have associated, with the one modification that they did no systematic thinking about association. We should have then industry, government, society, but we should have no political economy, political science, history, social philosophy. We should have at most records, chronicles of bare events, with no conventional classifications and interpretations of the events. Suppose that at this moment the process of social self-examination begins. Association becomes introspective. Certain men begin to feel scientific and philosophic curiosity about the human activities, some of which they see, and more of which they know by record. The

¹ The conceptions which these last paragraphs try to fix are not the property of any one individual, certainly not my own. So far as I can trace my share of them to definite sources, they are due largely to a sort of telepathic communication for seven years with my colleagues of the philosophical department of the University of Chicago, and to PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN'S *Social and Ethical Interpretations*. My debt to the latter source is none the less clear, although I am unable to adopt all of Professor Baldwin's conclusions. For instance, I am disposed to dissent from his views on three out of the four cases of the "extra-social" which he specifies in this JOURNAL, Vol. IV, pp. 650 *sq.* As a sample of the former sort of stimulus a recent remark by Professor Dewey may be quoted: "The effort to apply psychology to social affairs means that the determination of ethical values lies, not in any set or class, however superior, but in the workings of the social whole; that the explanation is found in the complex interactions and interrelations which constitute this whole. To save personality in all we must serve all alike — state the achievements of all in terms of mechanism, that is, of the exercise of reciprocal influence. To affirm personality independent of mechanism is to restrict its full meaning to a few, and to make its expression in the few irregular and arbitrary." (*Psychological Review*, March, 1900, p. 123.)

main difference between what would follow and what now occurs in the field open to such reflection would be that no particular way of looking at the facts would be able to claim precedence over other ways. No "science" would be able to say: "This is my preserve, no one else has any right here." We should presently have the same social sciences that we have now, with the difference that no long familiarity with the forms of one of the sciences would give it a prestige that would obscure its relative subordination to all the other sciences. Among the ways of looking at the common subject-matter would be one which would enlist certain minds more intensively than the more specific forms of treatment. It would be the way which takes note, in the first place, of general characteristics manifested in all association, and which attempts to find the unity underlying the unspeakable diversity in the relations of these characteristics to each other, and in the relations of all specific and particular actions to their universals.

This, minus the fictitious historical assumption, marks the exact situation of the philosophical sociologists. They see that the impulse, quality, and tendency of the energy put forth in association is not necessarily indicated by the obvious and familiar groupings of persons and classifications of activities in the special social sciences. They see that the life-problem of every man is a question of his total function as a man. It cannot be summarily solved in terms of political or economic units. They see accordingly that the activities which associated men perform are consequences and accidents, on the one hand of the energies of the men associating, and, on the other, of their twofold environment. The sociologists, therefore, say that they are bound to know something over and above and beyond men in the different specific groups which first arrest reflective attention—their families, their trades, their classes, their unions, their nations, etc. The sociologists are bound to get acquainted with the common traits of men that produce these groups and in turn are affected by them. All this is part of the sociological purpose to penetrate beyond our present insight into knowledge of what is more and less essential, more and less fundamental, more and

less inevitable, more and less desirable, more and less modifiable and controllable in human conditions and actions.

This recapitulation brings us close to a perception which must be developed in later chapters. In a word, the universal fact of association, in all its varieties of scope and form, is an affair of individuals who are storage batteries of interests. All these phenomena of association are permutations of these interests that lodge in the individual. Whether we call these general facts "characteristics" or "circumstances" or "incidents" or "conditions" of association makes little difference, so long as we avoid using either word as a snap judgment about facts and relations which require further investigation. The main thing is that when we break away from the conventionalities of the older social sciences, and look out over human associations without using those conventionalities as spectacles, we see some general peculiarities of association that promise to reward further attention, especially by giving new meaning to familiar aspects of association. It is a fair presumption that further search with the aid of these clues will result in profounder knowledge of the specific social relationships than has been gained by study of them in the forms of the traditional sciences alone. It is the belief of the sociologists that it is possible so to generalize the facts which ethnology, history, economics, political science, and psychology analyze that we may presently have, not only a sociology that uses these facts, but a sociology that will in turn be a basis for these sciences in an improved form; a basis that will furnish means for discovering more facts and better ones in the peculiar territory of these special sciences.¹

This survey enforces the further conclusion which it has been hard for the sociologists to accept, to which comparatively few of them are even now reconciled, viz., that sociology cannot furnish any credible generalizations of laws until it has patiently studied conditions which confront us when we refuse to have our vision restricted by the categories of conventional social science. The very best thing that sociology can do in its present state is

¹ *Vide* "Methodology of the Social Problem," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, November, 1898, pp. 385 *sq.*

to make conditions and relationships conspicuous that are either invisible or obscure in the older forms of social science. We need to see aspects of association that we have either ignored or undervalued or never observed. We have been chasing moon-beam expectations of sociological systems before we have begun to criticise or even to collect our phenomena. In a few years, therefore, some of our most pretentious literature will be fit only for the museums of antiquities or the pulp mills. We have reached the obvious necessity of starting at the beginning and of refusing to let our dogmatizing zeal outrun our analytical discoveries. We have as terms in our problem: first, the physical environment; second, the fundamental interests of individuals; third, manifestations of these interests in the institutions that are the products of association; fourth, forms of relationship that are discoverable in these institutions, and modes of operation that are manifested by the same. Now the sociological problem is to express all that occurs in human association in terms of the elements that enter into association. These are, first, the physical laws that *converge* in individuals, and, second, the spiritual laws that *emerge* in individuals.

We may conclude this chapter with a résumé of its already numerous repetitions. Sociology is one of the avenues of approach to knowledge of men as we actually find them, in distinction from men as we try to think them by abstraction for various special purposes. Thus, for example, if we want to know the laws of coexistence and sequence between states of consciousness in the individual mind, we have to consider men as standing each by himself. We disregard the relations of man to man. States of consciousness have existence, so far as we know, only within individual persons. We abstract one or more individuals from their living and moving with their fellows, and we try to discover what takes place within the consciousness of these individuals. Or, if we want to know the operations of the motive of self-interest in its relations to marketable goods, we have to abstract the economic man from the total man, and to trace the direction of his activities, and the laws of his activities, so far as the operation of self-interest can be measured: *i. e.*, we

have to develop "economic science." Or, if we want to learn the lessons of political experience, if we want to know how bodies of people joined together in states have fared in their attempts to live together as states, and to maintain themselves against other states, then we have to abstract from the whole mass of experience that is made up by the total history of all men, past and present, those portions of that experience which are primarily and evidently civic. We have to gather all the facts that are available about bodies politic. We have to set those facts in order, so that they will tell the utmost about the underlying principles which the facts manifest. We have to develop "political science."

But there is a more general and universal desideratum than either of these, or many more that might be scheduled. Men as men, not as specialists, want to understand the bearings of life as a whole. We want to know where and how to place ourselves in the confused tangle of activities that all men are carrying on together. We want to understand the conduct of life as a totality, so that we may make our individual lives, if possible, more intelligent factors in this whole, and so that we may move toward such adjustments of these incalculably various lives that the total of human conduct may become more intelligently unified. This desire to know the whole of human life, with a view to wiser conduct of life, has made men study in turn the various phases of life that are the particular objects of interest to the special social sciences. Sociology is not a rival of these sciences; it is a part of them, and an inevitable outcome and culmination of them. Expressed from the other point of view, each of these sciences is a pitifully incomplete part of the process of knowing its own subject-matter, unless it passes into the sociological synthesis and finds its completion there. Sociology advertises that, although we are just beginning to understand the intricacy of human life, it is possible to represent it in ways that will afford more connected views of the parts that compose it. These views are all the more trustworthy and valuable because they do not necessarily consist chiefly of novel details, but to a considerable extent frankly throw familiar details into new

perspectives, and then make requisitions for more details to fill up gaps of which we were unconscious in our previous knowledge.

Sociology, then, is not a proposed substitute for other divisions of social science. As we have argued above, it would be a step toward clearness if we should agree to use the term "sociology" as a generic name for all the social sciences considered, not as a series or hierarchy, but as an interdependent process of knowing the social reality as a whole: the system of divided labor upon the common subject-matter which has to be viewed in various aspects. If that agreement were reached, it would of course be desirable to fix upon a name for that portion of sociology which we are explaining in accordance with the description "study of man considered as affecting and as affected by association." Professor Sumner, of Yale, has introduced the term "societology," and he apparently applies it to very nearly the same aspect of the subject-matter to which these papers apply the term "sociology" in the secondary or more special sense of our formula. We repeat that our use of the term in this way is deliberately metaphorical. Usage, not academic nor individual preference, will of course gradually enforce a self-consistent code of terms with constant values.¹

Not to deal further with this important but non-essential matter of names, our point of departure is this: Human life, as it appears to us objectively, is *the involved activity of individuals associating*. Knowledge of human life accordingly presupposes a conspectus of human associations, and intimate perception of the ways in which the persons and the associations affect each other. This knowledge cannot be reached by any single science. Sociology is, in the first place, a sort of range-finder. The figure will not bear very close inspection, but, to be literal, sociology has to chart the field of human association, to correlate extant knowledge of various associations, and to show the relations

¹ Major Powell has made the following suggestion: He distinguishes sociology as "the science of institutions," and he adds: "I use the term sociology to distinguish one of five coördinated sciences: esthetology, technology, sociology, philology, and sophiology, and I call all of these sciences *demonomy*. I classify the sciences of sociology as *statistics, economics, civics, histories, and ethics*." (*American Anthropologist*, July, 1899, p. 476.)

of problems that look to more knowledge about association. Within the field thus described the work of all the social sciences falls.

For instance, general sociology names, among other associations, that of superior races with inferior races. Extant knowledge, such as it is, furnishes a few more or less credible generalizations about the laws of interrelation in case of such association. But suppose we wish to take up, as a serious scientific problem, the status of the colored race in the United States. Our general sociology will furnish the landmarks. It will help us place that particular association among all the other associations that compose the life of the world, and of our particular country at this moment. But we want to know, for example, wherein the assumed inferiority and superiority of the two races consists. Is it physiological? Is it psychical? Is it both? Is it accidental or essential? What is the prospect that the distinguishing differences can be made to disappear? What is likely to occur as this association of two unlike races continues? These questions propose problems that no abstract reasoning can solve. They take us into the realm of one social science and one physical science after another. Physiology must give its testimony. Ethnological investigation is needed. History must yield new information. Psychology must add discoveries. Political science must contribute its evidence. Political economy must furnish elements of the solution. All these and many more phases of the facts in question must then at last be organized into a representation of the whole situation.

Or, suppose we are studying the past, present, and future of the association which we see at this moment between a proletariat and a propertied class in this country. To what extent is it actual? Whence comes it? Whither tends it? What may we do about it? Here as before we have a group of real problems which are not the preserve of any conventional science. It involves history, statistics, demography, and, indeed, every other science that deals with real men. All our conclusions, whether scientific or popular, about such real conditions, imply as their logical antecedents the methods of discovery appropriate to these

particular departments of research. So in general of any case of actual association between men which we want either to understand or to control or to modify. Each is a fact within the great fact of human association at large. This fact of human association, made up of innumerable constituent associations, has its historical and its contemporary phases, all of which involve active influences in force at each given moment in any specific association. General sociology has, then, first of all, the task of plotting this whole actual system of human associations, and of deriving all the knowledge available about principles that are of general validity within and between associations. Thus the work of general sociology is related to the actual conduct of reflective life in society somewhat as geometry is to applied mechanics, or as general logic is to a particular argument. In other words, general sociology is merely formal and empty and speculative if it is considered as isolated from the rest of social science and self-sufficient. Having an actual content, it is merely one of the stages through which perceptive material about human life must pass in getting converted into knowledge of life in its wholeness.


It is to be said, further, and with all possible emphasis, that the results which sociology will reach for a long time to come must be chiefly qualitative, not quantitative. This proposition may be illustrated by use of very familiar material. For instance, every observer of American politics knows that we have to reckon with a certain hereditary antipathy to England. We know that this feeling is of two distinct types, viz., that which dates from our colonial times, and that which began to come over from Ireland at the middle of the nineteenth century. We must add to these distinct types of anti-British feeling the less definite and less energetic jealousy of Great Britain brought to us by immigrants from other European countries. On the other hand, we know that there are certain affinities between ourselves and the British. Now, it is a matter of nice balancing in "practical politics" to map out party programs so that these feelings will be discounted. No one can in advance take the precise measure of the pro- or anti-British sentiment. Politicians have to know

these sentiments qualitatively, and to be good judges of the stimuli that tend to rouse them. So of the sectarian sentiments. Everybody knows that there are materials for very determined conflict in most of the cities of the United States, if the inhabitants did not instinctively take account of the fact that they are not homogeneous theologically, or even religiously. We are in the main—not to mention minor differences—Jews and Catholics and Protestants and eclectics. Every candidate for public office, and every bidder for public approval of any sort, in our cities, or in the country at large, has to adjust his conduct to approximate qualitative knowledge of these religious differences. Not only that, but every citizen has to pay more or less conscious respect to the existence of these differences. The more general and public our relations are, the more do we need to make our qualitative knowledge of these factors in our environment precise and available.

The same is true of the centralizing and localizing sentiment in our political motives in the United States; of our sectional consciousness; of our attitude toward the possibilities suggested by the terms "expansion" and "anti-expansion;" of our individualistic and collectivistic tendencies in formulating industrial ideals. We cannot be intelligent actors in public life in any station unless we know the existence and the rôle of these and similar moral forces in our society. We must know them, not merely in these relatively complex and familiar forms, but in their relatively simple and elusive psychological elements. It is impossible for us to know these forces as the mechanical engineer knows the amount of power set free by use of a given quantity of fuel, or by the fall of a given volume of water from a given height. What we can know at best is the character and tendency of these forces, and certain facts of varying degrees of accuracy about their sources and their reciprocal ratios.

Now sociology, in its most general form, as well as in most of its more special forms of history, ethnology, economics, etc., is dealing with phases of human life which, at present at least, are knowable only qualitatively, and to a certain extent relatively. To know human relations in this way is by no means a

contemptible achievement. It is all the more respectable if we are perfectly clear in our own minds about the difference between such knowledge and knowledge that is definitely quantitative. Sociology is an attempt to know the factors that are always at work in every group of human beings, from the primitive pair, or the horde, to the modern religious congregation, or trade union, or club, or international alliance. Such factors are to be traced to the rudimentary conditions explained to us by physiology and psychology, *e. g.*, irritability and suggestibility. They appear in more complex forms as habit, imitation, invention. They are organized into sympathy and antipathy. They act with accumulations of physical and mental tradition. They become conflict, coöperation, individualization, and socialization. They arrive at last at the varieties of developed forms of association that are manifested by the most evolved societies. It is desirable and possible to know these factors of individual and social life qualitatively, in such a way that it will be feasible to rationalize life more intelligently. In order that we may not yield to the temptation to become dogmatic upon an insufficient basis, we should be advised at the outset, however, of the limitations of this knowledge. The amount of knowledge within the reach of today's sociology (in the large and inclusive sense) simply puts us in a position to judge of social reactions a little more sanely than people can who do not have the use of an equal amount of knowledge. We cannot yet in a single instance formulate in advance the influences that will produce a proposed social reaction in such a way that the formula can compare in precision and certainty with typical formulas in chemistry. Instead of being able to say, for example,



the best that we can say is something like this: Representing the fundamental human desires by *A, B, C, D, E, F*, and representing those desires as they appear in a given social situation by undetermined coefficients and exponents, we have at the most something like the following:

$$\text{The given situation} = ?A' \ ?B' \ ?C' \ ?D' \ ?E' \ ?F'.$$

Or we may reverse the formula for purposes of prediction, and it will amount to this: Given the terms,

$$?A' ?B' ?C' ?D' ?E' ?F',$$

and the product will be a certain social condition to be symbolized very roughly by the expression:

$$(A^q B^r C^v D^w E^x F^y) N. a. b.$$

On the other hand, it must be urged that inability to reach accuracy about the forces concerned in social reactions does not bar the way to studies which presuppose results at this point. We may take up further problems of qualitative measurement, while elementary problems, both of description and of measurement, are still in process of solution. For instance, suppose we reach the decision, hinted at above, that in all human associations we are dealing with fundamental human *interests*, which manifest themselves in desires, that in turn operate in accordance with variations of irritability, suggestibility, habit, imitation, invention, sympathy, and antipathy. There are a thousand problems about the actual quality of these forces, and about their relations to each other. Yet we may proceed to study the facts of modern *democracy*, for example, as they present themselves to our observation, and as they emerge in course of our experiments with control. We may study them in all their physical, industrial, æsthetic, scientific, moral, legal, and political phases, without waiting for the more intimate problems to be solved. Indeed, these antipodes of sociological study will both balance and stimulate each other. Each set of problems will be the more intelligently treated because of consciousness that neither set of problems will be settled until the results can be correlated with the results of the other set. We are estopped from dogmatic snap judgments about the social conditions in which we pursue our immediate daily interests, by consideration of the more precise elements of human activity and motive that are under investigation by students of another type.

Furthermore, we are not debarred from immediate social ambition, nor from practical endeavor to make society better, by the fact that sociological theories are only in the making. Physicians practiced fumigation of infected places, and with a certain

degree of success, long before they had an approximate explanation of the propagation of disease. We need not be less efficient for being intelligent about our limitations. There is no knowledge of social relations that can furnish adequate major premises for wholesale dogmas about social programs. There is insight into the facts of human association sufficient to show the way toward more insight, and toward more intelligent action. It is honest, and therefore socially the best policy, to represent sociology as it is, not as its more selfish exponents would like to have their public imagine that it is.

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[*To be continued.*]

A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW OF SOVEREIGNTY.

CHAPTER XII.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND CORPORATIONS.

THE third original institution, or set of institutions, from which the state has sprung, was private property in slaves, serfs, land, and capital, or the industrial institution *per se*. Throughout social evolution during the empiric stage this institution was subordinate to the overshadowing institutions of the family, the monarchy, the church. But since the emergence of the reflective stage and its abolition of slavery and serfdom, the industrial has taken a new and derived form, a change analogous to that which occurred in religion in the transition from the ethnic to the ethical, and in the state in the transition from absolutism to constitutionalism. These derived institutions are the merchants' and manufacturers' guilds and the more recent business corporation.

The persuasive basis of industry is originally closely bound with the coercive basis of organization, both being grounded on the necessity of subduing nature to gain a livelihood. But in the empiric stage coercion was corporal—the direct ownership of slave and serf. Consequently labor was degraded and despised, and those whose lot it was felt no particular devotion to it. But in the reflective stage, with the freedom of labor, with inventions, machinery, and industrial technique, industry acquires an interest in itself and arouses a devotion which is susceptible to the sanctions of persuasion. The love of work is the persuasive basis of industry. Work has an interest for its own sake, and also an ulterior interest as a means to the sustaining of all the other institutions. A free man works because he finds an interesting outlet for his energies, and because he wishes to support wife, children, preacher, government. But in so far as this ulterior end is not voluntary but compulsory, in so far as this love of work is overshadowed by the necessities of the worker, the basis

is not persuasive, but coercive, and where the latter element still exists it chokes the persuasive element and gives character to the institution. It is the gradual extraction of coercion from industry and its absorption by the state that permits this institution to be separated out from the others and established upon its own persuasive motive, the love of work.

The material basis, from the very nature of the institution, is more inclusive in industry than in any other institution. Industry is concerned primarily with the material of nature, fitting it for use in all institutions. It produces food, clothing, and shelter for wife and children; weapons and munitions for the state; cathedrals for the church; ballot paper for political parties. It thus prepares the primary material basis to which the other institutions add their own peculiar increment of value. It is partly for this reason that in the empiric stage, when production is direct and not yet based on the roundabout methods of accumulated capital, the industrial institution is not yet differentiated out from under the domestic, the military, and the ecclesiastical institutions. Capital consists of tools in place of machinery; land is more abundant than population; and consequently the material basis of industry does not have an independent importance and value. It is laborers who are scarce rather than land and machinery, and consequently industry is built upon slavery and serfdom rather than upon property in land and capital.¹ In the reflective period, however, with its wage system and oversupply of labor relative to land and capital, the latter becomes the basis of a newly differentiated institution, the industrial.

The organization of industry and its tendency to monopoly and centralization have the same basis and follow the same laws as those we have seen in other institutions. Yet the distinction between the empiric and reflective stages must be noted. In the former stage, as already stated, industry had not acquired its separate institution, but was subordinate mainly to the political institution. Therefore, as the latter developed toward centralization,

¹ The disproportionate importance given to this principle by Loria, expanding on the suggestion of Henry George, cannot be accepted. He overlooks the equal importance of religious and moral beliefs. See translation by KEASBEY, *Loria, The Economic Foundations of Society*.

so did industry centralize with it. The absolute monarch was private proprietor, not only of the land and vassals, but also of all the slaves and serfs belonging to the latter. Centralization was political, not industrial. Consequently in the later development of the state whereby subordinate classes gained partnership with the monarch and introduced order and right into coercion, the rights acquired were not peculiarly industrial, but primarily political. Freedom of labor is a political privilege. The right of free industry is the right to be free from governmental obstructions in the way of setting up an independent establishment and buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest. The right of free movement and free employment is the right to be free from arbitrary political obstruction in seeking employment. The right of property is the right of every individual, regardless of rank, learning, political influence, or other obstruction, to get and keep such property as he can. These are all primarily political privileges, and consist in the removal of those restrictions which the rulers had imposed directly on individuals and classes.

It is often asserted that slavery and serfdom disappeared, not because of state prohibition, but primarily through the economic fact of the wastefulness of coerced labor in competition with voluntary labor. This view is undoubtedly true. As already stated, only when useful objects, be they tools, animals, women, men, land, saints' relics, or public franchises, come to be recognized as scarce with reference to the existing density and volume of population, does their significance for self and their capacity for coercion rise into consciousness with sufficient clearness to invite men to appropriate them as private property. And when the increasing population and wealth production have transferred scarcity to other factors, then is the motive for appropriation also transferred. But while this may cause the disappearance of slavery and serfdom, it is not enough to bring about the positive rights of freedom. Economic causes alone would abolish serfdom, but would not prevent the substitution of a caste system like that of India. It required the positive interference of the state in the creation of legal rights, such as free

industry, free movement, free employment, free ownership of property, to enable individuals from the serf caste not only to be free from direct coercion, but also to break into the hitherto exclusive ranks of the ruling castes, and to share their industrial privileges. In China, too, with a weak state, slavery has run for centuries alongside freedom. But the European or American state, with its doctrines of right and its partnership of the capitalist and wage-earning classes, has both forcibly deprived the original slave- and serf-holding aristocracies of their private property in men, and has also given the latter equal privileges with the former, and in so doing has reshaped the industrial institution in such a way that indirect coercion and persuasion mainly, instead of direct coercion, must be relied upon to induce work and to create wealth. By the abolition of slavery and serfdom all persons are made the property of the state instead of the property of private owners, and the state, using its coercive power as it sees fit, has adjusted them to each other in their work according to its ideas of right, constituting the familiar substantive rights of life, property, free contract, free movement, free industry, free use of public property and the gifts of nature, etc. Caprice is thus largely excluded from industry, and order and security take its place — indispensable conditions for that immense increase of production required by the increase of population, and producible only through methods of persuasion.

The state in the reflective period, thus extracting direct coercion from property owners, prepared the way for the evolution of the industrial institution upon its own material basis. It did this by breaking down the restrictions which subordinate industry to politics and religion, thus making possible new associations of men for industrial purposes alone. The rights of freedom made industry fluid, and prepared it to recrystallize around its own persuasive and material basis. The material basis thus prepared was private property in land and capital, which henceforth was to be free of acquisition to all, and transferable. Here is a new basis for the industrial institution, enabling it to be separated out from other institutions and to

develop toward monopoly and centralization by means of its own indirect coercion, the privative sanctions. This development took successively two forms, the guild and the corporation.

First, as to the guilds. Along with the freedom of labor which resulted from economic and legal changes went the growth of absolutism; and the monarch, in order to strengthen himself against his nobility, introduced what may be called the *democratization* of property. The fact and concept of property originated as the possession of a narrow and aristocratic class. Serfs, slaves, and subordinates were not considered as capable of holding property in their own right. The mediæval guilds of merchants and manufacturers, having their origin in the necessity of association on the part of the newly freed serfs, and gradually gaining through their organization a recognition from the king, secured from the latter for each of their members the right of private property in tools, lands, and family. This democratization consisted simply in the right to buy, sell, and give their own tools and lands in trade and their daughters in marriage, just as the feudal lords did with their property.

These guilds, originating as the voluntary associations of free men, secured in time, through the further growth and strengthening of their organization, the exclusive jurisdiction, not only of commerce and manufactures, but also of local government, within their respective areas, as well as a share in the national government. The last came about as follows: Their delegates or headmen, from time to time, met in national convention, or went as a lobby to the meetings of the king and his grand council, in order to secure special privileges for their members. This convention or lobby was finally legalized and incorporated with delegates from the smaller landowners, and became a branch of the state, the house of commons. The guilds themselves in their local areas were granted again and again certain sovereign prerogatives—the right to tax themselves, to appoint and name the governmental officers in the locality, to adopt and enforce ordinances. Gradually by this process of legalization they became intrinsic parts of the structure of sovereignty. The sovereign merely took those forms

of organization which had sprung up as private associations through struggle and survival, and had shown by the fact of survival their strength and fitness, and then filled them with political functions. Their structure, that is, the organization of their coercive sanctions, was private and competitive in its origin and growth. It became public simply by being legally recognized as an organization and intrusted with public functions. Later, through the simple device of extension of the suffrage, subordinate and hitherto excluded classes, living in the area governed by the organization, were admitted to partnership in determining its will. This may be called the *socialization* of property and institutions. The democratization of institutions consisted in breaking up the centralized form which had resulted from survival, and creating small copies of it, each with similar unrestricted powers of private dominion. The socialization of institutions consists in introducing the subordinate classes into partnership with the hitherto absolute proprietor. The family was democratized when polygamy was outlawed, and slaves and serfs were guaranteed possession and control of their wives and children. The family was socialized when the wife and children were granted the right to veto the arbitrary commands of the head of the family and so were made partners with him. Political parties were democratized through the guaranteed right of free assemblage, free speech, and free nomination and election of candidates, whereby any group of persons could organize a party if they could persuade enough others to join. Parties are being socialized through the legalized ballot and primaries, by which the organization proper is transferred to sovereignty, and the subordinate members are guaranteed approved rights of veto and persuasion within the organization.¹ Democratization divides and multiplies an institution, restricting its centralizing tendencies, but retains its basis in private property. Socialization transfers it from private property to sovereignty, incorporates its organization into the constitution of the state, fixes the relations of its members to each other against capricious change, and amends it in such ways as

¹ See following chapter.

to guarantee certain rights within it to the constituted members. The guilds were a consequence of the democratization of property. Their socialization was effected after the triumph of the exclusive jurisdiction and political power which they attained under private control. This power and jurisdiction, being legally recognized and transferred to sovereignty, was amended in the interest of order and right, and thereby became the structure of city government.

Strangely enough, the guilds, which originated and grew up as industrial associations, ultimately lost their industrial life, while the shell of their organization survived by being filled with political duties. Their fate strikingly illustrates the suffocation which organization, as it approaches perfection, with its increased coercive power, inflicts upon the persuasive principle which animates it. Owing to the restrictions of the guilds, the new industry which arose with the inventions of machinery was compelled to seek new areas and develop a new organization, the corporation.

In the origin of business corporations we find again the freedom of labor and democratization of property which furnished the basis for new associations. Here, also, the principle of coercion with its privative sanctions was the basis of organization. Perfect freedom on the part of the owners of machinery in the employment, payment, discharge, and promotion of those who worked with their machines was the condition of organizing and economizing the forces of each establishment and fitting it to overcome others in the struggle for survival. Again, also, in this struggle, proceeding for the past 150 years, the smaller and weaker establishments have disappeared, and their territory has been occupied by the larger, until, in the United States, where this private competition has been the freest, and where corporations were earliest legalized through general incorporation laws in the place of special charters, the resultant monopoly and centralization have in many industries been accomplished. The state has not only not interfered, but has contributed positively to the process of centralization by its laws creating and protecting business corporations. These corporations, being a species of

joint property, require for the unity of administration of the coercive sanctions intrinsic in private property a further coercive power on the part of a portion of their stockholders over the remaining portion. A corporation is in law a unity, an artificial person, and by this can only be meant that all stockholders must submit to the controlling interest. The state, without taking ethical questions into account, but merely recognizing the natural unreflective relations which property owners assume to each other, legalized these relations as it found them, and determined the controlling interest in the corporation on the basis of the *shares* of stock rather than the number of stockholders. The will of the corporation is therefore the will of the owners of a majority of the stock. The process of socialization of these corporations has begun through legislation protecting, or rather creating, rights of the minority stockholders in determining the will of the institution. The state has not gone as far as to obliterate the plutocratic basis, "one share one vote," but it has in some cases, under a new ethical motive, authorized associations to be formed on the humanitarian basis, "one member one vote." These are known as coöperative associations, and the fact that they have not survived in the struggle with corporations shows how difficult it is for the state to create outright the structure of a new institution. Structure is a matter of private, competitive, unethical, coercive survival, and the state can introduce the ethical notions of right into it only after its period of struggle is past and after its monopolistic character has guaranteed immunity from the disciplined organizations based on private coercion. Since the public opinion controlling the state has not yet recognized the inevitable monopoly of corporations and is still busied with plans for their democratization, our search will find as yet but occasional steps toward their socialization. It can only be said that such steps will probably be directed to providing further rights for minority stockholders and to creating rights within the corporation for the laborers employed. The rights of the laborers turn especially upon the right to freedom from capricious employment and discharge, that is, to the introduction of order and right into the structure of the

institution. In general this may be designated as the "right to employment," and should be distinguished both from the "right to work" advocated by the revolution of 1848 in France and from the socialistic theory of the rights of laborers.

Louis Blanc's advocacy of the "right to work" and the establishment of "national workshops" in 1848 recognized intuitively that the right to work depended upon the perfection of organization. Consequently the two planks of the revolutionary platform were the "right to work" and the "organization of labor." The former depended on the latter. But the plan of organization thus ethically preconceived could by no means survive. It was absurdly simple and military. Eleven laborers formed an "escouade" with an "escouadier" at their head, five escouades a brigade with a brigadier, four brigades a lieutenancy, four lieutenancies a company, and as many companies under one chief as were necessary.¹ Apart from the reputed hostility of the French government which administered these workshops, they, of course, could not have competed with the highly disciplined organization of the "trust" which natural selection has since evolved. The state was here, as with the coöperative association, attempting to create an ethical institution where only a coercive one could survive. The case is different, however, after the final victory of the trust or monopoly. In this case the coercive sanctions have been organized and preserved by the struggle for life, and are fitted to the work in hand. Ethical considerations are now only questions of such structural amendment as will give the laborers security within the perfected and victorious organization. The device of compulsory or legal arbitration, as adopted in Australian colonies, is a step in this direction. Public ownership of monopolies is probable in many cases, but where it has hitherto been adopted the motive has not been mainly the provision of rights for employes, but the improvement and cheapening of the service for the public. Civil-service reform is a crude guaranty of the right to employment in the public service, but it again lacks fitness for industry, since it is an artificial check on the heads of

¹ See SINGER, *Das Recht auf Arbeit* (Wien, 1894), p. 44.

departments imposed by an outside commission, and was created by the state outright on ethical and *a priori* principles, instead of being developed under the test of survival. In successful private business the general manager has complete power of appointment and removal of subordinates, unhampered by any outside academic board of examiners, and if private industry is transferred to public ownership, this method must be retained. The solution lies in the proper selection of the heads of departments, and in accomplishing this the state or city must imitate the method of private corporations in selecting their general managers and superintendents.¹ The structure of industry must be incorporated into government exactly as developed by competitive survival, but at the same time must be so amended as to secure the rights of the laborers which are at the time accepted as the ethical purpose of the state.

The right to employment differs from the socialistic theories of labor's rights in that the latter hold that the laborer has the right to the entire product. If this be so, there can be no temporizing with petty claims short of confiscation. But these theories are weak on the economic side, because they do not apprehend the psychological basis of interest; and they are peculiarly naïve in their treatment of organization and administration, for, while socialists see the coerciveness of private property, they do not see that coercion is also the basis both of that organization which makes private business successful and of that administration which constitutes government. Coercion has a psychic basis, founded in human nature, and whether it be in

¹See COMMONS' *Pro. Report.*, New York, 1896, pp. 211-16. Also report of New York state excise commissioner, 1898. The commission, speaking of the amended civil-service law which restricted the state civil-service commission to examinations for "merit" only and gave to the heads of departments authority to hold examinations for "fitness," says, p. 38: "The results of these examinations were very interesting and instructive, and satisfied me that, except for places requiring technical knowledge, no examination which appears to grade and rate people according to their relative ability for a particular line of work should ever be wholly a paper or written examination; but should be made and personally conducted by people of broad experience, quick perception, and knowledge of human nature, who themselves are thoroughly qualified in the line on which they assume to question and grade candidates."

public or private hands, it cannot neglect its basis. Now, organization is essential to the right to employment, and socialists, by disdaining administrative problems, fail to comprehend the very nature of the state which they seek to enlarge.

Without considering further the possible details of state control of industry, we can only observe the principle. The growth of monopoly and centralization increases the coercive power of the private owners of industry by strengthening the privative sanctions. All the opportunities for investment and labor being under the control of a single authority, the material penalties inflicted on those who do not obey this authority are unavoidable. But the grounds for private coercive authority having ceased through the cessation of struggle, the state as the coercive institution of society tends to absorb this side of the industrial institution. It constitutes itself the coercive framework of industry within which the persuasive motives operate. This framework consists in the statutes and codes of laws governing property and corporations, the factory laws, the judicial decisions, the administrative methods which determine the relations of producers to each other. The state becomes the framework of industry, just as it becomes the framework of the family and the church. The laws governing property and labor constitute the bulk of its functions, and the legislatures, courts, and executives have been created expressly for, and are busied mainly with, the regulation of this important institution. And here, as with the other two original institutions, we see how the organic nature of the state has grown. It has been differentiated out from the primitive, homogeneous blending of institutions, not by being separated off from society and set out as a kind of envoy extraordinary, whose business it is to treat and arbitrate with foreign states and between private proprietors, but the very differentiation has been at the same time a deepening of the hold of the state and its seizure upon the hidden recesses of society previously autonomous. The state bears the relation to other institutions of structure to function, of organization to life, of machinery to force, of coercion to persuasion.

It is in this very way that the state liberates the industrial

motives from capricious control and gives security and right to the subordinate members of the institution. The persuasive motives thus freed are greatly strengthened and intensified. Security for investors and minority stockholders stimulates the savings of the masses of the people, increases their thrift, lowers the rates of interest, multiplies the machinery and production of society. The position of laborers is removed from the personal control of those over whom they have, in turn, no control; the amount and kind of their work becomes defined and calculable; each laborer acquires increased scope of self-direction, and his productive powers are called out, not by the fear of deprivation, but by the remuneratory and approbatory sanctions upon which his employers are thenceforth compelled to rely. Useful labor, thus freed from the badge of subjection, becomes a motive in itself, and the industrial institution, like other institutions, is established on its own clarified, persuasive basis, the love of work.

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[*To be continued.*]

CONDITIONS RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF EMPLOYÉS
AND LABORERS IMPOSED BY THE CITY OF PARIS UPON
THE COMPANY TO WHICH THE METROPOLITAN ROAD
WAS LEASED.

By a law passed March 30, 1898, the city of Paris was authorized to proceed with the construction of a system of underground railway lines, to be known as the Metropolitan Railway and to be operated by electricity.

The city was permitted to excavate the tunnels, make the cuttings, and build the viaducts—at the point where the railway emerges from the ground, as it will in one or two places. It is not permitted, however, to lay the tracks or work the road. This part of the enterprise must be intrusted to a working company, which is to lay the tracks, construct the electric plant and stations, and operate the road. The city receives, roughly speaking, one-third of the gross income from the sale of tickets, as rent for the part of the road which it constructs and for the right-of-way. The company takes two-thirds for its portion.

One section of the road, completing about one-sixth of the entire system, is almost completed, and is expected to be in operation by June 1.

The conditions which the city imposed upon the company in regard to the treatment of its laborers and employés are extremely interesting, and indicate the high-water mark attained by modern cities in this respect.

The more important of these conditions are contained in the following provisions, of Articles XVIII and XIX of the agreement between the city and the traction company:

Article XVIII. The working of the leased lines shall be organized in a manner to comply with the following provisions:

1. The salaries or wages of the workmen and employés shall be paid fortnightly, and shall in no case be less than 150 francs per month. Men employed temporarily shall receive wages which shall not be lower than 5 francs per day.

2. The working day shall not exceed ten hours. One full day of rest or two full half-days shall be granted each week to the personnel.

3. An annual vacation of ten days, with full salary, shall be granted to all employés.

4. The full salary shall be paid during the periods of military instruction.

5. Days of sickness, properly certified by the physician appointed by the managers of the fund established in accordance with Article XIX below, shall be paid for in full, without any deduction, during the period of at least one year.

6. In case of accident happening during work and resulting in a temporary incapacity, the workmen shall receive their entire wages until complete recovery, without prejudice to the indemnity which shall be due to them in case of final disability, either total or partial.

7. The workmen employed in the enterprise shall be insured against accident at the sole cost of the leasing company, which shall not under this head make any deductions from the wages due. Moreover, whatever may be determined in regard to the responsibility for an accident, the leasing company shall always be directly responsible to the victim for the payment of the indemnity.

A physician appointed by the management of the special fund, established in accordance with Article XIX below, shall be summoned to report upon each accident, and it shall be his duty to state the nature and the results of the same.

8. The administration of the city shall always have the right to prescribe such measures of safety and health as may be considered necessary.

9. A written commission shall be delivered, under the form of a wage contract, to every adult employé or workman, of either sex, who may have completed twenty-four months of service.

The leasing company is required to observe strictly the conditions above enumerated, in regard to the labor of its employés, under penalty of forfeiture of the lease.

Article XIX. The leasing company binds itself further :

(a) To furnish to the working personnel in its employ deposit books of the National Pension Fund. The payments shall be made by means of a 2 per cent. deduction from the wages of the employés and a 4 per cent. contribution by the company, making 6 per cent., which shall be deposited in their name by the leasing company, on the conditions defined below.

However, whenever the number of passengers shall exceed 220,000,000, the deduction from the wages of the laborers shall be reduced to 1 per cent., and the contribution by the company increased to 6 per cent., thus making the payment to be made in their name by the leasing company 7 per cent.

(b) To establish a free medical and drug service.

(c) To insure its laborers and employés against accidents.

To insure the execution of paragraph (b) of the present article, as well as paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the preceding article, the leasing company shall organize a special fund, which shall be managed by the workmen and employés themselves.

The leasing company shall charge to general expenses a sum sufficient to make the payments stipulated in (a), (b), and (c).

It is an interesting fact that the introduction of these provisions into the lease did not give rise to any prolonged negotiations between the parties concerned, nor did it excite any considerable discussion either in the city council

or the Parliament. In fact, the leasing company agreed readily to all the conditions, and indeed proposed itself some of the clauses favorable to the laborers.

EDMUND J. JAMES.

PARIS,

March 17, 1900.

The day after dictating above note Professor James mailed the following addition :

I find that the government, upon the demand of the minister of public works and upon the advice of the council of state, has struck out the two provisions of the lease relating to the minimum wage and the normal working day. This makes a material change, of course, in the actual facts concerning the provisions for the benefit of the laborers ; but it leaves undisturbed the significance of the circumstance that the city had insisted upon the insertion of this provision, while the leasing company had accepted it without any protest. The government struck out these clauses on the ground that they referred to matters already regulated by provisions in the existing code, and that these provisions should be altered only by general law and not by special contract.

E. J. J.

REVIEWS.

The Theory of the Leisure Class. An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions. By THORSTEIN VEBLEN. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. viii + 400, 8vo.

A LATE critic of a book has the same advantage as the critic of an old painting. He need not have any ideas of his own. He has learned what the proper thing to say is, and he has nothing to do but to say it. In the present case the proper thing to do is to condemn the book and call it pessimistic, even "cynical." Pessimism now means: looking facts in the face; seeing things as they are; calling a spade a spade. Anyone who does this is deserving of censure as disturbing the order of things. If there is one thing that the world does not want, it is truth. Truth is a medicine that must be administered in sugar-coated pills. A very little of it reacts upon the public system and will not go down. This is no modern fact. It has always been so. It is what they used to burn folks for. Nowadays they merely put their books on a sort of moral *index librorum expurgandorum*.

The trouble with this book is that it contains too much truth. It also suggests a great deal of truth that it does not contain, and this is quite as bad as to tell the truth outright. Galileo and Servetus were not persecuted for what they said, but for the deductions that their persecutors made from what they said. The reviewers of this book base their criticisms almost entirely on the conclusions they themselves draw from what is said in it, and scarcely at all on what it actually says. They forget entirely that it is, as its secondary title states, "an economic study in the evolution of institutions," and they assume in all gratuity that it is an attack on existing institutions. That is a pure deduction, but one for which there is no warrant in the book. Someone has said that the law of gravitation would be attacked if it was suspected of jeopardizing human interests. The history of man is exactly paralleled in the history of plants and animals, but no one has inveighed against the facts of biology, because they concern sub-human creatures. Darwin was soundly belabored for supposed consequences to man of his facts, but only for such.

Now, no truth has come more clearly forth from the most thorough study of organic evolution than that its whole method is essentially wasteful. Darwin showed this; Huxley multiplied examples of it; and even Herbert Spencer, who would have man imitate nature in all things, has supplied some of the most striking examples of the prodigality of nature. In describing this prodigality naturalists have not been suspected of condemning the habits and instincts of the birds and animals, of the fishes of the sea and the infusorians of the pool. But when an economist of a strictly scientific habit of mind investigates the history of the human species, discovers that human evolution, like organic evolution, is the outcome of the rhythmic action of great cosmic forces, one set of which is centrifugal and destructive, and tells us how these wasteful processes go on in society in coöperation with the conservative ones, he arouses hostility and is regarded as dangerous. And all because the specimens he has to investigate are men. In fact, the book is a mirror in which we can all see ourselves. It is more. It is a telescope through which we can see our ancestors, and when, all at one view, we see all the generations of our pedigree down to and including ourselves, we perceive how little difference there is, and the image takes on a rather ugly aspect. That is why it offends. This tracing back institutions, customs, habits, ideas, beliefs, and feelings to their primitive sources in barbarism and savagery, and showing what is the real basis of them, is not pleasant occupation for people who are proud of their ancestors, for many such have nothing but ancestors to be proud of.

It is perfectly legitimate to endeavor to show that the facts are not as stated, but a critic who does this must proceed scientifically. He must not waste his efforts in showing that there are other facts that have an opposite tendency. He must remember what the author of the book has set himself as a task; and in this case it must be admitted that he has clung tenaciously to this one field, resisting the temptation, which, as anyone can see, must have been strong, to go out of that field and deal with the opposite class of facts. There is no doubt that he could write as strong and able a book on the "instinct of workmanship" as he has written on the "instinct of sportsmanship," and it is to be hoped that he may do so. But in dealing with this book the critic has no right to complain that it is not a book on some other subject than the one chosen. As a matter of fact, there is much gained in dealing with one aspect of human evolution at a time. Very few writers are able to keep the different factors distinct. It requires a clear head.

Nearly all the treatment we find of such highly complex subjects is vitiated by the perpetual mixing up of the fields of inquiry, until all is muddle and *Wirrwarr*. Here for once we have a single subject clearly handled and consistently adhered to, at the risk even of giving offense to those whose suggestibility is so strong that they cannot keep other subjects out of view.

It may be said that the author ought at least to have shown how this very leisure class, and solely by virtue of its leisure, has made the greater part certainly of the earlier scientific discoveries, and worked out some of the most important problems; that even modern science owes as much to this class as to all other classes combined, as shown by de Candolle in his *Histoire des Sciences et des Savants*; that all the important "institutions," including the learned professions and the sciences, have, as Spencer has shown, developed out of "ecclesiastical institutions," and owe their existence and advanced modern character to that typical "leisure class," the priesthood, given over to "vicarious leisure" and "devout observances;" that no class and no human being, as the labor reformers so justly insist, can do any high intellectual work, or even cultivate the mind, without a certain amount of leisure and respite from incessant toil. Our author might, it would seem to some, have at least dwelt upon these well-known and universally admitted facts relating directly to the leisure class. But, in the first place, he is not engaged in explaining the intellectual and moral progress of the world, and, in the second place, these facts are too well known to need restatement, and he seems to have no taste for hackneyed topics. Such facts are not opposed to anything he says, but are simply also true. They are patent, while what he tells us is latent, and he chose between the two classes of subjects, telling us a good many things that we did not know before instead of telling us so much that we did know. In the third place, and principally, his point of view is strictly economic, and he deals with a subject within his own specialty, and has not seen fit to branch out into wider fields, as economic writers are so much in the habit of doing. *Ne sutor ultra crepidam*.

In a word, our author is dealing with the question of wealth, and his whole treatise is confined to the "pecuniary" aspect. He finds that everything has a pecuniary value, which has little to do with its intrinsic or rational value; that this pecuniary value has grown out of a long series of events in human history leading back to the age of barbarism. It is a typical case of conventional ideas as distinguished from rational ideas. It can only be made to seem rational when we

know and can trace its history, and see how, under all the circumstances, it could not have been otherwise. Pecuniary value is the result of natural causation, like everything else, but the series of terms consists of a long winding labyrinth of causes and effects that have ultimately produced something which, looked at directly, appears irrational and absurd. In this it is no exception to the general law of survivals in ethnology. Every lawyer knows what a legal fiction is, but most of them are mistaken in imagining that only advanced races are capable of creating such fictions. The study of ethnology shows that early institutions are a mass of fictions. The savage is more logical than the civilized man. Analyze the *couvade*, considered as the fiction by which the matriarchal was transformed into the patriarchal system without a break in the chain of logic.

Pecuniary value, as distinguished from intrinsic value, is a survival, and it has probably never before been so well traced out. Here are a few of the steps, but the book must be read to see them all and how they are connected: As soon as property became recognized as the thing that chiefly insures the satisfaction of desire, the "law of acquisition" went into effect, and thenceforth the problem was how to *acquire* the most with the least effort—not how to *produce* the most. The "least effort" part of the formula lies at the foundation of the author's distinction between "industry and exploit." Exploit is comparatively easy. Industry becomes synonymous with drudgery. The love of activity, *i. e.*, the actual pleasure in the exercise of the faculties, which is the essence of the "instinct of workmanship," could scarcely be eliminated, and "leisure" is by no means incompatible with activity. But excessive activity—the prolonged and laborious exertion required for the constant re-production of the objects of consumption—is essentially irksome and has always been avoided when possible. But these objects must be produced in order that their consumption may be enjoyed, and the only way to possess them without producing them is to make others produce them. Any power to do this is immediately exercised, and as things have been constituted in the history of mankind, this has taken the form of creating a dependent industrial class and an independent leisure class. The simplest form of this was slavery, and, as the author shows, the first slaves were women; afterward captives were made slaves; and finally all were enslaved but the few having privilege and power. Extensive modification of this normal state, of course, took place with time.

Now, the most natural thing in the world is that these two sets of persons should form two great classes totally unlike in almost every

respect. The dependent class is low, debased, degraded. The independent class is high, noble, exalted. This is not merely the judgment of the higher class, but also that of the lower. It is the universally recognized relation and constitutes what is called the *régime of status*. All the occupations of the dependent class are, in our author's happy phrase, "humilific," and all the occupations in which the independent class can engage must be "honorific." These occupations must not cross each other. They must be wholly different. The humilific occupations are all industrial, productive. Therefore the leisure class must pursue no industrial or productive occupations under pain of being suspected of dependence. The humilific occupations are the only ones that are "useful" in the economic sense. Therefore no member of the leisure class may do anything useful. The leisure class derive pleasure from the exercise of their faculties, but such exercise must involve no "utility," and must be characterized by "futility." There are certain directions in which the pleasures of activity may be indulged without the suspicion of dependence or necessity. Among these purely futile occupations we find war, the chase, gaming, politics, ruling, religious observances, etc. Then there are many incidental ways in which the leisure class, when in full power, are able to enjoy themselves. Thus it is said that a common amusement of the Roman nobles was to knock down a plebeian and then hand over a sesterce, which was the amount of the fine fixed by law for such offenses; and the idea of "fun" that the young British gentry entertained in the sixteenth century was to disfigure the faces of the poor they met in the streets by means of a sharp-pointed cane that they carried for such purposes. Everything done must be in the nature of sport, nothing must have the character of work. The surplus energy must express itself in wholly non-industrial and absolutely parasitic ways, otherwise there is loss of caste.

The above may give some idea of the general nature of the fundamental antithesis that sprang up naturally, as shown, and has persisted even down to our own times. The distinction has been characterized as "invidious," and this word has been criticised as imputing blameworthy motives. But it is used in a literal sense, as that which has *envy* at its root, for not only does the industrial class envy the leisure class, but every member of the leisure class is perpetually striving to gain the envy of others of that class. Though all the members of the leisure class are exempt from drudgery, they are by no means all equal in their "ability to pay," and, as there is no limit to the possibility of

conspicuous futile consumption, no one ever has as much as he wants in order to outdo and eclipse his rivals. There is thus brought about, not only a hierarchy of wealth, but a perpetual scramble to excel one another. Wealth becomes the basis of esteem. The standard is wholly pecuniary. Not only must wealth be possessed, but there must be a show of its possession. It must be made obvious to all that there is an inexhaustible reserve. Hence leisure must be made conspicuous by "conspicuous consumption" and "conspicuous waste." If only enough persons and the right persons could see it and know it, it would be highly honorific to light a cigar occasionally with a thousand-dollar bill. A man must not limit his consumption to himself and his family. He must live in a palace many times larger than he can possibly fill, and have a large retinue of servants and retainers, ostensibly to minister to his wants, but really to make clear his ability to pay.

From this arises the important principle of "vicarious leisure" and "vicarious consumption." Most of these servants must also be exempt from any productive work, and the women of his household must be absolutely non-productive and inactive. In the modern system of semi-industrial and quasi-predatory exploitation by the bourgeoisie the "captain of industry" must manage his business, and therefore seem to be doing something, mayhap something useful, but appearances must be kept up as in the feudal manor, and upon his wife devolves the "performance of leisure" and the display of her husband's ability to pay for useless things. He confers on her a vicarious leisure, and in dress and social appointments she is able to show his ability to consume and to waste to any required extent.

It will be seen that it is throughout the application of the fundamental maxim of "political economy"—the greatest gain for the least effort. But as effort is itself agreeable, the effort meant is only industrial, productive, useful effort. Primarily war and the chase were the principal honorific employments, growing out of the antecedent state in which both were more or less productive. War for booty gave way to war for captives, *i. e.*, slaves to do the productive work, and ultimately the chase entirely lost its productive value and was indulged in merely for sport. Witness the contempt in our day for the poacher and the "pot-hunter." At first all exploit was predatory; it has now become what our author aptly calls "quasi-predatory." There is no more regard for real justice or right now than then, but the exploitation must conform to laws made by the exploiting class, and so have a show of justice. The purpose is to acquire at all hazards, but it is not enough

to say that this must be done irrespective of whether anything is produced or not. All acquisition must be non-productive under pain of falling out of the leisure class.

No biologist can fail to observe parallels in the organic world to many of the facts set forth in this book. Space forbids their enumeration, but one can scarcely refrain from noting among nature's many wasteful ways the phenomena of secondary sexual characters, typified by the antlers of the stag and the gaudy tail of the peacock. These may be compared to wasteful human fashions, such as are enumerated in the chapter on "*Pecuniary Canons of Taste*." The principal difference is that nature, in producing these useless and cumbersome organs, has really given them a high degree of intrinsic beauty, even as judged by human tastes, while the products of human fashion, based on the canon of "*pecuniary beauty*," or costliness, are useless impediments to activity without the slightest claim upon any rational standard of taste.

The author's theory of why fashions change is ingenious, and must be largely true. The ugliness caused by their superfluous cost renders them intolerable to behold for any great length of time, so that a change is demanded by the æsthetic sense even of the leisure class; but the new ones can be no better, because they, too, must have these marks of "*reputable futility*" and "*conspicuous waste*," that are necessarily offensive to taste, which is based on the instinct of workmanship. They must therefore also soon give way to others no better than they, and so on indefinitely. It is a perpetual conflict between pecuniary beauty and rational beauty, which are incompatible, but in which the former always prevails, and all the latter can do is to condemn the product and compel the victor to bring on another.

The genesis of a great number of institutions, customs, practices, and beliefs is worked out in the book, and their barbaric origin clearly shown. It would be useless to attempt their enumeration here, and only a few of the most curious can be named, such as the exemption of women from labor (*vicarious leisure*): *inebriacy* and *dissipation*; costly and unæsthetic decoration; the non-punishment of crime when on a large scale; religious ceremonial evolutions recalling the *terpsichorean* stage or dance; the higher learning, or "*classicism*;" preference for inferior hand-made over superior machine-made goods; love of *archaism* in general; the respectability of *conservatism*; the conservatism and degeneracy of the higher institutions of learning; patriotism, dueling, snobbery; English saddles, walking sticks; athletic sports, college fraternities, the "*cap and gown*," etc., etc.

The author has certainly handled the English language with consummate skill, and, notwithstanding his indictment of "classicism," he displays no mean acquaintance with the classics. The book abounds in terse expressions, sharp antitheses, and quaint, but happy phrases. Some of these have been interpreted as irony and satire, but, as said above, this is the work of the critics themselves. The language is plain and unmistakable, as it should be, but the style is the farthest removed possible from either advocacy or vituperation, and the language, to use the author's own words, is "morally colorless." Some of it, if it is not classical, is likely to become so. His general terminology has already been used to a considerable extent in this review, the peculiar terms and expressions being put in quotation marks. Many others might be given if space permitted, such, for example, as "reputably wasteful expenditure," or "reputable waste," "reputable futility," and "pecuniary reputability;" and he speaks of certain things that have "advantages in the way of uselessness." On the other hand, we have such expressions as "vulgarly useful occupations," "vulgar effectiveness," and the "taint of usefulness." Then we have the "predatory animus," "quasi-predatory methods," "predatory fraud," "predatory parasitism," and "parasitic predation." Many incidental expressions are noteworthy, such as the "skilled and graded inebriety and perfunctory dueling" of the German students, and his statement that the "higher learning" chiefly confers a "knowledge of the unknowable." He says that the "exaltation of the defective" and admiration for "painstaking crudeness" and "elaborate ineptitude" are characteristics of "pecuniary standards of taste." And anyone who has noted how all athletic sports degenerate and become restricted to a few professionals will appreciate his remark that "the relation of football to physical culture is much the same as that of the bull fight to agriculture."

As has already been seen, the two great social classes are characterized by an assortment of sharply contrasted words and phrases, and not only their occupations, but their underlying instincts, are clearly marked off by such expressions as the "instinct of sportsmanship" and the "instinct of workmanship;" "exploit and industry," or "exploit and drudgery;" "honorific and humilific" occupations, and "perfunctory and proficuous" activities, all forming the primary contrast between "futility and utility." In each of these pairs the first belongs to the leisure class and represents the superior fitness to survive in human society. The leisure class constitutes the biologically fittest, the socially best, the aristocracy.

Of the general make-up of the book, as of all that issue from that well-known house, there is nothing to be said but praise, unless it be to note the retention of the superfluous *u* in such words as "honour," "favour," "colour," etc. To speak of our American "Labour Day" is a clear case of "archaism" and "conspicuous waste," and might be cited in defense of the main thesis of the book.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Cost of Living as Modified by Sanitary Science. By ELLEN H. RICHARDS. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1899. Pp. 121.

THE new impulse which the world is feeling in regard to the importance of the administration of the household is trying to find expression through publications of various kinds. Unfortunately much of the printed material, be it books or magazines, is superficial, unscientific, and misleading, and its only significance to the student of social reform lies in the hope that it is the precursor of something which will have intrinsic value. Miss Salmon's work on *Domestic Service* was the first book to confirm the reasonableness of this hope; and now Mrs. Richards' book appears as another important contribution to the study of household administration.

The title is somewhat misleading, for the author gives a much larger meaning to the term "sanitary science" than is commonly accepted. This is shown in the titles of the chapters, which are: "Standards of Living;" "The Service of Sanitary Science in Increasing Productive Life;" "Household Expenditure;" "The House;" "Operating Expenses;" "Food;" "Clothing in Relation to Health;" "The Emotional and Intellectual Life;" "The Organization of the House."

Mrs. Richards' belief that "standards of living should be regulated, not by money spent, not by servile imitation of others, but by that which will produce the best results in health of body and health of mind," leads to a broader view of sanitary science than is customary, and yet to one which is perfectly sound. It is only as a better physical environment results in higher life of every kind that the effort to secure it seems worth the struggle.

The chief part of the discussion of practical details is devoted to the needs and opportunities of a family with an income of from \$1,500 to \$2,500, since this is the class in American society which has need

of the greatest skill in the use of money. Mrs. Richards claims that the homes of such families fail in the more important essentials of comfort, taken in the best sense. She cites in illustration several clumsy and unintelligent household arrangements and says: "House architecture is fifty years behind shop building and factory construction." She asserts that "the ignorance of the housewife as to what is possible and her traditional conservatism are the causes for this state of things." And if the observer is inclined to question the justice of this severe arraignment and to call upon the other sex to bear part of the blame, there is little ground for demur when the question passes beyond methods of construction and becomes one of administration. In this field, though she is not always the undisputed "queen of her sphere," the housewife has a much freer hand. This is particularly true in regard to the food supply. "In no other department of household expenditure is there so great an opportunity for the exercise of knowledge and skill with so good results for pocket and health." "In most families there is ample margin in food from which to take a respectable slice without harming anyone." It is stated that 10 per cent. of the income is squandered in five ways: (1) needlessly expensive material, providing little nutrition; (2) a great deal thrown away; (3) bad preparation; (4) failure to select rightly, according to the season; (5) badly constructed ovens. A saving effected here would appreciably lift the family to a higher plane of efficient living.

Although the style of the book is somewhat marred by inconsequential arrangement of the paragraphs, its pages are full of suggestiveness; and that is what the author seeks rather than a complete exposition of the subject. She throws down the gauntlet to the modern housewife in her closing paragraph: "The twentieth-century household demands of its managers, first of all, a scientific understanding of the sanitary requirements of a human habitation; second, a knowledge of the values, absolute and relative, of the various articles which are used in the house, including food; third, a system of book-keeping that shall make possible a close watch upon expenses; fourth, an ability to secure from others the best they have to give, and to maintain a high standard of honest work. If the housewife cannot and will not apply herself to the problem, let her not stand longer in the way of progress, as she is surely doing today."

There is every hope that the challenge will soon be accepted.

MARION TALBOT.

The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. The Gifford Lectures. By JOHN CAIRD, D.D., LL.D., late Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Glasgow. With a Memoir by Edward Caird, D.C.L., LL.D., Master of Balliol. 2 vols. Vol. I, pp. cxli + 232; Vol. II, pp. 297. The Macmillan Co., 1899. \$4.50.

THESE lectures are devoted to a discussion of natural and revealed religion, faith and reason, the Christian idea of God, the origin and nature of evil, the possibility of moral restoration, the idea of the incarnation and the atonement, the kingdom of the Spirit, and, finally, the future life. They consist in a philosophical interpretation and appreciation of the traditional dogmas of the Christian church. One who is interested in theological discussion based on Hegelian presuppositions, but finds Hegel himself inaccessible, or in a literary way harsh and intolerable, may turn to these volumes assured that he will find nothing better of their kind, probably nothing so good in our language. It is not meant that Caird slavishly follows Hegel, but that he independently sets forth in beautiful and luminous English, but also in a masterly way, scarcely second to Hegel himself, the Hegelian philosophy of religion.

But it is not expected that this JOURNAL shall give a critical review of Caird's theology. Sociological questions, however, are treated only in the most inferential manner; rather, are alluded to only in the most incidental way. From this it must not be inferred that he had no interest in the question, whether from the practical or the theoretical point of view. On the contrary, his memoir describes his practical pioneer work in his own land, opening a girls' school of industry during his early ministry, on whose building and equipment he spent much time and pains. "Girls grow up," so he writes of his early parish, "utterly ignorant of the commonest sorts of household work, are unfit for domestic servants, even of the rudest kind, still more unfit to manage their own houses when they marry. They have no habits of personal neatness, no taste for order, cleanliness, domestic comfort; they never aspire to anything beyond the mere eking out of their coarse, scanty, comfortless life, and their only pleasures are sensual indulgence and scandal. . . . I am determined to do something to help them." And so he founded this school.

On the theoretical side one gathers here and there from his volumes that he would emphasize (*a*) the impassable limits beyond which

sociology cannot go in its cure for the ills of life. "It cannot shield us from the sorrows that desolate the home and lie heaviest on the heart. It cannot minister balm to the wounded spirit, or bring peace to the troubled conscience, or lessen the anguish of bereavement, or dispel from our path the awful shadow that is creeping ever nearer and more near." That is, sociology is not substitute for religion, only hand-maid. It may help apply the remedy, never provide or supersede it. The aim must be something more than to make men comfortable, healthy, full-fed, easy-minded, and supplied with all manner of earthly satisfactions. (b) Sociological success is grounded in the new moral power introduced into the world by Christianity. Social ethics has religious base and presupposition. Sociology must have regard for the new ideas of human nature and human destiny which Christianity has introduced; must look upon all men in the light of that new ideal of humanity which the life of Christ sets before us. "The pettiness and triviality, the sordid vileness and degradation, that but too often attach to the life of man become to the eye of Christian observation no longer its essence but its accidents, only the foul accretions that obscure its inherent glory. . . . We cease to despair of the very worst." (c) The real sociological problem is not charitable relief of human wretchedness by sympathy and help to the forlorn and fallen, but how to dry up the poisoned springs from which that wretchedness proceeds. "The question is, not merely, Can we do anything to elevate and socialize the pariah class? but it is the deeper one, Can anything be done to prevent its very existence? Is it possible by a more searching diagnosis to detect and counteract the hidden disease in the social organism to which this abnormal product is due? Is there no fundamental cure for this terrible concomitant of modern civilization—increasing comfort or luxurious affluence on the one hand, and at the same time, on the other, the rise and growth of a class of social outcasts, of masses of human beings sunk to the lowest point at which existence is endurable, who have nothing to lose and nothing to hope for, and whom sometimes, when the brute impulse in them is unkenneled, neither fear of God nor fear of man restrains?"

There is nothing novel or even debatable in these views of Caird, but they are all he gives us. Of the purely scientific and methodological side of sociology he has nothing to say. If one sought a metaphysic for his sociology, Caird would have much to urge in favor of the organic, as against the mechanical, view of society and the world.

GEORGE B. FOSTER.

Care and Treatment of Epileptics. By WILLIAM PRYOR LETCHWORTH, LL.D. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900. Pp. 246. \$4.

THERE was need of a book to reveal to the public the special character of epilepsy and the most suitable treatment of epileptics. Mr. Letchworth is eminently fitted for this task, and he has given us a beautiful, instructive, and inspiring volume, a witness to his learning and his philanthropy. The discussion of the characteristics of the disease, its heredity, and of the best methods of institutional treatment rests on eminent medical authorities and on the wide observations and trained judgment of the author.

The greater part of the book is a critical description of the best institutions already established, in Europe and America. The illustrations are numerous and valuable. All friends of this class of unfortunates will be glad to have at hand a clear, adequate, and convincing work, the best means of educating and directing public opinion. The movement to establish separate asylums, farms, and colonies for epileptics is now urged by all competent persons, and a wide reading of this volume will be one of the most efficient factors in promoting the measures advised by experts.

C. R. HENDERSON.

A Municipal Program. New York: Published for the National Municipal League; The Macmillan Co., 1900. Pp. xii + 246.

IN the bewildering diversity of municipal charters in this country it is an accomplishment to secure the substantial agreement of students and reformers from many states to a model charter. As the prospectus of this volume says:

This book is the outcome of a unique experience in reform movements. Criticism and denunciation of the maladministration of our cities have been increasing in volume for many years, but practical constructive work for improving municipal government upon any well-defined and well-grounded general principles has been conspicuously lacking.

In May, 1897, at the Louisville meeting of the National Municipal League, it was decided, however, that an effort should be made to utilize the facts that had been accumulated by the league at its previous meetings, and to formulate on the part of the league a plan or program which should set forth succinctly the essential principles that must underlie successful municipal government, and should, if possible, embody those principles in a form which could be enacted into a law or laws and thus put into practical operation.

The committee made a preliminary report at the session of the league held at Indianapolis in the autumn of 1898, and the entire session of the league was devoted to a discussion of the report. The committee was instructed to continue its work and make a report for final action at the meeting to be held in November, 1899, at Columbus.

The comprehensive series of essays printed in the first part of the book is designed to introduce and defend the constitutional amendments and municipal corporations act which constitute the proposals of the National Municipal League. The first chapter, by John A. Fairlie, logically treats of municipal development in the United States, giving a valuable historical survey of the rise of existing methods and institutions. Mr. Horace E. Deming states the municipal problem and indicates the place of public opinion under the new charter; Dr. Albert Shaw, the proper scope of municipal activities; Professor Goodnow, the place of the council and mayor and political parties; Dr. Leo S. Rowe summarizes the program in one chapter, and in another treats clearly and critically the problem of public accounting; Comptroller Coler protests against including revenue-producing operations of the city under the limitation of indebtedness; Mr. Charles Richardson writes of municipal franchises; and Professor Delos F. Wilcox concludes with an examination of the municipal program. These chapters are all worth reading, but naturally are subordinate to the proposals of the league.

Preliminary to securing a satisfactory municipal charter it has been recognized that in the present confusion of legislation it would be necessary to have constitutional amendments to secure both uniformity and elasticity. Special legislation is to be prohibited, and cities with a population of over 25,000 frame their own charters, subject to certain necessary and uniform limitations. Executive and administrative functions have been more clearly defined; the only elective officers are the mayor and council. The limit of municipal indebtedness disregards remunerative enterprises. "The city's property in its streets, docks, ferries, bridges, and public places is declared to be inalienable, except by a four-fifths vote of all the members elected to the council, and approved by the mayor." Municipal bookkeeping is reformed and given greater publicity. Municipal elections are separated from state and national elections. The merit principle is affirmed. With these regulations the cities are to enjoy home rule, and a model charter is suggested.

The charter begins by providing for a single council chamber, thus affirming a principle which, if carried out consistently, would make the charter irreproachable. The system of checks is totally abandoned, except that the mayor is given such great powers that the people are in danger of relying upon him as the check. The elimination of all elective officials except mayor and councilmen also recognizes this necessity of simplifying municipal government so as to make the relationship between elector and representative direct. The making of the term of office of councilman six years, retiring one-third each year, insures continuity and responsibility, and their election at large would doubtless secure abler men than at present and reduce local rivalry and intrigue.

Altogether the charter avoids most of the mistakes of American cities, and perhaps it may be said, if the mayor has exceptional powers, that may be necessary until the American citizen is better trained. An experience for a decade or two might fit him to be governed directly by a council with a mayor as presiding officer. As was said in the beginning, it is an encouraging fact that such an admirable charter could have been devised by men of many minds and experiences, and that ought to recommend it to all municipal reformers.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

The Ténichef Prize.—Prince W. Ténichef has founded a prize of five thousand francs, to be awarded, after competition, to the author or authors who shall write most successfully upon the following subject: *Interferences with the Social Order (Les atteintes à l'ordre social)*. The program suggested to competitors is the following:

To study conflicts in violent form which amount to assaults upon the material order in societies.

To determine by comparison of these interferences whether there are general causes and habitual processes which give an explanation of the birth and development of these conflicts.

To trace how these conflicts work out, and to determine whether comparative study of them yields general indications which would assist statesmen to foresee, to limit, and peacefully to settle them.

Under the head "violent social conflicts" the following are particularly included:

Disorders or collective brigandage provoked by misery or by long loss of work, disorderly strikes, the misfortunes following wars, famines, epidemics, etc.

Civil wars, struggles of races, of religions, or of sects within the same state; revolts of subjugated populations.

Attacks upon the person of heads of states and of political personages, anarchical acts in so far as they are symptoms of a disturbed social order.

Insurrections, revolutions, and *coups d'état*.

The examples should be drawn from the history of the last four centuries and from the civilized countries of Europe and America.

The judges of the competition have been selected by the founder of the prize from the members and associates of the *Institut International de Sociologie*. They are: M. Ch. Letourneau, professor of sociology in the *École d'Anthropologie*, president; M. G. Tarde, professor of sociology in the *École des Sciences politiques* and in the *Collège des Sciences sociales*; M. René Worms, agrégé des Facultés de Droit, directeur de la *Revue internationale de sociologie*; M. Ad. Coste, ancien président de la *Société de Statistique de Paris*; M. H. Monin, professeur d'histoire à l'Hôtel-de-Ville de Paris.

The competition is open to all, without distinction of nationality, the members of the jury alone excepted.

The monographs entered in competition must be written in the French language.

The writers must not make themselves known. The monographs must not contain their names. Each monograph shall have upon its first page two devices; there shall be attached a sealed envelope bearing on the outside the same two devices, and containing the name and address of the author. The jury, after pronouncing judgment, will open only those envelopes which bear the devices of the monographs deemed worthy of a prize.

The monographs should be sent to the following addresses:

M. le Président du jury du concours Ténichef, chez MM. Giard et Brière, libraires-éditeurs à Paris, rue Soufflot, 16.

They should reach this address at the latest December 31, 1902.

The jury will decide in the course of the year 1903. It will determine, according to the value of the works submitted, whether to award a single prize or several, or one or more rewards, or none at all, or to reopen the question to competition, etc.

Competitors are urged, in their own interest, to write as plainly as possible, and only upon one side of the sheet.

In case the authors of monographs that receive a prize or reward shall not have published their work within a year from the time of the award, the *Institut International de Sociologie* shall be entitled to gratuitous publication of the same in its *Annales*. The manuscripts will be returned by the jury to the *Institut*. Authors may retain copies.

Public Guardianship of the Natural Rights of Children.—The social guarantee which insures the protection of life and liberty and the orderly pursuit of happiness to mankind in general also includes a pledge to preserve to childhood its inalienable right to the enjoyment of pure air, pure water, sunshine, and a fair part of the use of the sand, clay, and loam which Mother Earth holds in store for all her children.

In the stress of city living, and the permissive municipal neglect which breeds greed in the plans of tenement-house construction, the children too often have just cause of complaint because of the fact that they are deprived of these natural inheritances, which are God-given, and may not be hindered or abridged by aught in constitutions, laws, ordinances, customs, lack of intelligence, or neglect in any quarter. Thus is laid a claim in equity that the child who has been deprived of his ray of sunshine to play with, in a well-ventilated domicile free from the company of disease microbes which lurk in the darkness and damp, his little plot of ground to dig in, and the pure water for which he contracted when he consented to live in the world, has an undoubted right of action, in equity, if not in law, against the municipality which has permitted his despoilment.

The compensation to be made is not in the substitution of other benefits, but in the dedication of public play-grounds, where children may enjoy the blessings denied them in the home, and also be afforded the intelligent supervision which insures education in play.

The public play-ground for children, with its equipment in all essentials, has larger claim upon the tax-paying public than any which may be argued in support of the public-park systems and drives, which are so creditable to many large cities of the world. The establishment of public play-grounds by any municipality which exhibits their need is simply an act of restitution, which insures to the children natural inheritances in association, of which they have been individually deprived through the plain neglect of the duties of guardianship imposed by the social compact. There is no doubt but what the symphonies of distress with which mother ears are so familiar are often the vain effort of babyhood to disturb the slumbers of neglectful aldermen and health officers residing within their jurisdiction, in the equally vain hope of so destroying their peace that they may awaken to a sense of duty neglected.

But just as soon as baby is able to walk, he may go out into the world in search of his lost privileges. Not to face the peril of the street where he may be run over by horses or automobiles, nor to be pushed off the sidewalk by the skurrying seniors who neither note nor heed; but to discover a vacant plot of ground convenient to his boarding place, which may be converted into a play-ground for himself and his associates, and be set apart under the operation of the law of eminent domain constituted in equity for his relief.

The hope of the children must come through an awakening of the public conscience and the persistent activity of their friends in endeavor to provoke municipal action to establish public play-grounds.

So long as this great wrong remains unrighted, so long must agitation continue.—C. E. FAULKNER, President National Conference of Charities and Corrections.

Society and the Individual.—I. The past century has been characterized by its devotion to the study of nature. The coming century bids fair to be characterized by its interest in the study of society; for social utility is today seen more clearly than ever to be the ultimate reference of all scientific investigation.

II. Theories of the nature of society have historically taken the two radically opposed forms which we may call *individualism* and *communism*. The former takes the individual as the dominating factor, and society is adjusted to it by being considered its mere creature. The latter takes society as the dominating factor, and the individual is adjusted to it by being sacrificed.

1. This individualistic theory of society involves an atomistic conception of the individual, viz., that there is in each person a core of selfhood—"powers" or "faculties"—not constituted by relation to anything else outside. In the theories of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers these "powers" and "faculties" of each person were voluntarily limited by him, by his allying himself with other persons in a society for his "individual" convenience.

In theory the Anglo-Saxon man of today is very largely an "individualist," *e. g.*, in his religious views of "personal salvation," in his political views of "inalienable rights," in his economic views of "private property." In practice, however, his individualism is fortunately modified by his traditional and instinctive *loyalty* to church, to family, to party, and to nation. This present-day sharp division of theory and practice is, to say the least, unfortunate.

2. In opposition to the individualistic doctrine is the communistic view, which makes the individual a means and society the end. This is the military ideal, in which the individual is reduced to a pawn to be played for some higher stake (supposedly) than he personally represents. If communism is the extreme "military" view, individualism may be considered as the extreme "leisure class" view.

III. The persistent survival of these two theories of society indicates that they each embody a partially adequate truth, demanding a larger and more inclusive theory to do justice to both. This theory, already being advanced by many writers, is, that society is an organism, *i. e.*, a body in which the whole acts in the action of every part; or where the degree to which the whole acts in the action of the part is the degree of the organization of the body. This necessitates a conception of the individual as a functioning organ in society. But this means a very different view from those indicated above. It takes only one atom to make a complete atom, but it takes a complete organism to make a complete organ. Just as the whole nervous and functional activity of the body is on analysis seen to be involved in the act of the foot in walking or kicking, so all the resources of the whole of society are coming to be seen as involved in the daily action of the individual in transacting his business, solving his problems, or eating his dinner. But while the whole body with all its functions thus operates in the operations of every member, yet each member in its functioning has individuality. For its does not follow, because the functioning hand is the whole body functioning in the hand, and similarly with the foot, that, therefore, the hand is the foot. Organic identity is not mathematical equality. The former holds fast to all differences, while the latter abstracts from all differences.

We may say, then, that just as the ultimate fact in physiology is neither body nor organs, but the system of organs, the system being but the unity of the different organs in their reciprocity of function, each organ using every other to help it in its work, and, in that very subordination of others to itself, subordinating itself to all the others and cooperating with them; so in the social organism *the ultimate fact, the unit*, is neither the body politic, nor the separate individual; neither a preëxistent person built up with others into society, nor an impersonal society subordinating individuals; but *the society-of-individuals, or the individual-in-society*, each term getting its meaning and worth from the other—in Latin terminology, *the socius*.

IV. Some of the considerations that support this organic view of society are that:

1. It does justice to the truth of both individualism and communism; to the former by recognizing the uniqueness and the indefeasible rights of the individual; and to the latter by recognizing the interdependence of men, and the further fact that their rights get reality ultimately only through the sanction of their fellows.

2. This view is also corroborated by recent investigations into the development of self-consciousness. Children get their first notions of persons, not from their knowledge of themselves as isolated individuals, but from their perception of *what their immediate neighbors are in relation to their own activities and interests*.

3. Social confirmation of opinions, moreover, even about objects of sense, is quite necessary to the most original and obstinately independent man. Any man may be made insane by the persistent unreasonable conduct of all his fellows toward him.

V. This conception of the nature of the individual and of society, finally, has an important bearing upon some serious questions of the present day; conspicuously three, *viz.*, of sovereignty, of personal rights, and of punishment.

1. According to the organic concept, sovereignty is located neither exclusively in the government nor exclusively in the individual (for this misconceives their nature), but in both as constituting the total system which is the ultimate reality. Thus the government must look to the character of the individuals to get light upon its governing functions, while the individual must look to the government to make his individuality and personality possible. *The absolute sovereign* can never permanently be merely

one party to the relation of governor and governed but must be two or more parties working reciprocally, if we are to have any real authority or any real freedom.

2. With regard to natural or inalienable rights, there is but one such right—the right of a man to be treated as he really is, a functioning member in a community-of-members. With every change in the relation in which he stands to his fellows there is a change in his rights; and these rights are vested, not in the abstract individual, but in the social status of the community.

3. The old theory that punishment is a vindication of the majesty of the law was communistic, while the current popular opinion that punishment is merely for the reformation of the offender is individualistic. These two views take the respective forms, in practice, of harshness on the one hand and sentimentality on the other. Both are one-sided. Punishment is rather the assertion of the organic and social nature of the individual in society against an action that is in principle the denial of this organic nature, and the punishment must be so recognized by the punished, *i. e.*, as just what he himself in his saner mood would do to his insurrectionary unsocial self.

In the light of this, capital punishment may be truly and seriously stated as the necessity of killing some men to make them good in this life before they die. It is to make martyrs of some men, on account of their own misdeeds, for the sake of humanity.

Lynch law is barbarous because it defeats this purpose.—E. B. MCGILVARY, "Society and the Individual," in *Philosophical Review*, March, 1900.

Introductory Principles in Sociology.—The social unity of men can be understood only psychologically. The social body must always be viewed as a whole whose parts are made up of human individuals considered especially as sentient beings. Two marked aspects of all social organizations present themselves. All forms of society in which the sense of unity is prominent, and is given precedence over that of the parts, we may call communities (*Gemeinschaft*), and those in which the whole is habitually viewed as subordinate to the parts we may call societies (*Gesellschaft*). The germinal forms of the "community" spring up through mother love, sexual love, and love between brothers and sisters; the elementary "societary" fact lies in those acts of exchange and intercourse in which the individuals are viewed as mere individuals, having nothing in common, and stand opposed in relations of hostility, *e. g.*, not only as in war, but as in many commercial situations. Each of these two views of social relations has two forms of statement: the first either (A) that the race is one through its common ancestor, Adam, the form of the religious dogma, or (B) that common bonds and common conditions of life are insured as universal and necessary by the very nature of man; the second view takes the forms (a) that, if each can be the enemy of each, each can exchange with and exploit each, or (b) that, upon this principle, an association which maintains hostility must finally bind in servitude every man and make him a subject. Forms A and b are consistent with each other, while B and a are inconsistent.

Society, as the general term, has been defined, according to various preconceptions, from the times of the Roman lawyers down, as a person, a biological organism, etc., whereas the empirical method of dealing with the subject is today gaining ground and strength. From this standpoint, for a working hypothesis, we may say that society is a crowd of individuals scattered over a particular territory, who do business peaceably with each other, and enforce the observation of certain rules of conduct.—PROFESSOR FERDINAND TÖNNIES, "Zur Einleitung in die Sociologie," in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie u. philosophische Kritik*, January, 1900.

The Castration of Certain Classes of the Degenerate as an Effective Social Protective Measure.—In a former paper¹ it was shown that a lessened procreative power is one of the characteristics of the degenerate. But while the procreative power is lessened, it is not wholly destroyed, and this fact is of great social significance, for that which in the degenerate parent is noticeable only as a general psycho-physical weakening and lack of ability will pass over in his offspring into all sorts of mental and nervous diseases of such a character as to render the person concerned a direct menace and burden to society, unless regenerative factors should appear through the mixture of new blood into the strain. It is thus seen that the point

¹ See AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, July, 1899, p. 128.

of real danger is the degenerate who is capable of the act of procreation, for his offspring, the idiot, the imbecile, the epileptic, and the criminal, are so pronouncedly abnormal as to become socially outcast, and thus not liable to contract the marriage relationship; moreover, they are brought under confinement to a large degree, and this confinement is of a nature to prevent the begetting of offspring. There are four methods by which it is proposed to prevent the generation of progeny by the criminal and the degenerate: (1) The prohibition of marriage in cases where either party belongs to the classes named; this method is manifestly impracticable. (2) The isolation of the proscribed classes during the entire period of sexual fertility; beside other difficulties, this method must confront that of persuading the present generation to undertake the expense of a scheme which promises returns only to a future generation—an expense so great, moreover, as to add very materially to the economic burden of today's civilization. (3) The general and authoritative encouragement of the use of various means of preventing conception while allowing sexual congress. The chief objection to this method lies in the fact that the use of these means implies too great an expense and too much skill in manipulation to make it practicable by the classes where its good effects would be most needed. Added to this is the fact that such means are not always effective; and, furthermore, their use would run counter to certain ecclesiastical teachings which jump well with unbridled sensuality, and are therefore very readily obeyed by those classes within which are found the larger share of the criminals and degenerates. (4) Castration of certain classes of the criminal and degenerate. This method is highly commended and strenuously urged by competent persons in many lands—notably, in England, Germany, and the United States. As the operation of castration is commonly understood, however, it is by far too difficult and dangerous to permit its general use in the classes under discussion. In the case of the male less dangerous and comparatively simple methods have been discovered by which castration can be accomplished, but for the female no such method is known. From a medical standpoint, therefore, it seems that the use of castration as a social prophylactic measure must be confined to males, save in exceptional instances. This is not so discouraging as it may seem, for with the female the period of fertility is much sooner over than with the male, and the criminality of the female is not usually of so dangerous a type as is that of the male. From the standpoint of private and public right and welfare, the use of castration for the purpose in question is certainly not indefensible. The right of society to protect itself by isolating for a considerable time, and for life if need be, the insane, the epileptic, the leprosy, and the criminal, is unquestioned. If in self-defense it may deprive these of the exercise of all powers for an indefinite time, or for all time, it is difficult to see why the same right does not warrant it in depriving certain classes of a single power which they can never exert save to the hurt of all concerned. They are deprived of *potentia generandi* alone; *potentia coeundi* still remains to them. As to the particular classes which should be made subject to castration, there is much yet to be said. Certainly the habitual criminal, the criminal from instinct, the perpetrator of certain outrageous sexual crimes, imbeciles, epileptics, the chronic insane, and the confirmed drunkard should without hesitation be made to fall within the category of those subject to the operation.—P. NÄCKE, "Die Kastration bei gewissen Klassen von Degenerierten als ein wirksamer sozialer Schutz," in *Archiv für Kriminal-Anthropologie und Kriminalistik*, 3. Band, 1. u. 2. Heft, pp. 58-84.

Some Lessons of the Peace Conference.—A cursory survey of the proceedings of the conference suggests the following reflections:

1. We are obviously far removed from a "United States of Europe," with a central executive, able to enforce obedience to its decrees by means of an international army and navy. The most far-reaching of the schemes submitted to the Hague conference contemplated no stronger form of compulsion for securing their success than that derived from the moral obligation of treaties.

2. Any preconceived limitation of armaments is, and is long likely to be, an impossibility.

3. Any general renunciation either of particular means of weakening an enemy (*e. g.*, by the capture of private property at sea or the employment against him of particular kinds of weapons, *e. g.*, the dum-dum bullet, or any other novelty likely to

be suggested by the progress of invention) is sure to meet with opposition, on the ground that such renunciation would unfairly affect nations which are compelled by their circumstances to rely specially on one or other of the practices which it is proposed thus to stigmatize.

4. The divergencies of view which cause certain powers to formulate reserves on certain points are due to deep-seated and enduring causes. Thus the United States are not likely to withdraw their objection to being bound in any way to depart from their traditional attitude with reference to European politics and to questions purely American. Turkey is certain to remain jealous of interference with her concerns, even in the guise of a tender of good offices. Great Britain will continue to refuse even to discuss any rules which would hamper her in the freest use of her advantages as the great sea power; while, with other states which keep small standing armies, she will always be loth wholly to prevent non-combatants from assisting in the defense of their country.

5. With reference to the form of the documents prepared at The Hague, one is struck by the unusual provision, contained in all three declarations, that they, like the conventions, shall need ratification. Each of the conventions and declarations drafted by the conference contains a clause which implies, though it does not express, that any one of the powers, parties to it, may, by denouncing it, stand free, after the lapse of a year, from the obligations which it imposes. It might be as well if duration of all agreements of this class were limited to five years (ten would perhaps be better), as in the case of the declaration with reference to projectiles from balloons.

6. The substantive provisions contained in the arbitration convention amount really to nothing, since everything in them which savored of an obligatory character was omitted, in deference to arguments of which the German delegation was the mouthpiece.

7. As to the machinery of arbitration, a code of procedure has been drafted, but its rules may be followed or departed from at the discretion of litigants. A permanent court is also to be instituted, although no one need seek its aid. It is, however, quite possible that the mere existence of such a court, with its rota of judges, its bureau fixed at The Hague, its archives and its officials, may in time produce among the powers a habit of referring their disputes to it for settlement.

8. Nothing done at The Hague has touched the real difficulties in the way of arbitration, viz.: (1) the making it to any extent compulsory, without derogating from the sovereignty of states; (2) the selection of the classes of topics to which compulsory arbitration is applicable, since there are admittedly classes of topics to which it is not applicable; (3) the choice of impartial arbitrators.—T. E. HALLAND, "Some Lessons of the Peace Conference," in *Fortnightly Review*, December, 1899.

Penal Aspects of Drunkenness.—The conclusions and recommendations of the committee are summarized as follows:

The classes of offenders considered are roughly divided into the following groups:

First of all the large class of accidental and of first offenders, who under the present practice of the courts are commonly discharged, and, with occasional exceptions, obviously require only the exemplary warning furnished by arrest, a night in jail, and arraignment in court. For the exceptional cases referred to, probation or probationary fine may serve still more to reinforce the warning. This whole group constitutes more than 50 per cent. of the total number of arrests for drunkenness in Suffolk county.

Second, the smaller class of occasional offenders, presumably on the road to habitual inebriety, and calling for the most intelligent sympathy and treatment. It is here that the restraint, encouragement, and personal influence of probation, and in rarer cases of probationary fines, are most needed and most effective.

Third, the still smaller, but more distinctly pathological, group of habitual and of periodical drunkards. Here the restraining influence of probation is obviously less likely to produce permanent results; and it is this class which makes the strongest appeal for the more systematic and scientific rescue work of asylum treatment. Unhappily, at present the frequent application of fines, and consequent short-term imprisonment, to persons in this critical condition only hastens the work of demoralization.

Fourth, the smallest and most pathetic residual group of confirmed inebriates. For the small minority of young offenders belonging to this group every consideration

of humanity urges the exhaustion of every deterrent influence and the most thorough asylum treatment before turning to the last resort of prolonged imprisonment. For the great majority of this group, including the "rounders" and incorrigibles who infest our public institutions, permanent detention under an indeterminate sentence, and under conditions which protect them and society from further degradation, is the only logical treatment.

However reluctant public opinion may be to sanction such heroic treatment, it must not be forgotten that there is in every great community a residual group of incurables and incorrigibles calling for special and systematic treatment, in their own interest no less than in the interest of society. Individual and social welfare, individual and social justice, unite in demanding that the unfortunate who has lost the power of self-control shall be protected against his own degrading weakness, and that society shall be relieved in part of the danger and the contagion of his example, and the hereditary transmission of weakness to pauperized and degenerate children. Such ends a monastic régime of wholesome discipline, labor, recreation, and improvement can alone accomplish.

Finally, it must be fully admitted that such a comparatively simple classification cannot pretend to be exhaustive. It is one of the complexities of the situation, calling for the largest exercise of wisdom by the courts, that in all these groups cases of drunkenness are not infrequently complicated with criminal conduct, so that they cannot be disposed of as simple cases of intoxication. Doubtless such complications in some measure account for seeming anomalies in the punishment of persons nominally under arrest for drunkenness. Moreover, in practice these groups overlap, and not a few cases are so complicated and obscure as to defy accurate diagnosis and classification.—EDWARD CUMMINGS, Report of the Advisory Committee appointed by the Mayor of Boston, "The Penal Aspects of Drunkenness," in *Charities Review*, January, 1900.

The Crisis in the Growth of French Socialism.—A propos of the Dreyfus affair there has arisen a crisis in the growth of socialism in France which affords opportunity for a general clearing up and restatement of the fundamental positions of socialism and its consequent attitude toward various allied reforms and types of social phenomena. The action of the socialists has been spontaneously and almost unanimously in favor of Dreyfus and against his persecutors. Certain of the socialists, however, are inclined to criticise this action on the ground that socialism has to do solely with the realm of politics and economics, and that to turn aside from this is to dissipate the energies of the socialist army and to endanger the ultimate success of the socialist cause.

In the opinion of the writer this is a false position, justified neither by the logic of fact nor by that of the theory of socialism. The aim of socialism is not simply the emancipation of the individual from economic inequality, but from all inequality of every sort—intellectual, ecclesiastical, and moral, as well as economic. The socialization of property being the fundamental condition of this complete emancipation, it is natural that considerable emphasis should have been laid upon it; but the socialization of property is not the only condition of complete emancipation of the individual, and to make it such is to forget that the individual demands more for his welfare than that which material goods can provide. The process of economic emancipation will be very greatly affected by the kind of intellectual training the man has, as well as by the religious tenets he is taught to believe and the form of government by which he is controlled. No one of these influences can be ignored. It is of the very essence of socialism that it is not a party among parties, but a movement permeating all parties. A party is an organization for action, not for deliberation; for party action principles must be transformed into fixed dogmatic rules of thumb. The whole of socialism, however, cannot be cast into dogma. Its essence is in reality a principle which is to be made effective in a thousand different ways and in as many different combinations of circumstances, and yet is always to remain one and the same principle. A socialist may be a collectivist, a communist, a republican, or a democrat, as circumstances may warrant, and yet never stultify himself as a socialist. It is always the simple question as to where he can best labor for the attainment of the great aim of the socialist—the complete emancipation of the individual from all forms of servitude.

Again, as has been hinted, back of the work which party is able to perform lies a great work which precedes and produces party — the work of research and discussion, the process by which the public opinion, of which party merely takes advantage, is made. Here is a field of labor in which the socialist cannot be too active. This must not be understood to mean, however, that the socialist should not enter the ranks of party; quite the contrary: let him seize every opportunity to use party organization as a legitimate instrument for the carrying into effect of those plans which deliberation and discussion have shown to be wise and just. In particular is the socialist workman to take an active part in those coöperative associations having as their object methods of production and of consumption intended to better his condition relative to these two processes. At one time, and for a very good reason, the socialist was strenuously opposed to all such organizations; but the reason for that attitude no longer exists; associations for coöperative production and consumption are no longer used by the enemies of socialism as a means of making the socialist content with a miserable lot which would otherwise be unbearable; the Belgian socialists have set the French socialists a good example in this respect, and one which we cannot afford to allow to go unheeded. In any case a well-fed socialist is of more value than a famished one.

If socialism emerges from the present crisis with its sphere of activity limited to the reiteration of a few economic and political demands, it will have taken a backward step from which it will take long years to recover. But if there results a clearer recognition of the fact that socialism aims at nothing less than the complete emancipation of the whole man from every form of oppression and a stronger determination to use all means that promise to further this aim, then once more is socialism to be congratulated upon its ability to adapt itself to the varying changes of social life without forgetting its mission and without failing to use every opportunity for the discharge of that mission. — EUGÈNE FOURNIÈRE, "La crise de croissance du socialisme français," in *La Revue socialiste*, October, 1899.

Youthful Criminality and Methods of its Control. — An interesting side-light is thrown upon the ever-recurring question proposed by the French Academy of Dijon, "Has the progress of science and art tended to improve our social customs?" by the apparent fact that throughout the whole civilized world of our day criminality in youth shows a marked tendency to increase. Statistics are today more often questioned and examined than ever before as to their validity, and yet nowhere do we hear of a decreasing tendency in youthful criminality in any of the great states of the world, and seldom of a stationary condition of affairs. Of course, the number of kinds of crimes, along with our sense of what constitutes a crime, steadily increases, and the machinery for gathering data on the subject constantly becomes more effective; and yet, taking these things into account, it seems pretty evident that the above statement of the extent of youthful criminality is measurably true. For instance, in Germany, according to the Royal Statistical Office at Berlin, the number of youths brought up for trial annually between the years 1882 and 1897 increased from about 10½ per cent. to 19½ per cent. — altogether an increase of 82 per cent., according to one authority. The number of second offenses has increased from a little more than one-seventh of all youths punished in 1889 to nearly one-fifth in 1896. In Holland the number of criminal youths seems to have increased between 1881 and 1897 one-fourth, while that of adult criminals increased one-ninth, giving in 1897 twice as many youthful as adult criminals.

The causes of this youthful criminality may be considered from the two stand-points: inner and outer, or psychological and sociological. Under the former head may be considered the hereditary tendencies, and those other organic personal traits, to discuss which would be beside the mark here. Some of the chief sociological causes of criminality, however, we may note, appear from the following considerations:

1. That in the most densely populated districts youthful crimes are proportionately greater than elsewhere; and that the strong tendency of the modern industrial movement to concentrate population abnormally in certain industrial centers has augmented the evil.
2. The great city exerts a strong disintegrating influence on the family, necessarily tending to vicious early experiences in childhood and youth.

3. The great city (virtually the product of the last half-century) also exerts many directly inciting impulses to evil in the youth needing especially strong counter-incitements to virtue.

4. The intense, sometimes unscrupulous, and generally narrow commercial spirit of the age, which makes wealth so universally the chief standard of respectability, is causing many youths to fall before the temptation to dishonesty.

5. The church, some time a most powerful helper to youthful virtue among all classes, is losing its influence among those cowed and hard-driven classes which need its help most.

The methods of prevention and reform of youthful criminals have heretofore been very poor and inadequate, especially with respect to the custom of locking up young offenders with hardened criminals, and then setting them adrift again upon a harsh and disdainful world after such a schooling in vice. The remedies must lie (1) in the movement, already encouraging in some parts, to strengthen the family life physically and morally by improved housing, and cultural and religious advantages; (2) in reducing the congestion of the great cities; and (3) especially in improved methods of systematic education, such, for instance, as are being rapidly advanced in parts of England and the United States through reform schools, truant schools, and industrial schools.—WILHELM REIN, "Jugendlichen Verbrechen und seine Bekämpfung," in *Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft*, January, 1900.

Advantages of Proportional Representation.—Among the objections which have been raised against proportional representation are: (1) that it works toward the disintegration of parties, and the formation of a new kind of political grouping; (2) that it increases electoral dissensions, and does not conserve the political spirit; (3) that it seeks the formation of governmental majorities, and does not perpetuate the domination of the party in power. These objections are evidently contradictory and inconsistent enough to refute themselves. Moreover, the evils which are thus enumerated are not peculiar to any particular mode of representation, but are an inevitable consequence of any representative method; the question is whether proportional representation would increase or whether it would diminish those evils.

An important fact to be considered in deciding this question is that the present tendency of the political parties is to develop on exclusively economic issues, and to make of politics a war between hostile industrial classes; thus giving an exaggerated and undue representation of but a part of the interests of the whole social life. One of our most important duties at this point in the development of modern democratic institutions is to protect democracy against itself, and to favor all those forms of government which promise to guarantee the rights and interests of the minority. Proportional representation, we believe, offers an effective check to the despotism of mere numbers.

Proportional representation, however, is not to be offered as a political panacea, for there is no panacea in politics any more than in medicine; but there are certain definite and considerable advantages of the system which may be enumerated as follows:

It will make more truly efficient the machinery of parliamentary government, by assuring to each group having a certain number of voters a political power in proportion to the numbers and influence of its constituency, and by doing away with the illusory method of representation at present in vogue, which often renders vain the commands and wishes of the majority, as well as of the minority. It would not at once introduce an idyllic social order, but it would certainly introduce an element of quiet and unostentatious honesty. It would permit the parties to be represented by their best candidates, and the candidates to conduct themselves with greater freedom. It would relieve the political struggle of the appearance—and largely the reality—of a mere game played for the sake of the spoils. It would guarantee the rights of the majority against any triumph of a minority favored by election frauds. It would give more certainty in the possession of seats; and while it would possibly cause frequent redistributions of parties in the assemblies, such redistributions would be in accord with the real movements of public opinion. If it would multiply the number of political groups, it would also weaken the merely partisan spirit, and tend to make the methods of business predominate in politics over the methods of war; thus

making for a broader spirit of peace, justice, and liberty.—M. LE COMTE GORLET D'ALVIELLA, "La représentation proportionnelle et le régime parlementaire," in *Revue des deux Mondes*, January 1, 1900.

The Group Spirit.—Several varieties or different manifestations of the group spirit may be distinguished as follows: (1) *the mob spirit* (a very distinct type); (2) *the family spirit*, which takes the form of the clan spirit in case of war; (3) *the professional spirit*, or *esprit de corps* in its proper sense, such as the sacerdotal, the academic, the military, the judiciary, the mercantile spirit, etc.; (4) *the party spirit*, which, through the publicity of the press, tends to become *public spirit*; (5) *the (religious) sectarian spirit*; (6) *the national spirit* or patriotism; and (7) *the supranational spirit*, or spirit of the civilization, frequently taking its name from the dominating religion, such as the Christian, the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, etc.

The question of the socio-psychological nature of these varieties of the group spirit, and of the rôle which they play in the formation and development of societies, is the central question in sociology. *Esprit de corps*, in its general sense as group spirit, is thus what Professor Giddings has tried to express by his somewhat misconceived principle, *consciousness of kind*.

In mobs or crowds the group spirit manifests itself as an intense collective pride, a very sensitive self-love common to all the members, and a mutual sympathy which feels the interest of each to be the interest of all. The formation of such a spirit may be clearly seen, for instance, in temporary congresses.

But the true bond between the members of a group is their conformity to a traditional type. This conformity expresses itself chiefly in *manner* and in *dress*. Through the propensity to imitate innovations, on the one hand, and traditional forms, on the other, we get the two general kinds of groups, the transient and the permanent, giving rise to the two corresponding general types of group spirit, or *esprit de corps*.

The group spirit has everywhere two important aspects, viz., the harsh external aspect presented to the stranger and the dissenter, and the gentle, internal aspect of reciprocal devotion among the members of the group. The one leads to violence and intolerance, especially in the party spirit, the mob spirit, and the sectarian spirit; the other to tenderness, consideration, and mutual just dealing, as especially in the family spirit. The latter, indeed, is the great force working to soften and broaden all types of the group spirit.

In all social groups which have a complete history we find three phases of development marked by corresponding transformations in manners and dress.

I. *The period or phase of formation* of the group spirit is characterized by the development of (1) a distinct group ceremonial; (2) a distinct uniform or costume; and (3), in case the harsh aspect of the group spirit predominates, by the use of the boycott. A strong intensive spirit is thus produced.

II. *The phase of dissemination* follows. The severe boycott of trade union, church, nation, or civilization—*e. g.*, strikes, excommunications, closed ports, etc.—gradually yields, through the increase of commerce, communication, and mutual acquaintance, to arbitrations, religious toleration, and "open-door" policies.

A similar transformation takes place in the distinctive group costumes and ceremonies: *e. g.*, from the varied national costumes and manners of the Middle Ages to the common European customs of daily dress and manners in our own time; from the peculiar costumes and privileges of the mediæval artisan, servant, and noble, to the mere badge or mannerism that marks their descendants today. The principle of this transformation is that, as the commercial and social isolation and estrangement of groups, necessitating sharp signs of distinction, decrease, the dress or ceremony ceases to be directly useful, and becomes symbolic of a traditional group spirit. The transformation takes place in two ways: (1) the number of occasions for using the distinctive dress or ceremony diminishes, and (2) their elaborateness is reduced, often to a fragment—a ribbon or pin.

III. The third phase of the development succeeds in *the reintegration of the group spirit*, by its broader adaptation to far-reaching social purposes.—G. TARDE, "L'esprit de groupe," in *Archives d'Anthropologie criminelle*, January 15, 1900.

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Abbreviations. See at end of Bibliography.

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A.	Arena.	JHS.	Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
AA.	American Anthropologist.	JPE.	Journal of Political Economy.
AAC.	Archives d'anthropologie criminelle.	JNS.	Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik.
AAE.	Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia.	JRS.	Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
AAn.	American Antiquarian.	LC.	Literarisches Centralblatt.
AAP.	Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.	LG.	Labour Gazette.
AC.	L'Association catholique.	LoQR.	London Quarterly Review.
ACQ.	American Catholic Quarterly Review.	LQR.	Law Quarterly Review.
AGP.	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.	MHM.	Mansfield House Magazine.
AHR.	American Historical Review.	MIM.	Monatsschrift für innere Mission.
ALS.	Annales de l'Institut des sciences sociales.	MA.	Municipal Affairs.
AJP.	American Journal of Psychology.	NA.	Nuova antologia.
AJS.	American Journal of Sociology.	NAR.	North American Review.
AJT.	American Journal of Theology.	NC.	Nineteenth Century.
ALR.	American Law Register.	NS.	Natural Science.
ALRv.	American Law Review.	NW.	New World.
AMP.	Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Séances.	NZ.	Neue Zeit.
AOR.	Archiv für öffentliches Recht.	PhR.	Philosophical Review.
ASA.	American Statistical Association, Publications.	PSM.	Popular Science Monthly.
ASAr.	Allgemeine statistisches Archiv.	PSQ.	Political Science Quarterly.
ASG.	Archiv für sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.	P-R.	Psychological Review.
ASP.	Annales des sciences politiques.	QJE.	Quarterly Journal of Economics.
ASPh.	Archiv für systematische Philosophie.	QR.	Quarterly Review.
BDL.	Bulletin of the Department of Labor.	RBP.	Rivista beneficenza publica.
BG.	Blätter für Gefängniskunde.	RCS.	Revue de christianisme sociale.
BML.	Banker's Magazine, London.	RDC.	Rivista di discipline carcerarie.
BMN.	Banker's Magazine, New York.	RDI.	Revue de droit internationale.
BOT.	Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.	RDM.	Revue des deux mondes.
BS.	Bibliotheca Sacra.	REA.	Revue mensuelle de l'Ecole d'anthropologie de Paris.
BSt.	Bulletin de statistique et de législation comparée.	ReS.	Reforme sociale.
BUI.	Bulletin de l'Union internationale de droit pénale.	ReS.	Revue socialiste.
C.	Cosmopolis.	RH.	Revue historique.
ChOR.	Charity Organisation Review.	RHD.	Revue d'histoire diplomatique.
ChR.	Charities Review.	RIF.	Rivista italiana di filosofia.
CoR.	Contemporary Review.	RIS.	Revue internationale de sociologie.
DL.	Deutsche Literaturzeitung.	RIS.	Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali.
DR.	Deutsche Revue.	RM.	Revue métaphysique et de morale.
DRu.	Deutsche Rundschau.	RP.	Revue philanthropique.
DZG.	Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.	RPe.	Revue pénitentiaire.
EcJ.	Economic Journal.	RPh.	Revue philosophique.
EcR.	Economic Review.	RPP.	Revue politique et parlementaire.
EdR.	Educational Review.	RRL.	Review of Reviews, London.
EHR.	English Historical Review.	RKN.	Review of Reviews, New York.
EM.	Engineering Magazine.	RSC.	Revue sociale catholique.
F.	Forum.	RSI.	Revisita storica italiana.
FR.	Fortnightly Review.	RT.	Revue du travail.
GEc.	Giornale degli economisti.	S.	Sanitarian.
GM.	Gunter's Magazine.	SR.	School Review.
HLR.	Harvard Law Review.	SS.	Science sociale.
HN.	Humanité nouvelle.	VWP.	Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
HR.	Hygienische Rundschau.	YR.	Yale Review.
HZ.	Historische Zeitschrift.	ZE.	Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
IAE.	Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.	ZGS.	Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaften.
IJE.	International Journal of Ethics.	ZPK.	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
JAI.	Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.	ZPO.	Zeitschrift für das Privat- und öffentliche Recht.
JCB.	Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association.	ZPP.	Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
JEc.	Journal des économistes.	ZS.	Zeitschrift für Socialwissenschaft.
JFI.	Journal of the Franklin Institute.	ZVR.	Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
JGV.	Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft.	ZVS.	Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.

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
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